Jamie_L

Thomas,

Other than the two criticisms of UPD that you mention, I have one other problem with it:

UPD is not compatible with an omnipotent God.

How much sense does it make to say: "God can do anything, but he can't achieve his ends without suffering."

This does not refute God, per se, but refutes the traditional notion of an omnipotent god. The only way for UPD to be compatible with an omnipotent God is to say God causes suffering as an ends, not a means. That is, he causes suffering because he wants suffering to exist. This is incompatible with the notion of a benevolent god.

So, to me, any Christian who uses UPD is denying some aspect of their professed god - either omnipotence or benevolence.

Only are religion that does not propose a benevolent, omnipotent god can get by with UPD, in my opinion. And even then, you're still stuck with the Trancendetal Arguement from Skepticism. Not a good foundation for a religion, if you ask me.

Jamie

Thomas Metcalf

The way most theists would try to avoid that is to use a different definition for "omnipotence." If there are goods that logically require some suffering, it's logically impossible to produce them without the instrumental suffering. I agree, however, that to move in this direction must end up denying some form of omnipotence.

Hobbs

I think they have another possible answer, one I've heard on occasion: that, in the grand scheme of eternity, suffering, even gratuitous suffering, here in this short life is so insignificant that it is, well, insignificant.

The problem with this is that it goes against the common theist claim that God is the only way (or at least the best way) to provide meaning and purpose in this life. But here, they are arguing that their worldview makes this life insignificant; the only significant point is whether you pick the right theology to get into heaven in the next life. But if they want to give up on the claim that God provides meaning and purpose in this life, then at least the insignificance defense isn't inconsistent, and, if there really is a heaven, perhaps even a not so bad one.

Thomas Metcalf

I agree that that's a useful criticism. I would also simply add that a morally perfect being prevents any gratuitous suffering. If God does not prevent all gratuitous suffering, it is possible to imagine a (slightly) morally better being, and this conflicts with "morally perfect."

Kantian

I recommend this satire in theology fiction, <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0156005050/103-7890474-9235828" target="_blank">Blameless in Abbadon</a>, by James Morrow. It contains several theodicies on the problem of evil:

• Disciplinary defense: Spare the rod, spoil the species. The novel's protagonist, a top-notch theologian who knows all the tricks of trade, establishes this Theodicy. The counterargument to this is that the quantity of pointless pain in the universe indicates depraved malevolence in God's nature.
• Hidden harmony defense Father knows best. This is the most popular version of Theodicy offered today- but it remains a stunning example of "pornography for priests" and goes counter to all human instincts.
• Eschatological Defense invented by Origien, the eunuch (so it says in the book) Existential, Moral, and Natural evil are justified in the end- the Day of Judgment. Morrow's creative rebuttal to this is the ingeniously titled Disneyland Defense- that a father promising the kids he will take them to Disneyland in spring gives him no right to sexually molest them throughout winter.
• Ontological defense God is perfect; whereas the universe is imperfect- otherwise it would be God. The universe is like a giant Swiss cheese, full of 'holes'- the holes being "evil" as the privation of the good. Morrow can't seem to come up with an answer for this one.
• Liberum Arbitrium The free will defense, that it was Adam's and Eve's choice that doomed humanity. However, the rebuttal here is that this defense presumes a strange form of Lamarckian biology that passes on inherent depravity, which has no scientific justification whatsoever.

Yes, the father-knows-best argument.

Voltaire's Candide took care of this ages ago.

[ August 06, 2002: Message edited by: Immanuel Kant ]</p>

Thomas Metcalf

Thanks for the recommendation. Another good semi-satirical take on theodicy is this.

<a href="http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/mark_vuletic/five.html" target="_blank">http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/mark_vuletic/five.html</A>

It fairly clearly demonstrates the dubiousness of theodicy.

Automaton

"He sewed his eyes shut, because he is afraid to see..." -Nine Inch Nails, Heresy

Apparently you haven't heard of the existential problem of evil, where the theist is unhappy with the current state of affairs but can't bring themselves to question belief in the all-loving God that would allow this. If theists did have the intellectual courage to question their child-conditioned beliefs, however, there would be no theists left.
We don't have a problem with evil per se. We have a problem with simple-minded God concepts that contradict aforementioned basic fact of reality.
So you are completely, 100%, alright with holding two contradictory beliefs at once and accepting both of them, without any sort of rationalization or justification for this whatsoever? Great.

Grumpy

I'll take a stab at it. Given that God wants to minimize suffering, he would be capable of arranging the "holes" or "shadows" such that humans never fall within them. Surely God's "light" of goodness could shine universally over the surface of the Earth, the depths of the ocean, and parts of the Moon where humans have travelled. His inattention (thus permitting evil) can be left for inhospitable areas, like the planet's core, Neptune, the Andromeda Galaxy, etc.

For that matter, there need only be a single "hole" in the physical universe in order to make it "imperfect" and thus not-God. In that case, God could use his power to hide that shadow spot in a harmless place. Think of it as a tailor hiding the seams in a garment.

But, as the saying goes, since suffering exists (apparently), God must want it, be powerless to stop it, or not be aware of it. And that's not God.

Keith Russell

Greetings:

If God is omnipresent, then everything that exists would be God.

If there is evil, and God is omnipresent, then parts of God are evil.

Even if God was not omnipresent, if He was omnipotent, He could do anything. He could thus remove evil if He wanted.

Once you begin to define God, the existence of God begins to be impossible.

Keith Russell.

WJ

auto!

I think if atheists questioned their childhood beliefs, they would see that no amount of intellectualizing will make the problem of evil go away

I see a Kant expert here! Just curious, do all Kantians believe in the sythetic apriori?