Keith Russell

Keith Russell,
your argument was already refuted by Kantian in his last post previous to yours ---- I'll re-state Kantian's relevant words in my own words:

Note, for the Socratic dialogue's sake of this thread, Hugo Holbling is adopting an extreme relativist standpoint --- but it stands up well under pressure.

Simply saying "all viewpoints are relative" does not mean one cannot choose a viewpoint ---

But, believing that 'all viewpoints are relative' is the viewpoint that one has chosen.

it simply and only means
no viewpoint can ever be "ultimately legitimized" above all others

All basis for judgment come within a particular viewpoint

which means:

You can judge as much as you like (as an extreme relativist), but only from a particular viewpoint

This seems obvious, and incontrovertible. I cannot recall ever claiming to 'judge' without a particular viewpoint.

and

A viewpoint cannot be chosen as to its ultimate legitimization, because there is no demonstratable ultimate legitimization

and

You can choose any viewpoint you like, but not because of its "ultimate legitimization".

Then, what is the 'ultimate legitimization' of the above viewpoint?

Keith.

Adrian Selby

Just butting in on this fascinating thread, thanks to all for the pleasure i've had reading the to's and fro's.

My question is, how far does this position of relativism extend. I myself am a moral relativist for example, but I do think certain statements about reality are capable of being objectively true.

I'm thinking of the scenario where two people are stood near a 'wall' and there is no way round it. On the other side is something they both want. One person believes they will not be able to get to it, and the other believes they can, because they do not believe there is anything there, or do not believe the wall will stop them.

How can the simple test of walking forward to the wall not show one person's beliefs to be more true than the other's regarding what they perceive and what they believe about their perception.

Either they arrive at the object of their desire or they do not. If they do not, has not reality provided the evidence required that one belief is true and one isn't?

I ask this because if we can establish through this example that there are situations under which one's viewpoint and beliefs can be shown to be erroneous, then isn't the foundationalists task one of finding a way to build on this axiom to less distinct areas?

Adrian

John Page

I use faith. I have faith that we will someday be able to discover how we think what we think and, therefore, why we think what we think.

I have faith that we will be able to modify the thinking capability naturally provided to us and consciously improve upon it so we can contemplate our being with greater understanding.

Cheers, John

P.S. All we need is the right kind of beer.

Keith Russell

John:

OK, how do you define 'faith'? I think you are not talking about what I call 'faith'. I think you mean 'hope'...

(When I use the word 'faith', I use it to mean 'belief without evidence', but it is a word I try to avoid as much as possible.)

Keith.

John Page

I don't think so. Maybe they didn't try hard enough, long enough or use the right method etc.

The only way to restrict these imponderables (if its OK to call them that) is to restrict the scope of the proposition (or belief). e.g. Without outside assistance or mining tools I will not be able to go through the wall before lunch time tomorrow providing there is no change in the phsycial status quo of the wall etc. etc.

So, with many caveats, you have restricted the domain of the proposition to something that is rigorously testable and, perhaps, rigorously repeatably testable. In this way you might strengthen the conclusion from your proposition but absolutely? No, the conclusion must be relative to all the predications made.

But foundationalism rests upon the predication that there are truths that cannot be (reasonably?) doubted.

I would agree that a bigot may have no reasonable doubt that their truths are universal. What are we to think then when a second bigot thinks a second set of truths that are contrary to the first bigot's?

I entirely agree that one might say it is an absolute truth that "there are situations under which one's viewpoint and beliefs can be shown to be erroneous". However, this is merely the view of one of the bigots in the preceeding paragraph vis a vis another bigot.

IMO the resolution of this difficulty is to understand that truths are localized and not universal. i.e. they are relative to the mind(s) that beget them.

Comments?

Cheers, John

John Page

Keith

We only discover whether a faith is "justified" a posteriori (as opposed to being true or false).

IMO Faith is a human process. See this link for a vague description.

Cheers, John

Kantian

:boohoo:
Yes, it is not an argument in itself, because it is a description. On the other hand, the “junk” is also the conclusion I have drawn from what you consistently posted in this thread. The shoe fits exactly, to a T, without a doubt. If somebody tried (this was the case) to convince me that the Tampa Bay Buccaneers was going to lose in the NFC championship, solely because of weak reasons, like the temperature will be in the low 10’s, and that their craptactularly crappy won- loss record in cold weather was sufficient grounds to evaluate their chance, I’d told him off as well.

Perhaps you’ve confused me for a relativist. Remember, I’m a transcendentalist – although one could derive a doctrine of perspectivism from the vocabulary of Kant...

However, I have my own standard of evaluation, based on my own tastes. They are predicated by the coherence and profundity of the presentation, and I am able of making my own judgments. I am always encumbered with a viewpoint, along with that viewpoint I have ‘baggage’ to deal with, and within that baggage is a collection of my suppositions, my memories, my experiences, my personal facticity. With a private viewpoint, I am condemned to continually observe, weigh, reason, evaluate and judge entirely on my own. Any ‘external standard’ I adopt relies utterly on my own existential decisions. With all these tools at hand, I can evaluate the writings of others, and so, I conclude that your continual mischaracterization of relativism is tiresome and redundant.

A bit more research on the topic and a bit more background in the relevant matters would prevent you from posting such idle trash.

~Transcendentalist~

Keith Russell

Kantian:

When you're ready to argue, I'll be right here.

haveaniceday.

Keith.

Keith Russell

John:

Even by that definition of 'faith'--

--I have no faith, want no faith, and need no faith.

Keith.

Kantian

The relativist had to employ his mental faculties, his tools to arrive at such a position, and I have already shown how this is the case.

That is the conclusion of a person who doubts the legitimacy of anything independent or objective, apart from the subject or knower.

The relativist may go about his private business, with the belief that his truths are not transcendental truths applicable to all people.

:banghead:
False. The relativist is capable of living in day-to-day life with the assurance that his truths, his beliefs are true, only for him.

~Transcendentalist~