rebelnerd

I didn't say anything about free will, I stated that due to being sentient we can make choices. Non-sentient systems do not make choices, the weather does not choose to be rainy or sunny. I can choose what pair of socks to wear or choose not to wear them at all. Granted, these choices may be based on past experience, but they are choices none the less. A computer does not make choices, it reacts to data via it's progamming. Now I will agree that if one was to extend this to humans and intelligent animals, we are also reacting to our programming to a degree. What that degree is though is subject to debate (like the one here.)

Filo

Icarus

You illustrated the crucial point in this discussion very well, Mageth. Freewill posits that individuals have at least a limited amount of control over the behaviors they exhibit, beliefs and attitudes they hold, and their internal states, viz., emotions or moods. Freewill suggests that in any test situation, then, given options are presented and the agent can just as easily choose one option as another. In fact, the freewill indicates that the agent must have the capacity to exercise any available option and--as Xeren pointed out--this is just as it appears to the agent. There is no method to demonstrate the veracity of this premise, however, since only one outcome can result from each test. We have no way of knowing if the agent could demonstrate freewill, since the test case cannot be replicated. If such a replication could occur, however, should we expect a different outcome the second time around? Absolutely not. The only way to produce a variant outcome is to introduce some new information or stimuli into the system. If the agent experienced the exact situation a second time, the chain of events would be like making a trip back in time or watching a video recording of the first test run--since no reason would exist for the agent to change his mind. I agree with Mageth, Bill, and others who deny human capacity to choose freely between options. Past life experiences, internal states, and external stimuli interact in complex ways to produce results that we can merely observe, not control.

Icarus

excreationist

Mageth:
"The degree to which an individual (animal) is able to excercise free will is dependent upon its level of intelligence."

I see a potential problem with this argument.

Imagine a person who through some accident becomes completely paralyzed, with no ability to move, speak or communicate in any other way. Imagine the person in a bed in an extended care facility. Imagine that the person's brain is otherwise functioning perfectly - the person retains his/her former consciousness and intelligence.

Imagine a fly on the wall of the room. Is the fly climbing on the wall of the room capable of exhibiting more or less of what is referred to as "free will" than the paralyzed person?

You just said that the paralysed person retains their original intelligence - so they'd have more intelligence than the fly! (Though they'd have an inability to express it) To develop their original intelligence they would have had to interact with the world in complex ways though. (e.g. at least some of their muscles, like the ability to blink at will, would have been functional earlier in their life)

Edit: I see now the earlier post was talking about *exercising* free will... well the totally paralysed person would believe that they have no choice but to lie there, completely motionless, but they would still be able to make intelligent decisions about what they're going to think about and ponder.

[ August 17, 2002: Message edited by: excreationist ]</p>

excreationist

Icarus:
...If the agent experienced the exact situation a second time, the chain of events would be like making a trip back in time or watching a video recording of the first test run--since no reason would exist for the agent to change his mind...
If they had memories of the events happening the first time then the agent would be different... they might choose a different option to the one they chose the second time around, simply because they're curious about the other option or the last time around they weren't fully satisfied with the outcome of the original choice.

Mageth

excreationist:

You just said that the paralysed person retains their original intelligence - so they'd have more intelligence than the fly! (Though they'd have an inability to express it) To develop their original intelligence they would have had to interact with the world in complex ways though. (e.g. at least some of their muscles, like the ability to blink at will, would have been functional earlier in their life)

I did say that their paralysis was due to some accident, so I assumed they developed their intelligence through their former capacity for interactions with the world. If they didn't lose their original intelligence in the accident, why would they have to redevelop it?

And if they can't, as I proposed, interact with the world in any way, how can they express free will, in spite of their intelligence?

[ August 17, 2002: Message edited by: Mageth ]</p>

Mageth

If they had memories of the events happening the first time then the agent would be different... they might choose a different option to the one they chose the second time around, simply because they're curious about the other option or the last time around they weren't fully satisfied with the outcome of the original choice.

The thought experiment proposes exactly the same initial conditions. If they had memories of the events in the second running of the experiment, there would of course be different initial conditions, so one might expect, or at least not be surprised by, different outcomes. Without the memories, there's no reason to expect different outcomes.

Bill

I disagree, so long as we use the word "programming" in a broad sense (as "the entire informational and stimulus contents of our brains").

No matter what we do in our lives, our doing it is a product of what we have experienced prior to our doing. I have never experienced the Arabic language, and so I could never (so long as that remains true) be expected to utter anything in Arabic, other than something that was accidently Arabic based upon what I uttered in English. I cannot do that of which I cannot conceive.

What I can conceive of is a product of: <ol type="1">[*]my past experiences;[*]my internal "programming" (again, based upon my past experiences; because scientific experimentation has clearly shown us that the development of certain kinds of mental capabilities do depend upon our having certain experiences at certain ages);[*]and the current stimuli that I am experiencing (or at least, recently have experienced).[/list=a]While you assert that my actions are something other than the product of the above pre-existing circumstances, I see nothing offered by you in the way of actual evidence. Your assertion that "prayer, fasting, narcotics, ritual, 'sacred' dance, etc..." amounts to operations that are in some way NOT a function of my current mental state of mind, or which in some way overrides my mental state of mind, obviously is obscured by your misunderstanding of the broad meaning of the word "programming" in my prior post.

If I engage in "prayer" I am engaging in a learned ritual. If it affects my behavior in any way, it is due to the force of the internal "programming" which this ritual of prayer exerts.

Other ritual behaviors can have similar results IF I EXPECT SUCH RESULTS FROM SUCH RITUALS! Such expectations are a product of my prior environment (culture, religion, etc.).

And just as obviously, the use of anything that changes my chemical state (fasting, narcotics, exercise or other stimulating activity, etc.) will just as obviously operate as part of the prior causal factors which influence what it is that I can (or will) do.

Just because our brains are complex, and have a plethora of nuances that can shove our decisions in one direction or another, does not in any way mean that our decisions are not determined by the state of affairs which exists at the time when the decision is made. To assert otherwise is to assert that we are connected to some external realm from whence such decisions are fed into us. That is a theistic claim, and it has NO SCIENTIFIC FOUNDATION!

So, while you ultimately make the claim that "the human being is NOT the 'total sum of its programming" and nothing more,' you offer us no evidence whatsoever upon which we might base a decision to agree with that claim. I, on the other hand, have the whole of the field of psychology behind me, which asserts that human actions are something that can be controlled, in some cases by changing a chemical factor and in other changes by influencing a behavioral factor, but in all instances, by introducing some change to the environment of the individual which causes some change in the behavior of that individual.

== Bill

Demosthenes

In reply to Mageth's post,

Even if you repeat the experiment, there would be different outcomes in due to differences in the brains of the people over time. But we can create models which we use to predict what the others will do, we do it all the time without even realizing it. It's analogous to predicting the weather, we can do it to a degree of certainty, but beyond that, we're clueless about what it'll do next.

Bill, I'm a bit confused by what you mean, I agree that all decisions we make are influenced by our past experience and knowledge. We can't make decisions out of nothing. To me, free will means having the ability to make decisions based on past knowledge and experience and also are unique during the moments they're made.

That's the crux of free will, at least for me, making unique decisions.

From reading the posts, I'm beginning to think that we have differing definitions of free will. If you will, please tell how you define free will, regardless of whether it's an illusion or not.

EDIT: I accidently pressed the enter button before I was done

[ August 17, 2002: Message edited by: Demosthenes ]</p>

nyx

Bill,

Maybe you can straighten me out here. It seems to me that there may be a lot more genetic "programming" of humans than most would like to recognize. We do fall into patterns that even chemicals can't alter.

How much freedom do we really have in our choices? Is it not limited somewhat by our sets of choices? Even though we make decisions based on past experiences, do we not repeat ourselves often? Even when I try, it is difficult to break cycles of behavior. How much of this do you attribute to genetic predisposition?

Nyx

Bill

There are, in fact, conflicting claims about exactly what "free will" means. The strong claim is that, at any point of decision, you could just as easily have decided to do otherwise than what you actually did. That is the claim I preach against when I agree that "free will is bunk."

And the weak claim, that <a href="http://www.secweb.org/bookstore/bookdetail.asp?BookID=637" target="_blank">Simon Blackburn defends in his book, Think!</a> is just what you say: that we have the capacity to make some decision based upon our state of mind, rather than merely reacting the way that a plant reacts to the Sun. This sort of "free will" does allow us to decide to do something that is substantially different than that which might have been predicted that we ought to do, but for which we (when we do such a contrary action) have, at least internal to ourselves, some good reason for doing (or failing to do) that particular thing. As an example, most people will try to take cover from inclement weather on most occasions. But, under certain influences, it has been observed that some people will actually go to great lengths to expose themselves to that very inclement weather (see: "Singing in the Rain," for instance). But in all cases, our behavior would be totally predictable if we knew in advance what all of the programming and influences (information and stimuli) were.

That is the weak claim in favor of "free will." But to me, it seems to equivocate the meaning of the word "free." So, I refuse to accept that a fully causal exercise of "will" is in any sense of the word "free." It is an exercise of "will," but, since it is fully causal, it cannot be "free." So, because of this state of affairs, I find myself in agreement with the post that begain this thread: Free will is bunk. On the one hand (the strong case), it clearly does not exist, and on the other hand (the weak case), it is not really "free."

== Bill