Originally Posted by kennethamy

The argument is more complex than that. Leibniz makes two points. (1) that some evils are logically necessary in order to certain goods to exist. It is a good to pity a cripple, and to aid him. If there was no cripple, there would be no pity for him. So, being a cripple (for instance) is logically necessary in for there to be the good of pity. The second point is that in general, a world with pity and sympathy in it is a better world than one without sympathy in it, and that since pity and the evil necessary for the pity are a "package deal" (if you see what I mean) the "package" pity plus evil, is better than no pity and no evil. God could certainly have created a world with no evil in it. But, Leibniz simply assumes that a world with no evil in it would not be so good as a world with evil and with the good for which the evil was logically necessary. For Leibniz (who separately from Newton invented the calculus) God (the supreme mathematician) is faced with a minimax problem (a large one!). Of all the infinite set of possible worlds, which world has the least amount of evil logically compatible with the greatest amount of good? It is that world which would be "the best of all possible worlds". So, for Leibniz, a world with no evil in it would not be as good as a world with some evil in it as long as the latter world's good compensated for the evil necessary for it. For in such a world, the total amount of good would be greater than a world with no evil in it. Notice, what Leibniz is trying to do is to solve the logical problem of how it is possible for an all-good and loving God who is also all-powerful, to allow there to be evil, so that the mere existence of evil would be enough to show that such a God could not exist? He is trying (in other words) to show that the three propositions, God is all good and loving, God is all powerful, and evil exists, do not constitute an inconsistent set of propositions where one of them must be false on pain of contradiction. And, I think he, in fact does so. Notice, as David Hume pointed out, in his Dialogues on Natural Philosophy, that even if Leibniz has solved the logical problem and shown that the existence of evil does not show that the idea of God is a self-contradiction he has not shown that the existence of evil is not overwhelming evidence against an all-loving and all-powerful God. Showing that the existence of evil is compatible with such a God is one thing, but showing that the existence of evil is not evidence against such a God is a very different thing. And, that, by the way, is what Voltaire brilliantly argued in his novel, Candide where he points out how preposterous it is that all the evils in the world (earthquakes, floods, rapes, and murders, to name just a few) are compensated for by some greater good. But, to repeat, that doesn't show that Leibniz has not solved the logical problem of evil which was an attempt to show that the existence of evil was logically inconsistent with the existence of an all good and all powerful God. It is logically possible, but empirically highly unlikely.

Originally Posted by arcadia

I guess I am missing something here. This omnipotent benificent God who can create any world he wishes, including an absolute human paradise with virgins galore for everybody and hot and cold flowing rum punches, which certainly to us sounds "good" decides instead that in order to make the world really really good or even better, he has to create evil which makes some of us miserable and gives others of us the grand opportunity to feel pity??? Personally, I would be very happy if I NEVER had to PITY any of my fellow humans or was even familiar with that emotion. That paradise, not some kind of ying/yang dualistic system with some wretches suffering and others required to pity them, depending on the whim of a capricious overlord, sounds like what a truly benificent, omnipotent god would create.

From what you describe here, it sounds like Leibniz is performing a parlor trick by claiming that while we have one definition of benificence, god has another one and we, mere mortals have no idea what benificence or even good is. He hasn't solved the problem; instead he just redefined it's most important term.

Originally Posted by Biff the unclean

Why is it that schools don't require all students to read Voltaire's Candide ???!!! How is it possible that Dr Pangloss is still alive in 2007??????

Originally Posted by kennethamy

Well, that's certainly an objection, namely that if pity and (some suffering) are a "package" deal, you would rather reject the package (or as one character in Dostoyevsky's famous novel, The Brothers Karamazov put it, "I give back my entrance ticket [to heaven]". Leibniz's answer to that is, I am afraid, that you don't understand that certain moral goods are necessary for us to be human beings and persons, so the question really comes down to whether it is better to have a world with persons, than to have a world without persons, and without pity. What sort of being would you be without the capacity for compassion and pity? I think that most of us believe that compassion and pity are goods, and perhaps goods necessary for us to be persons. So the issue is one of still another package deal, as you can see. Note, I am not agreeing with Leibniz, but I am trying to point out what the issue is.

However, the main point is that Leibniz seems to have shown the way out of the logiclal problem of the problem of evil. Now, you seem to disagree with his moral assumptions, but that is quite different.

Originally Posted by everettf

Have you shown any evidence of any gods anywhere? No hearsay allowed. please show evidence.

Originally Posted by kennethamy

What has that question to do with the problem of evil? What would you accept as evidence? For example, would you accept the appearance of design in the universe? Obviously, unless you tell me what you would accept as evidence (and my guess is, it might be nothing at all) the discussion will be a futile one.