Freethought & Rationalism Archive

Gurdur · 06-03-2003, 02:22 PM

editing out.

Hugo Holbling · 06-03-2003, 02:27 PM

That's a secret you and i ain't supposed to know 'bout.

Edit: i refered to Gurdur's post above, now edited. The secret is safe and the order of the recurrent theothanatologist will ever strive to keep it so.

You have been warned.

John Page · 06-03-2003, 02:44 PM

Quote:

Originally posted by Tyler Durden
Let's break the cryptic muttering and see what legitimate inferences there may be:
Premise 1: If philosophical truth is universal, then 'Philosophy' is universal.

Premise 2: Philosophical truth is contingent.

Conclusion: There is no universal 'Philosophy.'

Hoho! Legitimate inferences, is it? What you posted was:

Quote:

Originally posted by Tyler Durden
Since truth is contingent, then there is no philosophy.

Please explain how it can be true that there is no philosophy if philosophical truths are contingent.

Also, do you maintain that truth is utterly subjective? (Hey Primal, want to comment?) If not, then what is it contingent upon? What legitimizes the inferences required to arrive at it?

Oh yes, did you speak to Nelson yet? Or did his language die with him?

Cheers, John

Gurdur · 06-03-2003, 02:44 PM

Quote:

Originally posted by Hugo Holbling
you and i ain't supposed to know

original post edited out.
I shall now imitate a particularly taciturn fossilized oyster.

John Page · 06-03-2003, 02:48 PM

Quote:

Originally posted by Gurdur
editing out.

LOL. Hey Gurdur, you pre-empted my reductionist zero sum game.
Cheers, John

Tyler Durden · 06-03-2003, 02:50 PM

Quote:

Originally posted by John Page Please explain how it can be true that there is no philosophy if philosophical truths are contingent.

Refer to my impeccably logical argument.

Quote:

Also, do you maintain that truth is utterly subjective? (Hey Primal, want to comment?)

Not at all! Truth is both contingent and intersubjective.

Quote:

If not, then what is it contingent upon?

Agreement between interested parties.

Quote:

What legitimizes the inferences required to arrive at it?

The experience of repetition and difference of particulars and the social activity of reaching agreements.

Quote:

Oh yes, did you speak to Nelson yet? Or did his language die with him?

Actually his language is conveniently located at the nearest Barnes and Nobel. Feel free to go over there and get a direct line yourself

Hugo Holbling · 06-03-2003, 02:55 PM

Moving back on topic, Gurdur, what did you think of Tyler's quote from Pierce:

Quote:

�Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the objects of our conception to have. Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.�

Is this close to your own pragmatic understanding of the term?

John Page · 06-03-2003, 03:09 PM

Quote:

Originally posted by Tyler Durden
Refer to my impeccably logical argument.

But your argument is contradictory . True?

Quote:

Originally posted by Tyler Durden
Refer to my impeccably logical argument.

Not at all! Truth is both contingent and intersubjective.

Agreement between interested parties.

The experience of repetition and difference of particulars and the social activity of reaching agreements.

...therefore a truth is contingent upon the particular thoughts of the thinker (thinkers, plural, if intersubjectivity is deployed).

And now folks, back to the other thread to debate the dependencies and relationships between language, thought and particulars we can measure (otherwise known as physical matter).

Unless, of course....

Cheers, John

Tyler Durden · 06-03-2003, 03:24 PM

Quote:

Originally posted by John Page
But your argument is contradictory . True?

That thread is interesting, but i fail to see how my impeccably logical argument (sic) is contradictory. It could be, but i am sure there are ways around superfical readings, since they are predicated on a implicit theory of truth, as my first post in this thread should hint at. Show me the money, por favor, senor!

John Page · 06-03-2003, 04:45 PM

Quote:

Originally posted by Tyler Durden
That thread is interesting, but i fail to see how my impeccably logical argument (sic) is contradictory.0

Because, wait for it, if it could not be contradicted then it would become a Transcendental Universal.

Action Replay:

Quote:

Tyler Durden's brain thinks about proposition P and arrives at the determination TRUE.
Kantrarian's brain thinks about proposition P and arrives at the determination FALSE.

Given the above and using Tyler's rules of legitimate inference the proposition "Brains always tell the truth" is FALSE

06-03-2003, 02:27 PM	#12
Hugo Holbling Veteran Member Join Date: Sep 2002 Location: Self-banned in 2005 Posts: 1,344	Moving back into the shadows - my work here is done. That's a secret you and i ain't supposed to know 'bout. Edit: i refered to Gurdur's post above, now edited. The secret is safe and the order of the recurrent theothanatologist will ever strive to keep it so. You have been warned.

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06-03-2003, 02:22 PM	#11
Gurdur Contributor Join Date: Jun 2000 Location: Buggered if I know Posts: 12,410	editing out.

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