SeaKayaker

SingleDad,

Thanks for the reply.

I maintain that we should investigate worldviews based on their internal consistency, and I consider presuppositions crucial for internally investigating worldviews. However, is consistency a good judge of the soundness of a worldview?

I see a couple of points here. One is that two consistent statements are not necessarily true. For instance, I can say that I live in California (false) and that I have never been to Montana (false). These statements are consistent (it is possible that I could live in California and never have visited Montana), but false. Yet, we do not evaluate presuppositional claims in the same manner that we evaluate simpler claims (such as where I have been or where I live). It is impossible to impartially evaluate a worldview. If I claim that logic exists, in order to evaluate that directly you either have to presuppose that logic does exist or that it does not exist. In neither way are you impartial and if you take the second method I can pretty much ignore you (constructing an argument without the rules of logic would be impossible). This is just one example of how this is a different sort of issue from simple questions of fact easily settled through empirical evidence.
Now, you also say that there are many “mutually contradictory yet internally consistent metaphysical systems.” I do not claim to know everything, but I have not come across any metaphysical system aside from Christianity that is internally consistent. Any metaphysical system that places man’s reason as authoritative pretty much falls under my arguments against atheism (or similar arguments from a different angle), dealing with may worldviews at once. Others, I believe, fall under other critiques. As it seems thus far that the people on this post are either Christian (myself) or some level of atheist (everyone else), I would like to limit our discussion to atheism and Christianity for the time being. None of us has the time to investigate every religion, so I will try to stick to the ones most relevant to our current discussion for now.

In case there has been some confusion here, this is what I mean by indirectly challenging presuppositions (see if they lead to an internal contradiction).

Yes it is, so how about if we limit ourselves to a discussion of atheism and Christianity. We could theoretically arrive at a conditional proof of (C v A)<C. This would be a conditional proof based on the conditional proof assumption (that our only two options are C and A) where C = Christianity is true and A = atheism is true.

The issue of whether atheism is a metaphysical system (a worldview) or simply a random belief is a large one and I believe that atheism is a worldview. I have read George Smith’s piece on why it is not, and I will comment on that when I can (just to make sure, do you consider George Smith’s Atheism: The Case Against God a good definition, presentation, and defense of Atheism?).

SeaKayaker

Jack the Bodiless

SeaKayaker:
What sort of Christian are you? Biblical errancy is easily demonstrated, but if you don't actually believe the Bible is inerrant, it would be a waste of time.

For instance, how do you address the contradictions between empirical evidence and the Genesis creation story? What is your answer to the question I asked Jim Mitchell: If a paleontologist notes the position of a sequence of fossils in the fossil record, and then undergoes religious conversion or deconversion, will he find that the fossils have moved?

Jack the Bodiless

Another thing: You've said that you would like to concentrate on Christianity and atheism, but it would be interesting (and probably relevant) to know why you consider Hinduism to be internally inconsistent.

SingleDad

SeaKayaker

Like I said, internal consistency seems to be a necessary condition, but it is not sufficient. Accordance with perception is another necessary criterion. And actually, internal consistency derives from accordance with perception, since it appears to be the case that perception is itself consistent.

Not true. You have created an impartial meta-metaphysical system (internal consistency) with which you attempt to evaluate worldviews. I have another system, which I believe to be more compelling (accordance with perception). Both systems are relatively impartial; they can at least be used to evaluate any metaphysical system that claims to be internally consistent or that claims to account for perception.

However, if you actually believe that there is no such way to impartially evaluate metaphysical systems, then it is meaningless to claim that CP is "better" than an alternative metaphysical system, and your argument collapses. You can't just invoke noncomparability as a defense.

Your willful ignorance in evaluating different metaphysical systems is not a persuasive point. So far you have offered only the trivial strawman of metaphysical scientism as an example of a nontheistic metaphysical system.

Additionally you have not demonstrated the internal consistency of theism, much less biblical CP. The question of what it means to declare that "a god actually exists" is still completely undefined. Also, the statements in the bible that are contrary to perceptual fact need to be explained. The bible declares unequivocably that the world was created 6000 years ago and that there was a global flood, and that the sun orbits the earth. All of these statements of fact have been contradicted by perceptual experiences. You cannot reconcile the truth of the bible with the truth of perceptual experiences, so one or the other must go.

To "save" the internal consistency of CP, you must abandon the belief in the truth of perceptual experiences. However, most naturalists would see such a feature as prima facie evidence of the literal insanity of CP.

It is not at all clear that the belief in autonomous reasoning or autonomous perception by itself establishes a logical contradiction. Indeed according to CP, a god's reasoning and perception are autonomous, so autonomy per se cannot entail a contradiction. There is no reason why autonomy must entail perfection or an infinity.

You are obliged to make these critiques, not merely assert them.

Nope. We won't let you get away with that, unless you are making the general case that theistic presuppositionalism is necessary, which is a different argument. If you wish to make the case that christian presuppositionalism is true because it is christian (and not just theistic), then you most definitely need to account for the existence of other religions.

It is not our fault that you have chosen a position with such wide scope. Of course, you can make the arguments in any order you choose, but eventually you will need to address the questions of other religions.

Again, it should be noted that atheism is not a metaphysical system. Metaphysical naturalism (or just naturalism) is the term you're looking for here. Precision in philosophical arguments is always necessary; ambiguity begets uncertainty.

Rather than investigating whether atheism is a worldview, just use the uncontroversial term that does represent a worldview, metaphysical naturalism. The problem is that atheism is usually a conclusion, whereas nonbelief in the supernatural is a presupposition; the two positions are subtly but substantially dissimilar.

bgponder

Seak'er:
Sorry to be so long in replying. I have really been studying to try to form as coherent a reply as possible, other stuff happened...
Well, the anti-presup winds were certainly unleashed on the heels of our lasts posts re Van Til. I had already read "Why I Believe in God" from your earlier reference, and while I do see there a general humility, and I have no doubt that he was a kind man, I still see, in reference to those who may be merely skeptical, what might be termed a CP elitism. I fully admit that my inference may be predjudiced.

I don't know what else I can constructively add to what SingleDad, Jack and HRG have said generally in response to CP and/or TAG, but since the last question you asked me was whether or not I thought Universal Laws were necessary (as a full explanation, including "why" and leading to, proceeding from, or including an ontological statement), I will respond to that, and touch on other related things that have come up throughout.

Yes! Universal Laws are necessary, and in the context of our discussion re science, logic, etc., the ULs will always be formulated relative to the metaphysical constituents of the worldview being discussed. The ULs of Metaphysical Naturalism are the axioms of science, logic, et.al. and the answer to the regressive "Why?" will always be "Because that is what has been repeatedly observed or inferred from repeated observation."

Of course, you know the ULs of CP much better than I.

Now, is it meaningful to compare worldviews in this way? Not unless you simply wish to highlight differences. Is any one (or either one, in our case) truer? It depends on how you define Truth. Inasmuch as atheism/naturalism/nontheism/nonChristianity do not reflect the Bible, and you define the Bible as Truth, they will not be true. Inasmuch as their axioms do reflect the Bible, you must concede that those aspects are true.

And as far as the "full" explanation, Seak'er--while God may answer all the whys, it's obvious He doesn't answer most of the "how" details. I never saw, and still don't see, anything like the symbols you showed me, or biology, or geometry, ad infinitum. I gotta say, respectfully, that even though it's only a short time I've seen your thoughts, it's hard for me to believe that JC God satisfies your mind.

Is there an Ultimate Truth, or an ultimate standard of Truth? An Authority we cannot, or do not question? For me, not yet--I am still thinking about it.

I sense this may be my last post in this thread, but we will meet again, I guarantee, and I look forward to it.

Peace, Cornbread, and Happy Holidays!! Barry

SeaKayaker

SingleDad,

Sorry for the long delay, but school tends to get busy just before break (I am now off for Christmas).

Therefore, if metaphysic naturalism is inconsistent, then it cannot be true, right?

I am sorry for the confusion, but this is not what I meant. I meant that it is impossible to impartially directly evaluate a worldview. For instance, I cannot say that the Bible says that God exists and that contradicts metaphysic naturalism and therefore metaphysic naturalism must be false and expect the metaphysic naturalist to find this persuasive. Because the metaphysic naturalist does not accept the authority of Scripture, he will find this a ludicrous argument, so one has to indirectly evaluate worldviews.
Because your worldview will determine how you account for and interpret perceptions, I find accordance with perception to be a weak way of evaluating a worldview. You say that perception appears to be consistent (I take that to mean “accurate” in the context), but is there any reason why it should be?

Just to make sure that this is clear, I should have said that there is no way to directly evaluate a worldview impartially (without stepping out of your own worldview and into the other worldview).

In case this is not clear, I am referring to the God of the Christian Bible.

When discussing consistency, we have mainly been dealing with the fundamental issues of worldviews at large (in this thread, mainly epistemology). How can you make these critiques of Christianity if you have not shown that the metaphysic naturalist has a basis for logic? I do believe that there was a global flood, not having found any persuasive evidence to the contrary (remember, my presuppositions will cause me to require far more evidence to deny a global flood than would yours). I do not believe that you can make a persuasive Biblical case to say that the sun revolves around the earth. On the exact date of creation, I will be more flexible. I would not say that the evidence is irreconcilable with a recent creation, but neither will I at the moment insist that the earth is not more than six thousand years old.

Actually, Christian presuppositionalism provides the basis for accepting the truth of perceptual experiences.

Man’s autonomous reason is faulty, not God’s.


I believe that you are an atheist, not a Hindu, a Mormon, or a Muslim, so I will respond to you as to an atheist. Neither of us has the time to defend our worldviews against all other possible worldviews, so I am proposing the reasonable alternative that we deal with the issue of Christianity and metaphysic naturalism for now.

Are you asking me to refute all other religions or to explain why they exist? In the light of your previous comments, the first seems likely, although the second seems to fit better with your actual words here.

SeaKayaker

SeaKayaker

Bgponder,

Sorry to see you go, but I have one last comment (if you are reading this post).

My point is that everyone, you included, has an ultimate standard of truth. There is an authority that you do not question, be it logic, empiricism, your autonomous reason, or something else. I am just looking at the validity of these ultimate authorities.

Thanks for your posts (it is not everyone who is willing to keep up a dialogue with a Christian presuppositionalist without just ranting and raving).
SeaKayaker

SingleDad

SeaKayaker

No rush. Metaphysics isn't going anywhere.

Well, consistency as a criterion of "truth" is a metaphysical statement. However, I would say that an explosively contradictory metaphysical system is not at all useful. I note the condition explosively contradictory because it is not clear what value <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-paraconsistent/" target="_blank">Paraconsistent Logics</a> might have for metaphysics.

Ok. I understand your meaning and I agree.

It is not "god" that is at issue (at least here) but "actually exists" means.

It is unclear what you mean. What is a "basis" for logic? Why must I have one? Why can I not simply presuppose (as you do) that logic is truth-preserving?

To take your approach, can I not "insert" myself into christian presuppositionalism and note that according to your own metaphysical system, there are statements that are held to be both true and false? Such observations are valid according to both of our metaphysical systems.

This is a rather disingeneous statement. It is not that there is not any persuasive evidence against a global flood, rather you deny the truthfulness of any evidence that does exist. Indeed, to maintain the belief in a global flood, it seems to me that one must deny that we can speak truthfully at all from the evidence of our senses; in other words, to save christianity from self-contradiction, you must deny that one can never determine the truthfulness of observation and perception under any circumstances.

I don't see how, or even why. You have the whole truth in the bible. Why even bother with perception? Why not simply call it all lies and delusions of the devil and be done with it?

This is not the issue. The issue is your claim that the naturalist account of reasoning is faulty because it falsely assumes that man's reasoning is autonomous. The implication is clear: if reasoning is claimed to be autonomous, then it cannot exist. So it is hard to see your reasoning here.

You are making a much broader general claim than I am, that christianity is true because all other worldviews are inconsistent. The metaphysical naturalist is making a much narrower claim, that metaphysical naturalism is useful because it adequately explains the world of experience. There is no need to examine or "defend" it against all worldviews, because the value of MN does not depend on the flaws of other worldviews.

CP sets itself a difficult task by defining its value in terms of all other worldviews. Before you have me convinced, you will indeed have to address all other possible worldviews, either in the general case or one-by-one. If you do not wish to set yourself such an Olympian task, then you will have to modify your claim.

I don't mind starting off one by one. Showing that MN is explosively self-contradictory would indeed be a good first start.

Remember that the "ultimate authority" of metaphysical naturalism is not logic or objective reality. Rather it is the existence of perceptual experiences.

Also remember that a presupposition can be imposed because it helps one makes sense of things known to be true (e.g. the principle for constructing empirical ontological hypotheses), and can be evaluated on that basis.

[ December 16, 2001: Message edited by: SingleDad ]</p>

SeaKayaker

SingleDad,

Thanks for the reply.

Just out of curiosity, what to you mean to say that we both believe that logic is “truth-preserving?” I claim that logic “works” because of the universal laws of the universe that God created and maintains, so what do you mean in saying that I consider logic “truth-preserving?”

If that is what you wish to do, you are entitled to do so. Just remember, though, that when you offer an internal critique to my worldview I will work to show how it is internally consistent. My explanations will not be intended to convince you (as a metaphysical naturalist) that Christianity is true and your system is false, but just that Christianity is internally consistent. As is presuppose the authority of Scripture, it would be valid and normal for me to appeal to Scripture to answer your objections.

I am not aware of any convincing evidence against the possibility of a global flood. If you would care to enlighten me, please feel free to do so. However, I would take more evidence to deny a global flood than you would. To look at this in a different way, we can ask what the chance is of life coming into existence from non-living matter (or of macro-evolution, or some similar idea). I think that we can both agree that the probability is extremely slim. However, even if there is only a 1 in 100,000,000,000 chance of one of those events happening the way an atheist would claim that it had to happen, it still could happen (one of those 100,000,000,000 options had to happen, and the outcome you claim is equally probable as any other one outcome). Therefore, you accept that it did indeed happen because of your presuppositions (I am not trying to make evolution sound impossible; I am making the case that it could be possible in your worldview). I am doing the same sort of thing, just with different presuppositions.

The Bible does not reveal everything. For instance, there is much that it does not reveal about science. In fact, one could take its command for man to have dominion over the earth to say that Christians have a religious duty to further science (since this helps fulfill this commandment). This could be a bit of a stretch, but I think that it shows that, although the Bible reveals truth to man, it does not reveal every single truth.

If any of the other religions that I mentioned were completely true, could metaphysical naturalism be true as well?

Why do you not have this responsibility? George Smith sets forth the argument that atheism is a negative belief and therefore does not have a burden of proof against theistic beliefs. Is this the idea that you are getting at?

SeaKayaker

Goliath

SeaKayaker,

Incorrect. Some atheists, when asked how the universe was formed, say "I don't know." I am just one of such a set of atheists. Since your entire argument rests on this invalid assertion, your entire argument crumbles into dust.

Oh, in the future, please be sure to make a distinction between evolution and abiogenesis. My area is Mathematics, not Biology. Regrettably, I'm not very knowledgable about Biology. However, even I know the difference between the concepts of evolution and abiogenesis.

Goliath