vixstile

bd-from-kg and dk

You seem to be misinterpreting most of what I post, so I have decided to refrain from further discussing this subject until I better construct my own ideas. I'll admit that before came to this board a month or so ago, i'd hadn't contemplated the various aspects of moral theory. I can only assume that you have put far more though in to your ideas than I have.

I'll also admit that I am not very skilled at presenting my ideas in writing. This is probably due to a lack of formal education (I only have three semester of High School under my belt, and I excelled at failing during those three semesters). One of the main reasons I first decided to post on this board was to improve my writing.

[ May 21, 2002: Message edited by: vixstile ]</p>

bd-from-kg

Koyaanisqatsi:

A remarkable statement. Perhaps, like Pompous Bastard, you use all sorts of words in nonstandard ways. Perhaps you don’t’ mean the same thing by “contradict” that the rest of us do?

As for reposting a long excerpt from the same thread, this strikes me as a waste of time and bandwidth. But I read your post (in fact, all of your posts on this thread) in their entirety before saying this. I stand by it. You say yourself (see blow) that your claim that my analogy isn’t valid is based on the claim that there are no objective moral truths. Since you’re apparently claiming that you made an argument to this effect somewhere, please point it out. Perhaps my reading comprehension skills have declined in my later years.

What arguments did I accuse you of making that you never did?

I didn’t argue that the Earth’s age is objective; I took that for granted. The point was that people have different beliefs about it even though there is an objective truth regarding it.

You didn’t argue that objective morality doesn’t exist because it cannot be demonstrated to exist; in fact, you had never even brought up the question of whether it can be demonstrated to exist until now. Besides, this argument is fallacious. Whether something is objectively true and whether it can be demonstrated to be true are different questions. The first is a matter of ontology, the second of epistemology.
Here’s an illustration. It can be demonstrated (IMO) that evolution actually occurred. But it cannot be demonstrated that it can be demonstrated. That is, I can (in principle) present all of the evidence for evolution and state (quite correctly) that in view of this overwhelming evidence it is plainly irrational not to believe in evolution. But now suppose that, after being presented with this evidence, someone says “I don’t think the evidence is overwhelming; in fact, I don’t think it’s very good. And I certainly don’t think that it’s irrational not to believe in it.” He’s wrong, but you can’t demonstrate that he’s wrong. All you can do is go over the evidence again. But this does not show that it is not objectively true that evolution occurred, nor does it show that the evidence, considered objectively, is not sufficient to compel rational belief.

First off, your obsessive references to God are out of place here. The title of this thread is “What defines a non-theistic objective morality?” And I’m not a theist.
Second, you don’t seem to understand what the question “what constitutes (or more precisely, what would constitute) an objective morality?” means. It’s a definitional question: given X, what characteristics would it have to have for you to call it an “objective morality”?

Koy, I’m not an idiot. When you say “there is no such thing as ‘objective morality,’", I can figure out that what you’re denying the existence of is “objective morality”. The question was, what do you mean by “objective morality”?

Huh? I was saying that if I understood what you meant by saying that there is no such thing as objective morality, I might agree that you’re clearly right.

bd-from-kg

Koyaanisqatsi:
Not so. I consider 99percent's account of why slavery is wrong to be profoundly off the mark. His explanation makes slavery out to be wrong in essentially the same way that a misguided tax policy is wrong. IMO this trivializes the evil of slavery.

bd-from-kg

Alonzo Fyfe:

A couple of items.

Christian ethics is at least as objective as your ethics. There is, of course, a serious epistemological problem in theistic moral systems of determining what it is that God commands, or approves of, or whatever, since God is notoriously uncommunicative. But if God exists and approves of some things while disapproving others, this is an objective fact. How can “an act is good if and only if God approves of it” not be an objective definition? To be sure, the fact that God approves of an act is an objective fact about a subjective state, but it’s still an objective fact.

The exact same thing can be said about your moral system. The “all things considered” criterion, whether the “things” in question are “desires” or “reasons” or pleasure and pain as in classic utilitarianism, defines the “rightness” of an act in terms of subjective states.

Not so. Although subjectivists are almost bound to get different answers, there is no “objectively correct” answer from an “all things considered” perspective either.

First, there’s the problem of who “counts”, or to follow your analogy, whose “reasons” or “desires” should appear in your sum. You seem to think that all you have to do is to reject subjectivism and the problem is solved, but it isn’t.

For example, what about fetuses? Do all fetuses count equally at all stages of development? If so, what do you count as a “reason” or “desire” on the part of a fetus who has not yet developed to the point of having desires or reasons? If not, at what point of development do you start counting them? Or do you use a “sliding scale” depending on the level of development? If so, how do you objectively determine what sliding scale to use?

Next, what about chimpanzees? In the early stages baby chimps score higher than human babies on all tests of mental development. Doesn’t that mean that they should count at least as much as human babies?

For that matter, what about dogs, cats, pigs, squirrels, mice, etc.? They also have “reasons” and “desires”. Do you include them? If not, on what objective basis do you leave them out?

Second, are all “desires” or “reasons” considered equal? For example, would a Nazi’s desire to exterminate the Jews be given the same weight as a Jew’s desire not to be exterminated? If so, given that there were far more Nazis than Jews in Germany at the relevant time, doesn’t that imply that exterminating the Jews was “right”? Does the rightness of exterminating the Jews really depend on the results of a poll?

But if all desires or reasons are not to be treated as equal, how do you objectively decide how much weight each one is to be given?

What if one man has twenty reasons for wanting X to be done while two others have only one each (but perhaps very good ones) for not wanting it done. How do you objectively weigh these reasons? Is it one man’s desire to do it vs. two men’s desire not to do it, or twenty reasons to do it vs. two reasons not to? Or again, should we give different weights to different reasons? If you propose to weight all reasons equally, what if a hundred people want to kill me to divide up my property, and I want to stay alive? It looks like a hundred reasons to one for killing me. Does that mean that the hundred have a moral obligation to kill me?

Third, isn’t it possible for something to be wrong even if there is no one at all who has a reason or desire that it not be done? To take an extreme example, suppose that a group of sadists learns how to create a large number of people who want to be tortured, even though they get no pleasure out of it but suffer miserably. Will it then be right for the sadists to torture them on the basis of your “all things considered” criterion? If not, why not?

Or, consider a society similar to the one depicted in “Brave New World”: everyone is perfectly happy to be who he is, doing what he does, and has no desire to change things in the slightest. In fact, everyone has a strong desire to keep things exactly as they are. This society would presumably be happy, but it would also be completely stagnant. Suppose you came across a society and had it in your power to change it so that it would start to progress, knowing that over the millennia it would produce far more happiness and satisfaction than this one would. Would you not have a moral duty to refrain from doing anything of the sort on the basis of your “all things considered” criterion? If not, on what objective basis would you justify saying that your own desires or reasons outweigh those of the millions of people in this society?

Suppose that a classic utilitarian challenges your criterion based on “desires” or “reasons”, saying that the correct criterion is the “greatest happiness” (which as we have seen does not necessarily give the same results). ON what objective basis can you show that his criterion is incorrect and yours correct?

Or suppose that someone says that virtue (in Aristotle’s sense, which does not require a preexisting moral code) is the supreme good, and that one’s duty is to promote virtue as much as possible. How is it self-evident that his criterion is not superior to yours?

Or suppose that someone says that rationality is all-important – that one should do one’s utmost to induce people to act as rationally as possible. How do you prove him wrong?

In short, your “all things considered” criterion seems to require many decisions for which there seems to be no “objectively correct” choice. So in what sense is this really an “objective” morality?

99Percent

bd-from-kg: My understanding is that you are trying to show that there are objective moral facts by deducing them from certain physical facts. It’s well known that the sort of thing you’re attempting here can’t be done. What I’ve been doing is to try to help you see that your arguments involve implicit moral premises. In other words, you’re deriving “oughts” from other “oughts”. This is perfectly legitimate, but it doesn’t show that the “oughts” that appear in the conclusions are “objective”.

I am looking forward to seeing exactly where my moral theory fails. I understand somethings are imposible to prove scientifically such as free will and intent of purpose, but in the realm of moral philosophy I think these can be reasonably accepted in the sense that it provides reasonable practical purpose.

And I don’t see why the fact that something is subjective implies that it has nothing to do with something objective.

That there are things that are subjective is objectively true, certainly, but objective moral theory must rest on purely objective facts within the realm of human understanding or else it fails. For example I cannot base my actions on my empathy of other's suffering since people can suffer for realistically trivial reasons. Not because my neighbor seems to be in deep anguish and suffering because he doesn't own a BMW like mine, must I be morally obligated to give him my car. Likewise I can't see how slavery can be objectively wrong because slaves are "suffering". Certainly lots of slave could live confortable lives and maybe never even suffered the least bit, or maybe they would "suffer" a lot less than if they would have been free, but that doesn't mean at all that slavery would be "good" in this case.

It’s true that one can no longer live if one doesn’t stay alive, but how does it follow that it’s good to stay alive? You conveniently skipped the point that if I were in extreme agony I’d have to survive in order to continue to be in extreme agony. In other words, it’s not necessarily good to stay alive; in some situations it’s rational to want to die.

I think I need to make it more clear what I am trying to say. Staying alive is more than just "good", it is fundamental. You cannot choose to stay alive or to die or make any moral decision if you are not alive to begin with. That some people decide to terminate their life because they can't bear their own pain is their personal moral imperative. But your posible moral decision to end the life others cannot be based on the perceived pain of others as that is subjective. I think this way you can objectively say that only the individual can decide for himself whether his life is worth living.

Besides, we all die despite our best efforts; it’s in the nature of life to die.

True, but individually we strive to live the longest and the best and that is why we are moral, because we are constantly making decisions that affect our well-being and longitivity.

And it’s interesting that you have said nothing about reproduction. It’s just as true that a given species will disappear if its members fail to reproduce as it is that it will disappear if they fail to stay alive (at least long enough to reproduce). Does it follow reproducing is “morally good” by the same reasoning that you used to conclude that staying alive is “morally good”?

Again, life by itself is not simply a value of goodness or badness, it is fundamental in order to decide what is good or bad for life itself. Individually we couldn't careless about perpuating life, although having children by our own free will can certainly add enjoyment and a sense of fulfillment - its up to each individual to decide that for himself.

I don’t know about you, but survival is something that I desire. And I think you desire it too, or you would never have gotten the idea that staying alive is “good”.

Yes, but the "desire" for life is not something you can value as a comparison of other values, because without life you cannot have desire for life or any other desires to begin with.

Buddhism is a perfect illustration of this. Buddhists believe in reincarnation, so what they mean be “staying alive” is continuing to be reincarnated. And they regard this as something that emphatically is not desirable, because life is suffering. What they regard as the “ultimate good” is to cease to exist. You may not agree with this philosophy, but it isn’t obviously irrational.

To me it is completely irrational because life is not only suffering, not to mention the idea of reincarnation to be completely ridiculous.

True. But if your strongest desire is to die, how does the fact that your living is a precondition for having any desires at all imply that it would be morally wrong to fulfill this desire?

It doesn't.

So nothing is relevant to morality unless it can be measured on your handy moral-o-meter? How did you arrive at that conclusion? And where can I get one of them?

You already have one: your reason

99%: Slavery is person X preventing with force and at his whim from person Y of doing things person X and Z can freely do. Besides, slavery is not only passive restraint. It is also the forcing others to do things at the threat of force.
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All true. So what? How do reach a moral conclusion about slavery from these facts?

Because men are moral beings that need free will in order to reason and to live their life with purpose. Slavery goes against the free will of men.

99% Laws are applied equally to everyone, they are supposed to anyway.
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What do you mean by “supposed to”? It’s true that in America the law itself says that the laws are to apply equally to everyone. but it didn’t say that until after slavery was abolished. And in a great many countries the law says nothing of the sort. Besides, even if the law does say that, why should this law be followed? What’s wrong with a government simply ignoring its own laws when it’s convenient to do so? Who’s going to stop them or punish them? The government?

Well, I don't want to get too much into politics. But let me point out that laws are supposed to be objective. American politics today is full of laws that are based on subjectivism and to this day there has never been a society with fully objective laws, unfortunately. That is why I say "supposed to", but that is a topic for another thread entirely.

99%:The difference (and objectively so) between the policeman arresting a criminal and a slave owner is that the policeman is responding to an initiation of violence from the criminal.
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That isn’t necessarily true. The criminal might, for example, be guilty of embezzlement, or failing to pay his taxes. But even if it is true, why is this fact morally relevant?

Ok, the criminal not only might have initiated violence but might have commited an immoral action (lying, cheating, etc). It is morally relevant because the state is denying the criminal of his own free will to be free as any other citizen. In the case of slavery it is not the state that is denying the liberty of an individual, but another individual at his own whim and power.

OK, the argument as I reconstructed it (I had to add some premises since the conclusion obviously did not follow from the ones you did state) looks something like this:

P1: The well being of society is “good”.

P2: The well being of society depends on the well being of the individuals in it.

P3: Slavery is not conducive to the well-being of the slaves.

C1 Therefore slavery is not conducive to the well being of society. (from P2 and P3)

C2 Therefore slavery is immoral. (from P1 and C1)

My point was that C1 does not follow from P2 and P3, unless P2 is interpreted as meaning that the well being of society depends on the well being of every one of its members, in which case it is obviously false. It’s not clear how the fact that slaves are acting under coercion can be used to save this argument or to construct a new, valid argument along these lines.

The way I am arguing is:

P1: The well being of society is "good"

P2: The well being of society depends on the well being of the individual in it.

P3: The well being of individuals depend on their individual moral strength.

P4: Slavery is morally wrong.

C1: Slavery is a symptom of bad morality in individuals.

C2: Therefore slavery is not good for society.

That’s what troubled me about your comment that what’s wrong with slavery is that it reduces the “productivity” of those enslaved (and therefore, presumably, the GNP of the society as a whole). The implication is that if slavery results in the slaves producing things of more value than they would have produced otherwise, it’s perfectly OK; in fact, it would seem to be morally obligatory according to your reasoning. Unless, of course, slavery damages the “well being” of society in some other, noneconomic sense.

I am not advocating the immorality of slavery in utilitarian terms - far from it. But I do say that a consequence of slavery is that men are less productive and which is what can be bad from a societal standpoint, but that is beside the issue of the morality of slavery itself. I think I have said this point clearly enough, I don't see why you keep on insisting on it.

In short, all of your attempts to derive “objective moral truths” from facts about the “real world” fail, as must all such attempts. All of them appeal implicitly to moral principles that cannot be derived from any facts about the real world.

Sorry, but I am not convinced.

bd-from-kg

99Percent:

It fails only in the sense that it cannot be derived from objective facts about the real world. In other words, it can’t be derived from non-moral premises.

If you’re talking about objective moral principles it’s not good enough to “think they can be reasonably accepted” or that they “provide a reasonable practical purpose”. You have to show that they’re true.

It’s quite possible that Principle X is part of a moral system that “can be reasonably accepted” and “provides reasonable practical purpose” and that Principle Y, which is clearly incompatible with X, is part of another moral system that “can reasonably be accepted” and “provides a reasonable practical purpose”. (In fact, this happens all the time.) Then what? Which one is the objectively true principle?

The logic here is faulty. My two-year-old grandchild often suffers for realistically trivial reasons, but it doesn’t follow that his feelings have nothing to do with how I should treat him.

OK. Suppose that all slaves led far more comfortable lives that free men, suffered far less, and were much happier. Would slavery still be wrong? If so, why? What moral principle is involved here? How do you deduce it from objective facts about the real world?

Anyway, surely the fact that action A would cause everyone to much happier while doing B instead would cause universal misery might, under some circumstances, have some bearing on whether you ought to choose A or B?

Yes, I understand that it’s “fundamental” in the sense that without life there are no values. But you seemed to be saying that this fact has direct moral implications:

But at this point I’m not clear about what “ought” you think is “intrinsically derived” from this “fundamental” fact.

If it were wrong to base moral decisions on the perceived pain of others, it would be just as wrong to cure someone in order to end his perceived agonizing pain as it would be to kill him. Something seems amiss here.

So if Albert Schweitzer chooses a life that is not well calculated to help him live “longest and best”, he’s thereby being immoral? Whereas if a man steals tem million dollars, then murders his victim and covers up his crime to avoid being executed, he’s being “moral” because he’s striving to live the longest and best?

Of course I can. I can choose to risk my life to save a drowning child. I can eat unhealthy foods or smoke cigarettes because I prefer the enjoyment to living longer.

That’s irrelevant. the point is that if you believed that life is suffering, it would be irrational for you to want to continue to live. placing a value of any kind on living only makes sense if you believe that living is desirable. but this is a subjective judgment.

Nope. Reason (at least in the sense of logic) can tell you nothing at all about what to value, or what values should have priority. If by “reason” you mean something more than logic you may have a point, but you certainly haven’t made it clear.

Why is being able to reason and live one’s life with a purpose “good”? How do you deduce this from objective facts about the real world?

Anyway, as I pointed out earlier, slavery does not go against the free will of men. It just prevents them from doing some things that they would like to do, as do many other things.

Why are laws supposed to be objective? How do you deduce this from objective facts about the real world?

How do you know that the fact that the criminal did something immoral justifies depriving him of his freedom? How do you deduce this from objective facts about the real world?

Why does that matter? What moral principle is involved? How do you deduce it from objective facts about the real world?

That’s hardly the argument you made originally. You were arguing that slavery was wrong because it was not good for society; now you’re arguing that it’s not good for society because it’s morally wrong. I’m not concerned about the merits of this new argument, but I would like to know where P4 came from. How do you deduce this from objective facts about the real world?

You aren’t now but you were then.

OK, try very carefully to derive an “objective moral principle” only from facts about the real world. Try to state all of the premises explicitly and for each conclusion state which premises it is based on. You’ll find that it can’t be done. Perhaps then you’ll be convinced.

Alonzo Fyfe

bd-from-kg:

Before starting, I think it is relevant to note again that your theory and mine seem to end up at the same place.

Though I think you get there by making two wrong turns.

(1) You embrace internalism, which pays attention only to the reasons (desires) of the agent and disregards all others, yielding an ethic of selfishness, cruelty, and exploitation.

(2) You reject instrumentalism, introducing a concept of "sufficient knowledge and understanding" that brings all of those external desires back in, thus avoiding an ethic of selfishness, cruelty, and exploitation.

I do not think it is a route that can be taken -- because there is no bridge across the canyon between "sufficient knowledge and understanding" and empathy. And even if such a bridge exists, it is a contingent bridge -- and you need a necessary bridge to carry the weight that you need to haul across it.

Be that as it may, since the two theories would end up in the same place if successful, any questions asked about where one theory would end up can also be asked about the other theory.

For example, how would a person with 'sufficient knowledge and understanding' regard the wellbeing of a fetus, chimpanzee, etc. How would a person of 'sufficient knowledge and understanding' weigh the different interests of different people? What if one person with 'sufficient knowledge and
understanding' comes to the conlusion that he should maximize happiness and another, in the relevantly similar situation, comes to a different conclusion?

This is not to be taken as a type of 'et tu' response to your objections -- since such a response is logically falacious. It is meant to give you a perspective that should allow you to better assess the answers I do give.


First, there’s the problem of who "counts"...

"All things considered" means "all things considered." (Or, more precisely, all desires considered). There is no nonarbitrary reason to exclude any desires.

Fetuses -- to the degree that they have desires, those desires are to be considered. Chimps, cats, dogs, the same. To the degree that they have an
aversion (negative desire) to pain, pain should not be inflicted upon them.

I believe that a conceptus has substantially the same desires as the cells in my little finger. And a creature can desire only that which it can
perceive/comprehend. Thus, animals have no desire to continue living because they have no perception/conception of life. They can desire clean water, good food, have an aversion to pain, etc. They do not make plans as humans do, so disrupting those plans is less harmful. Thus, if faced with a choice between saving an animal or a human, the human should be saved -- but the suffering of the animal should be limited.


Second, are all "desires" or "reasons" considered equal?

In the first analysis, yes. This is justified by the fact that there is no value other than desire-based value, therefore no second value against which the values of desires can be measured.

(Caveat: the strength of the desire determines its weight.)

However, desires are the ultimate object of evaluation as well. They are evaluated according to how they stand in relationship to other desires. This type of relationship is called a recursive formula in mathematics, hermaneutic circle in philosophy of language, and a 'virtuous circle' in logic. It is an integral part of coherentist and connectionist epistemologies, and no philosopher that I know raises an objection against it as a legitimate method.

(I have received criticism from lay-people for the circularity in this type of formula -- but none from professional philosphers, and I trust the philosophers in this.)

So, the NAZI's desire to exterminate the Jews counts equally on the first analysis, comes out quite poorly in the final analysis. So does the desire for rape, sadism, etc.


If all desires or reasons are not to be treated as equal, how do you objectively decide how much weight each one is to be given?

How do you decide to weigh different reasons when you make a decision? Let say that you have twenty reasons not to take a new job. But they are all rather inignificant reasons. But 1 very strong, important reason to take it. How do you weigh them?

The intrapersonal weighing of reasons provide the best model for the interpersonal weighing of reasons.


Third, isn’t it possible for something to be wrong even if there is no one at all who has a reason or desire that it not be done?

No.

(Caveat: Strictly speaking, it is possible that nobody has a desire that 'it not be done' but, rather, an aversion -- a negative desire -- to some consequence of the thing. But I don't think this relevantly answers the question.)

This is an ontological claim -- the only values that exist in the real world (that are capable of explaining intentional action) relate states of affairs and desires.

Without desire, there is no value. If values have to be capable of causing muscles to move (for truths to be spoken, for checks to be written and money to be paid, for votes to be cast, for arguments to be written), then values must be something in the real world that is a part of the explanation for moving muscles.

Beliefs and desires are sufficient in explaining intentional human action.

Beliefs are value-neutral. They are simply records about the external world --
innert data stored in a mental database, This data may be more or less accurate, but a person will always act as if all of the data in his belief database is accurate.

This leaves desires as the only real-world entity with the right type of action-causing power.

Part of the truth behind the propositions that no set of facts entail a value is that no set of beliefs entail a desire. All of the beliefs in the belief database just sit there until at least one desire is tossed into the stew. That desire picks out an end, assigns it a value, and gives the person a reason for action in that it causes action aimed at realizing the value in the desired end.

This is not to say that there can be no causal connection between belief acquisition and desires. Desires are a part of the real world and thus, can be created, destroyed, and altered by external events (facts). But causality is contingent and does not carry the weight of
entailment. Heck, medication can alter desire.

You may note the parallel between this and my objection to the route you take in your ethics. No set of facts that you throw at a person to improve his knowledge and understanding entails a value in another person's well being. All of the beliefs that a person with "sufficient knowledge and understanding" may acquire cannot entail a desire that another person be made better off.

There may be a causal relationship, but the causal relationships are contingent and cannot carry the weight of entailment. (And I doubt even the existence of a causal relationship.)

The only other option that I can see is to define one's way across the chasm by importing values (desires) into the definition of "understanding". But this begs the question. Which values get imported? What is the justification for importing one set of values (desires) or another?

And if, ultimately, all external desires get imported through this definition of understanding, this yields the same conclusion as my own 'all things (desires) considered' criterion.

Internalists cannot cross this fact-value/belief-desire canyon. They can only contingently include the desires (wellbeing) of people other than the agent in their ethics. Which is why internalism yields an ethic of selfishness, cruelty, and exploitation, and why I choose to go a different route.

Because this is an ontological claim, I could be wrong. Other types of action-influencing values may exist in the real world. I do not know what form they would take, and cannot answer how I would take them into consideration unless and until I know what they are. My first guess is that no such entities exist, so I do not need to worry about them.

The fact that we can conceive of a science-fiction universe with desire-independent value does not imply that this is such a universe -- any more than the fact that we can conceive of a world in which a person can teleport himself across the universe implies that
teleportation exists in fact.

In order to add another sort of value to this system and use it to make evaluations, that other sort of desire-independent value needs to be defended as existing and as being linked appropraitely to intentional action -- it must be able to cause muscles to contract and expand in the physical world. Until such an entity has been demonstrated, I will stick with my desire-dependent values.

[ May 22, 2002: Message edited by: Alonzo Fyfe ]</p>

dk

dk: - - In this case I used “would” to infer perpetual action, not subjective judgment.
dk: - If some fact or principle is contingent upon personal assent or belief, then it’s subjective. Objective knowledge is by definition ambivalent to belief or accent. For example, scientists can’t test or demonstrate the existence of “string theory”, but if “string theory” exists then its certainly objective. Analogously, if morality exists then it’s objective. Morality constructs terms of right and wrong from human nature to regulate conduct with reason. The objectivity of morality hinges on the objective nature of humanity and reason.
dk: - Bingo, yet “free will” is quintessentially nothing more than the belief people participate in their own destiny, hence by your definition objectively subjective (which is a conflicted statement). We’ve just stumbled upon a variation of Pascal’s wager. If a person believes they possess free will then morality becomes a suitable platform to direct one’s actions to shape the future; or if a people lack free will then our fates our determined by chaotic events beyond human control. The principle of non-contradiction determines two contradictory statements can’t both be true. Therefore either humanity posses free will then morality is objective; or people are slaves to their fate then morality is nonexistent. Lets be clear the proposition of subjective morality puts utility before principle, and moral truths are quintessentially constructed from principles suitable to human nature. To place utility before principle categorizes people as a “means to an ends” verses an “end unto themselves”. If an individual is basically a means to an ends, then free will is a misnomer.
dk: - It’s a bet!!! If reasonable people have the capacity to participate in their future with reason, then free will exists and morality is inherently objective. If people’s future is determined by chaotic forces beyond human comprehension then reason and knowledge are mute, and people are mere objects of utility and happenstance, hence suited to tyranny, like a clog in the wheel of fate. So the objective nature of morality rests entirely on a person’s access to reason or absent a capacity to reason, the cover of moral law.
dk: - A person can abdicate reason and free will to rationalize any action or behavior, but in doing so they throw themselves and their progeny to the mercy of fate. Lots of people do, and misery loves company. When a person forsakes reason and free will to embrace creature comforts, impulses or instinct they denigrate themselves as mere objects without virtue, predisposed. If fate is a malevolent master then people suffer and die, and if fate is a benevolent tyrant then life is good and people die. On the other hand if people do have the capacity to participate in their destiny then moral truth is objective and reasonably suited to human nature. I’m not discounting emotions, instincts, intuition, individuality, happiness or experience; but focusing on a reasonable distinction between illegitimate and legitimate suffering derived from a holistic perspective of humanity as the basis of objective morality. .
dk: Seems to me the age of the Earth is either objective or eternal. Hey, if the age of the earth is Eternal, then is that objective? Seems to me the two alternatives are both objective and mutually exclusive, so the earth can’t in the same sense at the same time be both eternal and objective. In either case the age of the Earth is objective. The answer begs the question,
[*]“Can matter be created or destroyed?” <ol type="a">[*] Yes, then the first cause must be eternal i.e. an unmoved mover (theistic and pluralistic).[*] No, then the earth is eternal (extreme monism)[/list=a]
dk: - Masturbation as a moral question is simple. Is masturbation a suitable response to procreative impulses; the answer is obviously no. Ethical questions about masturbation are quite difficult because the science considers the many different situations and circumstances surrounding human potential, fidelity, intimacy, perversion and privation. Masturbation under the subjective doctrines of Malthus, biometrics, sociology and psychology isn’t a moral issue at all, but a pathology or a right of passage. Subjective doctrines about human nature postulate that sexual intercourse and gratification are mutually exclusive of fidelity and intimacy. The pervasive sociological and psychological dogma of human sexuality categorizes people as instruments for mutual (or self) gratification devoid of reason, intimacy, fidelity, children or moral capacity.

[ May 22, 2002: Message edited by: dk ]</p>

Koyaanisqatsi

What a cute evasion tactic. Let me quote the entire section again so that you can address the point I was making:

Which you evaded. I then pointed out:

As you can see, the context of your contradiction comes from the fact that you have stated two people believe different things--an inherently subjective state--and then asserted that that doesn't mean there is no objective truth behind this inherently subjective situation, which is why I asked you what would that "objective truth" possibly be?

You have two subjective opinions. Where is the objectivity in there?

Smith believes masturbation is "wrong;" Jones believes masturbation is "right." You are asserting that there is an objective "truth" regarding the "wrong" or "rightness" of masturbation.

What is it and how would it possibly be established? What is the mechanism for this objective mandate on a purely and inherently subjective state?

Follow? You posited a subjective scenario and then just asserted that it didn't preclude an objective solution, which is contradictory to the subjective scenario you presented.

What is the objective truth that you claim is behind this inherently subjective scenario?

Of course it would, since it demonstrates your evasions from the more salient issues raised, such as just happened. Your selective posting allowed you to avoid addressing the argument; the inherent contradiction of your positing a necessarily subjective scenario and then simply declaring that it doesn't preclude an objective solution without either providing us with that solution or the possible mechanism that would support such a solution.

X believes "A"; Y believes "Not A."

What a person does or does not believe is inherently a subjective scenario, as I pointed out previously and you evaded, so, as before, where is the possible objective solution you assert is not here precluded?

Who is objectively "right" here? X or Y? What is objectively "true" here? "A" or "Not A?"

It is impossible to determine since the scenario inherently precludes any kind of objective classification.

Unless I'm missing something here, which is why I asked YOU to support your assertion that such a scenario does not necessarily preclude an objective solution.

No, I demonstrated that your analogy wasn't valid based on the terminology you were misapplying.

"Correct" and "incorrect" (not "right" and "wrong" in the moral sense we've been using) are the words that must be applied to your analogy to make it valid, since the age of the Earth is a fixed number. One is either correct in stating the age of the Earth or incorrect in stating the age of the Earth.

Conversely, the question of masturbation's immorality is not and cannot be a fixed quality even if a god existed and declared masturbation to be immoral, since that would still be an example of a purely subjective declaration.

Unless, again, as I stated before and you continue to avoid, you can demonstrate how it would be possible for anyone (let alone a god) to explain how such an inherently subjective choice could be objectively immoral.

As I challenged you before, name just one objective moral truth and the mechanism behind it that supports this objectivity or concede that no such classification can ever possibly be applied.

This is why I have to repost, apparently, because you keep avoiding the salient issues. Not even proving that a god exists would mandate an objective moral truth, since the judgmentof that god would simply be a subjective decision, so as you can readily see, I have demonstrated three times now that no such "moral objectivity" can possibly exist.

Another example of why I need to repost when dealing with you.

Either that or you're just engaging in pointless evasion tactics.

I'll refresh your aging brain again and remind you that my objection was to you taking my words out of context in order to accuse me of making arguments I never did:

<ol type="A">[*] It wasn't the "only" argument[*] I made no "unsupported claims"[*] The arguments I did make--that your scenario was inherently subjective "and here's why"; that it would not be possible for you to demonstrate what about it necessarily entailed an objective solution; that the Earth's age is not ambiguous, but beliefs are by their very nature; that you used improper terminology in your analogy rendering it invalid; etc.--were simply ignored by you in favor of addressing a snippet from my post out of context so that you could "accuse me of making arguments I never did, just so that you can address them according to your own agenda."[/list=a]

In other words, I did not argue that your analogy was invalid or inapplicable simply because, "I assert there are no objective moral truths."

That is an argument I never made, either directly or indirectly.

And here's another perfect example of you doing precisely what I just accused you of; taking snippets of my post out of context in order for you to selectively concoct arguments that fit your agenda.

This section of my post was in response to a different false argument you had accused me of.

Here's the whole goddamned thing again to demonstrate what I'm talking about:

Got that? That was my argument, which I then went on to support, which you, again have ignored:

Clear now?

And the point I was making about it is that it is not valid and not applicable because of all of the arguments you ignored, primary of which is the fact that it is not possible to establish an objective truth in the same manner one can with the age of the Earth regarding the morality or immorality of masturbation, even if you were to prove a god exists. Such a scenario is inherently subjective; thus your analogy was comparing apples with oranges.

Again, I'll ask you, what is the objective truth regarding whether or not masturbation is moral or immoral and how could such an objective truth be established?

It is impossible to establish it because a claim of objectivity in regard to morality is an inherently contradictory claim.

Unless you can demonstrate for us what the objective truth would be? Here, I'll make it easy for you.

Masturbation is immoral. Masturbation is moral.

Demonstrate the objective truth that would render one of these statements objectively false and the mechanism that supports the objectivity that I am missing.

Who is the one doing the unsupportable asserting here?

Fuckin hell.

From my very first post (you know, the one of the ones you claimed to have read along with all the rest):

And this from my second post, which was in response to your post:

I then had this to say in regard to your analogy:

Followed by my third post, a response to Helen:

And then a follow up to that post in my fourth post:

As you can plainly see (or so one would think), I have been arguing that one cannot demonstrate objective morality and that objective morality does not exist due to the inherently subjective nature of morality in every single post I've made!


I guess you were correct in your assessment of your reading comprehension skills.

There you go again; basing an argument upon a flawed analogy!

The question (as I also stated prior) isn't whether some "thing" is objectively true (such as the age of the Earth), but whether or not morality (an inherently subjective, abstract judgment call) can be said to be objectively true.

As all of my posts starting with the very first one demonstrated, it is not possible to show that an abstract, personal judgment call such as "Masturbation is immoral" can be said to be objectively true in the same manner that one can say, "The age of the Earth is 'X'" is objectively true.

Apples and oranges.

No, it is not as my argument that even if you could prove a god exists to somehow establish an objective morality, the judgment of that god would itself inherently be a subjective declaration, "Masturbation is moral."

Once again, no matter how you slice it, morality is inherently subjective and is therefore only a matter for epistemology.

More extension of the same flawed analogy!

Let's run it down again:

One of those statements is objectively true and the other is objectively false.

In other words, there can exist no possible universe in which Evolution is both a fact of nature and not a fact of nature, correct?

Other than petulant declaration, please posit a possible universe where just one of those statements is objectively true and the other is objectively false and kindly provide a description of the mechanism that could establish such objectivity?

You cannot, because morality is an inherently subjective construct that will be inherently subjective in any possible universe.

Beg pardon?

"Believe" in evolution? Stop misapplying improper terminology if you please!

You can present all of the evidence for evolution and state that in view of this overwhelming evidence the theory has been satisfactorily demonstrated to be true.

You can colloquially respond to somebody who has declared, "I don't believe it," with "it is irrational not to believe it is true," but the proper thing to say would be, "The demonstration of the truth claim of the Theory of Evolution has been satisfactorily fulfilled," yes?

After all, either Evolution is a fact of nature and you have the evidence to support (i.e., demonstrate that fact) or you do not. Belief should never enter into the equation at all, just as in your age of the Earth analogy.

Either the Earth is X years old or it is not. Once you have presented your evidence demonstrating the age of the Earth and the evidence satisfactorily fulfills the basic epistemological guidelines we have mutually agreed upon in our society (aka, the "scientific method"), then it would be incumbent upon someone to demonstrate that your evidence is flawed, not to simply subjectively declare, "I believe the Earth is Y regardless of your evidence that the Earth is X."

In regard to the morality or immorality of masturbation, however, kindly explain precisely how it is that you could present evidence for "Masturbation is moral" in the same manner that you would present evidence for "Evolution is a fact of nature."

What is the evidence you would present that would make your continued reliance upon this analogy valid?

See? You continue to misapply and abuse terminology! Please stop doing that!

He's not "wrong" or "incorrect" because he's not challenging anything you presented! He's stating a subjective, personal, belief that is not subject to any form of objective standards!

And you certainly can demonstrate that he is incorrect in his personal claim by pointing out that it is nothing more than a personal claim and not counter-argumentation or demonstration that your evidence is in any manner flawed!

You keep comparing apples to oranges!

<img src="graemlins/banghead.gif" border="0" alt="[Bang Head]" />

"Rational belief." Now there's an oxymoron.

Either the evidence demonstrates that Evolution is a fact of nature, or it does not. If it does not, then it is incumbent upon the one making the counter claim to demonstrate how the evidence is flawed and/or otherwise insufficient to support the initial claim. "Belief" has nothing to do with it, other than in an ill-advised colloquial manner, precisely because the word is inherently indicative of subjectivity, as I have here demonstrated ad nauseam.

First off, your obsessive redirection of my arguments through selective redaction is pissing me the f off!

This is what I was arguing:

F*ckin hell!

I didn't claim you were one. I stated that even if you could prove that a god exists as a mechanism of "objective morality" that still wouldn't establish an actual objective morality, "since the question just shifts to the subjective desires of the god in question."

PLEASE ADDRESS MY ARGUMENTS AS THEY ARE WRITTEN INSTEAD OF SELECTIVELY REDACTING THEM IN ORDER TO ADDRESS SOMETHING THAT I'M NOT ARGUING!

Well, what do you know? More of your redirectional false accusations, only this time you redacted your own post.

Is it now? Gee, I never could have figured that out. You mean "defines" and "constitutes" are questions of definition?

I thought this whole thing was just about the existence or non-existence of a god as you so kindly clarified for me...

And, as I have been pointing out all along, there are no characteristics--including the proof of existence of a god--that would fulfill that question, since morality cannot, in any possible universe, be considered objective by the very nature of the abstraction.

Clear now?

All evidence to the contrary.

Sorry, cheap shot, but then I'm getting really tired of having to baby step you through things I've already written for us to both come to the same conclusion, there is no such thing as "objective morality." It is and even bigger oxymoron than "Rational belief."

I would hope that is abundantly clear now.

And I was saying that my posts have been demonstrating that very thing all along.

"Morality" (the abstract concept of labeling something "bad" or "good"), by its very nature, cannot possibly be objective in any possible universe due to the inherent reliance upon subjective personal judgment.

The term "objective morality" is oxymoronic, since there exists no possible universe in which the statements, "Masturbation is immoral" and "Masturbation is moral" are objectively mutually exclusive even if one were to prove that a god exists in one of those possible universe that mandates objectivity.

Is my position clearer now? MY answer to the question, "What defines a non-theistic objective morality?" is: nothing, since there is no such ultimate thing as "objective morality," either theistic or non-theistic. It is inherently a personal judgment call, based upon empathy and sympathy and group consensus.

Again, from my very first post(with my own minor redactions in italics):

I need a drink in all possible universes!

[ May 22, 2002: Message edited by: Koyaanisqatsi ]</p>

Koyaanisqatsi

The subjective judgment comes from the iherently subjective qualifier "better." It would serve him better than what and who is the one determining the quality of the "service" in order to objectively establish that it is, in fact, "better?"

A "fact" is not contingent upon personal assent or belief, only a principle can be.

As with bd's invalid analogy, it is irrelevant whether or not someone believes the Earth to be Y years old when it is in fact X years old.

The fact of the Earth's age is independent of anyone's personal beliefs, and therefore can be said to be objectively true.

Whether or not masturbation is immoral, however, is not independent of somebody's personal beliefs and therefore cannot be said to be objectively true.

Apples and oranges.

Do you mean to say, "But if 'string theory' can be satisfactorily demonstrated to be a fact of nature, then it is certainly objective," because if so, then I concur?

False. It is not analogous. Morality is an abstract concept not a theory that can be demonstrated to be true.

Just like bd, you concocting an invalid analogy that is not applicable.

No, "it" does not, because there is no "it" to personify in this manner. Humans construct terms of right and wrong from our nature to regulate conduct with reason.

Non-sequitur.

What? I have never made such a definition.

We have?

I fail to see the relevance (or coherence) to any of this.

False, on so many levels I don't know where to begin. Whether or not "humanity posses free will" [sic], morality cannot be objective.

Non-sequitur, also on so many levels that I have no idea where to begin.

How does it follow that morality is "nonexistent" if people are "slaves to fate?" Morality, as has been demonstrated ad nauseam is a subjective, human construct; a judgment call based upon social moors and personal empathy/sympathy psychology.

If I were "slave" to a "fate" (and by this I'll assume you mean a predetermined outcome of my existence), how would that preclude me from declaring that masturbation is moral?

Please.

False. The "proposition," as you put it, of subjective morality (or, more correctly, just "morality" since "subjective morality" is redundant) necessarily means that utility results in principle.

Tautology, but nice work if you can get it.

Since none of this is relevant and constitutes little more than a conversation you're having with yourself regarding "free will," I'll just skip comment on this if you don't mind.



Non sequitur. "Reasonable" people having the capacity to participate in their future with reason is nonsensical and does not in any way infer the consequent "free will exists" let alone the conclusion, "morality is inherently objective."

You are, quite literally, typing gibberish.

Yes...?

I'll assume you meant "moot."

That's probably "cog" unless you're Norwegian and what the hell are you babbling about?

Non-sequitur.

Whatever...

Not that it's relevant, but not necessarily. If one did not ever masturbate prior to intercourse (and had no nocturnal emissions), it is possible that physical damage to the testicals could ensue, thereby preventing procreation in the future.

Therefore, if procreation is the moral lynchpin, so to speak, then not masturbating on a regular basis could easily be considered immoral.

You remind me of Dr. Irwin Corey...

Therefore, the question as to whether or not masturbation is moral or immoral can only be subjectively addressed.

I rest my case and grab another drink.

[ May 22, 2002: Message edited by: Koyaanisqatsi ]</p>