Satan Oscillate My Metallic Sonatas

Datheron,


Nice thoughtful post. Some lucid thoughts there. Let me respond in kind,


I don't agree with *some* elements of your hypothesis:

1-God created logic. In (grim) truth man created logic. At least the logic you and I refer
to in everyday life. Logic is just a tool like language that man uses to help himself
along. IMHO it would be more accurate to say "God created the universe thus...and then
man figured out some patterns of the universe and called it logic'. I don't think
God explicitly sat down at His desk with pen and paper and said, 'You know what...I'm going
to create 'logic' today.' I think it is simply a pattern that is noticable after the fact
of creation. Remember...math doesn't actually exist. That is to say that there is no math
'object' that can be gathered and manipulated in some way. It is simply a style or method
of thinking. Your milage may very.

2-God was created. More precisely...God did not always exist. I think that attaching this
aspect (being born) of mankind to God is very natural, but not sound. Any modern theist
is quick to point out that God is not subject to time...He exists completely
outside the context of time. Though He may interact with our timespace He is not subject
to it like man is. As such the terms 'beginning' and 'end' have no meaning when
refering to God. In fact, this may be some insight into God's 'omnipotence' relevent to
man. If God's being was of greater dimensionality then ours (say 5) our entire 4-dimensional timespace would be a singularity to God. That is our timespace would seem like a single 'point' to God...a point that could easily be contained within God's higher dimensional being (like
say God's pinky for example).

In this case in doesn't make sense to say that God is 'in' the universe...it is more accurate
to say that the universe is 'in' God.

My $0.2 with regards to Stephen Hawking.

Satan Oscillate My Metallic Sonatas

bgponder

To Datheron, and all:

I am admittedly out of my league here, but as to the question of "what is, is, and what isn't, isn't" I consider the ramifications of superstring theory, being plausibly and logically extracted from our three-dimensional (spatial) experience, yet entailing obvious logical paradoxes. What is "up" in the six-dimensional universe "rolled" into a near-infinitely small ball as a consequence of the state change from the "perfect" (albeit unstable) ten dimensional universe (or twenty-six, and which is it?).

Please excuse the parentheses, but our reference-frame-specific descriptions of reality (logic) posit that which we cannot know, ergo the theist feels justified in applying the principle of "what we don't know might hurt us". It seems to me that the real question is whether we are more justified in living our lives according to what we can know, vs. what we cannot. Am I correct in assuming that this is the crux of the question?

[ February 16, 2002: Message edited by: bgponder ]</p>

Datheron

Deadlogic,

But that's exactly what my definition of "universe" is - all that exists. The fact that the theist must prostulate beyond our universe for some cause outside of it, then presuppose some God as that cause, is precisely the reasoning I'm using here to go beyond God. As Dr. Retard pointed out, why must we go beyond what we do know, i.e. our physical universe? Why can't it be "just is" and reality self-contained therein?

Datheron

SOMMS,

Hey, haven't seen you in a while!

Yes, I agree that all our physical laws and mathematical forumlae are merely tools to approximate the universe. However, we also must point out that as much as they are not the "real thing", they are abstractions to something which obviously exists and runs the universe - there is a set of rules of some form that govern the universe, and the only way we can understand them is by abstraction, using numbers and formulas in substitute.

Hence, while you're correct in saying that our laws of logic don't really "exist" concretely, IMO, you're forgetting that there is a set of laws that do exist, incomprehensible to us but still binding our actions, as well as that of God's.

First of all, I disagree that we would be a point. Just as 2D space is spread out before us, meaning that we are free to violate all 2D physical laws in 3-space, our universe would be laid out before God if he was higher-dimensional; he would be able to see all points in time laid out.

But yes, I realize that the theist view is that God is not subject to time; but then the question arises - how much of our laws apply to timeless creatures? For example, if I remember this correctly, doesn't the law of identity state that object x must have a single identity at a specific point in time - to have a different identity requires change, which requires time. In this case, it's logically impossible to have a square circle...or is it? It's possible to have a square, and it's possible to have a circle, and it's certainly possible for a square to become a circle...but in a timeless context, how does that play out?

As I pointed out to Dr. Retard, I find it extremely arrogant on our part to automatically assume how certain properties hold in extra-universal contexts when we have no clue what exists in those spaces in the first place. This is one such example - the theist prostulates a first cause to create God, he then waves his hands over God and calls him timeless and thus not requiring a cause, and then he objects to illogicalities by restricting God. In all such steps, the repurcussions of setting God a certain manner, setting the universe to be a certain manner, seems to be forgotten. Here I am trying to elaborate on that.

Datheron

bgponder,

Well, I'm no astrophysicist myself. I am familiar with some aspects of the string theory (largely thanks to Hyperspace, by Kaku), but of course the mathematics is out of my league as well.

But from a different angle, I think you've hit a part of my point - that is, by what standard can we start assigning these properties and laws to the universe and to God, as well as to whatever is beyond them? By what right do theists have to assign causality to the universe, but not to God, yet logic onto both? As I still do not see any justification for these assignments (other than circular argumentation), I have merely tried to demonstrate that they lead to interesting results that make little sense.

DeadLogic

I understand what you're saying, but your use of the word "universe" appears to suffer from equivocation. If the "universe" is "all that exists," then that includes God, if he exists. But when you say theists must go "beyond our universe," what is most often meant by "universe" here is "the physical world." It makes no sense to say that the universe is "all that exists" yet God is beyond that (How could God exist if he's not part of "ALL that exists"?). Whether only the physical world exists, or whether God exists "beyond the physical" - either way - that is the "universe" if you define the word as "all that exists."


Well... that the physical universe is real and not an illusion (Hinduism's "maya") is a philosophic presupposition many of us hold. But do we really "know" that it's real? To ask "Why must we go beyond what we know (i.e., the physical world)?" is to presume that one's view of reality is undeniable, self-evident truth, and all other views are arbitrarily "going beyond what we know." This is a bit arrogant, to say the least.

[ February 16, 2002: Message edited by: DeadLogic ]</p>

Datheron

Deadlogic,

It's not equivocation in the sense that I'm purposely trying to make equal the two terms; rather, we realize the difference in definition between the two terms. As you point out, a theist defines the universe more as "the physical, material world" so that God is outside of it. An atheist may define the universe as "all that exists", with the premise that God doesn't exist.

Or, another way to put it - since the universe is all that exists, and God is beyond the universe, it implies that God doesn't exist. But this is pointless semantics...let's get on with the meat of the argument.

Hence my position that we do not, cannot know anything beyond our universe, and hence deists have an ironic sort of respect among atheists.

Of course, to hold this course of argument ultimately means that the theistic point of view must also be voided, as it also attempts to go beyond what we can know. As a matter of fact, if this viewpoint is to be taken, then the universe is a self-contained entity - we cannot know of things beyond it, hence their existence is irrelevant to us. We may then simply use Occam's Razor to cut it out, or I may easily void any attempt to rationalize God via your lines above.

Once again, though, remember that my original argument stood upon the premise of the first-cause-arguing theist, one that already has go beyond the physical universe and thus "opens up" the floor for further extrapolations. I'm perfectly content in remaining inside a self-contained universe.

DeadLogic

<strong> There's a difference between arguing that the two terms are really equal (i.e., "all that exists" = "the physical world") and simply equivocating the meanings used when convenient. So far, you have only done the latter.


<strong> My argument doesn't "void" any view; if anything, it puts competing views on a more even playing field. All I said was that it's arrogant to assume that one's view is undeniable, self-evident truth. That doesn't mean one cannot argue cogently in support of his view. It just means that there's always the possibility that a person could be wrong.


<strong> In reference to the laws of logic (and the the correct definition of "reality"), any "further extrapolations" opened up does not necessarily imply the denial of the laws of logic. Whether "all that is" is physical, illusory, spiritual, or some combination of these, the laws of logic applies to "all that is."

That's the one thing I've tried to convey.

[ February 17, 2002: Message edited by: DeadLogic ]</p>

Datheron

Deadlogic,

Indeed, there is a difference, and I have adhered readily to it - I admit that I have been confusing in using the term for two meanings, but if you will read my argument and all the posts subsequent, you will note that I have always referenced it in its context. Remember that I am arguing from the perspective that we have accepted God as the first cause (thus there exists something beyond the physical world), and as a side trip my beliefs were also expressed in similar terms (that God doesn't exist, only the physical world). But to avoid confusion, I will separate the two terms from now onward.

This is what you're talking about exactly above - we're really discussing two worldviews here, and are getting mixed up in the details and similar terms.

My argument goes against the first-causer, hence its assumptions lie in the fact that we have already accepted an "outer-universe", as well as a God. From its perspective, God's word is authoritative and absolute, and hence our understanding of the universe via his "guidance" is also regarded as absolute. There is no conceivable way for the premises to be wrong, hence your argument doesn't stand in that light.

My own beliefs, on the other hand, are subject to error, and thus your argument does apply to my situation. Therefore, I have conceded that with my own worldview, but not that of the argument within its context.

Your stance reduces to the idea that if the laws of logic were "brute force", then so could this physical universe and its physical laws. That is what I'm trying to avoid, as to allow the premises to make sense and advance my argument. Like I've said before, there are many ways to defeat the first cause argument; taking out the premises is one such way, but I'm trying to explore the inconsistencies of going along w/ the premises, not curtail the argument before it has a chance to begin.

DeadLogic

Datheron,

<strong> I'm not sure what you mean by this. Yes, I see logic as being "universal" (sic), i.e., applying to "all that exists." But that doesn't imply that the laws of physics are universal. But that may not be what you are talking about.


<strong> So, if I'm interpreting you correctly, you're saying the premises of the first cause argument have an inconsistency in that God (according to the argument) is the "uncaused cause" of everything, yet there's logic, which appears to be equally "uncaused," and even superior to God.

If that's what you're arguing, then the view of logic I hold is contrary to your argument. As I've already explained, logic is not some entity hovering over us (or, I might add, over God), imposing its will upon us.

If you're going to find a weakness in the first cause argument, it's not going to be in "the origin of logic," but rather "the necessity of causality."