luvluv

Read a cute story the other day about a proffessor of ethics who has a curious method of dealing with moral determinist students.

He fails them. Whether they deserve it or not.

He then judges by their reaction whether or not they are truly moral determinists. After all, if they are right, he has no choice in failing them, so they can hardly complain. But if they do complain, then obviously they believe the professor did not HAVE to fail them.

I love it...

[ November 20, 2002: Message edited by: luvluv ]</p>

kingjames1

Reply to K

Wow...a full blooded determinist! You my friend are a rare species these days.

Two responses:

1) your determinism destroys any objective basis for social ethics -- I'm sure you're aware of this (e.g. crime and punishment type stuff). In other words, a social ethic must be a political fiction. No one can be held accountable for their actions if they are simply preprogrammed to so act. I suppose rehabilitative measures may be effective and prudent (re-programming their computer-brains ala Skinner). But retribution? Unjustified. Righteous indigination? Rationalized anger. No one can help what they do...the rapist, the murderer, child molester, etc. We shouldn't be angry at such people! It simply isn't rational if they are merely complex machines acting out their internal coding.

2) There is a difference between choosing between two courses of actions (cutting off my ear or not) and choosing to defy physical law or physiology (having it not hurt). Given sufficient reason (e.g. gangrene on the ear), I am capable of cutting off my ear. However, apart from the benefit of narcotics, I cannot will such amputation to be painless. There is a distinction here, even if you are a reductionistic determinist. One is clearly physiologically determined, the other is not clearly physiologically determined.

To simply assert that the distinction is illusory (that is, that human behavior is ultimately determined biologically) is to beg the question.

J.

[ November 21, 2002: Message edited by: kingjames1 ]</p>

K

luvluv:

That's a good story, but if it's true, that professor is an idiot. Just because his actions are determined by his inputs doesn't mean that his students can't complain. By complaining, they provide him a new set of inputs that may change his actions. This is the same reason for punishment of crimes.

I would guess that this story is purely fiction, but if it's not, that professor doesn't sound like he's equipped to teach ethics.

K

kingjames1:

Possibly, but I don't think nearly as rare as you suspect. Ast far as I'm aware, the majority of researchers in neurobiology fall in this camp.

This is all ridiculous. There are extremely practical reasons to punish crime. They don't require an objective basis. The anger and lust for revenge that we feel is just an evolutionary drive that serves to further these practical survivability aids.

1. Threat of punishment is another input into the decision making process of potential offenders. This input may be enough to deter some forms of behavior.

2. Punishment for crimes is a negative reinforcement. This can have the effect of reprogramming some offending individuals.

3. Some punishments restrict the rights of the offenders which can serve to protect other members of society.

4. The harshest punishments will often severly lessen the chance that the offenders can reproduce and pass on their genes to the next generation.

In fact, I can't think of a reason that we would punish crime if God were in charge and peoples' actions weren't deterministic. Certainly reasons 1, 2, 4 above make absolutely no sense if determinism weren't the case.

But I didn't ask you to make it not hurt, I asked you to make yourself BELIEVE that it wouldn't hurt. If you are not bound to the physical processing going on in your brain, you should be able to choose what you believe. That was the challenge.

What question does it beg? Certainly the research done on the behavior of individual neurons, on the behavior of the brain during its development and when subjected to different unusal conditions (injury, disease, chemical and electrical stimulation, etc.), and in areas such as conditioning support my position. I have yet to see any kind of research to support the idea of a soul or any other non-physical basis for human behavior.

jlowder

Neither I nor even many theists--including such notables as Richard Swinburne, John Hick, Robert Adams, and Wes Morriston--see any reason to believe that "the ways we speak about ethics is compatible with metaphysical naturalism." Until someone can show such an incompatibility, we are justified in assuming there is no incompatibility between metaphysical naturalism and "the ways we speak about ethics."

You assert that "metaphysical naturalism is incapable of adequately accounting for the existence of objective morality," but you don't provide an argument for this assertion. On the contrary, I think moral realism has stronger epistemic weight when combined with ethical naturalism than when combined with ethical supernaturalism, since the ontology of ethical naturalism entails (at least) one less kind of of fundamental entity than ethical supernaturalism. I also think that most people are more sure of their moral convictions than they are of God's existence, so, ironically, basing morality on God's existence actually weakens, not stengthens, one's moral foundations.

LOL! Spoken like a presuppositionalist. Just because someone holds a belief does not mean they "presuppose" that belief. In my case, metaphysical naturalism is not a presupposition, but a conclusion of several independent arguments. Look, I know it upsets you presuppositionalists to admit it when your critics do not "presuppose" a view contrary to yours, but that's exactly what we have here. Again, it isn't just naturalists who deny that moral realism requires God. Again, several very prominent theists agree that morality does not need God.

I'm not so sure your interpretation of Moore is accurate. As I understand him, he was NOT trying to argue that ethical naturalists have no basis for deciding which natural property is good. Instead, Moore was arguing that goodness cannot be reduced to a natural property. That's the whole reason Moore decide to posit non-natural, irreducible moral properties.

Jeffery Jay Lowder

[ November 25, 2002: Message edited by: jlowder ]</p>

Dr. Retard

I think Moore's point is that there is no analytic entailment from a natural property to a moral property. Remember that Moore believes in necessary ties between moral and natural properties -- he agreed that moral properties necessarily supervene on natural properties. But he argued that this tight relationship had to be synthetic and not analytic. In other words, the goodness of pleasure is not a matter of mere linguistic competence.

kingjames1

Reply to K

<strong>kingjames1 quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) your determinism destroys any objective basis for social ethics...In other words, a social ethic must be a political fiction. No one can be held accountable for their actions if they are simply preprogrammed to so act. I suppose rehabilitative measures may be effective and prudent (re-programming their computer-brains ala Skinner). But retribution? Unjustified. Righteous indigination? Rationalized anger.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This is all ridiculous. There are extremely practical reasons to punish crime. They don't require an objective basis. The anger and lust for revenge that we feel is just an evolutionary drive that serves to further these practical survivability aids.

1. Threat of punishment is another input into the decision making process of potential offenders. This input may be enough to deter some forms of behavior.

2. Punishment for crimes is a negative reinforcement. This can have the effect of reprogramming some offending individuals.

3. Some punishments restrict the rights of the offenders which can serve to protect other members of society.

4. The harshest punishments will often severly lessen the chance that the offenders can reproduce and pass on their genes to the next generation.
</strong>

Exactly!...penal retribution becomes purely rehabilitative and/or a form of behavioral re-enforcement (particularly, negative). This is to say, judicial punishment per se is purely pragmatic, having no (ethical or moral) meaning apart from potential social ramifications (e.g. keeping a rapist from raping other women). I.e. justice is a social construct. This was my point in the previous post. Compare this with a Christian view of justice and ethics: the punishment itself is a service to justice, not merely a means to an end. According to a biblical worldview, judicial punishment should be retributive (serving justice) as well as rehabilitiative (in certain cases) and certainly pragmatic (serving society). All these things are relvant factors, and should not be separated from one another. But, there is a distinction between retribution and rehabilitation or negative re-enforcement, between justice as a transcendent reality and social efficacy! The Christian is capable of understanding justice in its own right, without collapsing it into mere behavioral modification techniques or other such pragmatic measures.

You may argue that this is unnecessary, but I would respond that your understanding of evil and justice are far too thin. To reduce the grieving holocaust survivors' anger and cry for justice as mere genetically and biochemically pre-programmed responses to certain negative stimuli is not only clinically removed from the reality of such pain, but is woefully inadequate to explain the human experience of longing for justice and righteousness. This isn't a physiological reflex, but a profound human response to injustice and inhumane cruelty (...which in your system are merely arbitrarily, pre-programmed responses to certain inputs).

Perhaps to you this is only a mere assertion, but I find it hard to believe that anyone can dismiss the depth of human longing to merely biological factors. For example, are we to believe that poetry is really just a complex physiological reaponse to variegated inputs? Does not this mere assertion destroy poetry as such? Is the universal human desire for justice a mere artifact of evolution, or does it point us to something real and true (beyond our randomly constructed genes)?

Is the social Darwinian response ("no") really any different, practically speaking, than nihilism?


<strong>
In fact, I can't think of a reason that we would punish crime if God were in charge and peoples' actions weren't deterministic. Certainly reasons 1, 2, 4 above make absolutely no sense if determinism weren't the case.
</strong>


I'm not sure why you would say this, unless you assume that one is either a complete determinist or completely rejects causal relationships within human behavior. This is obviously a false dilemma. I needn't adopt either position.


<strong>
But I didn't ask you to make it not hurt, I asked you to make yourself BELIEVE that it wouldn't hurt. If you are not bound to the physical processing going on in your brain, you should be able to choose what you believe. That was the challenge.
</strong>

Surely, this is ridiculous. If you are not bound to the physical processes of the brain, than you should be able to believe anything?! Of course not! It is hardly a new concept that the physicality of the human being delimits our behavior, language, and thinking, even among those who hold to some sort of freedom of the will. Human freedom is limited; it is clearly absurd to believe that we are free from any constraints whatsoever (e.g. free to defy gravity). However, that we are anatomically and physiologically limited does not imply that we must go to the other extreme and assert that all human behavior, language, and thinking is purely physically determined. This is why critics of your system call it "reductionistic determinism." The presumption of reductionism is common in the sciences: scientists often believe they can reduce/explain all of reality to/within their fields of research: physicists often claim they can reduce the whole universe to physical law, some chemisists reduce everything to chemical laws, and biologists often reduce all of life to biological law (particularly the 'law' of survival), etc., etc. Fortunately, reality is more complicated than this.

Also, belief is not some arbitrary act -- one cannot simply choose to believe just anything, not, at least, with integrity, that is to say, with true belief. I can say that I 'believe' that I can levitate. But I can't really believe this, not with my current understanding of reality. I suppose an insane person might geniunely believe this, but the average person does not and cannot -- not without proof, not without something to convince them otherwise. There's the rub...

The human will is far more complicated than this. To reject determinism does not mean to embrace some sort of Sartrean concept of radical freedom. You seem to think one must accept either end of the spectrum. It seems most satisfactory to all the sciences (including the applied science of sociology) that humans are partially 'determined' by their environments (including their bodies) and partially free from such external conditions (which I do not equate with any random process).


<strong>
quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
To simply assert that the distinction is illusory (that is, that human behavior is ultimately determined biologically) is to beg the question.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

What question does it beg? Certainly the research done on the behavior of individual neurons, on the behavior of the brain during its development and when subjected to different unusal conditions (injury, disease, chemical and electrical stimulation, etc.), and in areas such as conditioning support my position. I have yet to see any kind of research to support the idea of a soul or any other non-physical basis for human behavior.
</strong>

Try the human experience! I'm only being somewhat facetious. Indeed, individual neurons do respond to input in predictably ways. But as complexity theory has taught us (and humbled us, one would hope), a massive network of neurons is another system altogether. Indeed, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts; and moreover, it is often of a completely different nature than its parts. To quickly conclude that the human brain is merely a complicated (classical) computer is (in my opinion) arrogant, not to mention rash. The research on the human brain has hardly even begun!

J.

[ December 02, 2002: Message edited by: kingjames1 ]</p>

kingjames1

Reply to jlowder

Fine, presuppose this. But do not then use human language as a proof or evidence for your (realistic) metaphysical naturalism. Certainly you see that this would be begging the question! If you don't see this, here is a Christian version of the argument: I presuppose that human language about ethics is compatible with theism; moreover I presuppose that theism is the only coherent basis for ethical realism (as you presuppose in your argument -- though I assume you argue your case elsewhere -- that metaphysical naturalism is the only coherent basis, since Christian theism is false in your understanding, as are the other proposed onto-theological bases for realism). Therefore, human language concerning ethics demonstrates or evidences the truth of theism.

BTW, I agree with you that human langage itself presupposes ethical realism (i.e. we speak as though our ethical categories, moral judgments, and behaviorial codes have an objective or real basis beyond mere social convention). But this does not demonstrate the truth of metaphysical naturalism, unless you can show a necessary link between metaphysical naturalism and ethical realism.


so you do seem to think that metaphysical naturalism is the only true basis for realism, as I assumed above...anyway, you are right in saying that naturalism entails (at least) one less "kind of fundamental entity," namely, God. However, to the Christian theist this is hardly a weakness. Indeed, it is the strength of the system. We have God to ground reality and knowledge. What do you have? Abstract principles? If ethical realism is valid, then you too require a non-natural category (is this substantially different than super-natural?), and hence your ontological system is necessarily dualistic, that is, two-story: natural and non-natural. Even if you argue that ethical realities supervene on natural states of affairs, or arise from combinations of natural states of affairs, you must maintain the distinction between natural objects and ethical/abstract objects to warrant a distinctly 'ethical' realism.

As I've stated elsewhere, this system is entirely mystical to me. Where do these supposed abstract objects come from? Are they eternal, or did they evolve? What is their nature? Are they essentially related? Is there a hierarchy (pantheon) between objects of logic and ethics (theorems and corollaries)? Are these objects reducible to natural states or properties? How then can combinations of natural states transform into ontologically different objects? Are they universally true, or only relatively (e.g. was it wrong to murder before humans evolved)? If they are eternal and universally binding (as most platonists and realists believe, esp. regarding the laws of logic), they seem to have the qualities of deity: eternality, omnipresense, omnipotence and sovereignty (e.g. the laws of logic are fundamental to physical law, and therefore all natural processes), and perhaps most striking, they have authority to bind our conscience, to direct how to behave and how not to behave!

BTW, how in the world do abstract objects engender "oughtness"? Please explain this mysterious transaction to me. It is perhaps the athestic realists version of transubstantiation, or more precisely, consubstantiation: transcendent -- in this case, ethical -- reality supervenes in the material. But how do impersonal, abstract principles obligate me to "be good"? I experience oughtness only in personal relationships, and even the feeling of responsibility towards impersonal objects (e.g. the earth's resources) presupposes someone to whom I am responsible (future generations, my present generation, the Creator, etc.). The question is this: to whom am I ultimately obligated, to whom am I finally responsible -- NOT to WHAT! Human language about ethics seems to presuppose a Person behind our consciences, our obligations, our duties, our responsibilities.

Speaking of these impersonal, god-like principles, do people generally believe in the existence of such objects? If not (and I think its clear that most of the world does not hold to this sort of system), then your criticism against theism, that people are more sure of their convinctions than God's existence, is a double-edged sword.

And several atheist agree that morality does require God, or something conceptually similar. So what?

When I say that you presuppose, I do not mean that you have no argument for your position (neither do other presuppositionalists that I am familar with - this is a common misconception, unfortunately -- presuppositionalists are not crass fideists, as commonly misunderstood). Rather, in the particular argument you are making, you have presupposed, that is, presumed or taken for granted the truthfulness of your metaphysical naturalism (which I assume you have made a case for elsewhere -- not that you just pulled it out of your butt). That's all I'm saying...its hardly controversial.


<strong>[/QUOTE]
I'm not so sure your interpretation of Moore is accurate. As I understand him, he was NOT trying to argue that ethical naturalists have no basis for deciding which natural property is good.
</strong>[/QUOTE]

Indeed, he's not; and i have no where argued that he was. But as you said, "Moore was arguing that goodness cannot be reduced to a natural property. That's the whole reason Moore decide to posit non-natural, irreducible moral properties." I heartily agree with this, and agree with Moore's negative conclusion here. Moreover, I believe Moore's proposed non-natural category of intution to have failed. I want to take Moore's argument further than he was willing to go.

J.

[ December 02, 2002: Message edited by: kingjames1 ]</p>

kingjames1

There seem to be two basic responses on this site to the question of ethics: 1) ethical values (which is an unfortunate term, suggesting subjective evaluations -- perhaps "virtues" is better) are real and transcend human persons and culture (mainly Lowder, if not exclusivley so) and 2) ethics are social constructs, rooted in our genetic code for group selection and developed culturally within conventional codes of conduct.

Responding to criticisms to my groupings above, let me here add that I understand that some believe that genetics has little to do with ethics (e.g. the standard cultural relativist) while others believe it is wholly determinitive (e.g. biological determinists). Others believe somewhere in between: certain behavioral norms are genetically programmed, which we then follow instinctively , but, to some extent, how those particulars behavioral norms are realized are socially determined and as varied as human culture. Further added comments of clarification will be in brackets.


Let me ask, is Lowder the only 'ethical realist' on this board? If not, what are the arguments from some of the others regarding a ground or reality behind our moral categories of "good" and "bad." Lowder has argued that it is possible that such exist, but has given no argumentation, as far as I can see, as to how we can know the existence of such abstract objects, and what they are like. Moreover, he has not answered my challenge on page 6 (repeated above) as to how abstract principles could obligate us toward the good. After all, does the correspondence between propositions and states of affairs obligate us towards truth and accuracy? Indeed, even right knowledge is an ethical matter. Why ought we argue what is true?

To those who fall in the second camp, the issue isn't whether we ought to think rightly or not, but that it is prudent to do so. [This at least has been the overwhelming response to my question on this thread, both from nihilists and to those who hold to an evolutionary ethic that looks fairly traditional-Judeo-Christian in form.]

In this case, it is foolish to think falsely -- it leads to decisions that may be detrimental to our health and lives. However, the cultural-relativist or social darwinian [or evolutionary ethicists, etc.,] has extremely difficult issues to face, if they care to face them.

[For example, let's take a look at the claims of the cultural relativists (perhaps the dominant view in the academy, at least in the humanities)...]

Cultural relativists are consistent with an atheistic worldview in that they deny any Creator or Universal Knower who determines what is true, good, or right. Truth, beauty, and goodness are interpretations/evaluations of reality determined within a particular cultural context. That is to say, they are determined by cultural constructs (e.g. social institutions). Their relativistic claims extend beyond ethics into epistemology, denying the so-called "correspondence theory of truth" according to which "true propositions" are those statements that 'correspond' with reality (an isomorphic correspondence between proposition P and state of affairs S). For example, the proposition "It is raining outside my bedroom window today, 12/02/02 at 3:03 PM," is true if and only if it is actually raining outside my bedroom window at that time and on that date. Simple enough, right?
Truth is a property of propositions then, and is determinable through objective science. By "objective science" we mean the determination of what is "real" (i.e. the actual state of affairs) through use of a scientific methodology. For example, consider the classical scientific method: empirical observation coupled with logical induction. This has proved a powerful tool in determining the probable truthfulness of our hypothetical propositions (or to falsify them, if you follow Karl Popper). In such 'intangible' fields as mathematics and logic, the process is obviously entirely analytical.
This epistemological model stands upon an ontological presupposition called "realism" or, if you're more 'sophisticated', "critical realism." Critical realism supposes that we can know what is real, that we have access to reality, however distorted it may be through our senses, measuring devices, and multi-processing brains. Without such access, the correspondence theory necessarily breaks down: if we cannot determine what is real, then we cannot know whether or not our propositions correspond with reality. In other words, correspondence theory presupposes the possibility of objectivity.
Cultural relativists however dismiss the scientific claim to objectivity as mythical. They claim that all human knowledge is a social construct (cf. the so-called "sociology of knowledge," e.g. Peter Berger's "The Social Construction of Reality") . Even the epistemic criteria we use to determine what is true knowledge has manifestly developed within the philosophical traditions of the West, and thus presuppose the very traditions within which they have their meaning (see MacIntyre's "Whose Justice, Which Rationality"). All we know, do, say is bounded by our social horizons, being mediated through, and expressed in culturally installed systems of meaning. No one epistemology or mythology or theology has any legitimate claim to 'objectivity'; they are all equally socially embedded structures of human culture. Indeed, even science as a human institution is a cultural construct, and hence socially determined (e.g. Kuhn's bombshell essay, "The Structure of Scientific Revolution"). Science (and therefore scientific methodology) has no more claim to 'The Truth' (i.e. universal truth) than does the witchdoctor (and his 'methodology') in Zimbabwe!

Now, this is not to be understood as a silly equating of science with animistic superstitions, nor is it a naïve rejection of the cultural value of these Western institutions. In fact, cultural relativists tend to be very pragmatic people. They will choose the modernist, logocentric, scientistic medical doctor, when they discover a strange lump in their throat, over the afro-centric witchdoctor (however quaint his spirituality) any day of the week! They apparently assume that some social constructs work better than others! [E.g. the postmodern pragmatism of a Richard Rorty.]
As stated above, the cultural relativists hold that the ethics of any society are culturally constructed, and thus mere artifacts of human society. They presume that human language and culture has no socially meaningful access to divine revelation. In this they implicitly deny the Christian doctrine of general revelation, according to which all people and cultures reflect, to one degree or another, the image and reality of God, both in their individual being and social praxis. Denying this possibility (not to mention the Christian doctrine of special revelation), all social constructions become equally arbitrary. No one system of ethics may be thought of as 'truer' than any other system; they are simply different ways different cultures have sought to preserve their social order.

Though this approach may sound plausible at first blush, and indeed has many convincing argument against the modernist conceptions of epistemology and knowledge, it is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. The first and most obvious is the implicit contradiction that cultural (or any) relativism entails. The error is as old as the Sophists, and the refutation as old as Socrates: if "truth" as such is a social construct, then on what basis do you advance or commend your social reduction of knowledge? Is it "true" that all truth-claims are socially determined? You see the problem.
The second problem is that, well, it is philistine! It is in essence the absolute denial of goodness, truth, and beauty as such. By reducing these lofty categories to mere socially constructed 'values', they are emptied of their power to be what they are, and have always functioned as, within human culture: something bigger than ourselves, something big enough to shape us, to woo and inspire us, to direct us beyond ourselves -- and not, finally, something we invent in order to advance our own self-conceived (or self-absorbed) purposes.
Finally, cultural relativism is worse than philistine, it is barbaric. It must necessarily conclude (if it is to be consistent) that the Nazi Holocaust, as a culturally determined method of preserving or establishing the social order in Germany, was no more or less legitimate than the civil rights movement in America two decades later. It has no basis to claim that such activity was "wrong" (only wrong "from our cultural vantage"). Consider a more recent tragedy: the terrorist attacks on 9/11. Is it wrong to fly hijacked planes into buildings? According to certain radical Muslim groups, not at all. In fact, it is quite good! Not surprisingly, America disagrees. Who's right? Well, of course from this perspective, no one is (absolutely speaking). The cultural relativists knows this, but as one 'contextualized' w/in the American culture, s/he is ticked, and cries with the less sophisticated theist next to them: "bomb the sonsabitches!" Why? Because they understandably (and self-consciously) identify with Americans and American culture.
Sympathizing with the American victims, they hotly demand retribution with the rest of us (after all they too are products of a culture that by and large still holds that flying planes into buildings filled with innocent people is wrong).
Or perhaps they simply and pragmatically assert that we must strike back (not for justice's sake, or any other such lofty moral reason), but in order to deter future attacks. But this is a sort of self-preservation, a presumption that American culture "ought" to be preserved and protected. Neither response however has any basis in the cultural-relativistic perspective: radical Islam and America are both equally arbitrary cultural forms. We support one or the other for equally arbitrary reasons: its what we grew up in. Basically, because I grew up in America, I support the elimination of the Al Qieda network from the face of the earth! But the Muslim in Afghanistan, brought up in the doctrines of radical Islam, understandably supports the jihad against the American Monstrosity -- the Great Satan of the West! Who dares claim that one is right and the other is wrong? On what basis? The relativist can't make any such distinctions, and so merely affirms his own culture -- a true xenophobe!

This whole response seems wholly unsatisfactory to me, and deeply flawed. According to cultural relativism, I can never assert that any culture's actions are wrong -- only "wrong to me," (which basically means I have been socially conditioned to find them distasteful!) But this does not fit with my moral experience. I think what Pol Pot did was wrong -- not just culturally wrong, but absolutely and unconditionally wrong! When I visited Auschwitz this summer, and wept over the pictures of women stripped and corralled en masse into the gas chambers, I believe that my response was deeper than mere social conditioning. I believe our collective grief over such tragedy reflects something prior to our respective cultural identities and superegos, something that reflects our fundamental humanity. We are more than cultural products, and our lives more than mere social constructions. The entire human experience seems to demand such a conclusion. Who can look a Holocaust survivor in the eye and claim ethical relativism (however sophisticated)?

[This brief look into cultural relativism has obvious implications for other forms of ethical relativism. And though some may deny it, even the hypothetical, genetically determined ethic that many have posited on this thread is ultimately relativistic (species-relative, that is).] The supposition that ethical intuition or conscience (i.e. our "shared humanity") evolved is equally unsatisfactory, being equally arbitrary. Instead of our moral outrage and grief being socially conditioned, it is now genetically determined. This too is barbaric, even animalistic, reducing ethics to mere (group) survival instinct. Why be compelled to obey my instincts now that I have evolved to self-consciousness? Why not 'disobey' in so far as that is possible; it's not as though nature is "right," or "good"? (I suppose if you hold to social darwinism though, being called animalistic is hardly a criticism.)

Do we just accept this, and go one with our delusions that good is meaningful and worth pursuing? Or do we become nihilists? Or do we posit vague, abstract principles impersonally structuring reality, and mysteriously supervening on my personal relationships and existential longings?

Lowder, I really I am interested in your response to my questions about impersonal principles obligating persons to behave in certain ways.

J.

[ December 03, 2002: Message edited by: kingjames1 ]</p>

Primal

In all my life I can say, save for once years ago: I've never seen such a long-winded post full of such confused and fantastic misinformation.


Perhaps James has been more affected by the postmodernist camp then he will admit; as he seems to be throwing logic completely out the window as well as history and methodology in his "criticisms" i.e. hyperbole. Among such fallacies is a false dillema, hasty generalizations, very dubious assumptions and a clear confusion of two very different claims.

First off he confuses ethical and epistemic(cognitive) relativists; going to great lengths to do so!

He then confuses cultural relativism,social darwinism and pragamtism.

Case in point. Was he discussing relativism or pragmatism?

James then wishes to defend his own views, a rather simplistic and primitive type of objectivism. One which "analytic" is cleanly cut from the "synthetic". One more or less coming from the days of Aristotle and tries, very pathetically to somehow link all objectivism,using this model to his own personal ,model of Christianity.

How does he do this exactly? Therein lies the real mystery. It seems that for all his ramblings he doesn't actually make an argument showing how the two are linked....he just posits it as a given.If the Bible in any part supports science,mathmatics and objectivism of the kind: I am not aware. Nor of how Objectivism supports theism of this kind. If anything a proper objectivism shows Christianity to be very wrong.

Also are the many contradictions: relativists believe in nothing...followed by relativists believe in what is pragmatic. Social constructs are genetically rooted...making me wonder how genetic behaviors are "socially constructed" by any means save genetic engineering.

After this he claims relativists who believe that morality is a matter of genes and social development:

and then says relativists believe all such things are only derived by social development not a moment later:

The last few arguments conist of little more then emotional apeals. Followed by a criticism of relativism, arbitrarily applied to all other nontheist positions. Lastly sprinkled with a little equation to anyone who thinks genes are the ultimate basis of morality with social darwinism:

Biological development is arbitrary? That's news to me.

Umm, aren't they one in the same according to the biological moralist? If anything James it is your devisions that are arbitrary.

It is very difficult for me to begin to unravel this level of confusion. Why follow instincts? Because you are any animal and that's what animals do; why wouldn't you? Also just because an instinct evolved to aid in group survival(for self-interested reasons btw, just to let you know as you seem somewhat illiterate in matters of darwinism) does not mean they hold any less power as a motivating force. Lastly, who says this is social Darwinism? It is clear you haven't put the slightest bit of thought into the issue. What is our group instincts say "help the poor"...what then? If I believe such a moral is genetic am I a social Darwinist?

Am I then, James, someone who believes the poor should die cause of Darwinism yet the poor should live cause of genetics? Perhaps you should stop limiting your criticisms to 19th century social theories as if they have any relevance to the modern atheists 21st century philosophies.

James all I have to say is, study an intriductory philosophy book and some basic biology. Actually learn about what you are talking about and then speak. Your post was quite literally, a waste of time. Not something you put in a serious intellectual discussion. You have misrepresented many major viewpoints, simply because you are so intellectually lazy that you wish for all issues to be a matter of two opposing viewpoints. So hence any belief that does not fit in one viewpoint or the other is forced into the viewpoint, even if that involves making stuff up. Do not presume to lecture us about the implications of relativism, either cognitive or ethical. As it is very clear to us who know what we are talking about: that you don't.

James all I have to say at the end of this post is: Shame on you. Please stop wasting mine and evryone elses time with your intellectual dishonesty, dressed rather poorly as serious philosophy.

[ December 02, 2002: Message edited by: Primal ]</p>