tronvillain

crocodile deathroll:
Pardon? Perhaps you could try that again, but be coherent this time.

[ February 24, 2002: Message edited by: tronvillain ]</p>

Bill

Well, not really ex nihilo (out of "nothing"), but out of "scrap matter" which the scientists used to feed the matter-converter-copying machine which this question logically presupposes the existence of.

In order to get identical (or at least, nearly identical) responses out of Bob and Bob2, you would necessarily need to employ a copying technique which reproduced all of the memories stored in the original Bob's brain. Since those things are encoded into the matter within the original Bob's brain, it should be quite feasible (presuming that the copying process itself is feasible) to produce a Bob2 which is in exactly the same initial state as was the Bob which was copied.

Of course, from the moment of copying, you have two distinct worldlines, and any differences at all, including the slightest difference in any measurable quantity of virtually anything, could have enough of an impact so as to diverge the two worldlines sufficiently such that different results are readily obtained.

So long as we agree that there is no part of a human which is immaterial (including, of course, electrical energy as part of the "material" which makes up a person), then there is nothing which a "matter/energy copying machine" could not reproduce and (theoretically, at least) put into the same place as the original (within the limits of quantum uncertainty).

At the end of the day, it is quantum uncertainty which gives the greatest prospect for rapid divergence of worldlines. There is no small part of either Bob or Bob2 which should not have a divergent history after the completion of the copying process (it says here in fine print....).

Anyway, until somebody invents this copying process, I don't see any real need to attempt to evaluate the effects of quantum uncertainty on the original and the copy (or copies ... we are of course not limited to "one at a time" reproduction, but could easily implement a "many worlds" version of Bob).

== Bill

crocodile deathroll

If a machine were to emulate Bob1 and his brain exactly quark for quark lepton for lepton even out of scrap matter like a pile of rotting compost.
Then that machine will also emulate Bob1's episodic memories "sense of self" and beliefs.
So if the original Bob was destroyed then the Bob will continue to exist as the copied version.
This will still happen if the matter was created ex nihilo. i.e a particle accelerator.
have I made myself clear

Do you believe it is the configuration of quarks that make us who we are.
Or is it the quarks them selves

99Percent

crocodile deathtroll: Do you believe it is the configuration of quarks that make us who we are.
Or is it the quarks them selves

We are the continous interaction with the present. The fact that there can be no identical points of view proves that we are all unique, no matter how similar we could be physically.

tronvillain

Yes, you were much more coherent this time, and assuming there is no divergence between the copies, I agree with you.

Synaesthesia

CDR One of the remarkable features of consciousness as Dennett points out is it's discontinuity. We are simply not aware of our eyes darting about several times a second or of the blindspots (the size of about 4 full moons end to end) in our vision. Consciousness is not continuous although it it is being represented, to relevant agencies, as being continuous.

Jonny

wow. this has been a learning experience for me. Thanks for replying you guys. In a way the question could be asked to determinists also. But I did not confuse the two. Because if the bob's answers differed from each other in even the slightest way, then I would think that there is a personality, or soul, or spirit, whatever you want to call it, that is seperate from the clones brain. That's why it has to do with dualism vs materialism. But it seems like a materialist would have to hold (which they have on this board) that both bob's would have the same definition (assuming of course, that everything is EXCACTLY the same since the time of the cloning process).


And a dualist, maybe would have to say that both bob's answers have to be different. At least in a small degree. But I wonder if theistic dualists believe that clones will have souls somehow. What, does God infuse the clone with a soul after it's done being copied? I have never heard a dualist who says yes to this. They just tell me that God will not ever allow human cloning to take place, or that the clones would be sort of like zombies. I guess time will tell. If cloning (perfected cloning that is) of humans becomes popular in the future then we are going to learn a lot i think.

[ February 26, 2002: Message edited by: Jonny ]</p>

Jonny

Would you say that the response the materialists are giving implies that one or both of the Bobs has no "free will"?

Quick answer. Not necessarily.

By the way. In this hypothetical situation...the clones come out perfectly identicle down to the smallest quirks. And both rooms are exactly the same, even in the smallest degree. That's what I should have specified.

Francois Tremblay

The only attributes that differ between the two Bobs is spatial location and other related attributes. This is not very relevant in the situation presented, unless the locations somehow differ in more attributes.

Even a dualist would be hard-pressed to explain why both Bobs would not say the same thing. If the "soul", or whatever entity is posited, is uncaused, then nothing can be said about the responses either way - if it is caused by something, it should be demontrated that these causes have somehow differed since the cloning. This may prove to be difficult for such proponents. But since dualism is false or meaningless (depending on one's interpretation), this is a purely hypothetical question.

[ February 26, 2002: Message edited by: Franc28 ]</p>

tronvillain

As I said before, the only options appear to be pure determinism and probablistic determinism. Whether or not you are a materialist or a dualist, this doesn't change, so a difference between their answers would simply indicate probablistic determinism. In other words, it would not in of itself be evidence for dualism.