Jamie_L

Given the direction this thread has taken, it might play better in MF&P, where these kind of things are batted about all the time.

First: talking about things not lasting forever. This line of reason, taken to it's conclusion, argues that there's no point in doing anything. At all. Including getting up in the morning. Or eating.

Second: People value things, and they don't necessarily value them for any personal benefit they provide (though in many cases this is true). The volunteer who helps AIDS patients doesn't think: "Here are all my options: I can help AIDS patients. I can help animals at the local shelter. I can go out and party with my friends... Of these, not helping AIDS patients will cause me more guilt than any benefits I might get out of not helping AIDS patients. Therefore, I will choose to help AIDS patients."

What the volunteer (typically) thinks is: I want to help AIDS patients.

Likewise, if I see my child about to be run over by a car, I will not think: "I don't want to risk my life, but if I don't try to save my child, the guilt and grief will be too much for me, therefore I am going to leap in front of the car and attempt to save my child."

What I would actually think is: "I've got to save my child," and jump in front of the car in an attempt to save my child.

I used to play the game of trying to tie everything back to selfish motives, but it required a lot of mental gymnastics. I no longer think that's really the way things work. It's much simpler to just assume people can rationally value things regardless of whether they provide them any personal benefit. Things make a lot more sense that way.

Jamie

Infinity Lover

One thing I've always been reminded of during my upbringing, is that I'm not the only person on this planet, and that I'm no more entitled to my place in this world than anyone else. As good a basis for ethics as any if you ask me.

Philosoft

Off to MF&P...

Alonzo Fyfe

Somewhere around here I am publishing a series of "chapters" having to do with Ethics Without God

Relevant to this discussion, Part XII and Part XIII discuss specifically the theory of action known as BDI Theory (or belief-desire-intention theory).

keyser_soze

Do you follow some kind of skewed objectivism path? That's gotta be one of the funniest ways of viewing the world that I've seen lately. Don't stop, it's at least interesting.

BTW, on topic...I think it is our social drive system(get capriani in here so he can bitch at me about my theory...well, nash's theory anyway) that gives us reason to help others, secular or not. We secularists just ascribe it to our nature, while nutjobs ascribe it to some religion or another.

Alonzo Fyfe

Standard among whom?

Even if this 'instinct' exists, there is still a further question. What is it that makes this 'instinct' moral?

If morality depends on evolution, than any 'instinct' that would have evolved would have been moral by definition. Morality is nothing more than whatever set of instincts that one evolved with. If this includes (as in the case of lion) killing off all the stepchildren or (in the case of the praying mantis) killing and eating one's mate during sex, then so be it.

If, on the other hand, morality is something distinct from evolution, then the fact that a certain set of 'instincts' exist have nothng to do with their being ethical. Whatever we say about any instincts and how they evolved, we still have additional questions to answer about what makes them ethical.

Another problem that exists with this line of thinking is a logical problem identified by 18th Century Scottish Philosopher David Hume. Such arguments involve an inference that, at best, requires some explanation. The problem is with having premises that contain 'is' statements (factual statements about human evolution) and ending up with conclusions that are basically 'ought' statements (ethical statements).

Nature doesn't really care if we survive as a species (whatever that means . . . because one of the major elements of evolution is that some species do not continue, and that those that do continue change over time). Nature just throws different combinations out into the world. Some survive, some do not. There is no natural imperative to 'survive as a species' -- it is just something that happens from time to time.

Third, a statement that we have 'a natural instinct to preserve our instinct' is, at best, metaphorical. First, if there is an 'instinct' at all it is to replicate our own genes and those others who carry our genes. This is not the same as 'our species'. It promotes kin selection -- a preference for the well-being of more genetically connected members of the species over those who are genetically more separated.

We have a disposition to like the same things that those ancestors who successfully replicated their genes liked. This includes such things as a desire for sex, fondness for certain types of food, a general disposition to protect our children.

One of the elements of evolutionary success is diversity. If every being in a species is identical in every way, it is easy for all of them to fall victim to a common foe -- a virus, a change in climate. Genetic diversity means that while some may be lost, others may survive. We are not meant to be identical -- not physically, nor mentally.

In addition, these could also include genetic dispositions to racism and rape. Racism gives us a natural preference for those people who 'look most similar to us' and rape an option for males to replicate their genes without bothering with the consent of a mate. Linking evolution to ethics may yield the conclusion that these are 'good' things that -- like with religion -- we have come to incorrectly view as bad. Which, ultimately, provides an argument against linking evolution and ethics.

Clearly, evolution also gave us a capacity to learn sentiments -- through interaction with the environment. The same plasticity of the brain that gives us the capacity to acquire new and different beliefs (some true, some false), also is responsible for our capacity to acquire desires (some good, some bad). Our desires are not genetically locked. Which means, just as it is reasonable to ask what beliefs we SHOULD have -- which are true, it is just as reasonable to ask what desires we SHOULD have -- which are good?

This plasticity is subject to exploitation. People have the capacity to manipulate the desire formation of others for their own benefit. (Note: I use the word 'manipulation' here in a value-neutral sense; simply to note that they are subject to change by outside forces for ends other than our own. After all, we the very issue under discussion is what makes a certain choice 'good' or 'gad' and making such a judgment here would be question-begging at best.) But, then, once we grow up, to the degree that we seek to manipulate the desires of others, we are doing so for the fulfillment of our own already-manipulated sentiments. And so on.

I share the observation that I see this particular view often. I disagree with the interpretation that this is thereby the 'standard view'. If it is, you have shown one of the problems with this view. But it is one of a very, very long list of problems.

Alonzo Fyfe

BDI theory says that Beliefs + Desires interact to form Intentions which, in a person with no spinal injuries or similar constraints, yield actions.

Beliefs and desires are propositional attitudes -- that is to say, they identify mental attitudes towards propositions.

A propositional attitude is the meaning of a sentence. The sentence "my car is red," and "that car is red" are two different sentences, but they could simply be two different ways of reporting the same proposition if "my car" and "that car" happen to point to the same car.

So, take any proposition P. (P = 'snow is white'; P = 'it is raining in Trenton'; P = 'God personally selected Bush to be the President of the United States'; P = 'Jenny will have sex with me tonight.') . . .

A "belief that P" is a mental attitude that the proposition P is true. Beliefs are motiationally neutral, they are nothing more than data statements about how one thinks the world is. Beliefs can be false.

A "desire that P" is a mental attitude that the proposition P is to be made, or to be caused to remain, true. Desires provide motivation. That is, the strength of the "desire that P" determines the degree to which an agent is motivated to make P become or remain true.

The set of propositions P that can serve as the object of either a belief or a desire is unlimited. A person can learn to believe almost anything. A person can also come to desire almost anything.

The only desires one ever acts to fulfill are one's own desires. This is because the word 'desire' describes a functional state of the brain, and the only brain hooked up to my muscles in the right way that its desires can cause those muscles to move is my brain. Everything that I do aims to generate or preserve as much truth in the set of propositions P that are the objects of my desires.

Yet, those desires can be categorized as either self-regarding or other-regarding. A person can have a desire that P = 'no child goes hungry' as easily as he can have a desire that P = 'I am happy'. In both cases, the desire motivates the agent to make P true.

Happiness is a chemical effect that arises when one desires that P and believes that P. One can obtain this effect even when P is false (as long as one believes that P is true). This desire to experience happiness is one of our desires, but it is clearly not the only desire. For several propositions P, a person with a desire that P would select P being true and believing it is false, over P being false and believing it is true. These examples show that the agent has a desire that P (a motivation to make P true) that is independent of happiness.

Yet, except in these unusual cases, most people act on at least two desires, a desire that P = 'no child suffers' (for example), and a second desire for Q = 'I am happy', where Q requires that P is true and the agent believes that P.

Thus, we have both the fact that individuals have other-regarding desires motivating their actions, and the illusion that they are really after nothing more than their own happiness.

Wiploc

Sounds like you are having trouble justifying morality as a form of hedonism.

The payoff here is that you saved other people's lives, not that you feel good doing it. That's the whole point. It doesn't get better if you add a pseudo-justification like, "God wanted me to." Personal sacrifice that benefits other people is a typical example of what people call moral. The point is not that it feels good. Calling it moral helps make it feel good (you can puff out your chest and say, "I'm moral!") but that still isn't the point.
crc

John Page

Spoken like a true masochist, wiploc! (Like the guy said, its whatever makes you feel good, even if that is a perversion to others).

Viti

I donated a kidney to a coworker even though there was some pain, discomfort, and inconvenience...I feel pretty damn good and happy when I see him healthy now...I feel like I made a real difference in this world