Wyrdsmyth

Yes, but let's also consider the possibility of Sasquatch, O'Leary the leprechaun, and Ariel the Wind sprite. Let's also consider the possibility that there are such things as unicorns, manticores and medusae who can turn you to stone with a glare. At what point do we evaluate these possibilities as 'not very likely, so I will provisionally consider them to be fiction'? Since they all lack what most reasonable people would consider to be 'adequate evidence'? Sure, there are anecdotal stories of encounters with such, just as holy scriptures are written anecdotes of experiences with gods or angels. But why should we consider any of these to be 'adequate evidence'? Do you see where I'm going with this? The theists are left in the same bind as the leprechaunists and the believers of Bigfoot. If their 'evidence' is just anecdotal experiences, which we skeptics never can experience for ourselves, first-hand, then why should they be taken seriously? Because of arcane metaphysical arguments, and that's it?

Please elaborate on how you get from 'Why something instead of nothing' to 'the god of my particular religion is the one that exists.' We're just on the edge of our seats.

Liquidrage

"They have the conviction that there is no God so infixed in their minds, that any plausible evidence for a God MUST be fallible by default"

then later...

"I was trying to say that most atheists here are not open to the possible existence of God, but are firmly against the notion. Apparently they believe that it is like saying 5=4. I believe that even the sternest of atheists should concede and say that there is a possibility of a creator, just like there is a possibility of invisible unicorns floating around"

This is *still* an absurd stereotype.
You seem to have a preconcieved notion that you are *still* clinging too. It is my experience from 27 years of living, 5 years on #Atheism and a few months on these boards that many (I would use "a majority" for I believe it to be true but I have no evidence to support that claim) do not deny the possibility of the existance of a creator.


"I Agree to some extent. I believe that the first step is to clear your mind of any notion of God, and just consider a creator. Is there any evidence against the such? I think that the first step is to consider the possibility that there is a God. Or maybe I'm wrong."

There is no evidence for *it*. You are starting by "clear your mind of any notion of God, and just consider a creator".
This is a presupposition. I'm sure it would work to clearly show someone the truth that they wanted to see.

I tend to adhere to the cosmological (kalam) arguement. Why something instead of nothing?"

This would logically lead to a belief that there is something instead of nothing and that the cause of the something is at the present unknown.

*/
Basically you are arguing that if you open yourself up to belief that you will find something to believe in.
I doubt worded as I did that many would argue. Opening yourself up to belief is what leads to Jews and Christians and Hindus and Buddhists (and many more) all knowing and feeling that they are 100% right.
The ability of the human mind to convince it self that it is recieving stimulation from an outside source is astounding. After all, without our ability to talk to ourselves we wouldn't be human.

geoff

Wyrdsmyth:

Re: your original posted question, I think it is helpful to the discussion to distinguish between two of the major view points that seem to be held by forum participants: supernaturalism (SN, hereafter) and metaphysical naturalism (MN). In what follows I will sketch what I think would be the rough type or kind of argument or arguments that would establish the plausibility of SN by way of showing, first, that SN is rational and that, second, the alternative MN is irrational.

Please keep in mind that what follows is not the set of arguments itself but merely a sketch of what those arguments could look like(I hope to flesh out number "2" in the "Philosophy" forum soon.)

1. To establish the rationality of SN, one would need to show that a person S is within her epistemic rights to believe the proposition SN and that sufficient evidence exists that makes belief in SN more plausible than the alternative (which is, in this case, MN).

2. To show that MN is irrational, one would need to show the belief MN entails epistemic and metaphysical challenges to such a degree so as to make MN implausible.

Thus, in demonstrating both (1) and (2) jointly, one would have a proof for the greater plausibility of SN over against MN.

[ May 22, 2002: Message edited by: geoff ]

[ May 22, 2002: Message edited by: geoff ]</p>

free12thinker

We have argued over the term 'absolute' (with WJ under a different topic), when referring to a position of theism or atheism. I don't know of any ahteists who think their views are absolute, reason and logic would make nothing absolute. Just as you noted, invisible floating unicorn's could very well exist. I think that the impression you get of atheists, in reference to their 'level of believability' is wrong, but I will say that the likelihood of a god is equal to that of an invisible floating unicorn, since neither of them, in theory or actuality, has ever surfaced beyond stories or myths.

Everything in life (outside of religion for some) is put on a scale of sorts, based on already existing information. In this, the likelihood and plausibility of things will be weighed on information in similiar fields of information. There is nothing by which to compare the theory of god with, in substance or otherwise since we have no evidence of a phenomena, or spirit or ghost, in any capacity whatsoever.

[ May 22, 2002: Message edited by: free12thinker ]</p>

Wyrdsmyth

Sure, go for it. Sounds a bit high-minded, which is tune with many of the theistic epistemologists who have been so busily trying make faith 'respectable' in intellectual circles over the past few decades.

But I think the key phrase you mention is "sufficient evidence exists that makes belief in SN more plausible than the alternative." That's really the point of this thread. We already have a lot of arguments in a vein similar to what you're sketching out above. And what it all boils down to, when you strip away a lot of the epistemelogical terminology, is... okay, where is the evidence? Let's see it. If you're going to argue that IF there is sufficient evidence for believing in the supernatural THEN it's more plausible than the alternative, that's fine. But I can't ever seem to get past that big IF.

The real question is, IS there sufficient evidence for believing in the supernatural. This is what my whole OP is about. There are proponents of religion running about, preaching and saying they are telling us God's word, and it's all based on 'self-affirming revelation' and so on... But that's all we ever seem to get. We get guys talking about God, but we don't actually get the God. We get people making arguments about sufficient evidence for the supernatural, but we never get the supernatural.

Where's that burning bush? That's what I want to know.

geoff

Taking your last question first, the burning bush phenomenon was attested to by reliable witnesses and recorded in a book for public scrutiny. If you try to defeat that notion by:

(1) discrediting the witnesses for being "pre-scientific", having incorrigible biases, or having an irresolvable agenda, then I would respond by saying your defeater is no defeater at all but an ad hominem. (I could just as easily turn it around and say that you are the one with the incorrigible bias and irresolvable agenda. You see, such a maneuver doesn't prove anything at all. We'd be committing the genetic fallacy. As far as labeling these witnesses as "pre-scientific" in an attempt to discredit them, let me remind you that testimony is a reliable means of acquiring knowledge. That's as true today as it was 2,000 years ago. Just think of all the things you take to be true that you were told were true and haven't had the chance -- and probably never will -- to prove.

(2) claiming that the phenomenon can be explained naturalistically, then I would respond, "Why?" Why should we take a people-group's regular, almost habitual experience of interacting with God (extending the burning bush experience to the regular interactions Israel had with God), events which they believed to be true (they didn't think they were being deceived, they weren't trying to pull a "power game" on their neighbors, etc.), and reduce these to naturalistic explanations? Israel's background beliefs were grounded in, among countless other things, theistic encounters; encounters that occurred at different times and in different ways (remember, too, not all of Israel believed. Doubters of the supernatural were in their midst then as is the case now).

If you want to take this debate to the arena of biblical criticism, then fine. Move it there. But if you are going to a priori reject the possibility of a reliable testimony bearing witness to supernatural events, formed by people who took them to be supernatural, then you are the one who needs to check your bias. Again, there is no a priori reason for rejecting their testimony. (Leising's ditch and Hume's gap need not apply).

As far as additional evidence for theism, look for my new thread in the "philosophy" forum on why naturalism cannot account for abstract entities. That's the first half of the argument. The second is to establish that theism alone can explain the existence of abstract objects. (I can think of about 15 additional good, sound arguments that defeat naturalism and establish theism. But, for the sake of order, let's look at them one at at time. ; )

Geoff

P.S. I do enjoy this thread. I'm glad you initiated it!

[ May 23, 2002: Message edited by: geoff ]</p>

Wyrdsmyth

What is your criteria for determining that they are 'reliable'? Seriously.

It's not about whether they were pre-scientific or when they lived. If a couple of people down in a remote part of Arizona claimed that a burning bush spoke to them in God's voice today, I would be no less skeptical of them than I am of the ancient Hebrews. What about you? The fact is, testimony BY ITSELF is not a reliable means of acquiring knowledge. If I told you "My cousin Earl saw an alien once," that isn't necessarily good evidence for aliens, is it? You want more than that, don't you, in order to believe? That's what I'm getting at. I want more than anecdotes.

</strong>

Because the simplest and most plausible answer is naturalistic -- i.e., that the supernatural encounters were all "made-up," they were fictions. Isn't that what you believe about the Oracles of Delphi, the Homeric rhapsodes, Mohammed's visions, Joseph Smith talking to angels? My question to you is: Why extend special credibility to a certain tribe of ancient people in the Near East?

</strong>

Sure there is. It sounds made-up. That is the most likely explanation. Now, that may not seem like a very valid criterion to you, but I think it is. When we evaluate testimony, we compare it to what we already believe about how the world works. Note the distinction however... I am not a priori ruling out the POSSIBILITY of the supernatural; but, rather, I am saying the testimony of FANTASTIC things should be held to a much more rigorous standard than testimony about mundane things. I'm not just talking about the supernatural, either, but even natural things that are what most of would call FANTASTIC. If Cousin Earl tells me he saw a meteor shower last night, I may provisionally believe him. But if Cousin Earl tells me he saw an alien last night, I will provisionally not believe him, unless he has something like a dead alien corpse lying in the bed of his pickup, to BACK HIS FANTASTIC STORY UP. We'll call this the Cousin Earl Proviso to Epistemology. How does that sound?

***

"You believe me, now?" Cousin Earl said, lifting the tarp with the nuzzle of his shotgun, so that I could see the battered body of the little gray-skinned alien underneath.

"Yeah... Okay, I'm sorry I didn't believe you at first, Earl."

</strong>

Fifteen?!? Well, buddy, you should only need one. But I think you have your work cut out for you. Good luck.

So am I! It's always a pleasure to have an intelligent theist stick around for some discussion, as opposed to the hit-and-run trolls or the incoherent loonies.

[ May 28, 2002: Message edited by: Wyrdsmyth ]</p>

sbaii

I don't understand why the concern over the existence of a god. Very few nations use the laws mentioned in the Bible as dictated supposedly by Yahweh. The ones that do are generally considered in humane. So the Old Testament offers no practical rules for life today. The New Testament offers utter pacifism which if the "Christian" nations had followed would have caused their demise. We learn proper behavior from our families and the communities where we grow up. Catholicism gives criminals a game to play: Today I sin, tomorrow I confess, etc. The more austere Protestant religions offer mainly guilt and fear of hell. The more liberal Protestant churches offer a place to socialize and feel better about death. The Eastern religions offer nonliving as the best model for life, asceticism or a monastic life of meditation.

Most people fear death. Religion is supposed to
allay that fear, but most western religions put a layer of eternal justice on top of that so their followers can enjoy the prospect of someone burning for eternity. No one questions the justice of an eternal punishment; it is just the other side of the coin to them.

Religion and logic are not going to answer how the universe or matter came into existence. Only science can do that. We have so many problems right here and now to deal with that question seems the most academic of all.

In the end, most if not all religions are more emotion-driven than intellectual. Ministers and priests are driven by a need for power no matter how self-abnegating they may appear. They play to their well-heeled constituents to keep their churches in operation. And people are still despoiling the earth and driving themselves crazy acquiring more materialistic stuff. The answer lies in teaching people how to think rationally and recognize the emotional problems that obstruct rationality.

sbaii

"...these people that DO know that God exists are just good people that would rather have a profession that would help spread their view on life, which is obviously true and obviously benefical (according to them). "

But their views on life and how to live it, often have at best silly rules, like kosher rules and required rituals, or very prejudiced assumptions about nonbelievers (they are going to hell), or
models or nonlife like fasting and ascetism or constant meditation.And I'm talking about the good ones.

"With all do respect, atheists (as far as I know) are a VERY bias bunch. They have the conviction that there is no God so infixed in their minds, that any plausible evidence for a God MUST be fallible by default."

What plausible evidence do you offer? The default answer to existence? The god lurking among our knowledge gaps? The more science reveals to us, the farther god recedes from our daily lives. Most educated people do not blame a god/spirit for disease or natural disasters. God is relegated to before the Big Bang . Of course, if you want to you can claim your own "miracles", but the fact remains, the gods ain't what they used to be and it drives the fundies crazy.

"... if you are certain that you have the only way to true salvation, and of course your way is obvious and coherant, it may make sense for you to dislodge other similar belief systems to further help others."

Ever hear of the Inquisition? Now they knew how to deal with skeptics.

"Why would you even want to talk to God, or walk on water, via the power of God?"

Why do people want to fly? or climb mountains? or explore terra incognita? or travel in space?
You don't sound very adventurous for a fifteen year old.

" as I have said... SATAN WANTS TO EAT YOUR SOUL!"

Satan was a middle eastern construct. Read Joseph Campbell's books.

You believe in god because you don't want to contemplate your own nonexistence. That's perfectly understandable. But what's not is the belief in all the trappings of religion that usually accompanies belief in god. Would you believe in a god without a belief in heaven?
~your friendly neighborhood atheist

geoff

Wyrdsmyth wrote:

"What is your criteria for determining that they are 'reliable'? Seriously."

My reply:

I will answer this question with two distinct lines of thought which, I think, need to go together in order to achieve credibility. The first line deals directly with the question of whether the author (or authors) of Genesis are reliable or dependable. I will take it that Moses is responsible (or chiefly responsible) for writing Genesis. (I don't have the space or time to defend this assertion. I'll only say that critical and sympathetic scholarship have regularly affirmed Mosaic authorship up until modern biblical criticism challenged this traditional understanding over the last 150 or so years. But maintaining Mosaic authorship isn't entirely critical to my argument. We could more modestly assume that an Israelite with pro-monotheistic sympathies authored it.)

The first dilemma we run into in determining the historical reliability of a text is determining what criteria ought to be used. Space is way too limited to provide an exhaustive analysis and explanation here, but first, such a determination is not a hard science, but something akin to a legal proceeding in a courtroom. Thus, I think that any criteria worth their weight would include both internal textual evidence and external evidence. The internal evidence consists of, at least, the author's intent in recording the events he witnessed. Both critical and sympathetic scholarship have shown that at least one major purpose for the writing of Genesis is to show that the Jews should not identify God with the gods of the surrounding cultures (i.e., Yahweh is not polytheistic and intemperate, among other things, like the Canaanite gods). Genesis, then, is primarily a book of encouragement to the Israelites, an effort to remind them that their God is not limited by the fallabilities of, primarily, the Canaanite gods. Also, the author doesn't seem to be trying to "pull a fast one" or write a mythology. He is writing what he takes to be genuine history. The external evidence consists of archeological, extra-biblical and other evidence that would buttress the idea that Genesis belongs to the historical genre, not mythology. Of course, no one (I don't think) will be able to furnish a burned bush that hasn't been consumed. But a world-wide flood? Other writings from other non-Israelitish cultures attest to that event as a historical fact. And this doesn't seem like it's the result of shameless borrowing either: it seems that they are all attesting to the same event.

The other line of thought is perhaps the most important. I'll pose it in the form of a question: Why do theists and non-theists evaluate and judge the available data in widely divergent ways? Why does a theist look at the evidence and determine that God is the most reasonable explanation? Why does a non-theist look at the evidence and arrive at an antithetical explanation? I think it has much less to do with the evidence at hand and much more with the pre-theoretical commitments held to by adherents of each camp. In other words, we aren't coming to the evidence neutral but with fundamental interpretive commitments that cause us to view the evidence in certain ways. Practically speaking, then, a staunch non-theist will likely not be persuaded by my line of reasoning above. He will remain committed to his naturalistic explanation. But the argument might have more power for, e.g., a naturalist who has an inclination to interpret the evidence in a pro-supernaturalistic way. By the way, this is not a Van Tillian or presuppositional idea. The idea that we evaluate evidence according to pre-interpretive commitments is widely attested to by non-theists, too. For starters, see Michael Polanyi (cf. "Personal Knowledge") and Thomas Kuhn (cf. "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions").

Wyrdsmyth wrote:

"Because the simplest and most plausible answer is naturalistic -- i.e., that the supernatural encounters were all "made-up," they were fictions. Isn't that what you believe about the Oracles of Delphi, the Homeric rhapsodes, Mohammed's visions, Joseph Smith talking to angels? My question to you is: Why extend special credibility to a certain tribe of ancient people in the Near East?"

My reply:

One thought -- much of Homer's writings were taken by his contemporaries (no less by Homer himself) to be works of fiction or were at least later categorized as fictional by the Greeks. In the case of the writings of J. Smith and Mohammed, I would argue (if I had more space) that the Book of Mormon has no historical basis (e.g., for starters, where are the golden plates?) and the Quran is loaded with historical inaccuracies.

Wyrdsmyth wrote:

"Sure there is. It sounds made-up. That is the most likely explanation. Now, that not may not seem like a very valid criterion to you, but I think it is. When we evaluate testimony, we compare it to what we already believe about how the world works. Note the distinction however... I am not a priori ruling out the POSSIBILITY of the supernatural; but, rather, I am saying the testimony of FANTASTIC things should be held to a much more rigorous standard than testimony about mundane things. I'm not just talking about the supernatural, either, but even natural things that are what most of would call FANTASTIC. If Cousin Earl tells me he saw a meteor shower last night, I may provisionally believe him. But if Cousin Earl tells me he saw an alien last night, I will provisionally not believe him, unless he has something like a dead alien corpse lying in the bed of his pickup, to BACK HIS FANTASTIC STORY UP. We'll call this the Cousin Earl Proviso to Epistemology. How does that sound?"

My reply:

I strongly disagree that that which is putatively supernatural ("fantastic") requires more evidence. I would think just the opposite is be true. That which is putatively supernatural has the character of being unique, among other things. It is not that supernatural explanations lack supporting evidence (I happen to think there is plenty of evidence supporting theism), but that such evidence makes supernaturalistic explanations at least plausible if not more probable than naturalistic explanations. At this point we are, again, back to the place of one's pre-interpretive commitments. Believe it or not, I think that atheists can be rational in their belief that God does not exist. I believe this because I think it is epistemically permisible to evaluate the available data atheistically. I don't think the atheistic interpretation is true but i do think it can be rationally defended (for more on "epistemic permisiblity" see A. Plantinga's "Warrant" trilogy).

Wyrdsmyth wrote:

"Fifteen?!? Well, buddy, you should only need one. But I think you have your work cut out for you. Good luck."

My reply:

Again, one's pre-interpretive commitments will play a large part (a determinative part?) in whether one accepts the various premises of a pro-theistic argument and how strongly one accepts the premises, but I think I could outline about 15 arguments in which the premises are more plausible than their denial. A sneak preview: A few of the arguments deal with things that seem to be dependent upon an unlimited mind (abstract entities, intentionality, collections), one is an argument from physical constants to a supernatural necessary being, another argument deals with proper function and reliability (an epistemological argument) and yet another is a non-rational argument that seeks to defend the idea that love seems to be more than the sum of mere physical processes that drive one to reproduce but stems from a infinitely personal source. Again, I don't think any of these arguments will be logically coercive. But I do think they are sound and more plausible than their denials. And, again, I think one's approach to the arguments will largely determine the power they have to persuade. (Speaking personally, since participating in these forums I have a new respect for naturalism and the arguments for it. But I haven't been persuaded to change my fundamental commitment from theism to naturalism. Why is that? I think it has less to do with the power or coerciveness of the arguements and more to do with the plausibility and general appeal of theism. (The same, I would think, would apply to you and your commitment to naturalism).

[ May 28, 2002: Message edited by: geoff ]</p>