Plump-DJ

Well cosmologies do not lack belief. We're clearly using the term to mean without God. And of the nine basic cosmologies only 2 are atheistic. So yes it does seem to come down to a with God (theism, pantheism, deism Godism, Dualism, Panenthiesm, Subjectivism) or without God (Naturism, negationsim) situation. There are no other options.

I don't have to. It's been done by those before me. Let's start with some David Hume, Kant and later Bertrand Russell and Richard Rorty. The point being that there are no answers to the epistemologicaly devistating skepticism from a 'without God situation'. Skepticism from the likes of Hume & further confirmed by the likes of athiestic thinkers such as Russell and Rorty.

Take the question i asked earlier about causes and effects. When we observe cause and effect, we find that the effect is nothing like its cause. For instance, a flame is nothing like the match from which it comes. The loud "THUD" is nothing like the hard plastic bowling ball or
the floor on which it is dropped. The scent of the flower is nothing like the textured petal of the flower. The causes are not like the effects.

Our perceptions are effects caused by the world around us. But if we find that causes are not like their effects, what makes us think that our perceptions accurately represent anythng like the world around us? There is no reason, is there? And if we bring in Evolution we ask "How do we know about Evolution?" Thru our sense percpetion. And the same question applies.

Vorkosigan

I don't have to. It's been done by those before me. Let's start with some David Hume, Kant and later Bertrand Russell and Richard Rorty. The point being that there are no answers to the epistemologicaly devistating skepticism from a 'without God situation'.

Come come. Hume's point was that induction had to be innate. There was no way one could learn it. However, innateness is neatly supplied by evolutionary psychology. As I discussed above. Twice.

Far there being no answers, there is in fact a robust framework being erected in the cognitive sciences even as we speak.

But if we find that causes are not like their effects, what makes us think that our perceptions accurately represent anythng like the world around us?

Is this a serious question? The problem of induction is twofold. First, how can we induct? And second, how is it our inductions are so reliable? The consistency of perception is the sticky point that needs explaining. For you to explain the reliability of sense perception, you need to multiply entities fearsomely. We take a more pragmatic route. Our picture of the universe isn't there to be "accurate" but effective, a very different standard which, in accuracy terms, might be rendered "as accurate as necessary." Accuracy, too, is a completely subjective term.........

There is no reason, is there? And if we bring in Evolution we ask "How do we know about Evolution?" Thru our sense percpetion. And the same question applies.

Remember, it is two questions. The fact that perception is consistent is the key. In a a nutshell, first, we assume that our perceptions work. We then set about discovering why this is the case. Lo and behold! We stumble across evolution. That explains how it is our senses are so reliable. Nothing circular about it, as I explained above, because in the latter half of the loop, we have more knowledge than in the former. I suggest you scroll up and re-read the statement about induction I made twice to Kris.

Besides, you're in an even worse position than we metaphysical naturalists. You've got to explain, on no grounds at all, how you know your god isn't a trickster constantly screwing with your mind. Of course, you have the problem of Last Thursdayism too. Metaphysical naturalists don't face those problems. Happy hunting!

Also, you seem to have misunderstood Rorty. I found this
<a href="http://www.iusb.edu/~wrobbins/Essays/contraplantinga.html" target="_blank">neat-o online paper</a>:

"Actually, Rorty's meaning is quite different. He is not saying that we are would-be representers of the world whom Darwin leaves with no built-in orientation toward that which we are supposed to be representing in our thoughts. He is saying that we can use Darwin to reassert the value of a folk psychologically based intellectual self-image against generic Cartesianism. If we do so, we will think of our minds as devices that fashion and refashion tools in the form of folk psychological beliefs and desires for coping with the world rather than as devices that are supposed to form accurate representations of the world. This intellectual self-image has none of the skeptical consequences that Plantinga tries to pin on evolutionary naturalism."

The issue isn't the accuracy of our sense, but the effectiveness of them.

Vorkosigan.

Plump-DJ

Well he did a little bit more then that. Here's a quick rundown.

1) Reliability of the Senses.

Even if our senses were reliable, after Hume, Kant, Wittgenstein, Quinn, and all the coherentists we know that all experience is sufficiently theory laden that it is not possible to assume a close identity between reality and the way it appears to us. The fact that all minds impose the same structures on the world causing our experience to be uniform does not, as some have suggested, give us objectivity, rather, it precludes our ability to contrast

2) External World.

Immanuel Kant said it was one of the greatest scandals of science and philosophy that there was no proof of the existence of the external world. Because we can make no distinction between the internal world of our thoughts and the external world, we can not know that what we call the external is just a form of our internal world. Therefore, we cannot know that the external world even exists.

3) The Inductive Problem

Bertrand Russell expresses the problem well, he says, “What these arguments prove – and I do not think the proof can be controverted – is that induction is an independent logical principle, incapable of being inferred either form experience or from other logical principles, and that without this principle science is impossible.” (“A History of Western Philosophy” p674)

4) The Uniformity of Nature

Bertrand Russell explains it well, “It has been argued that we have reason to know that the future will resemble the past, because what was the future has constantly become the past, and has always been found to resemble the past, so that we really have experience of the future, namely of times which were formerly future, which we may call past futures. But such an argument really begs the very question at issue. We have experience of past futures, but not of future futures, and the question is: Will future futures resemble past futures? This question is not to be answered by an argument, which starts from past futures alone. We have therefore still to seek for some principle which shall enable us to know that the future will follow the same laws as the past." (“The Problems of Philosophy” p64-65)

Without a justification for the Uniformity of Nature, no scientific generalizations can ever be justified.

5) Universality of Logic.

man cannot account for the universality of logic. All reasoning and argumentation assume that logic is universal. That is, they assume that it applies to all objects in all places and at all times. But, this last assumption is unjustified. In fact, no argument for logic can be offered, for to formulate an argument for logic, you must assume the validity of logic.

You may be tempted to respond here that the universality of logic is undeniable and no counter example can be given. But, such a response may point up merely our psychological limitations. But, a psychological inability to modify logic’s universality does not prove it is in fact universal. It merely means we cannot modify it.

I am not trying to refute the universality of logic. I am merely pointing out the inability of unaided man to account for something so central and basic to the knowing process.

6) The ontology of Logic

Man cannot account for the ontological nature of logic. Is logic a substance? Is it a property? Where is it? Is it everywhere?

If we do not answer these questions what are we reduced to? Many of us consider logic to be the bedrock of our world-view and our theory of knowledge. But what kind of a foundation is this, do I say, “I don’t know what it is, I don’t know why I believe it, and I don’t know if it always applies, but it is the standard that everything else must pass and the solid foundation on which everything else is built?”

7) Causality

I'm sure you're aware of Hume's dismissal of causality. Habits of the mind he called them. Without causality there is no sense perception. No sense perception no science. No science, no knowledge.

8) The Self.

Man cannot justify a meaningful belief in the existence of his own self. Are you simply a dream, an idea in the mind of a god or an angel or demon. Are you a program on magnetic tape as an old Moody Blues song suggests. Are you simply the nexus of ideas as David Hume suggests. Are you material, spiritual, abstract, or concrete. Whenever autonomous man says his self exists, he has some metaphysical notion behind the term that he cannot justify. Since any given notion of the self cannot be justified, no particular notion of the self can be justified.

Most definetly.

Ahhhh... well i gathered this might come up. To be honest this had occured to me. I mean for the presupp argument to work you both have to agree on what you're talking about. But i think If you decide to change the notions of 'know' and 'true' from "that which really is" to "that which works" (effective) you're really shoiwing (at least to me) that we cannot deal with these terms as defined. In otherwords when you say that such and such is true and I know it you're not really using these words in the classic realist sense but in another more pragmatic sense. But if knowledge of the world refers to that which is then we don't really have any knowledge do we? The fact that one must redefine the terms because he cannot deal with them as defined is a proof of this i think.

Well in all fairness i don't think your response answers the particular question I asked. In fact when i was discussing this via email with a presupper i raised the very point you did. The Evolution response simply shifts the question.

How do we know about evolution? Did we use our sense perception to gain this information? If so then we will have to answer the previous question before we can say we know anything about it at all! If causes are not like their effects how do we know that any of the perceptions we have about evolution are anything like the actual data? I understand that you believe it is but the question is not about what we believe but about knowledge. We cannot answer this question with the word Evolution without engaging in circular reasoning.

Well i don't think so. Not if one takes a quick look at the problems raised by Hume et al. They're epistemologicaly devistating and if you're foundations are one of the 2 basic atheistic cosmologies you dont have any answers to those questions. Unless there is a 'God' (we're not talking Triune biblcial God's here btw ) there is no justification for knowledge. This is what the lesson of the history of epistemology tells us. That autonomous man cannot lay a foundation for knowledge on his own.

Well i was speaking of the epistemic problems above that have been confirmed later by the likes of Russell and Rorty.

So we redefine the terms because we cannot deal with them. Know no longer means "that which is" but "that which works"! That's not knowledge.

Bill Snedden

I'm sure that Vorkosigan will likely provide a point-by-point rebuttal to your argument, but this happens to be one of my favorite topics and I just can't help but reply.

First, you must be aware that the "standard" presuppositional argument as developed by Van Til, Bahnsen, et al does indeed claim that only the "triune biblical god" provides the necessary foundation for human knowledge. No other god suffices. This is due to its "unique" characteristics. For instance, Van Til claimed that only in the Christian God's triune nature could a valid solution be found to the problem of universals.

Of course, this is not only highly questionable, but also likely heterodox (see <a href="http://members.aol.com/ironslee/papers.htm" target="_blank">Lee Irons</a>, "Van Til's Philosophical Misuse of the Trinity.")

Second, you should also be aware that Hume, Kant, Descartes, Quine, et al were specifically attempting to demonstrate how human knowledge could be possible without making any arbitrary assumptions. In other words, without assuming a foundation. Descartes cogito makes this point perfectly clear: the only non-arbitrary assumption I can make is that I exist.

Their failure to provide the justification you seek in no way proves that no justification is possible for "atheistic worldviews."

Any epistemology can be justified given the proper ontological foundation (the presupposition). You make the claim that human knowledge is possible because your god created the universe in such a way as to render human knowledge possible. Non-theists claim that human knowledge is possible because the character of the universe is such that human knowledge is possible. Your non-demonstrated claims to the contrary notwithstanding, both provide justification for believing that we can have knowledge (for example, presupposing the existence of a triune god and presupposing the brute fact of existence both can "justify" the belief in an external world). The question is, how do we evaluate opposing presuppositions? Which one is "better"?.

Unfortunately, this evaluation would seem to require an external standard. But, by definition, there can be no external standard to a "worldview"; by definition it encompassess all of our thought.

Van Til's approach was to argue by retortion; to show that non-Christian worldviews contained inherent contradictions. At this he and all subsequent apologists of his ilk have failed utterly. Their "contradictions" are nothing more than phantoms imposed upon them by their own presuppositions. I've always found it somewhat ironic that CPs argue so forcefully that contradictions invalidate a worldview while blithely ignoring the contradiction at the very heart of theirs (3=1?).

Certainly individual non-Christians hold contradictory beliefs. So do individual Christians. Neither invalidates the possibility in principle of justification in either worldview.

In the end, it boils down to a choice of values. Do we prefer to live in a universe where we are free moral agents with the responsibility to direct our own destiny or are we to be the chattel of a cosmic slave-master?

Regards,

Bill Snedden

Vorkosigan

This is the most important thing:

How do we know about evolution? Did we use our
sense perception to gain this information? If so then we will have to answer the previous question before we can say we know anything about it at all! If causes are not like their effects how do we know that any of the perceptions we have about evolution are anything like the actual data? I understand that you believe it is but the question is not about what we believe but about knowledge. We cannot answer this question with the word Evolution without engaging in circular reasoning.

As the Giere quote points out, it is not circular reasoning if, when the circle comes back, you have more information than you did at the previous iteration. Then it becomes a positive feedback loop. It can't be a circle if something changes.

I do believe that our sense perceptions are both reliable and effective because my senses report that the world is predictable and stable over time. It is the four-dimensional aspect of the world that defies explanation if we are really a brain in a jar. You have to multiply entities fearsomely to make a workable brain in the jar case. But in any case, since I do not postulate supernatural entities, the brain-in-the-jar scenario is not a problem for me. It is you who faces the problem of the trickster god.

In any case, it may well be that our senses do not work at all, but there is no reason to suspect they do not. That is the real issue here. What reason can you offer to believe that the world is a fraud?

Let's go over your points:

Even if our senses were reliable, after Hume, Kant, Wittgenstein, Quinn, and all the coherentists we know that all experience is sufficiently theory laden that it is not possible to assume a close identity between reality and the way it appears to us. The fact that all minds impose the same structures on the world causing our experience to be uniform does not, as some have suggested, give us objectivity, rather, it precludes our ability to contrast

You've tossed in a lot of words here -- theory-ladenness, objectivity. Where did "objectivity" come in? I have never claimed we were "objective."

Of course our perceptions are theory-laden. But this is equivocating. You want me to read "theory-laden" as "biased," which is why you introduced the word "objective" out of the blue. I don't think Hume ever considered that theory-ladenness might be a useful property for a mind to have. In order to effectively function in the world, our minds must contain numerous theories -- useful, if not correct, about how the world works -- like that objects can have intentions, that things set in motion continue moving unless something acts on them, that humans almost never keep doing the same thing over and over again, and so on. These theories of how things work -- so-called folk psychology, of which there have been numerous studies done, are a necessary part of our ability to function in the world. A mind without theory-ladenness could not function; indeed, it would not even be a mind.

In other words, I cheerfully embrace the charge of theory-ladenness, and ask you how a mind could function without it. The standard I subscribe to is one of effectiveness -- are human perceptions good enough to permit us to function in the world? And the answer is, of course.

Immanuel Kant said ....the external world, we can not know that what we call the external is just a form of our internal world. Therefore, we cannot know that the external world even exists.

Again, what evidence suggests that it doesn't? Apply Kant's argument to any part of the world and you can see how it works: what evidence do I have that my daughter isn't sick? None! So of course she must be sick, right? Kant can complain all he wants. As far as I know, my internal world ends at the limits of my skin, and no evidence suggests otherwise. Despite intense effort, I have unable to affect the course of events by merely willing them. I have to be able to intervene.

Bertrand Russell expresses the problem well, he says, “What these arguments prove – and I do not think the proof can be controverted – is that induction is an independent logical principle, incapable of being inferred either form experience or from other logical principles, and that without this principle science is impossible.” (“A History of Western Philosophy” p674

Please use more up-to-date cites. The problem of induction has been solved by evolution. It put it there.

....We have therefore still to seek for some principle which shall enable us to know that the future will follow the same laws as the past."

There are three ways to answer this question. The first is to ask why we need this principle in the first place. The future by definition is unknowable.

The second way is to note that we are living in the future of the past. To all past times, this is the future. Relative to the past, we demonstrate that indeed the laws of the future resemble the past. It is only our own future that as yet is murky.

The third way -- need I even mention it? -- is to ask what reason we have to assume that the future will not be like the past? Is Russell arguing that there is evidence that a sudden discontinuity between current and future natural laws will suddenly occur?

Without a justification for the Uniformity of Nature, no scientific generalizations can ever be justified.

I must disagree. Regardless of what we think about the future, any scientific generalization about the past is justified. And further, any scientific prediction that comes true in the future is also justified. Ergo, scientific predictions are justified by their potential, based on past success, to be true.

In any case, what does "justified" mean? I love that word. Who do I need to "justify" to? Is there a Committee out there somewhere?

man cannot account for the universality of logic.

Word to the wise: The expression "man" for "humans" is not really acceptable in serious writing any more. It signals to others that you are a Christian apologist or similar, since those are the only people who use that outmoded language.


I am not trying to refute the universality of logic. I am merely pointing out the inability of unaided man to account for something so central and basic to the knowing process.

Fortunately we have several hundred million years of evolution to account for the development of logic. And we know logic is in fact not universal. Is Schroedinger's Cat dead or alive?

I'm sure you're aware of Hume's dismissal of causality. Habits of the mind he called them. Without causality there is no sense perception. No sense perception no science. No science, no knowledge.

But we do have causality, which means that we know something Hume didn't. Could that something be....evolution? Causality is one of those theory-laden things that humans have so they can function in a world where actions have consequences.

Since any given notion of the self cannot be justified, no particular notion of the self can be justified.

"Justified" to who? How? Why do I even need to "justify" my belief in my own existence? It is self-evident, and I know of no evidence to cause me to doubt it.

The fact that one must redefine the terms because he cannot deal with them as defined is a proof of this i think.

I am "redefining" the terms because your word, "accuracy," has no definable meaning. Whose view of the world is more "accurate?" A human's? An amoeba's? A fly's? A hawk's? A pig's? A snake's? Each experiences the world in a different way, and none sees the world a physicist sees when they take apart atoms. Accuracy is a loaded and subjective term. It presupposes that there is one correct view, and anything that deviates from that is "inaccurate." But of course, there is no one correct view. Animals, including humans, have such senses as they need to do the things they need to do. A fly has very effective senses for finding food and avoiding predators. A shark can sense electromagnetic fields. Unaided humans can't. Meanwhile physicists see wavelike particles. Whose view of the world is more "accurate?"

I am not "redefining the terms" -- I think it is very insulting to imply that I would somehow worm out of something by playing semantic games. I am simply refusing to agree that there is some perfect Platonic world out there we can "know" "accurately." "Accuracy" is a arbitrary value that has no meaning.

This whole accuracy thing you've raised is a tactic to get me to buy your presupposition about truth with a very big T. Sorry, but the real issue is effective senses. And I think it would be real tough to argue that our senses are not effective.

They're epistemologicaly devistating and if you're foundations are one of the 2 basic atheistic cosmologies you dont have any answers to those questions.

Alas, evolution has built in all the equipment we need to escape the "devastating" problems of Hume. 300 years ago they might have been interesting, now they are just prefaces in cognitive science textbooks.

So we redefine the terms because we cannot deal with them. Know no longer means "that which is" but "that which works"! That's not knowledge.

That is the very definition of knowledge. How do you "know" something? When you are aware that it "works." You can't know "what is" because "what is" is an invention of people who think about capital-T truth, like Plato or Van Til. Scientific knowledge is provisional or approximate. It is little-T truth. Us little-T truth types use criteria like usefulness and reliability to determine when we "know" something. You know something when you can make it work for you over and over again. How do you "know" how to start your car? You've done it hundreds of times. You don't "know" it because you have a grasp of TRUTH. You know it because you've done it. If I give a writing test to my students, I don't ask them about TRUTH, I have them write a formal essay to show that they understand and can use the guidelines I gave them.

I can't think of any way we can know knowledge in the Platonic sense of perfect knowing you postulate above.

Vorkosigan

Plump-DJ

As the Giere quote points out, it is not circular reasoning if, when the circle comes back, you have more information than you did at the previous iteration. Then it becomes a positive feedback loop. It can't be a circle if something changes.

Right. I still don't see how this answers the question. If i ask you the above question and you respond "Evolution solves this one" you've just assumed that which you're trying to support because the question is simly shifted. If our senses are effects and effects are not like their causes what reason do we have for thinking our perceptions about evolution bere any resemblance to the data?

We also seem to be going in circles anyways so perhaps some clarification on your part (if it's not to much trouble of course) would clear things up on this end. I don't want to argue a strawman if you do in fact have an answer.

I do believe that our sense perceptions are both reliable and effective because my senses report that the world is predictable and stable over time. It is the four-dimensional aspect of the world that defies explanation if we are really a brain in a jar. You have to multiply entities fearsomely to make a workable brain in the jar case. But in any case, since I do not postulate supernatural entities, the brain-in-the-jar scenario is not a problem for me. It is you who faces the problem of the trickster god.

Well it seems to me that you face the problem of not being able to answer even the most foundational questions regarding knowledge. You state that you believe your sense perception is reliable, but that is exactly the point. We're not interested in what we believe but in what we know and can justify. And Evolution does not help us. As far as God being a trickster goes I think this response misses the point of the presupper argument.

The presupper does not argue that knowledge does not exist, he argues that without God there is no justification and there is no knowledge. If God is a trickster then there is no knowledge. So.. the point is one between no knowledge and knowledge and if knowledge then a non trickster God. That is the point of the presupper argument i believe. You seem to be looking at this argument from above when i think this argument is actually 'arse up'.

There *are* reasons to suspect they do not. I offered an objection above and it seems that you have not responded to it. If causes are not like their effects (think about *how* different flame is to the match, or the THUD from a basketball is to the ball itself) and our perceptions are effects caused by the world around you what reason to do you have for thinking that your perceptions bear any resemblance to their causes? (that which is) Answer you gave. Evolution. So now we ask, if percpetions are not like their causes what makes you think that your perceptions about Evolution bere any resemblance to the actual data? Answer you gave. Evolution. See the problem?

With all this theory-laden baggage you are carrying, how do you know your perceptions are accurate? You just
cheerfully embrace theory ladenness. The question is still there. Ignorance is bliss. And since your "theory" does not provide the necessary elements to justify accurate sense perceptions, why would you continue to hold that "theory"?

Word to the wise: The expression "man" for "humans" is not really acceptable in serious writing any more. It signals to others that you are a Christian apologist or similar, since those are the only people who use that outmoded language.

Well i disagree. (shock horror suprise) I think the word man is fine to use. I'm no Apologist and i was unaware that the word had developed this "stigma" about it., despite my many discussions on all things theistic and non-theistic. Who is this 'committee' of which you speak -- who has decreed that the word man cannot be used as above?

Fortunately we have several hundred million years of evolution to account for the development of logic. And we know logic is in fact not universal. Is Schroedinger's Cat dead or alive?

Point 1) If logic is not universal and invariant it loses it's law like quality. If it loses that then it becomes mere convention. It is no longer binding.

Point 2) If logic is reduced to matter or "stuff in our heads" it loses it's law like quality. It is as in Point 1 reduced to mere convention.

The problem with conventions as i'm sure you are aware is that they are easity overturned. Logic no longer carries any weight. So what if a person is illogical? There's nothing wrong with that, it's just another convention and they can simply reject my convention. And as such truth is no longer exclusive. We're both right, i just use a different logic to you. Could you live consistently with this belief?

And i'm not so sure your QM example shows that something can exist and not-exist in the same sense at the same time? How much do we really understand about what is going on inside the Quantum? Can you really say that you know 1) The cat both exists and non-exists and 2) in *the same sense at the same time*?

But we do have causality, which means that we know something Hume didn't. Could that something be....evolution? Causality is one of those theory-laden things that humans have so they can function in a world where actions have consequences.

I really don't see how Evolution answers Hume's skepticism on causality. And saying we need it to function is neither here nor there. This says nothing of it's ontological status. Is causality 'out there' or not? I believe so but what i believe and what i can show are two different things. Evolution cannot tell us the ontological status of causality and if their is no causality then there is no sense perception and hence no knowledge.

"Justified" to who? How? Why do I even need to "justify" my belief in my own existence? It is self-evident, and I know of no evidence to cause me to doubt it.

What is the self Vork? Do you know what the 'you' in you is? Are you material, spiritual, abstract, or concrete? When you say it is self-evident that you exist, what are 'you' actually saying exists? We are confident in the assertion “I exist,” only because it is completely without content and meaning.

This whole accuracy thing you've raised is a tactic to get me to buy your presupposition about truth with a very big T. Sorry, but the real issue is effective senses. And I think it would be real tough to argue that our senses are not effective.

This is not what i seek to do. I don't seek to do anything other then argue in the hope that i might pick sometihng up. I don't care wether you buy the presup argument or not. I also see the pragmatic approach to knowledge as being a concession by man (what else shall i say? Human's sounds silly here) that he can no longer play the game he's been trying to play for the last 2000 years.

Alas, evolution has built in all the equipment we need to escape the "devastating" problems of Hume. 300 years ago they might have been interesting, now they are just prefaces in cognitive science textbooks.

And how do you know about evolution? Did you use your sense percetion? Did you use logic? Round and round we go.

That is the very definition of knowledge. How do you "know" something? When you are aware that it "works." You can't know "what is" because "what is" is an invention of people who think about capital-T truth, like Plato or Van Til. Scientific knowledge is provisional or approximate. It is little-T truth. Us little-T truth types use criteria like usefulness and reliability to determine when we "know" something. You know something when you can make it work for you over and over again. How do you "know" how to start your car? You've done it hundreds of times. You don't "know" it because you have a grasp of TRUTH. You know it because you've done it. If I give a writing test to my students, I don't ask them about TRUTH, I have them write a formal essay to show that they understand and can use the guidelines I gave them.

What do you mean by capital-T truth? From this paragraph it would seem that you mean absolute truth or
ultimate truth or universal truth. This is if we compare it to little-T truth, which is provisional or approximate. The problem is this:

1) This paragraph is a denial of capital-T truth

2) This paragraph about capital-T truth and little-T truth is itself a capital-T truth statement.

So, we are left with this: If this paragraph is true, then it must be false. It self-stultifies or is self referentially refuting.

BTW i've ommitted a number of the other points. This is getting rather large for my tastes. If we can cover some ground then we can focus on these issues afterwords. So let's not lose sight of the big picture here. The argument which brought us here.

Jack the Bodiless

Plump:
That's why "senses and reason" are usually lumped together as a single package. We use our reason, based on past experience, to fill in the details of what we perceive. When we hear a THUD, our reason supplies us with the information that something has hit the ground. And this is why a person blind or deaf since birth, who suddenly gains sight or hearing, cannot use them effectively at first: they lack the specialized reasoning skills to interpret what they are seeing or hearing.

As for circularity: try the following exercise.

Take a blank sheet of paper and write "Senses and reason are generally reliable" on it. Then draw a box around that statement.

Next, write "We perceive fossils etc" nearby, and draw an arrow pointing from the first statement to the second. But don't draw a box around this or any subsequent statement.

Next, an arrow from the previous statement to "We deduce evolution".

Next, an arrow from the previous statement to "Accurate senses and reason aid survival".

Next, an arrow from the previous statement back to the "Senses and reason are generally reliable" box.

Now, you are entirely correct in noting that this is circular. If our senses and reason aren't reliable, the whole chain falls apart, and we cannot then conclude that evolution justifies belief in the reliability of our senses and reason.

However, that's where the box comes in. That box indicates that the first statement is the Prime Axiom: the necessary assumption that makes knowledge possible. Without making that assumption, we can know nothing. That statement is necessarily true, and all else follows. The truth of the statement in the box is NOT considered to be contingent upon the truth of anything else on the paper. Evolution provides a functional explanation for the assumed reliability of our senses and reason, but does not replace the "leap of faith" required to assume the Prime Axiom in the first place. The Prime Axiom anchors everything else. As Vorkorsigan said, going around the loop increases knowledge: we now have the original assumption, plus a reason WHY our senses and reason are reliable.

Presuppositionalists claim that their religion provides an alternative, "true" Prime Axiom: they are lying. This is evident because the Prime Axiom is the necessary foundation of knowledge, and without it they could not determine that the Bible even exists, or read its contents. The ability of presuppositionalists to function before they read their Bibles for the first time is proof that the Bible is not a necessary foundation for knowledge.

At best, they can try to argue that Christian presuppositionalism plays a similar role to evolution: part of a secondary functional explanation for WHY our senses and reason are reliable. However, as the Prime Axiom remains the true foundation of knowledge, we can legitimately use our senses and reason to investigate and evaluate the rival claims of metaphysical naturalism and Christian theism.

Vorkosigan

Right. I still don't see how this answers the question. If i ask you the above question and you respond "Evolution solves this one" you've just assumed that which you're trying to support because the question is simly shifted. If our senses are effects and effects are not like their causes what reason do we have for thinking our perceptions about evolution bere any resemblance to the data?

1. Reliability and repeatability of sense perceptions.
2. Intersubjectivity.
3. Lack of any evidence that our sense are ineffective for any significant time or domain in which they are employed.

Well it seems to me that you face the problem of not being able to answer even the most foundational questions regarding knowledge. You state that you believe your sense perception is reliable, but that is exactly the point. We're not interested in what we believe but in what we know and can justify.

"Justify" has no meaning. What we know is this:

1. Our sense data is reliable and effective in sorting out the world for us.
2. Intersubjectivity: others report similar sense data, confirming my own expectations.
3. There is no evidence that suggests that (1) and (2) are wrong.
4. In addition to the negative evidence (lack of evidence suggesting serious long term problems with the sensory apparatus of humans), there exists also a positive explanation for the reason our senses are effective: we are evolved to function effectively in the world.

And Evolution does not help us. As far as God being a trickster goes I think this response misses the point of the presupper argument.

On the contrary, the presupper is in an even worse position. First, she's invented all sorts of entities that there is no evidence to support. Second, her decision to opt for one supernatural entity over all others is completely subjective. Presuppositionalism is subjectivity raised to the nth power. The act of Presupposing implies that one makes the move before one has evidence and afterword one's position will be maintained despite evidence. What is this but the counsel of despair? The presupper in effect concedes the argument of the skeptic: the evidential argument for gods is so hopeless, the presupper concludes, that the only recourse is to short-circuit debate by accepting god prior to argument, since in an argument the believer is bound to lose. This point of view is so hope-less, arbitrary and subjective, that the majority of theists reject it.

The presupper does not argue that knowledge does not exist, he argues that without God there is no justification and there is no knowledge.

First, the presupper doesn't argue, she simply makes an arbitrary choice. May as well roll dice and choose gods, the effect is the same.

If God is a trickster then there is no knowledge. So.. the point is one between no knowledge and knowledge and if knowledge then a non trickster God. That is the point of the presupper argument i believe. You seem to be looking at this argument from above when i think this argument is actually 'arse up'.

No, because you simply assert that we have knowledge and god is not a trickster. But of course, you have no way to argue this. You can't discover that god is not a trickster, you just have to hope its not. All your questions can be thrown right back at you, with the additional problem that your cosmology faces: namely, the trickster god.

With all this theory-laden baggage you are carrying, how do you know your perceptions are accurate?

I never said they WERE "accurate?" There isn't any such thing as "accurate." I can't sense electromagnetic fields, a shark can. Whose senses are more "accurate?" Your notion of accuracy is absurd and meaningless. There is no "accurate" world out there.

The notion I put forward was the one of "effective." Do our senses work well enough to enable us to function? You bet. Why? Evolution.

You just cheerfully embrace theory ladenness. The question is still there. Ignorance is bliss. And since your "theory" does not provide the necessary elements to justify accurate sense perceptions, why would you continue to hold that "theory"?

I continue to hold this theory because I haven't saddled it with the meaningless and subjective idea of "accuracy" but with the different standard of "effectiveness." Our perceptions require theories underneath them in order to function. Dogs, cockroaches, sharks, and lizards have completely different theories of the way the world works.

Well i disagree. (shock horror suprise) I think the word man is fine to use. I'm no Apologist and i was unaware that the word had developed this "stigma" about it.

It is common practice in academia to avoid this word entirely when referring to humans collectively, and to substitute "she" and "he" interchangeably, as I did above.

Point 1) If logic is not universal and invariant it loses it's law like quality. If it loses that then it becomes mere convention. It is no longer binding.

Correct. Logic is a construction that is an effective tool for understanding reality. It is not an abstraction with an existence independent of the minds that use it.

"Binding" and "justify" and "accuracy"....did it ever strike you that the language you use reeks of authority, power and control?

Point 2) If logic is reduced to matter or "stuff in our heads" it loses it's law like quality. It is as in Point 1 reduced to mere convention.

You seem confused. A mere convention can be useful -- the metric system is mere convention, but it is very effective. Further, what is this one thing called "logic?" Two value? Three-value? Bayesian? There are different logics. Logic is a convention, in part built into humans, for handling certain aspects of reality.

The problem with conventions as i'm sure you are aware is that they are easity overturned.

Really? Try overturning the convention toward male dominance in a muslim society.

Logic no longer carries any weight. So what if a person is illogical? There's nothing wrong with that, it's just another convention and they can simply reject my convention. And as such truth is no longer exclusive. We're both right, i just use a different logic to you. Could you live consistently with this belief?

I do all the time. It is a quandry posed by living in a society with other human beings. Just the other day I was down on a certain street in Taipei, where I saw three beef noodle shops. A fourth was being opened. In a US city, a street with 3 noodle shops would probably see a different kind of restaurant being opened. But the Chinese use different logic than we do, because they use different assumptions (axioms) about business and human behavior (For example, it would be insane to open a different restaurant, when a proven market for beef noodle exists in that area. Also, deliveries of goods will be simpler, since wholesalers are already used to that area).....

And i'm not so sure your QM example shows that something can exist and not-exist in the same sense at the same time? How much do we really understand about what is going on inside the Quantum? Can you really say that you know 1) The cat both exists and non-exists and 2) in *the same sense at the same time*?

Hell no. Can anyone? That's the whole point. Where's the invariant logic and causality at the QM level?

I really don't see how Evolution answers Hume's skepticism on causality. And saying we need it to function is neither here nor there. This says nothing of it's ontological status. Is causality 'out there' or not? I believe so but what i believe and what i can show are two different things. Evolution cannot tell us the ontological status of causality and if their is no causality then there is no sense perception and hence no knowledge.

Evolution can tell us about it. Numerous experiments with the expectations of infants and toddlers have yielded much data about what people appear to be born with.

What is the self Vork? Do you know what the 'you' in you is? Are you material, spiritual, abstract, or concrete? When you say it is self-evident that you exist, what are 'you' actually saying exists? We are confident in the assertion “I exist,” only because it is completely without content and meaning.

"I am a concrete object with a multitude of internal functions." I do not know what the Self is, nor does it worry me overmuch that I do not. I expect that within the next twenty years cognitive science will make progress on the issue, and close this gap too, just like science has closed all the others.

I also see the pragmatic approach to knowledge as being a concession by man (what else shall i say? Human's sounds silly here) that he can no longer play the game he's been trying to play for the last 2000 years.

That's funny, because I see the pragmatic approach as a positive response to the failure of presuppositionalism and other supernatural nonsense.

And how do you know about evolution? Did you use your sense percetion? Did you use logic? Round and round we go.

No, you're going round and round. I've mounted a positive feedback loop and am leaving you on the ground running in circles

2) This paragraph about capital-T truth and little-T truth is itself a capital-T truth statement.So, we are left with this: If this paragraph is true, then it must be false. It self-stultifies or is self referentially refuting.

Or, alternatively, you're equivocating two different kinds of truth -- one, capital-T truth statements about the world, and the other, capital-T truth statements within logical systems underpinned by axioms. Which kind was I making a statement about?

BTW i've ommitted a number of the other points. brought us here.

Bring'em on.

Vorkosigan

MaxMainspring

This first problem you have with this assertion is that in order for it to be meaningful you would have to define the difference between an "accurate" perception and an "inaccurate" one. How would an accurate correspondance differ from one that was not?

The second problem you have is that if your putative God exists, then he is the one that is responsible for the disparities between cause and effect that you allude to. If he has fashioned a world with such disconnects, then you have no basis for saying that it is a defect that he/she/it has remedied within the edifice of your consciousness and any such assumption you make is unwarranted.

The fact that you would feel more confident of your knowledge if he had done so is of no probative value at all. It has no bearing on such a question and no bearing on the question of the existence of such an entity.

The fact is that, if you are right about the invalidity of knowledge absent a god, then such a conclusion does absolutely nothing to preclude the existence of deluded theists, of which you would be one. We would all be deluded, theists and non-theists alike. Your presupposition does not deliver you from this difficulty.

For my part, my firmest conviction on the matter tells me that our mental contruction of the world around us is in no way an "accurate" rendition of external reality (to the extent that this statement is even meaningful). If fact my best guess is that you would not recognize my experiential picture of reality, just as I would likewise be lost in yours. But this is not a cause for alarm or for a failure of nerve, it is merely the nature of that beast we call consciousness which is generated (by whatever means) by individual organisms each of which differs from the other.

When a presuppostionist says that without God we have no way of having confidence in our internal representations of reality, my temptation is to say "duh". But my real question is why should anyone but an insecure absolutist care?

If you want to extend the difficulty to the validity of logical constructions of reality then you have to be prepared to characterize your putative God's relation to logic. Is logic established by divine fiat, or is God subject to it just as the rest of us are? Any discussion of episitemology within a presuppostionistic context requires that that question be answered first.

I trust you see the problems that this question brings however it is answered.


Edited to to change the second to last sentence from "Any discussion of logic within a presuppostionistic context requires that that question be answered first." to its present form

[ June 10, 2002: Message edited by: MaxMainspring ]</p>

Plump-DJ

1. Reliability and repeatability of sense perceptions.
2. Intersubjectivity.
3. Lack of any evidence that our sense are ineffective for any significant time or domain in which they are employed.

Let's walk this thru in steps shall we.

1) I ask "When we observe the world we see that causes have no resemblance to the effects. The difference between say a THUD and the basketball bouncing off a wall is striking. Now if our sense perceptions are caused by the world around us what *reason* do we have for thinking they bere any resemblance to that which is?"

2) You respond Evolution.

3) I ask "If we use our sense perception to learn of evolution and we see that causes are nothing like their effects (our perceptions) what reason do you have for thinking that our perception about Evolution bere's any resemblanceto the actual data?"

4) Now you respond with 3 points above.

1) Reliablity and repeatablility.

Reliablity. A) Reliable how? If reliable does not mean *corresponds to that which is* then we have *not* got knowledge of the world. If you claim it does correspond to that which is you're going to have to come across the word accurate at some stage and you're going to have to answer the question below.
B) This is the point in question. Simply saying they are reliable does not answer the question above.

Repeatability doesn't help us. To use an analogy, if the ball is 'that which is' and the THUD is the effect and I bounce a ball of the wall the THUD will continue THUDing, time after time. Therefore that is no reason for thinking your perceptions about evolution bere any resemblance to the actual data or that "which is" because you continue to have the same perceptions.

2) Intersubjectivity. Because other's have the same perceptions as us is no reason for thinking that our sense perceptions are an exception to the rule of cause and effect which we observe. They are as locked into this world as you and I so what reason do we have for thinking that their perceptions about reality correspond to that which is, given that causes are not like their effects? Because they have the same perceptions as us is no reason.

"Justify" has no meaning. What we know is this:

Actually i wrote more then that. I said we are also interested in what we can know. And just for the record if one cannot justify their beliefs wether it be in God or the reliablity of their senses then what have they got? Knowledge? An irrational belief? Justify *does* mean a lot in confirming the rationality of one's position. And the numerous books on this subject confirm the incorrectness of this. Why write a book on why Evolution shows us why we know stuff if we don't need to justify knowledge? Why bother with epistemology? Why are you arguing with me and trying to show me why we know about the world via evolution if it does not need justification? You could simply assert that knowledge does not need to be justified. You could tell me that our senses are reliable because they just are. But you're not doing that (because it woulld not be a rational thing to do) and nor are the philosopher's who study epistemology or the people who write books on why evolution show's us how we can know stuff about the world.

On the contrary, the presupper is in an even worse position. First, she's invented all sorts of entities that there is no evidence to support. Second, her decision to opt for one supernatural entity over all others is completely subjective. Presuppositionalism is subjectivity raised to the nth power. The act of Presupposing implies that one makes the move before one has evidence and afterword one's position will be maintained despite evidence. What is this but the counsel of despair? The presupper in effect concedes the argument of the skeptic: the evidential argument for gods is so hopeless, the presupper concludes, that the only recourse is to short-circuit debate by accepting god prior to argument, since in an argument the believer is bound to lose. This point of view is so hope-less, arbitrary and subjective, that the majority of theists reject it.

Well if we're going to start arguing in gnereralities i'd argue a large amount of theists reject it because they don't even understand it. From your assertion here i'm guessing most atheists probably don't really understand what's being argued either. And all this talk about evidence and trickster God's *completely* misses the point of this argument. Now, i'm not claiming to be a "presupper guru" but i think i do know what the presupper argument is actually trying to show. As i write below, think of it as a logic disjunct. It's actually very simple. The presupper argues that If God does not exist then no knowledge exists therefore if knowledge then God. That's it. Now if the presupper can show that knowledge without God is impossible there's only 1 option left Vork. So all this talk about trickster God's and so forth misses the point. If God is a trickster, then there is no knowledge. If you want evidence, you need knowledge first. But if the argument works then whenever you say you know sometihng you require God first. That's what the presupper is trying to show. By proving the impossiblity of the contrary you're left with only 1 option.

So if the argument is succesful you're left with. 1) God and Knowledge or 2) Not God/Trickster God's/whatever else you want to put in here and *no* knowledge.

First, the presupper doesn't argue, she simply makes an arbitrary choice. May as well roll dice and choose gods, the effect is the same.

So what then are we doing? Asserting? Well let's get too it then. I assert (for the sake of this discussion mind you) that Knowledge requires God. You say No it does not. Right. End of discussion. Let's move on. This is *not* what is happening. If it were then we would not be arguing would we?

And this whole point misses the presupper argument (again) which i have already stated. Think of it like a logic disjunct. The argument tries to show the impossiblity of the contrary. If you can scratch the leg of the disjunct that says knowledge cant exist without God your left with God. It's as simple as that. To say there is no argument invovled is just plain old false.

I never said they WERE "accurate?" There isn't any such thing as "accurate." I can't sense electromagnetic fields, a shark can. Whose senses are more "accurate?" Your notion of accuracy is absurd and meaningless. There is no "accurate" world out there.

What does that even mean? Are you suggesting there is no objective reality? If you're not denying the existence of an objective reality then if you or i claim we know something about "that which is" we're going to have to justify that our senses are actually telling us about that which is. That means we're going to have to come across the word accurate at some stage in our justification. If our senses and reason are not accurate in describing 'that which is' then what have we got? We certainly have *not* got knowledge about this objective reality, whatever that is.

I continue to hold this theory because I haven't saddled it with the meaningless and subjective idea of "accuracy" but with the different standard of "effectiveness." Our perceptions require theories underneath them in order to function. Dogs, cockroaches, sharks, and lizards have completely different theories of the way the world works.

So? If a Dog claims he know's something about the world we can hear his justification for that. It doesn't matter wether they have different pictures of reality, the question is "Do our senses and reason give us a reliable picture of reality?" If you say they do then you're going to have to come across the word accurate at some stage. If you say our senses are not accurate and that such word's are meaningless we have *not* got knowledge about the way things are. Ignorance is bliss remember. And if you decide Evolution is the answer you're going to have to answer that question which I posed.

It is common practice in academia to avoid this word entirely when referring to humans collectively, and to substitute "she" and "he" interchangeably, as I did above.

Well i guess the Academics have sopken haven't they? I have no problem with the use of the word man to describe human beings.. so all those Academics who have a problem with it can kiss my rosy red arse.

Really? Try overturning the convention toward male dominance in a muslim society.

Ok. Done.

I do all the time. It is a quandry posed by living in a society with other human beings. Just the other day I was down on a certain street in Taipei, where I saw three beef noodle shops. A fourth was being opened. In a US city, a street with 3 noodle shops would probably see a different kind of restaurant being opened. But the Chinese use different logic than we do, because they use different assumptions (axioms) about business and human behavior (For example, it would be insane to open a different restaurant, when a proven market for beef noodle exists in that area. Also, deliveries of goods will be simpler, since wholesalers are already used to that area).....

If logic is a convention, it is no more binding then any other convention. You don't like it, well hey, just reject it. You don't like people who wear their hats backwards, well don't wear it? You don't like this silly either/or logic of the westerners, hey just embrace some of that 'contradictions' can co-exist nicely logic of the Hindu's. If you claim that a theist is irrational for his or her belief in God, hey.. so what. They just use a different kind of logic to you. If i claim you're being illogical or you're contradicting yourself, so what. You don't accept my particular brand of logic any more then you embrace the Muslim notion of a male dominated society. So claiming someone is illogical doesn't actually mean very much if logic is a convention.

Evolution can tell us about it. Numerous experiments with the expectations of infants and toddlers have yielded much data about what people appear to be born with.

*So what?* Look... it seems to me from this response that you don't really know what Hume's skepticism was. It has not been answered. Evolution doesn't answer it either. Just because someone is born with a particular *whatever* does not confirm or deny the ontological status of causality.

"I am a concrete object with a multitude of internal functions." I do not know what the Self is, nor does it worry me overmuch that I do not. I expect that within the next twenty years cognitive science will make progress on the issue, and close this gap too, just like science has closed all the others.

So you do not know what the self is. Wether that worries you or me is really beside the point. You said before that it is self-evident that the self exists ,why should you justify it. Now you're saying you don't really know what the self is so doesn't that make your previous statement somewhat vacuous? I mean if i say "I exist" yet i don't really know what i am i'm not saying anything very meaningful or interesting am i? I exist yet i don't even know what the I in "I" means. In otherwords i cannot justify a meaningful belief in myself... because i don't even know what i am.

No, you're going round and round. I've mounted a positive feedback loop and am leaving you on the ground running in circles

All i see is someone who can't give an adequete answer to a very simple question. How do you know about Evolution? You can have all the feedback loops you like however if you decide at any stage you're going to use your sense percetion to claim you *know* something about Evolution and use that as a justification for your belief in the reliability of your senses about *that which is* you're going to have to answer that question.

Or, alternatively, you're equivocating two different kinds of truth -- one, capital-T truth statements about the world, and the other, capital-T truth statements within logical systems underpinned by axioms. Which kind was I making a statement about?

Well if you're not making any truth statements about reality or the way things are, why would anyone be interested in what you've got to say in this discussion? This is what we're here for right? To make statements about "that which is"? If you're going to claim that "No i wasn't making any universal or absolute T statements about that which is or the way things are with my statement about T vs t" then i'm not interested. If you don't want to make any statements about the way you think the world around us is (which is why we're here) let's end the discussion now.

[ June 11, 2002: Message edited by: Plump-DJ ]</p>