Celsus

Hi all,

Thanks for all the responses, they have proven much food for thought. It's also going to take me forever to get round to responding to everyone (however inadequately) and I really do want to address as many views as possible, so I'm going on a first come, first served basis from here on in...
Yes, it is not necessary that one hold an anti-realist position in order to come to an agnostic decision on the matter. NT studies are good as an extreme case because the source texts are being forever deconstructed by opponents of their views. Backtracking a little, the question is: where do we draw the line on whether something is essentially historical or otherwise? I remember confounding myself when I tried to argue for the reliability of Herodotus and found absolutely no good scientific or methodological reasons for it.
Yes, irony is indeed striking at times. Wasn't it Aristotle himself, father of Logical Errors 101 who frequently indulged in the genetic fallacy?

Your point on Kuhn is interesting, and possibly applicable in a slightly different angle as well: I haven't read Kuhn, but my understanding of him is also that he took something of a panglossian approach to scientific theory in that it needed to be shielded from relentless criticism in order to later thrive. Although one can say that Lynn Margulis should be enough to question that idea, Laudan takes great exception to Feyerabend's technique of exceptions to disprove rules (so let's leave it for now...). So does this panglossianism apply to NT studies as well? I'm just throwing out ideas since I've completely lost track of my supposed hypothetical position, my pre-thread position, and my current position, so take it for what it's worth...
Thanks for the recommendation again. It sounds interesting, but I won't have the time for that until at least next year.
Is Acts itself reliable? What are its origins (aren't they fairly obscure?)? What about Hegesippus and later writers?

History is intertwined with narrative, and the Christian narrative is intertwined with myth, and the myth is tangled with the cultural milieu of its time. Is it possible to unravel all those things, this far removed in history? If so, what remains?
These sorts of observations make this entire thread worthwhile!

Joel

Celsus

Deductively, all it shows is that the author of the Epistula Apostolorum believed that people he considered "Christians" of the second century believed in the resurrection of Jesus. Ignoring epistemological questions generally earns one the title "naive realist" but having been prone to the label myself, I will refrain, and instead ask you: So what assumptions and presuppositions are you relying on to reach your QED?
The philosophy of Biblical studies.
I've given the definition twice. Historical realists must believe that we can accurately describe events or social processes of the past. What would you like me to explain/expand upon?

Joel

Hugo Holbling

It isn't my position, Vork; the winking smilie may have been a tip in this regard. Nevertheless, i'll continue on this line for Joel's benefit.

My point was of course that improving our methodology to the nth degree would have little effect on what remains the impossibility in principle of separating the historical fact from the text and its associated influences. A scientific experiment does not appear to depend on the political motivations of its author, whereas a writer's hermeneutic colours a historical narrative. In attempting to counter this methodologically the historian cannot appeal to comparison with reality in the way a scientific realist can, so his methodology remains comparative. I may of course be mistaken (and i must consider it quite likely) but that is why i asked the question at the end of my last post.

Interestingly enough, Fuller makes this bold assertion in his Social Epistemology:

Devitt and Niiniluoto (perhaps the most sophisticated scientific realists) find no need to rely on history at all, of course; nor does van Fraassen. Fuller seems to misunderstand the employment of historical examples to make methodological points; it is hard to see how these can turn on whether or not the history describes how things really happened.

In any case, this raises the important point which likely distills what Joel was aiming at: is history (or Biblical criticism for that matter) as epistemologically sound as any other empirical inquiry? Is the question meaningful?

Peter Kirby

I don't agree that is all that is shown, but even so, wouldn't that be knowledge about history, that the author believed a certain thing?

The text was composed in the second century because it places the end of the world at 120 years past Pentecost. The author believed in the resurrection of Jesus, as seen by the direct narration of Easter events and the use of the pre-ascension revelation discourse genre.

Usually it is "theology" rather than philosophy, which is why I am not up on it. As carried out by folks like R. L. Fox or Michael Grant, though, biblical studies is just an application of history to particular sources. So what we should be looking for is philosophy of history, not particularly of biblical studies.

"Accurately" or "reliably"?

best,
Peter Kirby

NOGO

For once I have to agree with Bede ... in part.

In physics and chemistry and other so-called "pure" sciences we can control all the vairables and repeat the experiments to our heart's content. In other sciences, like geology, we cannot.

Methodology is part of science; like it or not.
And any science is as good as its methodology.

I wish I could say the same for history.

A realist position in history is a must but we must also recognize that humans are insecure and frighten creatures who love myths in which they can take refuge. That is part of reality too.

kenaz

No it is not an insidious attempt to convert a realist into an antirealist

What I meant is that is the realist should extend his search to the realm of subjugated knowledges, instead of dealing with only empircal knowledges that are already part of a dominant historical discourse. A realist can then use the excavated subjugated knowledges to carry out a critique on the existing unitary historical narrative. The emphasis is verifiability of existing historical contents, an attack on the exteriority of dominant discourse in order to displace or disprove it. It is still very much a realist position I think. For an antirealist, the excavation of subjugated knowledges will be contexualised within the dominant discourse through genealogy, in order to analyse the power relations and discover possibilities for inversion. In other words, it is more concerned with the interiority of the unitary historical narrative, and seeks to rupture it from within, rather than a realist's without.

kenaz

I see your point, and agree that it is possible, in instances where historical and scientific discourses are disparate and do not tread into each other's terrain.
However, what happens when historical contents are found to be subjugated by scientific discourse? What does a person who holds antirealist views on history and realist position on science do then? Does he privilege the scientific realist position and go "oh well, I guess it's ok if certain historical knowledges gets swept under the carpet by science", or should he insist on the antirealist historical contexualisation of subjugated knowledges, thus throwing his realist view of science in doubt?
I am really curious, because I don't want to simply concede they are irreconcilable, period. But I can't seem to think of a way in which they can be integrated in such an instance.

godfry n. glad

kenaz: Please explain "subjugated knowledges".

godfry

CJD

I'm going to translate this in sociological terms, to see if I understand you correctly, kenaz. "Subjugated knowledges" are those bits of knowledge that are taken for granted. That is, they are ideas that lay beneath the surfaces of a given culture's institutions (e.g., Gehlen's "tip of the iceberg" analogy). As such, both "subjugated knowledges" and "dominant historical discourses" are actually empirically verifiable if and only if one takes a realist view of history.

Yes, typical sociology of knowledge methodology.

Only in the sense that it relativizes everything. What is left, then, is for the one doing the verifying to show how one critique is plausible over against another.

Method cannot be either/or like this. It must take account of the dialectic or suffer from the possibility of becoming the object of its own criticism

Wondering if I understood you,

CJD

Vorkosigan

In any case, I do not see why we should privilege subjugated knowledges over other kinds. They are, after all, just as much constructions as the dominant knowledge is.

Whether I excavate subjugated knowledges or not, the question of the relationship between realism and methodology is not addressed. I prefer nuts-and-bolts analysis of the world out there, rather than labels that create categories that do not have any useful meaning (like "subjugated knowledge").

Yesterday three American soldiers were killed in Iraq. Can we take an anti-realist position with regard to that assertion?

Vorkosigan