starling

I don't know about free will. I've always thought free will was simply the ability to change one's behavior according to the current situation instead of pre-programmed instincts. But I do know that God is the greatest jelly donut in existence! :notworthy

tronvillain

Koy:
It is not at all clear that "free will" implies that all one hundred Charlies are each capable of doing something that god did not foresee or "program." I am not aware of any coherent definition of "free will" that is not compatible with determinism, and hence with God's omniscience. Oh, you could add inherent randomness to make the system less deterministic (it is not clear that this would necessarily affect God's omniscience), but that does not appear to make the will any more "free."

Koyaanisqatsi

How could they?

You ask us to accept that everyone has free will and then say that at the "end of time" a god will pick all the "moral" people and put them in heaven. You then point out that this god knew these people were the winners, let's say (due to omniscience) at the beginning of time (i.e., at the instant this god allegedly thought of humans).

Contemplate this for a second. A being who knows prior to any action whether or not that action will result in a certain outcome. That's what omniscience means; the ability to "know all." Now, many apologists try to sneak in "to know all that is knowable" as if that gets them off the hook, but it does not, since they also define their god (typically) as one who knows the unknowable; indeed, as one who is unknowable to humans.

The attempt is to employ a disengenuous conflation of disparate contextual meanings of the term "knowable;" first in relation to humanity and then in relation to their god.

But note the fallacy. There is nothing "unknowable" to humanity; there is only that which is not currently known. The assertion (and basis of the conflation) is that there is something that is unknowable to humans; namely "god," so right there you have a disparity that only arises out of the false application of an unsupported assertion.

Regardless, of course, it is an irrelevant semantics sidetrack from the point, which is that nothing humans do can be unknown to and omniscient god. An omniscient god knows everything that humans can do and will do and have done and are capable of doing. That's what omniscience means from the perspective of such a creature.

So, how could such a creature create beings that do things that it doesn't know they can do and will do and have done and are capable of doing in order for these beings to have "free" will?

If you know everything that I will do the instant you create me (which you must, if you're truly omniscient) then how can I ever do anything that isn't known by you long before I do it? If this god can accurately see the "future," then the instant this being even thinks about our creation (as we are), it can see whether or not we pass the test of morality and get admittance into heaven.

Thus making the whole experiment a complete waste of everyone's time.

This god is omniscient, which means it knows everything you will ever do or say or practice or preach before you are even created, since that is what is knowable to this god. See what I mean? It is knowable to this god what you will do or say or practice or preach, due to its omniscience. If it doesn't know what you do or say or practice or preach, then it can't be omniscient.

It contradicts itself.

No, because god can't make people with "free" will; i.e., the ability to do or say or practice or preach that which god did not already know they would do or say or practice or preach.

It is a fait accompli the instant such an omnimax being even contemplates beings with our design (assuming, as we must, that we are also designed by this god).

How could an omniscient being not know what you will do?

If you say, "By giving us free will," then you are axiomatically stating that we have the ability to do something that an omniscient being can't know we would do. Note the absolute "can't."

If we can do something that god can't know we would do, then how is it possible to attribute "omniscience" to that god? You cannot.

Koyaanisqatsi

Well, setting aside the punishment quotient for non-compliance that is found primarily in the christian and muslim cults, if you know that a god created you and wants you to behave in a certain way, then how can anything you do be considered "free?"

God: I want you to do this.
You: I choose not to.
God: But I want you to.
You: Am I free to choose not to?
God: Yes, absolutely.
You: Then what do you care what I choose?
God: It's important that you choose what I desire.
You: Why?
God: Because I say so.
You: I don't accept that, of my own free will. Now what?

See? If there is no punishment for non-compliance with god's desires (which there must not be for us to be free), then what we choose in relation to that god's desires is entirely irrelevant. If god wants us to do something, then that axiomatically means there is an imperative of some kind that we do it. If not, then there is no reason, necessarily, that we do it.

If there is no necessary reason we do anything that god wants us to do, then it doesn't matter whether or not we do what this god wants us to do. There is no and can be no consequence for not choosing to do what god wants us to do, or else we can't be exercising our own "free will."

If, however, there is a consequence for not choosing to do what god wants us to do, then god's wants are actually threats, since god is the one who created everything and therefore created the potential harm for non-compliance with god's wants.

In the christian cult, this is called "Hell." If we don't do what god wants (in the christian cult) then we are thrown (or "cast") into Hell.

How can you have free will if a consequence for not doing what god wants means eternal damnation?

As I've mentioned many times before, in the following scenario (which is an identical analogy and therefore apt), do you have any free will?

I will punch you or I will hug you.

No matter what happens, you have no free will, since you are being either hugged or punched no matter what it is you want. You are being acted upon, whether you want it or not.

How is that either "free" or an action of your own will if I am either punching you or hugging you?

Then that means there was no reason to choose a particular C72 or J12 from out of the other 198 participants.

Then, again, there would have been no reason to choose a particular "template" at all. God would have to test every single being every single time, but if that's the case, then what good is god's omniscience?

Indeed, it would have to be done with every single person, yet, why would it, if, indeed, this god is omniscient?

Omniscience would dictate that god would not have to "test" every single being every single time (i.e., every single existence). Remember that my initial objection to all of this was in the contradictory problems inherent in positing an omniscient, omnipotent god, but it also addresses the pointlessness of doing a "test" universe.

Why, if this god is omniscient? See the contradiction?

Which would mean (if this weren't logically contradictory) that god would populate the world with everyone who behaves the way god wants them to behave and none of us would have free will.

Free will isn't an arm or a leg; it is an abstract cognitive process that seeks to determine on a case by case basis what moral action is "right" (in this god's eyes) and what moral action is "wrong" (in this god's eyes), so if we are all created in a manner in which we behave the way this god wants us to behave, then we can't behave any other way and we have no free will to behave in a manner that this god doesn't want us to behave.

How could we? We would be created in a manner where we behave in the way this god wants us to behave.

Koyaanisqatsi

Then what is the point of granting them "free will" to begin with? If god knows what will happen (which it must, due to omniscience) the second it conceives of these 100 Charlies, then why create the 100 Charlies to begin with? To find out what it already would know?

The whole point of the thought experiment is that these 100 Charlies are somehow (presumably through "free will") capable of doing something completely on their own without god's intervention or influence, but how is that possible when this god allegedly created us and "knows all"?

If you are a computer programmer who "knows all" there is to know about computer programming, then how is it possible you can create a program that does something you aren't already aware it is capable of doing and, in fact, created to begin with?

Remember the caveat; that you are a computer programmer who knows all there is to know about computer programming and, further all that could be known about computer programming.

With this level of absolute expertise we're talking about, you would know precisely, without even having to run the program, what it would do and how it would do it and what variables would arise and how your program would adapt and conform to those variables. You would know how it would perform on every single operating system and with every single glitch in those systems and on and on and on. There would be no ultimate reason for running the program, with that level of absolute knowledge; the level of absolute knowledge that this god is alleged to have.

Well, now you are. If my life is determined by god, then I can not possibly have "free will." It is determined by god what I will do and not do, not by me.

If, however, you are claiming that it is determined by me and not by a god, then such a god is irrelevant to my "determinism."

If you agree and then add in the caveat, "Ok, but this god gets to ultimately judge you on your "'determinism,'" then, ultimately I never had "free will" to begin with, since if I did not do what god wanted me to do, I would ultimately be punished for non-compliance.

If such a god punishes me for not doing what it wanted me to do, then, once again, I (and my choices) cannot be considered to be of my own free will, just as in the analogy I presented prior regarding the misnomer of "choice" in the scenario, "I will either punch you or hug you."

No matter what I "choose," I am still without my own ultimate free will, thus rendering the term meaningless.

I am being acted upon no matter what, so there is nothing free about my choices and nothing I would be choosing of my own free will. For me to be acting truly of my own "free will," I must have the option to not have either the hug or the punch.

If somebody else (and in this case, the "somebody" is ultimate) has the power to either directly or indirectly threaten me in any way into making a choice of any kind, then I cannot be considered to be acting out of my own "free will."

It's rigged from the start that I will be acted upon for the (false) "choice" that I make. A slave has no choice, unless that choice is freedom from punishment of the slave master. A slave master has only one ultimate "hold" over his or her slaves; punishment for non-compliance.

If it is directly or indirectly applied, then it is not possible to consider the slave to ever effectively (i.e., legitimately) act according to his or her "free will."

Indeed, it would not, since an omniscient god could not "add inherent randomness." It contradicts the attribute of omniscience. That much is absolutely clear. If a god does not know the outcome of its creation's experiences, then how can one consider that god to be omniscient?

Jamie_L

Koy:

Well, I certainly agree with you with respect to the inherent problems in the concept of "free will". As I mentioned earlier, I actually agree with everything you are saying.

However, there seem to be lots and LOTS of people who just shake their heads and say: "No, free will is possible. God gave it to us. Your arguements are wrong." I got tired of having the same arguement over and over, and thought I would try accepting their cognitive dissonance on the topic of "free will" and see if I could point out why their position would still be in error.

Perhaps you are right, however, that it's kind of a pointless exercise.

Jamie

Carol Massey

Jamie,

I would suggest that 'freewill' is something of a misnomer. 'Veto power' is more likely a better way to describe the application of freedom to discern and choose our actions and/or responses....allowing some, vetoing others.

In his book, The User Illusion: Cutting Consciousness Down To Size , Tor Norretranders does an remarkable job of
explaining the difference in 'freewill' and 'veto power', and backs it up with much scientific research.

tronvillain

Koyaanisqatsi:
Oh, an omniscient and omnipotent entity would have no reason to create hundreds of Charlies. If it wanted a Charlie that would eat a lot of doughnuts it would already know how to create one.
Given that the thought experiment concludes with doing away with the actual creation of the hundred Charlies, it seems to me that the point of the thought experiment is simply to illustrate the compatibility of omniscience with free will. The hundred Charlies are simply doing what any one of us does: making decisions based on the percieved state of the world and internal makeup. Minor variations in the initial conditions or some degree of randomness in the system produces a number of different Charlies, one of which eats more doughnuts than any of the others, without any intervention or influence by God whatsoever.
A computer programmer who "knows all" there is to know about computer programming is essentially one who has already run all the possible variations of computer programs in his head. It is not possible for such a programmer to create something capable of doing something the programmer was not already aware it was capable of doing, but what is your point? This does not appear to have anything to do with the discussion.
All that argument says is that whatever God's motivation for creation is, it is definitely not knowledge. Again, this does not appear to have anything to do with the discussion.
Well, what you will do will be determined by God in the sense that God sets your initial conditions and laws by which you operate, but you have "free will" in the sense that you make decisions based on your perception of the world and your internal make-up. If God subsequently interferes with the system and alters you, it is essentially desroying one individual with free will and creating another (or put more simply, it is interfering with free will).

It would seem somewhat ridiculous for God to punish someone for being the way God made them, but God threatening punishment does not interfere with free will at all. If you say to me, "Wash my car or I will beat you!" you are not interfering with my free will: do not have to wash your car since I can choose to be beaten instead. It is an attempt to deprive me of my freedom and make me a slave, but it does not affect free will.
As I said, while it would seem somewhat ridiculous for God to punish you for being the way it made you (unresponsive to its threats), it does not appear to affect free willL:you were capable of making choices about the world based on your internal make-up. "I will either punch you or hug you" is a statement that offers no opportunity for choice whatsoever, so I fail to see why you brought it up. Perhaps you meant to say something like "Do x and I will punch you, do y and I will hug you" or "Choose whether I will punch you or hug you"?
What is "your own ultimate free will"? It is meaningless simply because it lacks any apparent defintion. What more do you want than the ability to make choices based on the way you are and the way the world is?
A slave is not free, but a slave does have free will: the ability to make choices based on the way they are and the way the world is. Choosing to disobey and be punishment is obviously not an especially appealing choice, but it is a choice. You cannot deprive someone of free will without destroying them.
Ah, but inherent randomness does not necessarily contradict the attribute of omniscience. All randomness implies is that there will be no complete sufficient reason for the occurence of an event, but an omnipotent God could still know the outcome. That is, there would be absolutely no explanation for why a given particle decayed at a given time, but God would still know which particle and when.

tronvillain

Oh, and I will simply point out that I am an atheist, in case anyone was unaware. *chuckle*

Anyway, I suggest reading Dennett's Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting.

Ricomise

I find this interesting.

I certainly do not intend to speak for Koyaanisqatsi, but I understand the "punch or hug" statement this way:

God creates me, unleashes me in the universe to do my "free will" until I die. Then once I die, God either sends me to heaven or to hell. Which one I go to may be dependent upon my actions in the universe (that presumably God knew I would take before I took them), however, those are the only possibilities.

I think it could be fully expressed this way: "No matter what you do, I will either punch you or hug you." (This may be the same as "Choose whether I will puch you or hug you", but stated in a more imperative way.)

If, no matter what I do, I will be acted upon by God, in what way is my will "free?"

Tronvillain's (very interesting) answer is this:

I think, perhaps, that this discussion goes back to the very definition of what "free will" is. How "free" does one have to be to have "free will?" Are two choices sufficient? Must the choices be meaningful in some sense? If God limits the amount of choices for any reason, is the will still "free?"

Comments are apreciated.