DRFseven

Alonzo, your post at 9:13 P.M., above, appears to me to be completely blank, yet when I click on "Quote" to reply, I get some sort of a post, not addressed to anyone, in the Reply field. What happened?

Alonzo Fyfe

Let me see. I say that torturing children is wrong in the sense of the largest, most all-encompassing sense of wrong that exists on the planet and you interpret that as my saying there is nothing wrong with torturing children.

Obviously, you and I are speaking a different language. What you write may look like English, but it's not any language I have come across before.

(I hate the way it sounds, but I just do not understand a person who reads somebody's statement that "X is white" and begins his response with the statement, "Since you deny that X is white . . . ")

DRFseven

Um, about that post that went missing? It came back, so just nevermind me, folks, everything's fine. What the?

Alonzo Fyfe

On this issue, it seems to me that if one is actually concerned that children not be tortured, then one should focus on those things that actually have an effect on reducing the possibility that a person will torture a children.

This is to focus on making sure that individuals have the relevant desires, that they do not want to torture children. This is the first and most effective line of defense.

Should this fail, then the second line of defense is external constraints -- threats of punishment or actual physical restraint (of which the most effective possible restraint is execution).

If there is some third "transcendental should" out there, it is of no importance unless it can actually interact with the physical world. If it is materially impotent, then it is impractical at best to deal with it.

Now, I hold that this "transcendental should" does not exist. Those who pretend they can see it are substantially only seeing the object of their own desires. (Or, more accurately, the prejudices and bigotries of pre-literate cultures several thousand years ago.)

I do believe in the possibility of moral improvement, as "moral should" is expanded to cover more and more interests of more and more people. But moral progressed is blocked by people who follow rituals that hold ancient prejudices up as the highest of all possible modern ideals.

The AntiChris

I was under the impression that your theory is based on your interpretation of (inferences drawn from) the "moral" language most people use? Your theory, as I understand it, postulates an "all-things-considered" view, where the "right" or "wrong" of an act can be objectively measured using a calculation of all desires that exist.

So it appears that you are inferring an objective measure of "right" or "wrong" from moral language.

However, you make this inferrence from language which, by your own admission, says nothing about the agent's own measures of right and wrong.

This doesn't look to me like a sound basis for making such assumptions.
I'm afraid I have no idea what you're saying here!

Chris

Alonzo Fyfe

Oh, you are talking about Objective(2). I was afraid that I was being accused of using moral language to defend Objective(1).

Objective(1): Moral propositions refer to intrinsic moral properties.

Objective(2): Moral propositions are objectively true or false and independent of beliefs.

I deny that there are Objective(1) moral properties, but defend the thesis that moral claims are Objective(2) -- they are objectively true or false statements about relationships between desires and all other desires. A desire is good insofar as it is consistent with fulfilling other desires; bad insofar as it thwarts other desires.

My claim is that the best-fit, error-free interpretation of statements such as "X is immoral" or "you have an obligation to do X" makes them objectively true propositions describing relationships between X, the desires that would cause X, and the relationship between those desires and all other desires.


Again, what do you take me to be admitting?

Am I admitting that language says nothing about the agent's own measure of right and wrong? This is not necessarily true. Agents can easily use language to report their own measure of right and wrong -- by simply making statements of the form "I believe X" or "I feel that Y." X and Y can even be moral claims. However, "I believe that X" does not mean the same thing as X. "I believe that Jim's car is red" is a statement about my mental states -- my brain structure. "Jim's car is red" is a statement about Jim's car.

With respect to moral propositions, I am not interested in claims of the form, "I believe that X is wrong." I am concerned about the claim "X is wrong." As shown above, the former is a claim about I (me). The second is a claim about X.

My thesis is that the meaning of X is not to be determined by looking at the beliefs and desires of the agent claiming X. If I see, in a book, "Earth is the third planet from the sun," I do not need to know anything about the person who wrote it to know what it means. The statement says nothing about the author. It does say something about the subject, "the Earth."

The best-fit, error-free interpretation of the phrase "X is wrong" also takes it to be an objective statement about X, not about the author of the statement.


First, I am a bit uncomfortable about the "my theory" thing -- though I use this myself in a moment of weakness. However, to be honest . . .

I believe that the theory presented here is the best interpretation possible of J.S. Mill's "Utilitarianism" and is also very close to the view David Hume defended in his philosophical writing. Martineau defended something similar at the turn of the century (though Henry Sedgwick point out some significant holes in Martineau's interpretation that I think can be corrected. Namely, Martineau said that we are evaluated on the basis of the desires we have. Sedgewick's objections can be handled by adding that we are also evaluated on the basis of the desires we do not have.) R.M. Adams defended this view in the Journal of Philosophy, 1976 article "Motive Utilitarianism," and I borrow a lot of arguments from of J.L. Mackie's book, "Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong."

I have small disagreements with some of these authors, but these are small disagreements.

Now, it is not technically correct to say that an act is to be evaluated according to its ability to fulfill desires. Rather, an act is to be evaluated according to whether it is an act which a person with good desires would perform, and a good desire is a desire that is compatible with the fulfillment of all other desires.

The reason for the difference is that actions must be caused by desires, and we do not want to say that a person should have done act A if the only way to do so would be for the agent to have a desire that, in other areas, would cause misery and suffering.

Ultimately, the moral question is not "What should we do?" but "What desires should we have?"

Or, on other words, the question is, How should our moral emotions be tuned? Should we be morally repulsed by slavery? Should we have an aversion to mistreating kittens? In short, what should we like or dislike?

The mother who tells her son that mistreating the kittens is wrong is attempting to cause the development of a moral emotion in her son that would provide a psychological inhibition against mistreating kittens (and any similar act of mistreatment). And this is a good aversion for the son to have because this aversion is compatible with the fulfillment of other desires.


Perhaps, again, I need you to explain what you mean by "such assumptions?" It still sounds to me as if you are interpreting me as saying something I am not saying.

For example, you may be interpreting me as saying that this theory describes a state of affairs that has intrinsic(1) value. Of course, the argument does not support that kind of conclusion. If I were making any type of claim that these arguments supported any type of objective(1) moral property, then you would be correct to criticize me for making such a claim.

But I am not doing that. I am defending a two-step process.

Step (1): Determine the best-fit error-free interpretation of the proposition "X is wrong" as spoken by most native speakers in the language.

Step (2): Determine if this proposition is capable of being objectively true or false and independent of the speaker's belief.

My answer to (1) is that the best-fit error-free interpretation refers to the quality of desires, which desires are good and which desires are bad, relative to their relationship to all other desires.

My answer to (2) is that this type of proposition has a unique right answer which is the same for all people, entirely independent of the speaker's beliefs and substantially independent even of the agent's desires.

tronvillain

Alonzo Fyfe:
While I am a subjectivist, I do not claim that we cannot make meaningful statements about other peoples' values. Is this some bizarre straw man of subjectivism that exists only within your own mind?

While the links between our emotiona and actions may be both causes and effects, it is not clear that they are objects of choice - it seems more likely that they are modified by experience.

Well, in a way that is what we are saying, but it is a laughable simplification as it ignores the complexity of emotion which would probably be involved. And thus, when we say, "He should be executed because it will deter future murderers," we are saying, "Killing him is going to make me less afraid that people will be murdered in the future, especially me and those close to me."

Ah, but that is simply because the phrase "bad feelings" is insufficient to describe the emotions inspired by actions requiring such punishments. Your argument is nothing more than rhetorical sleight of hand.

It is not clear the most people do find that reason for punishment morally repulsive, at least not when it is presented in an accurate fashion rather than the bizarre caricatures you seem to be fond of. Would people find "We are afraid of being killed by him." a morally repulsive reason for imprisoning a murderer? Probably not. Would people find "It will make us less sad and afraid and angry." a morally repulsive reason for killing a murderer? Perhaps, but many people would probably not. Whether or not someone will agree that a punishment fits a crime will depend on their emotional responses to the crime and to the punishment.

You will have to explain explicitly why you think that this interpretation implies that there is no point of disagreement between the two statements, since I simply do not see it. One person is saying "X bothers me" and the other is saying "X does not bother me" and so if X is done it will bother one of them and not the other, which obviously creates potential for dispute (one which cannot be resolbed by the gatheri0ng of evidence).

The problem here is that you are not comparing taste and morality correctly: someone taking an action you consider immoral is not analagous to them eating the type of pie you do not like, it is analagous to you eating the type of pie you do not like. Your moral sense of "taste" is exposed to the world, and the only way to affect what you "eat" is to attempt to affect the actions of others.

Oh, I admit that under your version of subjectivism such rituals make no sense, but fortunately I do not subscribe to your version. I have absolutely no difficulty making sense of these rituals under my version of subjectivism, but as long as you insist on your version we are going to have problems.

Alonzo Fyfe

No, actually, it is a first step in setting up a reductio ad absurdum. Of course, such an argument requires an absurdum that one can reductio ad. However, given some of the comments you made below, it may no longer be necessary.


This is not an either/or proposition. Emotions are modified by experience, but the experiences we give others (particularly our children) are a matter of choice. We choose to yell at them, or punish them, or praise them, and in all of this we are molding their emotions. Insofar as we get to choose our actions, we get to choose their consequences. And one of the consequences is the experiences we provide to others, and through those experiences mold their emotions -- to some degree.


Now, if I may, I would like to put three sets of quotes side by side.

Notice how sometimes you talk about "me", and at other times you talk about "we", "us", and "people". Though this may seem unimportant to you, the difference between these types of claims is the very core of the difference I have been arguing about between the universal subjectivist and the limited subjectivist.

The limited subjectivist says "me" -- he only talks about things as they relate to his values. "It bothers me." "I don't like it." He does not talk about value relative to others. The limited subjectivist looks at his emotions alone when making moral judgments. He knows that there are others out there, with their own emotions, but they do not count.

But we CAN talk about value relative to others -- you said so yourself, and said so in such a way as to cast ridicule on any who would doubt it. We CAN talk about value relative to others, and we CAN make sense of value relative to "we", rather than "me".

When you talk about justification for execution, you shift from talking about "X bothers me" to "X bothers us," and admit that though "X bothers me" may seem insufficient to the task, "X will make us less sad, afraid, and angry" makes sense.

And that is EXACTLY the point I have been trying to make in these oh so many posts. That morality (moral terms) do not concern themselves with "me" judgments -- my likes, my dislikes, what bothers me, what is good for me, what harms me. The concern "us" judgments -- our likes, our dislikes, what bothers us, what is good for us, what harms us and those we care about.

"me" versus "us" . I am a defender of the "us" factions. I am a defender of the thesis that understanding moral claims as "us" claims, rather than "me" claims, makes a lot more sense.

[Well, not EXACTLY the point I was trying to make, there is still some fine tuning to do with respect to the details. For one thing, we have to ask which "us" are relevant in moral judgments. Just men? Just caucasians? Just executives of large oil companies and fundamentalists Christians? Does it include the unborn? Animals? But these questions are a second step in the argument. I do not want them to overshadow the first step, which is that it makes more sense to view moral claims, not as "me" judgments, but as "us" and "we" judgments.]


Note: There was one point, in the distant past, when I said that DRFSeven and I were not so far apart. It is where he said that, though we make individual judgments based on our emotions, those emotions themselves are "justified" in a sense by their contribution to maintaining society, which in turn benefits all of us. This is where DRFSeven went from thinking of morality as an exercise in "me" judgments, to an exercise in "us" judgments. And where he does that, I think we are indeed not so far apart.

The AntiChris

Alonzo Fyfe
I assure you I fully understand the distinction you make and accept that the theory you advocate is objective(2).
Earlier in this thread you said that it was not possible to draw certain inferences from particular types of statements. It seemed to me that this is exactly what you ultimately do when you attempt to explain moral value in terms of an objective desire calculation.

However, I'm clearly getting nowhere with this line of questioning and, since it's not essential to my argument (that the inferences you draw from your interpretation of moral language are flawed), I'm content to let it drop.
Thanks. I may just be tempted to do some serious reading on this subject.
I'm happy to accept that this is one plausible account of how we might form our moral opinions and that from this one could devise an objective measure of moral value. However, it seems to me that any such objective measure represents no more than one subjective view of moral value.
I'm not sure if you're saying in (2) that there can only be one right answer or if you're simply saying that it is possible to to devise an objective answer. If it is the former, then I think you assume far more than you can possibly know in (1).

Chris

Alonzo Fyfe

Thank you. However, I have found that it is a bit problematic for me to assume that another understands the distinction, so please excuse my asking.


What, specifically, do you mean by "certain inferences from particular types of statements?"

I have stated that the meaning of a proposition is independent of the motivation for speaking it. But, in saying this, I am not questioning inferences from statements. What I question are inferences about the meaning of a statement from the beliefs and desires of the person who utter it.

What does the sentence, "The interior angles of a triangle equal 180 degrees" mean? You don't find this out by examining the motivation behind the speech act of the person who says it. You find this out by learning how this proposition relates to other propositions, such as "A triangle is an a closed figure with three straight sides."

I have examined different meanings of the phrase "X is wrong" by examining how people relate this proposition to other propositions, such as their relation ship between "X is wrong" and "Do not do X", and how it relates to "X is wrong" when repeated by a different speaker.

[Note: If "X is wrong" is a first-person statement, as some people argue, then "X is wrong" when spoken by a different person is a different proposition, so this type of comparison is still a comparison of different propositions. Part of my argument is that "X is wrong" is not a first-person, singular ("i", "me") proposition, because when others repeat it they are taken to be saying the same proposition -- a property that first-person, singular propositions do not have. And when people use the opposite proposition, "X is not wrong," native speakers take them as contradicting those who say "X is wrong", because this also is not true of first-person, singular propositions. This is part of my reason for claiming that moral statements are ultimately first-person PLURAL ("us", "we") propositions.]


Okay, let's say this hypothetically. Even though you think that there are multiple possible accounts, it would be difficult to say that there are no limits.

The person who says that "X is wrong" is logically equivalent to "X is the product of six times seven" is either speaking nonsense or inventing his own language.

One question to ask is what is within, and what is outside, of these limits.

My arguments above are meant to suggest that interpreting the word "X is wrong" as some type of code for a first-person proposition (a proposition that is ultimately not about X, but about the speaker) lies outside these limits. This type of interpretation does not make sense of the way that people use the phrase "X is wrong." So, those who use this interpretation are either speaking nonsense, or inventing their own language.

Now, as more and more possibilities are shown to be outside the limits, we end up with fewer and fewer options within the limits. Will we ever get down to only one possibility inside the limits? Ultimately, I think so. But we can let that slide for the moment.