SRB

PO
For instance, suppose God loves every person that exists in the actual world. Secondly, suppose that a thing's causal history is essential to who
it is. If my parents are Susan and Joe, then it is an essential property of me that I was conceived by Susan and Joe. If there are any changes in the conditions that existed prior to my birth, it is quite plausible to suppose
that these changes could affect the question of whether the resulting person born is me or merely someone a lot like me. Now, if this analysis has been correct, it seems plausible to suppose that there are instances of suffering which are logically necessary conditions for certain people to be born. It does not follow that this suffering is one of the factors that contributes
to the "goodness" of this thing. In short, the question is not what makes good things good, but the question, "What are the conditions for the
possibility of x being instantiated?"

SRB
This is not an unknown purpose defence as it stands, since some kind of reason is offered for why a loving God would allow so much suffering. The issue is whether the reason can be shown to be implausible. I think it can.

First of all, consider the theory of transworld identity presupposed. Suppose your mother is Susan and you have always mistakenly believed she suffered from cancer for many years before you were born, because that's what a neighbour told you. Today you have learned about your neighbour's lie, and that Susan in fact never had cancer. Are we to suppose that the person you believe you are today is numerically distinct to the person you believed you were yesterday? That theory strikes me, and would strike most people, as extremely implausible.

Now let us accept the theory of transworld identity presupposed. I don't see how your theodicy works. Suppose God can manipulate things so that Smith exists with happy parents, and Jones never exists, or else so that Jones exists with parents who suffer awfully and Smith never exists. All else being equal, considering the situation before either person exists, it seems obvious that there is a strong reason to expect God to bring Smith into existence rather than Jones. Your defence presented above is misleading because we already know that you exist, and we become attached people who actually exist. It seems rather nasty to say of someone who already exists that it would have been more loving of God if God had never created that person, and had instead created someone else. But that is not what we are dealing with at all. The scenario we should be considering is the one with Smith and Jones, where *neither person yet exists*. In that situation, where we are considering *potential persons* God's decision to create the person for which far more suffering results, all things considered, doesn't make much sense.

You could of course say there is some mysterious and incomprehensible reason why all things *wouldn't* be equal if God created Smith rather than Jones, but then why bother with the line of thought above? Nothing is gained by postulating a rather questionable theory of transworld identity, an implausible connection between parental suffering and what a loving God would do, *as well* as an appeal to mystery. You might as well just appeal to mystery. You might as well forget everything you wrote above and just say "God has a reason for all the suffering we see, but we do not know what it is." That's unless, of course, you have some good response that does not appeal to some unknown purpose or some unknown benefit.

SRB

Kantian

<a href="http://www.id-online.de/ufo/pkdhowt5.htm" target="_blank">Phillip K. Dick lives.</a>

SRB, great posts, excellent responses. Pardon my digression, but just exactly what does SRB stand for?

Thomas Metcalf

"Why isn't is possible for a world to be infinitely more good than the 'best possible world?' Take the set of positive integers. For every member of this set x and y, either x = y, x is greater than y, or x is less than y. Obviously, this does not entail there is such a thing as the greatest integer. Nor have you answered my arguments concerning the Greatest Conceivable Island."

In fact, we know that there is an actual infinity of integers. My suggestion is that there is an actual infinity of goodness in the best of all possible worlds.
I think I did answer your "Island Objection," because it is very plausible that there are several best possible amounts of fruit. Too much fruit is conceivable. Perhaps too much goodness is not, but in this case, we simply have a false analogy.

"Your argument seems to be that theodicies discount the utility of humanitarianism, because evil always has a greater good. However, this overlooks the distinct possibility that humanitarianism may very well be one of those greater goods that is brought about by evil. This seems consistent with Christian tradition and also with the fact that humanitarianism (the act of trying to prevent human suffering) is impossible in the total absence of human suffering."

Well, of course it may be the greater good in question, but if everyone fails to effect humanitarianism, and I still successfully commit evil, there must have been some other good to justify this evil. Even if I personally fail to take part in humanitarianism, my failure must have some other good consequences.

"Additionally, from the fact that God has a moral reason for allowing evil to exist, it does not follow that everyone is morally justified in committing evil. For instance, suppose John is in the act of murdering Smith. Clarence is in a position to prevent John from murdering Smith, but for whatever reason, if Clarence does this, 30 people will die instantly. Now, it is obvious that Clarence has a morally justifiable reason for allowing Smith to be murdered. However, it does not follow at all from this that John is justified in murdering Smith."

I think this objection is stronger. I would respond that we have no reason to tell John not to murder Smith, if Christian theism is true. Perhaps we cannot find a positive reason for John to murder Smith, but we cannot proscribe it, either. The total expression of God's goals will remain the same, either way. In fact, it might be arguable that one ought to commit as much "evil" as possible, because every one of these actions will either cause the expression of God's goals to stay the same or to increase, and there's no reason to think it'll only be the former. If John murders Smith, God's goals can only increase in their expression.

"The result is that some things are possible in some worlds, but not in others. But S5 says that whatever is possible, is possible with respect to every possible world. Thus, if recombinationism is true, then S5 is false."

Well, thanks for some clarification, but I'm still having trouble grasping the idea that something could be modally (rather than just physically) possible with respect to any possible worlds. I haven't decided about S5, but at this point I'd still reject it.

"Now, if this analysis has been correct, it seems plausible to suppose that there are instances of suffering which are logically necessary conditions for certain people to be born. It does not follow that this suffering is one of the factors that contributes to the 'goodness' of this thing. In short, the question is not what makes good things good, but the question, 'What are the conditions for the possibility of x being instantiated?'"

I agree that there are instances of suffering that require "certain people" to be born. But, in relation to my original point, the only way these certain people are indeed "these" people, logically, is that suffering e was required to produce them. If we remove this (it's an essential property of those people), of course we're left with different people, but the only way they're logically different, necessarily, is that s wasn't required. I'm saying that there could be two people, George and Eric, who are identical (property-wise), except that suffering was necessary for the possibility of Eric but not for George. All the properties may be shared by both except the ones that require suffering.

If it is an essential property of Smith that suffering produced him, God could just arrange things so that Smith-2 was produced instead of Smith. This would certainly be a different person, but I see no need for God to prefer Smith to Smith-2 if all the non-suffering-produced properties are equal -- unless some suffering divorced from consequences is part of God's goals. This is the thrust of my objection here to UPD. I say what makes some state of affairs good can never be that suffering was required to produce it, alone.

Philip Osborne

"This is incorrect. UPD, as considered here, is a defence against evidential arguments from evil. The proponents of...."

This seems to be a misconstrual of what I have said. I did not say that to show one of the evidential argument from evil's premisses is possibly false is a sufficient condition for answering the argument. What I said was that if one shows that there is no way to demonstrate that the probability that there is gratuitous evil with respect to what God's plan would be over its negation, one show that the AE does not give any evidential support to atheism.

"Another reason for doubting such a defence is that that when followed up consistently it apparently leads to a kind of epistemological and moral skepticism. Such a defence has much in common with evil demon hypotheses. For example, how can we know that God has no unknown but justifying reason for making much of the world seem very different to how it really is, and a further unknown but justifying reason for letting us think otherwise? How can we know that, unknown to them, humans who commit terrible crimes are not actually overall somehow benefiting others?"

For instances of pure sensory perception experiences, we can overcome this apparent problem by applying the Principle of Credulity, which says that if it appears that p to me, and p is a sensory experience, then I am epistemically entitled to say it appears that p. However, in cognitive experiences, where some experience inclines me to believe some proposition about something, I am not always entitled to apply the Principle of Credulity. Having no knowledge about Quantum Mechanics, I cannot infer "this book on Quantum Mechanics is mostly correct in its conclusions" from "it appears that this book on Quantum Mechanics is mostly correct in its conclusions."

"First of all, consider the theory of transworld identity presupposed. Suppose your mother is Susan and you have always mistakenly believed she suffered from....."

This argument conflates personal identity with beliefs about personal identity. I would not believe I am a different person after learning of my neighbor's lie, because I am not comprehensively aware of all the conditions that were necessary for bringing me into existence. I do not know how whether or not my mother had cancer would affect my identity. And normally, people do not think of these things. Thus, the fact that I still believe I am the same person after learning of my neighbor's lie only reflects my lack of knowledge as to what the necessary conditions of my existence were, rather than actually counting against transworld identity. If I were completely aware of those conditions, then either cancer would not have numerically affected the person my mother gave birth to, or I would know that if my mother had had cancer, the resulting person would have been different in some respect, and I would detect my neighbor's lie.

"Now let us accept the theory of transworld identity presupposed. I don't see how your theodicy works. Suppose God can manipulate things so that Smith exists with happy parents, and Jones never exists, or else so that Jones exists with parents who suffer awfully and Smith never exists."

The point is that there seems nothing inconsistent with God loving the people who exist in the actual world. I certainly do not think that God would be immoral to love you or me. If loving the people who exist in the actual world is not incompatible with omnibenevolence (it would seem highly counter-intuitive to suggest otherwise), then there is nothing wrong with actualizing suffering, if such suffering is a logically necessary condition for the existence of such people.

"In fact, we know that there is an actual infinity of integers. My suggestion is that there is an actual infinity of goodness in the best of all possible worlds."

It is true that the set of all integers is an actual infinite, but it is also true that the set of all real numbers constitutes a larger set. In order for your best possible world objection to work, you must show that there is some degree of infinity such that it is greater than all other possible degrees of infinity. I'm not sure this is mathematically possible.

"In fact, it might be arguable that one ought to commit as much "evil" as possible, because every one of these actions will either cause the expression of God's...."

My theodicy suggests only that every evil which actually occurs is morally justified, not that every possible evil which could ever occur would be justified. So your suggestion that either way, God's goals would be brought about, is not necessarily true. The UPD does not say, "For all x, if x is evil, then God is morally justified in allowing x." It says, "for all x, if x 1) is evil, and 2) obtains in the actual world, then God is morally justified in allowing x. Not every evil which is possible satisfies (2), so it is not necessarily clear that they would be morally justified, or that they would satisfy God's plans to the degree that the ones which obtain in the actual world do.

"If it is an essential property of Smith that suffering produced him, God could just arrange things so that Smith-2 was produced instead of Smith. This would certainly be a different person, but I see no...."

I've already answered this. If it is rational for God to love Smith (and I see no reason why it would not be), then it is rational for God to actualize the suffering needed to bring about Smith.

"Well, thanks for some clarification, but I'm still having trouble grasping the idea that something could be modally (rather than just physically) possible with respect to any possible worlds. I haven't decided about S5, but at this point I'd still reject it."

At this point, I could only tell you that I think the intuitions backing S5 seem fairly plausible, and that (I think) there are strong arguments against recombinationism.

Sorry, this post was written pretty quickly. As you can see, it's already quite long, so I may have made a few errors along the way.

Sincerely,

Philip

Thomas Metcalf

"My theodicy suggests only that every evil which actually occurs is morally justified, not that every possible evil which could ever occur would be justified. So your suggestion that either way, God's goals would be brought about, is not necessarily true. The UPD does not say, 'For all x, if x is evil, then God is morally justified in allowing x.' It says, 'for all x, if x 1) is evil, and 2) obtains in the actual world, then God is morally justified in allowing x. Not every evil which is possible satisfies (2), so it is not necessarily clear that they would be morally justified, or that they would satisfy God's plans to the degree that the ones which obtain in the actual world do."

I agree that there are logically possible evils that would not be morally justified. But my position is not that every evil I logically could do would be justified, just that every evil I successfully commit (obtains in the real world) would be justified. I'm not really worried about the evils I fail to commit. The ones that occur in the real world either are justified equally, or have a yet greater moral worth, no? That is, the total goodness in the world either stays the same or increases.

"If loving the people who exist in the actual world is not incompatible with omnibenevolence (it would seem highly counter-intuitive to suggest otherwise), then there is nothing wrong with actualizing suffering, if such suffering is a logically necessary condition for the existence of such people."

I would say that loving the people who exist in the actual world is indeed compatible with omnibenevolence, but to create these people in the first place is not, if God chose the possible people whose existence requires suffering rather than the possible people who are equal (Leibniz' Law-wise) in every respect except that their existence requires no suffering.

"I've already answered this. If it is rational for God to love Smith (and I see no reason why it would not be), then it is rational for God to actualize the suffering needed to bring about Smith."

But it is not moral for God to actualize the suffering needed to bring about Smith. Why can't God choose Smith-2? I have no problem with God loving Smith, but God could love Smith-2 just as much, right?

(I'm willing to grant that I know of no effective way to argue that there is a best of all possible worlds.)

SRB

PO
For instances of pure sensory perception experiences, we can overcome this apparent problem by applying the Principle of Credulity..

SRB
A huge number of the empirically acquired beliefs we take to be knowledge are not formed by pure sensory perception, but by some indirect form of inference. So I don't think that what you say here goes very far to meeting the skeptical challenge.


PO
I would not believe I am a different person after learning of my neighbor's lie, because I am not comprehensively aware of all the conditions that were necessary for bringing me into existence.

SRB
This misses the point. In the case at hand, it is assumed for reductio that your transworld identity (TI) depends on whether your mother happened to suffer from cancer. If she had suffered from cancer, her son would be one particular person. If she had not so suffered, her son would be someone numerically distinct (let us suppose). But that is not very plausible. Our criterion of TI does not make TI something that is altered by facts about whether one's mother suffered from cancer. That gives a very good reason to think the presupposed theory of TI is false. What sentences involving TI *mean* depends on what speakers of English are trying to communicate with those sentences. We can use puzzle cases like the one I suggested to clarify what people mean by sentences concerning TI, and hence learn more about what TI is. Since most thoughtful people respond to the puzzle case by indicating that they take one's TI to be wholly independent of facts about one's mother having cancer, we can infer that it probably is independent.

PO
The point is that there seems nothing inconsistent with God loving the people who exist in the actual world. I certainly do not think that God would be immoral to love you or me.

SRB
It is obvious that whichever people God creates will be the people who he loves. But what we want to know is why God created the people who happen to exist (call us the humans-1) rather than a bunch of very similar people who would have suffered much less (call them the humans-2). To say that God loves the humans-1 and not the humans-2 because we exist and they don't, is no explanation at all. Before we existed, when both the humans-1 and the humans-2 were just "potential people," why did God prefer to make the humans-1 actual, a group of people who would suffer greatly, rather than the humans-2, who wouldn't have? Why the preference for people who will suffer more? For this theodicy to get off the ground, we need to know the answer.

SRB

HRG

No, it isn't. If S is a set, then P(S) (the power set of S, i.e. the set of all subsets of S) is strictly "larger" than S, in the sense that it has a strictly larger cardinality than S. This is known as Cantor's Power Set Theorem.

Proof by contradiction. Assume that there was a one-to-one correspondence f between the elements of S and the subsets of S, so that for every subset T we have T = f(x) for some element x of S.

Consider the subset U formed by all x which are not elements of their corresponding f(x): it would have the form U = f(y) for some y. But if y is an element of U, then y does belong to f(y) (= U), thus it cannot belong to U; if it is not an element of U, then it fulfills the condition of not belonging to f(y) and belongs to U.

Thus in both cases we get a contradiction.

Those who know Russell's Barber (he shaves all men who do not shave themselves) will notice the close similarity.

Regards,
HRG.

Vorkosigan

Where to?

Vorkosigan
RPCV Kenya, '86-88

Kantian

Ah, i chose South America and Africa as two preferred locations on the application form. I have not been officially accepted yet, but here is hoping! *apologies all around for the thread hijack*

lcb

Immanuel, you are doing a very noble and sacrificial deed in the service of humanity and are to be commended. Please dont be offended if i say Godspeed and God bless!