Tercel

The key to 2. This is nothing more than a rephrasing of the second premise. The key to being able to navigate in reality regardless of it being illusory or not is that it is consistent and regular.

I'm talking hypothetically here. Imagine there existed a world that was created by "a personal and consistent deity as the ultimate reality". I'm saying that in such a hypothetical world, there would most probably be "consistency and regularity of personal experience". The deity of that world, being a consistent and personal being, is most likely to make the world it creates consistent and regular.

I have no idea how you got that interpretation out of it.
Imagine another hypothetical world. This one has no deity, and is completely naturalistic. Imagine there are personal beings in such a world. How likely are they to find the world they live in as consistent and regular? Might not they find it chaotic and random? Any naturalistic ultimate reality in that world is going to be uncaring about any personal beings in it. It's not going to design itself to be comprehensible to those personal beings that are in it. Thus whether or not the personal beings find the paricular world to be consistent and regular to them will be a matter of chance.

In this conclusion I simply combine the results of the last two premises. This is just basic probabilistic reasoning based on the evidence. Use Bayes' theorem to simulate what I'm doing here if you want.


On to the other argument.

Um, that's a big sentence...
Having read it a couple of times, I will hazard the guess that no, that's not really what I'm saying here. I was saying that in the previous argument, but it's irrelevant for this one.
Here, I've noted that we can't actually prove the world exists, or a number of other basic things (Premise 1). Then I noted that we simply assume the truth of these things because it allows us to navigate in reality (Premise 2). This premise (Premise 3) draws out the implication in the second premise.
Question: Why do we assume the truth of these things? Answer: Because we want to navigate in "reality".
Question: Why do we wnat to navigate in "reality"?
Answer: Because it's convenient to do so. If we didn't navigate in reality properly then we might do things like walk into walls, starve to death etc.
This premise (Premise 3) rephrases the answer to this last question and points out that our belief in these basic things is based on convenience as opposed to evidence.

In this premise, I am simply noting that there is no good reason to stop us applying the same kind of belief based on convenience to God.

I find it convenient to believe in God. More on that further down this post.

We assumed the existence of the real world based on nothing more than convenience. I assume the accuracy of my memories based on nothing more than convenience. (Side note: Try proving the accuracy of your memory! ) I assume that other minds like mine (yours included) exist based on nothing more than convenience. (I can't prove you're not a psychological projection of my own mind) Am I justified in doing this? Presumably so - everyone does it! Why can't I then simply assume God exists because it's convenient to me?

As far as which deity goes, I'm not sure whether it's reasonable to assume any specific deity or not. I think assuming the existence of a deity is as far as this argument can be taken.

Aren't I? Are you simply riding the fence in case the world exists, or are you actually believing? Are you simply riding the fence in case your memories are actually reasonable accurate, or do you actually believe your memories reasonable accurately model what they claim to? Most people fall off when they try to ride fences. I imagine most people have fallen off those two fences, and so I imagine most people would have no trouble falling off the God fence.

Of course, one can't coherently maintain a belief in all religions. One can however, not be a Metaphysical Naturalist. I think you would struggle to find a religion that had Metaphysical Naturalists faring better in the afterlife than believers of other religions.

Of course they aren't. I'm simply saying that when they do act morally they're being inconsistent in their philosophy as they have no substantial reason to do so.

Okay. Many people however, myself included, can't see or don't have sufficient meaning to their lives without a belief in God.

Have a look at my previous response (and my soon coming response to his most recent post) to Vorkosigan on this issue.

You’ve misunderstood it. Some people find it difficult to cope with never seeing their loved ones again, or they are afraid of death. The belief that there is life after death can help these people. Even for people who don’t need this belief, it’s still nice to think it might be true. And if it’s convenient to believe it true, then, as we have seen above, it is justifiable to believe it.

Tercel

Jack the Bodiless

There is an important distinction here. I reluctantly accept without proof that my senses and reason are reliable: I have no alternative. If I could test them, I would, but I can't. These are the primary necessary assumptions required for mental function.

But why should anyone reluctantly accept the existence of God as a necessary assumption? The Universe makes sense without a God.
Why are you seeking to equate "naturalistic" with "chaotic and random"? A naturalistic Universe may or may not function according to regular and immutable natural laws: likewise, one controlled by a deity may be predictable or not, depending on the whim of the deity. There is no correlation between the existence of a deity and the regularity of a Universe: for instance, the Universe of metaphysical naturalism is much more regular and predictable than the Biblical one (no miracles).

Given that the Universe of metaphysical naturalism IS regular, you have this backwards: "Any naturalistic ultimate reality in that world is going to be uncaring about any personal beings in it. It's not going to design itself to be comprehensible to those personal beings that are in it". The personal beings designed themselves to comprehend the Universe (via evolution), not vice versa.

Jack the Bodiless

To elaborate: there are four posible types of Universe.

1. Chaotic, godless
2. Chaotic, with a God
3. Ordered, godless
4. Ordered, with a God

We have no means of determining the probabilities of each: it is meaningless to talk about the God-equipped Universes being "more likely". There is an anthropic argument that we are more likely to find ourselves in an ordered Universe than a chaotic one: a chaotic godless Universe lacks the stability required for life to evolve, and in a chaotic Universe in which I was created by the whim of a God, I could be eaten by my television tomorrow. Thus, 3 and 4 are more likely to contain intelligent life than 1 and 2, but there is no basis for considering 4 more plausible than 3.

If you wish to simply rule out option 2, and declare that you're only considering "Gods of order", I can just as easily rule out 1 and declare that I am only considering godless Universes which work in an orderly fashion.

Theli

Tercel...

I just wondered, if consistency in experiences is the key in wich you determine your reality by, how do you know you interpreted your experiences right?
If you claim that you felt the christian god, then your interpretation of that experience is based on prior knowledge (the bible, possibly). In wich, for you to claim that what you experienced the christian god you must assume that the source for your info (the bible) is truthfull.

I don't see how your argument really helps godbelief.
I also wanted to post a previous question (for the 3rd time).

What moraly justifiable reason can you give for an individual to act benevolent assuming the christian god exist, that you can't give assuming he doesn't exist?

Tercel

I disagree. We have plenty of examples of behaviour of personal, rational, intelligent beings. They're called humans. A little thought can be used to apply the relevant parts of this sample space to the concept of gods.

But the only way you "know" your "experience of the universe" is because that's what your memory is telling you. Why do you assume the truth of what your memory tells you?

I was using the word "pragmatism", but I dropped it in favour of "convenience" on the basis that it was easier to convey what I meant.
But really, whatever word you use, the principle is the same: We all assume quite a number of basic things to be true, and none of them can we prove - and most of them we can't even conceivably get any evidence for.
Do we do it because it's convenient? Well believing in God is convenient. Do we do it because it's natural and instinctual? Well the vast majority of humans have found belief in God to be natural and instinctual.

Can you present (and reasonably defend) a criteria that on the one hand explains why we are justified in making the assumptions that we do, but not justified in making the assumption of God's existence? Such a counter-example would best refute my argument - so can you come up with one?
(I am actually interested to see if you can, since this argument seems to be turning me into a presuppositionalist - which I'm not sure is a good thing )

Of course, it wouldn't make a good movie otherwise, would it?
But you can give no proof that this "reality" isn't similiar to the Matrix (without the parts that show it to be a lie) can you?

How about just confirming them to yourself?

Again though, it comes back to the question of why you are justified in granting that specific presupposition and not others such as God.

I’m not sure I want to know where that one came from!
Suffice to say, I have yet to discover that implication in my presuppositions.

Neither do mine.

I’m sure you have your own opinion of how the world should be run, just as I have my own opinion.

But Occam’s Razor cuts both ways. Yes I am multiplying entities unnecessarily with adding belief in God, but at the same time I am introducing a large dose of parsimony into my beliefs. –The assumption of God serves to give a good reason for believing the reality of the world, the existence of other minds, the accuracy of my memories etc. Where you have a set of pretty much independent presuppositions you are making, I –by adding only one more concept to my presuppositions- have rendered all of my presuppositions interdependent and significantly more parsimonious.

?
I think you may have mis-read my comment. I’m discussing a generalised version of Pascal’s Wager here. In general being religious is a better bet than being non-religious since most religions say bad stuff will happen to unbelievers and good stuff to believers. You challenged that with the point that some religions only claim that believers in their religion will go to heaven and the rest will go to hell or whatever else. In the above, I’m pointing out that even so, in general religions seem to prefer people who are religious (even if they haven’t got the “right” religion) over those who are completely atheistic with regard to all religious. Hence the “best bet” is to not be a Metaphysical Naturalist.

Can and am.

If we are immortal, destined for eternity, then what we do gains meaning. The love we give to others changes them and us and has implications for all eternity. Our choices really matter – they are not simply forgotten in time. Everything we do lasts and is not simply rendered meaningless dust long after our death.

I will one day die, everything physical I achieve on this world will with time crumble into dust, one day no one will remember me or anything I did, the human race will one day die out, the universe will one day end – be it collapsing back into itself or flying out and cooling for all eternity.

But we live on after death. Live on for all eternity. Every change I make to my own character is something that will have implications for eternity. It will never crumble, or die out, fade or cease. Everything I do to others will last, be it causing them suffering, or giving them love and compassion. It is something that will change them and have effect for ever. Only that which can last forever seems to me to be truly meaningful. That which we do that one day will end – that one day there will be no difference between us having done it and having not done it – that is meaningless. But that which has eternal implications becomes meaningful. True power is the power to change all things for eternity, all other power is an illusion.

I thought my view gave more meaning to human achievements? That which we achieve, and that which we give and do to one another will last forever. Each individual becomes a possessor of eternity. It seems to me that my view takes meaning away from empty physical achievements and bestows the meaning on each and every individual human being. The love we give to one another becomes that which has the greatest meaning of all. Is this bad?
Mozart brought joy to many people with his music, he changed people, people who he will have influenced for all eternity.
But on the other hand, my view recognises the power given to the human race.
People can choose the bad, then can rape, abuse, hate. And this has equally meaningful implications: That which they do to others will survive forever.
In granting us our eternal natures and our ability to interact with others God has granted us true power and meaning for what we do both to ourselves and others.

Are human achievements ridiculous without accepting Jesus? Well I’m not quite sure what you mean by “accepting Jesus”, but as you can see, I believe “human achievements” in and of themselves are completely meaningless. The only meaningful things is that which lasts, and that is what we make of ourselves and what we make of others.

I suggest you read Ecclesiastes. He’s a person who’s not sure that there’s anything after death, and he can clearly see the meaningless nature of our efforts in the material world.

Tercel

Tercel

If I am understanding the question properly, then the answer is that I simply assume that I am reasonably accuracte.

Can't I claim that what I felt correlates well with what the Bible seems to me to say?

I answered the question the first time it was asked. You told me I had either misunderstood the question or not answered it. If I "misunderstood" the question the first time around I see little reason to try again to answer it since I'm no doubt still misunderstanding it. Or perhaps you are misunderstanding my answer, in which case you'd probably still misunderstand it if I repeated it.

I can only suggest you reread my response to the question and try to understand what I was saying. The sections on my last two posts to Vorkosigan that dealt with what is meaningful may help you to understand where I'm coming from also.

Vorkosigan

I can see that this thread is bloating probably beyond recovery. Just like my abdomen.

I disagree. We have plenty of examples of behaviour of personal, rational, intelligent beings. They're called humans. A little thought can be used to apply the relevant parts of this sample space to the concept of gods.

I disagree. We can't even do what you are doing with humans; they are too different from each other. In any case, your god is perfect, humans are not. No generalizations possible. Additionally, there is no reason to assume the rationality of a deity is anything like our own.

But the only way you "know" your "experience of the universe" is because that's what your memory is telling you. Why do you assume the truth of what your memory tells you?

I don't assume the truth of what my memory is telling me; I discover that it is true because the universe is consistent. If my memory were false, the universe would not be consistent.

Additionally, there are records of events in my life that I can doublecheck. And the memories of others. Intersubjectivity is a powerful epistemological tool.

Can you present (and reasonably defend) a criteria that on the one hand explains why we are justified in making the assumptions that we do, but not justified in making the assumption of God's existence? Such a counter-example would best refute my argument - so can you come up with one?

I already gave it to you. Your assumption of god is (1) unnecessary (2) does not explain anything (3) is not warranted by logic or evidence (4) is contraindicated by our experience of reality (5) is incoherent and contradictory.

(I am actually interested to see if you can, since this argument seems to be turning me into a presuppositionalist - which I'm not sure is a good thing )

That would be too bad. I would mourn the loss of a good mind. Also, presuppositionalists make me want to consume Haagen-daaz by the quart. Please don't torture me that way!

But you can give no proof that this "reality" isn't similiar to the Matrix (without the parts that show it to be a lie) can you?

I don't need to. There's no evidence to suggest that it is. Why should I suspect that I am a brain in a jar?

Again though, it comes back to the question of why you are justified in granting that specific presupposition and not others such as God.

I gave five good reasons to disregard that presupposition.

m not sure I want to know where that one came from! uffice to say, I have yet to discover that implication in my presuppositions.

Just look at history, Tercel. People who believe in authority-gods do a lot of killing. The consequences of belief are one of the reasons freethinking atheists like myself gave it up. For any particular individual, authoritarian beliefs may well lead to positive outcomes, but for society as a whole, and for groups of people, authority beliefs are pernicious.

Occam’s Razor cuts both ways. Yes I am multiplying entities unnecessarily with adding belief in God, but at the same time I am introducing a large dose of parsimony into my beliefs. –The assumption of God serves to give a good reason for believing the reality of the world, the existence of other minds, the accuracy of my memories etc. Where you have a set of pretty much independent presuppositions you are making, I –by adding only one more concept to my presuppositions- have rendered all of my presuppositions interdependent and significantly more parsimonious.

No, it is not more "parsimonious." You don't assume "god," Tercel, you assume a god with a particular set of characteristics, none of which you have any evidence for. You have a whole forest of asumptions, and you still haven't escaped the same trap I am in as far as the brain-in-the-jar argument goes; your god could be playing tricks on you.

In any case, naturalism has already provided a pretty clear basic account of how human cognitive attributes could have evolved and actually work. Are you familiar with the field of evolutionary psychology?

I think you may have mis-read my comment. I’m discussing a generalised version of Pascal’s Wager here. In general being religious is a better bet than being non-religious since most ... Hence the “best bet” is to not be a Metaphysical Naturalist.

Hmmm, now I understand. That may well be true as generalization about religions. The problem in identifying the "correct" religious stance remain....in addition, you could broaden your statement to include many different kinds of beliefs. People are built to think that everyone should be doing the things they do; it's part of our cognitive equipment for group-forming in a society composed of highly social primates. I mean, ever had a friend turn on to collecting, or Sci-Fi, or D&D, or the Democratic Party and then try to bring you in? Your comment is true, but not nearly broad enough.

Are human achievements ridiculous without accepting Jesus? Well I’m not quite sure what you mean by “accepting Jesus”, but as you can see, I believe “human achievements” in and of themselves are completely meaningless. The only meaningful things is that which lasts, and that is what we make of ourselves and what we make of others.

Tercel, our philosophies are diametrically opposed. To me the human is the only thing that has meaning. The otherworldly focus of religion is one of its most dehumanizing and pernicious aspects; combined with the authoritarianism of religion, it has resulted in much human misery.

Vorkosigan

Tercel

What in particular were you hoping to "recover"?

Isn't this a rather narrow view? Simply because we have not observed a specific thing, has never stopped us before from making comparisons and predictions based on similiar things in our experience.

It seems rather convenient that when I argue "a god being somewhat similar to a human would most probably act something like this since that is what humans would be likely to do" I get hit with the argument that God is so different to humans that we could know absolutely nothing whatsoever about him or about his possible actions. Yet when it comes to the question of why there is suffering in the world, I am constantly told that any god would be similiar enough to humans for us to fully understand him and all possible reasons he might have for allowing suffering, and since none of the ones we can think of are good there exist no possible reasons and God doesn't exist.
Both there positions don't seem to me to be able to be maintained coherently at once.

How do you know the universe is consistent? Your memory? -That would be circular.

Of course, the second after you've finished doublechecking the events you're back to relying on your memory for the fact that you have doublechecked them and no better off than before you started.

Neither is belief in the existence of the world. People have been Solipsists in the past.

Actually I find it explains a lot of things. Perhaps you could tell me how assuming the accuracy of your memory or the falsity of Solipsism "explains" anything?

Well there I must differ.

However, I wanted here criteria with regard to differenciating "good" presuppositions from "bad" ones. Since presuppositions by nature aren't based on logic or evidence, I fail to see how this is related.

Care to explain?

??? Belief in any sort of "god" whatsoever is "incoherent and contradictory"? I'm not suggesting here you should be presupposing the Christian god, only a god.

Don't worry, I won't be dropping any evidential arguments any time soon. I'll simply add some pre-sup ones to my list.

But there's no evidence to suggest that it isn't. Why shouldn't you suspect that you are a brain in a jar? It's a conceivable possibility. I see no way of evaluating whether it a more likely possibility than not.
Let's rephrase:
You are presented with sense data. You are choosing to interpret that sense data as an accurate reflection of an actually existing external world. It's an apparently arbitrary choice. You could equally conceivably interpret the sense data as a phychological projection of your own subconscious. Or you could choose to interpret it as false sense data feed to you by an external source such as the Matrix.
Yet given these equally conceivable alternatives, most all people choice the first option. Why? Is it because the belief is convenient and natural? How does belief in god not fall under these same criteria?

But the examples I gave would seem to demonstrate that your reasons would have me disregard other important presuppositions apart from god.

So do those who don't! Of people convicted for Murder, I wonder what percentage of those are actively religious compared to percentage of actively religious people in general? Not high, I would imagine.
But what about Stalin? What about China?
Care to explain why the countries in which Metaphysical Naturalist regimes have been in power have been... less than satisfactory?

Imagine it is a dark foggy night, you walk down an alley and 10 youths are walking towards you in the distance. You are more than a little afraid they might be up to no good and going to hurt you. Would you feel better if you knew:
* None of them have any religious beliefs; or
* They are all dedicated Christians, just come from a Bible-study.

You do the math.

Perhaps you should do the above example twice then, to make sure you get it...

I assume a specific type of god, true. However my presuppositions would seem to have parsimony in themselves as I am assuming that and only that which is pragmatic for me to assume. All my presuppositions can thus be grouped into one underlying principle, which is extremely justifiable.

Good point. I suppose I’m assuming a non-tricking type of god.

Not greatly. I can understand however that naturalism could provide a reason for the accurate functioning of cognitive faculties via evolution. However the system is still circular of course. Why should I choose the presupposition that I can reason accurately because of I evolved to be able to do so, over the presupposition that I can reason accurately because an intelligent being designed me to do so?

I agree the problem of identifying the “correct” religious stance is still there. However, if you agree with me that “the ‘best bet’ is to not be a Metaphysical Naturalist” then perhaps we can get somewhere with this argument.
I say, we should presuppose a belief if and only if our “best bet” is to hold that belief (which is what I called “pragmatism” above).

It’s our best bet to believe in the reality of the world. It’s our best bet to believe in the accuracy of our memories. It’s our best bet to believe in the accuracy of our reasoning. It’s our best bet to believe other minds exist. It’s our best bet to believe in the accuracy of our senses. Do you agree with me up to here?
These beliefs we presuppose because -I say- they are our best bets. If our best bet to not believe in Metaphysical Naturalism, I say would should similarly presuppose that to be false.

I thought I was saying exactly that in my conclusion?

Tercel

Theli

Tercel...

Tercel:
If I am understanding the question properly, then the answer is that I simply assume that I am reasonably accuracte.
[/QUOTE]

That's a pretty bold assumption.
If your experience can be summoned up as feeling as presence, seeing something out of the ordinary or hearing a voice, isn't it a pretty large step from saying you felt a presence and saying you felt an omnipotent, omniscient, omni... (as so on) god?
The dumb thing about this is that people experience something that is barelly possible for them to comprehend, and then claim with certainty and conviction that it is a specific god (or entity) with specific attributes and a specific will.
I mean, if someone believed in ghosts they would have said that what they've experienced was in fact a ghost. Someone who believes in alien mindcontrol will say it was aliens.. And so on.

I must ask you, how can you "feel" that god is omnipotent? How can you feel that his son was Jesus?

Theli:
What moraly justifiable reason can you give for an individual to act benevolent assuming the christian god exist, that you can't give assuming he doesn't exist?

Tercel:
I answered the question the first time it was asked. You told me I had either misunderstood the question or not answered it. If I "misunderstood" the question the first time around I see little reason to try again to answer it since I'm no doubt still misunderstanding it.

Theli(NEW):
I phrased the question abit badly, and you gave a pretty weird answer. Probably caused by my own grammar.

(This is what you said)
Tercel:
If God is indeed God, then he surely has the sovereign right to make moral decrees? Furthermore as our creator and sustainer, we owe our very existence to him, he would seem to thus have every right to place laws ordering the morality of human behaviour.

Theli(NEW):
You showed me a reason out of god's perspective, wich was not what I was asking for.
The only reason you gave me as an individual was "we owe our very existence to him", wich would imply that we could willfully inflict damage on other beings aswell as ourselfs justified by guilt (or obedience).
If someone saves your life and then tell you to go on a killing spree, is that moraly justified on your part?

(You also said)
Tercel:
The existence of God provides an objective grounding point and source for any moral standard.

Theli(NEW):
But how can god's will be a objective grounding point for moral standard when his will (as writen in the bible) can, and has been interpreted in so many ways?
And also if his "will" can be used to justify crimes against humanity (I don't think I have to count them all) then how can you call it a good standard for the individual to live by?

[ May 23, 2002: Message edited by: Theli ]</p>

Vorkosigan

So do those who don't! Of people convicted for Murder, I wonder what percentage of those are actively religious compared to percentage of actively religious people in general? Not high, I would imagine.

Define "actively religious." Lots of mafia types go to church. Here in Taiwan organized crime gangs are associated with local temples.

But what about Stalin? What about China?
Care to explain why the countries in which Metaphysical Naturalist regimes have been in power have been... less than satisfactory?

China and the USSR had Communist regimes, authority beliefs just like Christianity.

Metaphysical naturalism contains nothing in it that demands that people be killed, so can't be the cause of any problems. Isn't a political philosophy, and doesn't lust for power. If you are correct, why aren't the jails filled with scientists? But as we both know, they are filled with believers.

Imagine it is a dark foggy night, you walk down an alley and 10 youths are walking towards you in the distance. You are more than a little afraid they might be up to no good and going to hurt you. Would you feel better if you knew:
* None of them have any religious beliefs; or
* They are all dedicated Christians, just come from a Bible-study.

Depends. Am I gay? A Jew? A muslim? An atheist? Christians discriminate against non-Christians, and violence by Christians against non-Christians is common in many places. Think Matthew Shepard was killed by atheists?

Me personally, I'd be delighted to find 10 co-nonreligionists in a dark alley. Do you think gangsters don't go to Bible study?

Indeed, Tercel, in the US there are whole realms of crime committed only by Christians. Murdering abortionists. Breaking Church-state separation laws. Attacking homosexuals. Etc.

In Kenya where I used to teach, all students take Bible study as part of their school curriculum, usually daily (unless they are muslims or hindus). You might be interested in the relatively common mass rapes that occurs when boys from boys schools go on a rampage against a local girls school. Here is a recent article on it:
<a href="http://allafrica.com/stories/200011130020.html" target="_blank">http://allafrica.com/stories/200011130020.html</a>
Did I mention that only boys from schools where Christianity has been taught do this?

So yes, Tercel, if I met ten bible thumpers in an alley, I might be a little scared.


It seems rather convenient that when I argue "a god being somewhat similar to a human would most probably act something like this since that is what humans would be likely to do" ....

Look at the worlds humans actually create in the arts, literature, and speculative sciences, Tercel. Are they regular? Orderly? Rational? Sometimes they closely reflect this one, sometimes they are wildly different. Even if you use humans as a model, the universes we actually create are so varied as to be meaningless for determining what some hypothetical deity might do.

....I get hit with the argument that God is so different to humans that we could know absolutely nothing whatsoever about him or about his possible actions. Yet when it comes to the question of why there is suffering in the world, I am constantly told that any god would be similiar enough to humans for us to fully understand him and all possible reasons he might have for allowing suffering, and since none of the ones we can think of are good there exist no possible reasons and God doesn't exist. Both there positions don't seem to me to be able to be maintained coherently at once.

The incoherence lies in the Christian claim that god is "good." You guys claim that my sister's slow, agonizing death from a degenerative nerve condition, along with her learning disabilities and badly-wired nervous system that falsely reports sense data to her brain, that her chronic, pointless suffering is actually "good" under some higher meaning of "good" beyond human ken. But that is absurd and incoherent. If we can't understand it, how do we know it is good?

Atheists just reflect the basic absurdity of this claim back at you. If god were good in any way we understand the term, then pointless suffering would not occur. Therefore god is not good, or good is incoherent. The confusion lies in your theology, not our arguments.

Of course, the second after you've finished doublechecking the events you're back to relying on your memory for the fact that you have doublechecked them and no better off than before you started.

No, because along the way I've discovered the wonderful process of evolution that explains why my memory for certain things works extremely well.

In any case, any epistemological trap you want to put me in also contains you. Your memory suffers the same problems.

Actually I find it explains a lot of things. Perhaps you could tell me how assuming the accuracy of your memory or the falsity of Solipsism "explains" anything?

Like I said, I don't "assume" the accuracy of my memory. I confirm it by repeated interactions with the world. Unless my memory worked, Tercel, how could we discuss its failures? If the world was not stable and my memory generally sound, then we would not even have a concept of memory, would we?

However, I wanted here criteria with regard to differenciating "good" presuppositions from "bad" ones. Since presuppositions by nature aren't based on logic or evidence, I fail to see how this is related.

Careful. Presuppositions may not be based on logic or evidence, but they are vulnerable to the application of those tools.

Care to explain? [why gods are contraindicated by reality]

Sure. Appeals to gods do not work. Period. Nothing fails like prayer. No evidence of gods has ever been found, and protocols deliberately designed to test for their influences have failed to find them. No miracles have ever been observed, and no natural laws are ever violated. And so on.

??? Belief in any sort of "god" whatsoever is "incoherent and contradictory"? I'm not suggesting here you should be presupposing the Christian god, only a god.

But you must assign that god properties in order for it to be responsible for the universe. And on doing so you opt for particular properties, which are contradicted by its alleged behavior -- smart enough to design DNA, but dumb enough to design water animals that breathe air, or a million other design stupidities in nature. There's no such thing as theism per se, there are only specific theisms. For example, it is a property of your theism that your god created the earth. But in some theisms, that is not the case. It is not the case that every imagined god is the Great Designer.

But there's no evidence to suggest that it isn't. Why shouldn't you suspect that you are a brain in a jar? It's a conceivable possibility. I see no way of evaluating whether it a more likely possibility than not.

I don't either, but it remains a pleasant speculation. I could also be a god on vacation, or a million other things. But since there is no reason to suspect I am a brain in a jar, or anything but a primate evolved on earth....there is no need to even argue the point. You're making the claim here, you supply the evidence. Must I refute every single speculation you invent?

Yet given these equally conceivable alternatives, most all people choice the first option. Why? Is it because the belief is convenient and natural? How does belief in god not fall under these same criteria?

It's not a question of convenience. I can't regard the world as anything but real; I'm not built to do that. My visual processing system treats the world as real regardless of my personal philosophy. Fire burns solipsists, Christians and metaphysical naturalists alike.

I assume a specific type of god, true. However my presuppositions would seem to have parsimony in themselves as I am assuming that and only that which is pragmatic for me to assume.

Maybe, but my point of view is even more parsimonious than yours, and thus is more pragmatic. You have added all sorts of unpragmatic presuppositions about the nature of the creator that are unwarranted by the reality we live in.

Why should I choose the presupposition that I can reason accurately because of I evolved to be able to do so, over the presupposition that I can reason accurately because an intelligent being designed me to do so?

Well, you shouldn't unless you regard evidence as important. But if you regard evidence as important, you might well ask why a chimp's brain and body have every organ yours does.....also, where do the australopithcenes and early Homo fit in your scheme of things? Failed designs? Were Neandertals just unlucky to have died out before Jesus came along? Did they have souls?

Actually, human reason is a good example of bad "Design." Why do humans, tool users by "Design," appear to contain no specific cognitive faculties for dealing with technology? Why are we so bad at assessing risk and statistics? Why are we capable of having multiple sexual partners if god didn't want us to behave that way? Why are we violent if god likes peace? And so on.

I agree the problem of identifying the “correct” religious stance is still there. However, if you agree with me that “the ‘best bet’ is to not be a Metaphysical Naturalist” then perhaps we can get somewhere with this argument.

I don't agree with you. The "best bet" is to choose the religious stance that reflects the true state of affairs. "Best" is subjective, you know.

Vorkosigan

[ May 23, 2002: Message edited by: Vorkosigan ]

[ May 23, 2002: Message edited by: Vorkosigan ]</p>