sophie

Jpbrooks : in Garlikov's essay) do those items (considered collectively) constitute understanding? As the essay points out in the example about Feynman, one may come to understand a problem in a new way even though one does not have access to all of the "rules" that have been discovered relating to that problem.

Your friend Garilkov, can I call him your friend, brilliant though he may be should have drawn a line between understanding and forming an understanding or as he put it come to understand.

In my mind these are two seperate problems and the reason why I attribute a quality of seperateness to them is when one understands the interference of always coming to understand again would hamper the use of an understanding. As such I will strongly claim that the use of an understanding is unhindered by everything except the conscious claim “that is wrong”, or “this does not seem correct, I must have misunderstood”. At this very same point, one would then need to “come to an understanding”, of that which one had no real understanding. Then Garilkov’s finer points will assume control of the situation.

If we review what I claimed about understanding was solely constrained to “an understanding”. Although one may come to a new understanding while using an old form of understanding, this would be a result of a bigger picture where an understanding was in play.

The good point you make and which can be formed into the question of “how do we come to form an understanding”, would necessitate another thread, from my point of view.

In concluding this post I reiterate the basic points of an understanding, an understanding existent in its current form, just an understanding which can be called into play anytime as long as the good old memory is in working order.