sophie

Luiseach :
Ah...a distinction is being made between three kinds of languages. I don't agree that a strict line can be drawn between L1 and L3; I also have my doubts about both the existence and possible expressibility of a 'private language' (L2).

You may come to visualise my point of view because I may have misrepresented what L1 actually is. L1 is the ontological language of representation. L1 is the language of bits and bytes to use a computer analogy. In my scheme L1 is a representative scheme of combinatorics. In other words I claim combinations of matter from reality, in this case neurological processes, are used to represent the existence of understanding. At best this is a necessary language and in my mind it is the most private of languages, because the combinations of matter which represent understandings, have to be based on age and mental environment. Using a lot less fine language, I would claim L1 is the CODING/ENCODING of an understanding. L1 is a language of the brain.

Why can I claim L1 by being the encoding of an understanding must necessarily be a private language? This would be linked with the encoding schemes of the brain, which at this point, I'd be better off being silent rather than risk putting my foot into my mouth.

The next step up is the conscious communication of these understandings which I claim is achieved by L2. L2 is the go-between the brain and the mind, once we claim mind as the conscious aspect of one's being. This L2 is the conscious L1, the language of mind riding on the language of brain.


The third language L3 is what we use to communicate with the outside world. We can note here this is the last language to develop as a human. L1 exists by definition of being brain. L2 would form to encourage thoughts, and L3 is mimiked to communicate with the world.


When L3 forms then the strict lines between the three languages may waver and suddenly one becomes an adult, no longer a baby. I cannot say for sure there are only three languages, but to me there should be at least these three forms of languages existent in human heads.

sophie

At best, perhaps, we could convince our subjective selves that we understand via a supposed 'private language,' but would we be able to convince others of the existence of this language without undermining its privacy?

I agree, but will this eventually be rewritten when we discover how we encode in the brain?

What do you think about this: rather than viewing the truth as a destination or a goal, we could suggest that understanding is the truth, and that both are provisional, and subject to modification in view of the light of new data. The truth, in other words, is an event, a process of understanding - open to refinement, enlargement and correction. The 'Truth' (with a capital 'T') is therefore unreachable as such, whereas the 'truth' (with a lower-case 't') is both achievable and tentative.

I would not disagree.

A truth could be viewed as a particular understanding of a given set of facts about reality...hence, in a sense, the truth 'occurs' where so-called 'objective' facts and 'subjective' perspectives intersect. What say you?

I cannot disagree. Would a fact be acceptable data originating from reality?

Where would personal truths lie in this schematic of truth?

excreationist

Luiseach:

I think when we think about the significance of words or objects, etc, we are constantly triggering a stream of associations. These would be used to explore the relevant aspects of the thing we are thinking about depending on what our goals are.
The association memory fragments would in turn be fleshed out (or defined) on demand by other triggered associations. Our brain cycles at about 50 times per second and these chains of associations could happen so fast that we wouldn't be aware of them.
All of this would fill up the working memory (short-term memory) of a person.... so for another person to fully imagine what the first person is thinking would involve a similar amount of short-term memory - plus more short-term memory to analyse it and remain conscious of their true identity. Also, lot of the associations would involve things like emotions - and it isn't really possible to explain exactly how desirable or undesirable something seems to someone. It would take a long time to work out a hierarchy of what things they prefer over other things. Emotions add a lot of "colour" to the content of private language - perhaps it is an essential part of it.

sophie

Luiseach, my refinement :

The truth is an understanding concerning data originating from reality subjected to private scrutiny and biased by cultural perspective.

Is this plausible enough to cover private reality?

Luiseach

Ah... Yes, I would agree with this. You may have already posted links to some literature on the subject, but is there any information about the language of the brain available? It's an interesting subject area.

And I suppose we could call this brain language (L1) 'private' in the sense that it cannot be directly accessed from the outside or even by the owner of the brain (as yet, given current technology).

I agree that the mind is the consciousness. And it seems to make sense that the L2 'rides' L1, in some way at least. It stands to reason that there are some structures (?) within the brain that act as the scaffolding to allow linguistic development (and hence understanding) to occur.

'Neurological hardwiring,' in other words.

So L3, as public language, is learned, whereas L1 and L2 are innate and private...hmmm.

I agree that L3 is learned, and that L1 is innate and private, but I would suggest that L2, as the go-between, is not formed solely by or as the conscious L1; I would think that L2 is also formed by the acquired L3. What say you?

P.S. I'll try to respond to the other posts at another time...it's rather late...

excreationist

Luiseach:
I haven't read many of posts in this thread and what I said to you just before might be irrelevant or repeating what has already been said before. You don't need to reply.

leyline

if A ->B and B->C then A->C

this is most certainly a useful assertion for understanding many things, but not all.

if a is taller than b, and b is taller than c, then a is taller than c,

but

if a is in love with b, and b is in love with c, it does not follow that a is in love with c !!

love is a form of understanding.

we can miss things by restricting ourselves exclusively to linear cause and effect.

for me truth is as much a relationship as love is. It includes our personal identity and that is why the causual chain does not always work. The 'taller than' relationship between people can be easily judged from the outside by others, but love cannot. Similarly for many types of truth relationship.

Some things cannot be abstracted from complex relationships. That which can be abstracted is intrinsically different to that which cannot. Holistic truths do not lend themselves to the seperate and connect paradigm of logic. The act of abstraction is to disengage and is intrinsically non holistic. JUst as the holistic is intrinsically non rational.

excreationist

leyline:
I think A->B means "thing A implies thing B".
e.g. [x is a mammal]->[x is an animal]
And if animals are alive, mammals would also be alive...

This is different I think. It uses a rule like this:
if A>B and B>C then A>C
Where A, B, and C (the heights) are quantities.

This doesn't involve quantities (A>B, etc) or logical statements (A->B and B->C)... it involves a different kind of relationship...
Similar things to your love example include:
A is touching B and B is touching C.
Or
A is different to B and B is different to C.
"Is in love with" is kind of like "is touching" in a way. I can't think of any other fundamentally different examples.

Your "is in love with" example doesn't properly fit the A->B, B->C thing so it doesn't really concern cause and effect.

leyline

"This doesn't involve quantities (A>B, etc) or logical statements (A->B and B->C)... it involves a different kind of relationship...

Your "is in love with" example doesn't properly fit the A->B, B->C thing so it doesn't really concern cause and effect."

uhhh......... yeh. Thats the point.

John Page

I don't agree with the reasoning above. It seems to me that the "Language of Understanding" has been invented unnecessarily. Now, I agree we must develop a language related to the topic of "understanding" in order to discuss it. Furthermore, I agree we use language to represent and communicate what we understand.

However, I don't see the justification for Lu to extrapolate that there is no understanding without language. I would like to offer the example of the zebra that understands that the presence of the lion means danger - but does not necessarily verbalize this understanding.

I think of an understanding as the mind apprehending a causal chain and applying the knowledge of such a causal chain to a current situation. In this way we recognize situations and understand their implications - for example "if it rains I will get wet" is an axiom we learn through experience.

If you guys wish to insist that brain processes can be considered as a language L1 I believe you will fall into the trap of believing the brain's operation must follow the laws of languages. Planets do not follow the laws of languages and while brains implement languages there is no reason to believe (IMO) that it is their modus operandi any more that language powering the orbit of a planet.

You will maybe think I'm making a mountain out of molehill but I believe it is a big mistake to think that language is an a priori requirement for understanding. Perhaps thats not what you're proposing......

Cheers, John