Ierrellus

Walrus,

There are currently several threads on SOD. IMO, in the one on "Man's new mind", the bests posts are by Bill and excreationist.

I have heard it said that we are an age in search of a paradigm. Nonsense. Paradigms evolve. So how could we ever find what may not be able yet to surplant what preceded it? Gilbert Ryle, in "A Concept of Mind", gives a good starting point for all of us who are living in post-modern
transition between paradigms. We must be able to see beyond the "Cartesian Myth" of dualism.

After that, IMO, we must be able to see Hegelian thesis, antithesis and synthesis as only one operative function of minds experiencing reality.
In the known universe all that exists is so inextricably combined that we cannot really waste our time creating polarities, but must seek out our place in the scheme of things.


More anon,

Ierrellus

Ierrellus

Paths to a post-modern paradigm tend to reflect the Greek idea of plenitude, i.e., the ultimate variety inclusive in one thing. From that vantage point a noncontradictive view of reality becomes possible.

Ierrellus

John Page

Hi Walrus!

1. Our thinking is subjective by its nature. Objective thinking employs "critical", "analytical" or "rational" techniques to make thinking less prone to error/delusion/illusion but its still subjective. It is not possible to be absolutely objective (I argue, subjectively ). Thus, no mode of thinking would seem to have primacy over any other.

2. Ontology? Being? There are things that we come to know. We know them subjectively. I don't know why they Be. To understand how they Be I believe we need to look at perception/cognition and how objects in the mind relate to the mind's external reality. As objectively as possible .

3. As to your example, why not consider the Phenomenology of Math. First our minds sense external entities, type them and hence may enumerate those of the same type. That 1 + 1 = 2 comes from our ontological experience of the world around. IMO Math is not an abstract law unto itself, it is a consequence of cognition and deeply rooted in the mind's eye of the real world. Maybe this is why some people think of it as "pure" or "natural" but, again, IMHO, an incorrect conclusion largely drawn from belief that the mind is not based in the physical world.

I'm sure I'll get flak from being so assertive on these points but what the hell. BTW, my use of the expression "the mind's eye" does not mean that I subscribe to the Cartesian theater (although I do go to the opera), what I'm getting at is that inner functions of the mind receive a very filtered/pre-processed picture of what's going onout there.

Cheers, John

John Page

An accurate rendition of experience, otherwise there could be no comparison of changes in reality across time.

Cheers, John

WJ

Hi john!

Long time no talk! I hope all is well over in your neck... .

I think, along the lines of 'abstractions', that notion tells me that say FL, while considered an objective truth(?), does not paint as accurate a picture that we think it does, with regard to a thing's existence. In that regard, it seems that it is completely a human construct in the sense that it is not absolute viz. human reality. Universal, but not absolute in the pure objective sense (whatever that really means).

I've asked other's this: So if math happens to work supprisingly well in describing things, yet fails in understanding the actual nature of the thing itself (perhaps if one can create a universe from nothing-might solve this problem)in your opinion, was math discovered or invented?

In other words, how can we theorize that math had already existed (v. invented)? What are some of the items that supports its independent existence viz. the laws on nature? (Perhaps nowhere, for the true Subjectivist.)

The word 'abstraction' seems to present a sort of oxymoron to the effectiveness, usefullness and application of math itself. Is there any 'true' hope in math? Where should one place our egg money?

Any and all thoughts welcomed.

Walrus

Ierrellus

Walrus,

Let's try experential mathematics: cells divide, multiply, add and subtract. Neuronal firings do the same. Why shouldn't a mind that can only survive by an accurate estimate of what exists outside of the organism have an identifying rapport with these mechanisms in what is other than itself?

Ierrellus

John Page

Math is a set of notions in the mind about relations between quantities. If we were considering cats, there would be less debate because they are external to the mind and easier to swing. Quantities are discovered through comparisons of sense data, math was invented to formalize and explore these discoveries.

However, because quantities are only experienced within the mind after initial "pre-processing", I doubt whether there is any point in making math into a religion that claims some ultimate truth or irreducibility of the universe. Ultimately, math relies upon the lie that objects are identical in order that they can become countable.

Sorry to sound so opinionated but its probably quicker to dump this way than through third person analysis.

The topic did prompt me to consider whether the minds of other species might not have the physical properties necessary to discern quantity. I imagine this became important very early in the evolution of evolution.

Cheers, John

owleye

Walrus...

If I might make a suggestion. Rather than speak about subjective and objective truths (or even subjective and objective meanings), let me suggest that what you have in mind are subjective and objective judgments (or propositions if you understand what they mean). If you then wish to regard the question of whether '4 = 2 + 2' is objectively or subjectively judged to be true, it then becomes much clearer to decide. (Note that Kant's distinction between a judgment and a proposition is merely that for a judgment, its modality is problematic, whereas for a proposition it is assertoric. That is, its force is one of certainty.)

A subjective judgment amounts to having a belief, whereas making an objective judgment is taken as having knowledge. We can say we believe something is the case to indicate we've made a subjective judgment and we do not expect that others would share that belief. With objective judgements, however, we expect others not only to share it, but if there was a dispute, we would undoubtedly make a case for our side.

owleye

WJ

Owl!

Let me try to clarify where I think you're going with that particular point. I do like how you are bringing 'belief' and 'judgement' into the realm of what is considered to be true about abstacts-math.

I think we need to first define the meaning between your ideas of beliefs and judgements, though. Or at least look at some distinctions. However, let me say, other than assertoric statements (which perhaps you can share an example), I think, depending on the metaphor we wish to apply (the thing we want to describe) we have a problem with clearly seperating objectivity and subjectivity.

We know from the earlier discussion that 'fish have fins' is an objective truth. And we know that 'this meat tastes good' is a subjective one. But I think what you said is very interesting:

"A subjective judgment amounts to having a belief, whereas making an objective judgment is taken as having knowledge. We can say we believe something is the case to indicate we've made a subjective judgment and we do not expect that others would share that belief. With objective judgements, however, we expect others not only to share it, but if there was a dispute, we would undoubtedly make a case for our side."

Now in math we know we can compute a formula to create an object yet it would not completely tell us the nature of the object or thing itself. In a similar way, an observation that say fish have fins, I agree, would be a statement that others should share and we could make our case thru observation that it is so.

But, what if observation is not possible to arrive at an objective truth or description or in your words, judgement, about a thing? And are all 'things' observable? (In this case, we'll say the 'nature' of a thing.)

(I want to go further but have to stop here because I want to keep it simple for now so that we don't get side tracked.)

Walrus

owleye

Walrus...

"We know from the earlier discussion that 'fish have fins' is an objective truth."

I don't know it is the case that because you've had an earlier discussion about fish having fins, that this allows the determination of it being an objective truth. Unless the proposition 'all fish have fins' is analytically true, then I see no reason for you to make this claim. However, I can, of course, consider it an objective judgement that all fish have fins, if this is what a non-inductive theory says. If it is an inductively determined hypothesis, then we can very well understand that it may be true, but it carries no certainty with it. Only in non-inductive theories (like, for example, Newton's laws of motion and gravitation or Einstein's theories of relativity), must it be the case that 'all fish have fins'.

"Now in math we know we can compute a formula to create an object yet it would not completely tell us the nature of the object or thing itself."

I'm not at all sure what you mean here. What sort of "object" is created by a computation? More puzzling, however, what do you mean by "thing itself?"

"In a similar way, an observation that say fish have fins,"

This is not what an observation is supposed to tell us. Presumably an observation can only say that "this fish has a fin."


"But, what if observation is not possible to arrive at an objective truth or description or in your words, judgement, about a thing?"

Some observations we are uncertain about. We may judge, subjectively, that such and such is a bat, but we may not wish to commit to it being an objective judgment -- i.e., we are reserving judgement that we may be wrong about our observation. On the other hand, if we have inspected it, measured it, calibrated our instruments, etc., we may conclude that we are in a position to say that something is the case and do so with some certainty. Despite this, I think, all observations are susceptible of being doubted, especially at the hands of a skillful cross-examiner, who might merely ask, "are you sure?"


"And are all 'things' observable? (In this case, we'll say the 'nature' of a thing.)"

Observation was the basis you drew upon for making an objective judgment. I think this idea has some merit, but you would need to explain how mathematical judgments achieve their certainty through observation. This is a non-trivial problem, particularly in the light that all mathematical reasoning appears to be based on quantificational logic.

owleye