Freethought & Rationalism Archive

Alix Nenuphar · 05-28-2003, 03:30 PM

RW:

I have a number of concerns with your response, but I will, for the moment limit myself to two (I have a graduate student about to be shot for plagarism. I must attempt to salvage him.)

You said,

Quote:

For man to achieve a state of pure anarchy will positively require he learn to value both himself and his neighbor with equal respect. This cannot be achieved, without incurring a logical contradiction, sans a history of evil and suffering. For a God to create such a creature ad hoc is not logically possible. An omniscientGod would know this. A being without a history would be the moral equivalent of proto-man. If proto-man had been the greatest possible good then no further history of man would have ensued. All would remain as it was from the beginning of man�s existence.

You assert, but do not demonstrate, that an omnimax being cannot create men who value both themselves and their neighbors with equal respect without logical contradiction. Why? The existence of such men involves no logical contradictions - in fact, you appear to state that such is the goal, i.e. it is achievable, and possible for these men to exist. Since your omnimax being can perform any action logically possible, it could create such men - without a developmental process involving suffering.

My second point follows from your response to Dr. Retard. You stated,

Quote:

Then perhaps this is the basis of your misunderstanding. I have never asserted that every instance of such causes of suffering and tragedy are necessary. I have never ascribed or established any such necessity to any specific instance. I agree with you that many such instances are totally unnecessary and regrettable.

So you admit the existence of unecessary and regrettable suffering.

If your omnimax being is omnibenevolent, then it would wish to eliminate such suffering. Such suffering exists, therefore the omnimax being doesn't - which is the essence of the Problem of Evil.

The only argument you provide to accompany this is that God (shorthand for omnimax being) is not responsible. Unfortunately, you do not support this assertion.

Consider: if God is omniscient, omnibenevolent, and omnipotent, then God was perfectly aware of what 'totally unecessary and regrettable' suffering was going to occur as a result of God creating the universe. But God went ahead and created it anyway - despite being capable of creating the world without that 'totally unecessary and regrettable' suffering. Hence, the Problem of Evil.

It does not appear to me that you have actually addressed the essence of the PoE.

Perhaps I missed something. Could you clarify?

rainbow walking · 05-28-2003, 09:18 PM

Hi Alix,
Thank you again for the opportunity to defend my position.

Alix: I have a number of concerns with your response, but I will, for the moment limit myself to two (I have a graduate student about to be shot for plagarism. I must attempt to salvage him.)

Rw: Lethal injection is the more humane method, certainly the one God would opt for, I would think:^D

Quote:

rw: For man to achieve a state of pure anarchy will positively require he learn to value both himself and his neighbor with equal respect. This cannot be achieved, without incurring a logical contradiction, sans a history of evil and suffering. For a God to create such a creature ad hoc is not logically possible. An omniscientGod would know this. A being without a history would be the moral equivalent of proto-man. If proto-man had been the greatest possible good then no further history of man would have ensued. All would remain as it was from the beginning of man�s existence.

Alix: You assert, but do not demonstrate, that an omnimax being cannot create men who value both themselves and their neighbors with equal respect without logical contradiction. Why? The existence of such men involves no logical contradictions - in fact, you appear to state that such is the goal, i.e. it is achievable, and possible for these men to exist. Since your omnimax being can perform any action logically possible, it could create such men - without a developmental process involving suffering.

Rw: Then allow me to elucidate. The distinction is in the difference between earned and unearned. In the case of respect it becomes more apparent. While we can confer respect upon a person initially as a matter of being polite, if they soon exhibit unpleasant tendencies they soon lose our respect. So there is a point where respect is gained and earned and can no longer be given. It is equivalent to the difference between earning a doctorate in philosophy and having one conferred upon you at birth. Thus a man with a history who has earned his position is better than a man without a history in the same position who has no history upon which to draw. An omniscient God would know this and prefer the best for man. Certainly it is achievable by man, but not logically conferrable by God. To be a matter of conference would contradict God�s omnibenevolence as his omnibenevolence would want the best for man and nothing less. An omniscient God would know the distinction. An omnipotent God could see to the conference anyway but would end up creating a logical contradiction to his other attributes in the process and an aberration in man. In the case of man living in pure anarchy, earned respect would be an absolute necessity. Unearned respect is a fickle friend. Here today and gone tomorrow.

Alix: So you admit the existence of unecessary and regrettable suffering.

Rw: Oh yes, absolutely.

Alix: If your omnimax being is omnibenevolent, then it would wish to eliminate such suffering. Such suffering exists, therefore the omnimax being doesn't - which is the essence of the Problem of Evil.

Rw: Not if his omniscience already knows that to succumb to his heart at any point prior to man�s acquisition of his greatest good would not facilitate the expression of his omni-benevolence to its fullest capacity. If his interference prevented man from achieving full potential, God would not allow himself to be ruled by his heart but his head in such a matter.

Alix: The only argument you provide to accompany this is that God (shorthand for omnimax being) is not responsible. Unfortunately, you do not support this assertion.

Rw: This was in reference to suffering incurred by premeditated acts committed by man and suffering that man either has the ability to alleviate himself now, or at some future point�which covers pretty much all bases. In most cases of premeditated action that incurs suffering it is regrettable and unnecessary. Any individual instance cannot be said to contribute to man�s greater good�only such suffering incurred in the aggregate as it pushes man to the realization of his responsibilities towards being �right� as opposed to wrong can be seen to result in man�s acquisition of his greatest good. No specific act is necessary but suffering incurred in this fashion is unavoidable until man nears his greatest good. The degree of suffering incurred is contingent on man�not God.

Alix: Consider: if God is omniscient, omnibenevolent, and omnipotent, then God was perfectly aware of what 'totally unecessary and regrettable' suffering was going to occur as a result of God creating the universe. But God went ahead and created it anyway - despite being capable of creating the world without that 'totally unecessary and regrettable' suffering. Hence, the Problem of Evil.

Rw: Yes God would know in advance of all such instances and the suffering incurred. He would also know the final outcome and the responses from him that would best facilitate that outcome. He could have created a species by-passing the meta-path but would have incurred a logical contradiction in the process. Knowing this he preferred to create a creature fit enough to travel the meta-path and realize God�s greatest good as expressed in his omni-benevolence.

Alix: It does not appear to me that you have actually addressed the essence of the PoE.

Perhaps I missed something. Could you clarify?

Rw: I hope this helps, (though it has been my experience that it rarely does. I generally end up explaining these things several times in different ways), maybe you�ll be the exception.

Have a nice day

Thomas Metcalf · 05-29-2003, 09:27 AM

rainbow walking :

I think there are two strands of theodicy working here, the (1) "God will do it eventually" theodicy and the (2) "humanity has to develop a principle for rightness" theodicy. I'll consider them in turn.

1. A couple of posts ago in "PoE", you claimed that humanity's spirit, science, politics, and progress were something we required suffering to achieve. I said:

Quote:

Thomas: God can give us spirit, science, politics, and progression.

And you said:

Quote:

Rw: He has and will...in his own way.

But that's obviously not good enough. It's not morally perfect. Because some of that suffering is unnecessary, because God could give us more of those goods immediately. It's as if I observe a swarm of bees attacking a child and I say "Well, I could get rid of all those bees and then the child would cease to be in so much pain. Maybe I'll do that in ten minutes." It would have been morally better to do it immediately, even though the child wouldn't have had as much of an opportunity to develop a "preference for rightness."

I don't think you're going to be able to defend the ethical principle "You shouldn't intervene to help someone if it's physically possible for them to help themselves, if they would just choose to do so."

2. In "My final reflections on PoE", you claim that it is the development of this "preference for rightness" that justifies all this suffering. But it is hard to see why God wouldn't just give us a greater capacity to develop it in the first place, and reduce suffering correspondingly. You seem to address this worry here:

Quote:

For such a being to address man�s suffering directly he would have to address the way man experiences physical and emotional pain and this would affect man�s perceptual capacities. For such a being to address man�s suffering indirectly he would have to address the way nature affects man�s perceptual capacities and thus create an entirely different set of physical attributes directing the inter-action of the materials that comprise man�s nature. Neither of these interventions would be �right� for man if man has any moral obligation to pursue his own greater good.

I don't understand why humanity would cease to be able to pursue its own greater good if it were better at such a pursuit in the first place! I'm saying God could have created, instead of humans, humans*, where humans* are just like us except they're a little better at identifying and pursuing the sorts of goods you try to identify in "final reflections". Humans* wouldn't have to suffer quite as much as humans. So how would this undermine the humans*' obligation to pursue their greater good?

Of course, God could also have instantiated the possible world that contains humans**, who are all born with a perfectly functioning "principle for rightness." What would be so wrong with that world, such that a world full of rape, murder, torture, genocide, famine, natural disasters that kill a much larger proportion of poor people than rich people, painful terminal illnesses, and the like, is good by comparison?

Alix Nenuphar · 05-29-2003, 10:05 AM

rw:

If I may suggest, there are three characteristics of your explanations which might cause misunderstandings (and a consequent need for clarification):

1) You often make assertions without support, assertions that are by no means obvious truisms. I suspect that you do view them as truisms.

2) Unusual terminology. I addressed this to some extent in my response to your 'Day Four' thread.

3) Failure to explain the process of deduction. You frequently conclusions, without showing how those conclusions were arrived at.

Now, as for the current post....

You said,

Quote:

Thus a man with a history who has earned his position is better than a man without a history in the same position who has no history upon which to draw.

Here is an example of point one. Why is such a man 'better' who has a history? If your contention is that both the end-result and the process are valuable, you should say that. As you phrase it, it appears that you are merely asserting that the end-result can be qualitatively different, depending on the process used to achieve it.

Quote:

An omniscient God would know this and prefer the best for man.

Using the standard definition of omnibenevolent, yes, God prefers what is best.

Quote:

Certainly it is achievable by man, but not logically conferrable by God.

Unsupported assertion. An omnipotent God could confer anything not logically impossible, yes?

Quote:

To be a matter of conference would contradict God�s omnibenevolence as his omnibenevolence would want the best for man and nothing less.

An omniscient God would know the distinction. An omnipotent God could see to the conference anyway but would end up creating a logical contradiction to his other attributes in the process and an aberration in man.

An excellent combination of points one and three: what other attributes? What aberration? Why does it cause this aberration?

Why does God confering this on man create a logical contradiction?

Quote:

In the case of man living in pure anarchy, earned respect would be an absolute necessity. Unearned respect is a fickle friend. Here today and gone tomorrow.

You continual refer to problems related to the fact that men are not God; that men must achieve things through learning and earning because there is no other way for them to be achieved. Your omnimax God does not have this limitation, and can create men who exhibit and are entitled to respect, admiration, and love, without the learning process.

It would appear that a great deal of your logic in this thread is based on some unusual ideas about what 'omnipotence' enables God to do. Surely an omnipotent God does not require a development process to achieve an end; to do indicates that He is NOT omnipotent. Again, this may be a case of point one - you are using the term in a highly idiosyncratic fashion.

Quote:

Alix: So you admit the existence of unecessary and regrettable suffering.

Rw: Oh yes, absolutely.

Alix: If your omnimax being is omnibenevolent, then it would wish to eliminate such suffering. Such suffering exists, therefore the omnimax being doesn't - which is the essence of the Problem of Evil.

Rw: Not if his omniscience already knows that to succumb to his heart at any point prior to man�s acquisition of his greatest good would not facilitate the expression of his omni-benevolence to its fullest capacity. If his interference prevented man from achieving full potential, God would not allow himself to be ruled by his heart but his head in such a matter.

Again, a problem of terminology. God can create men who have achieved their full potential and greatest good. In addition, you seem to be envisioning the progress of the world as a given, rather than allowing God to create the greatest good in the beginning.

If this premise: that the world as it is now must be a given, and you are arguing against the PoE on grounds that require God's intereference, then you should make this clear.

And again, you are making assertions, not logic chains.

And using such terms as 'heart' and 'head' with regard to an omnimax being is to commit semantic mayhem: these are worlds used metaphorically in relation to men - you have not demonstrated that they can be used in a similar fashion with God.

Quote:

Alix: The only argument you provide to accompany this is that God (shorthand for omnimax being) is not responsible. Unfortunately, you do not support this assertion.

Rw: This was in reference to suffering incurred by premeditated acts committed by man and suffering that man either has the ability to alleviate himself now, or at some future point�which covers pretty much all bases. In most cases of premeditated action that incurs suffering it is regrettable and unnecessary. Any individual instance cannot be said to contribute to man�s greater good�only such suffering incurred in the aggregate as it pushes man to the realization of his responsibilities towards being �right� as opposed to wrong can be seen to result in man�s acquisition of his greatest good. No specific act is necessary but suffering incurred in this fashion is unavoidable until man nears his greatest good. The degree of suffering incurred is contingent on man�not God.

And God could have created men who were already 'right' - to use your words. A solution that would have eliminated the suffering that you have admitted is necessary only for that purpose.

Quote:

Alix: Consider: if God is omniscient, omnibenevolent, and omnipotent, then God was perfectly aware of what 'totally unecessary and regrettable' suffering was going to occur as a result of God creating the universe. But God went ahead and created it anyway - despite being capable of creating the world without that 'totally unecessary and regrettable' suffering. Hence, the Problem of Evil.

Rw: Yes God would know in advance of all such instances and the suffering incurred. He would also know the final outcome and the responses from him that would best facilitate that outcome. He could have created a species by-passing the meta-path but would have incurred a logical contradiction in the process.

Sigh. Again and again you assert this. But you do not demonstrate it. What is the logical contradiction in by-passing the 'meta-path'?

Quote:

Knowing this he preferred to create a creature fit enough to travel the meta- path and realize God�s greatest good as expressed in his omni-benevolence.

Alix: It does not appear to me that you have actually addressed the essence of the PoE.

Perhaps I missed something. Could you clarify?

Rw: I hope this helps, (though it has been my experience that it rarely does. I generally end up explaining these things several times in different ways), maybe you�ll be the exception.

Have a nice day

Thanks. You too. If you wish to clarify (I can see that clarification appears to bore you), you might consider the points I noted above.

------------------------------------------------------------

Try it in simplified logical form.

P1: God created the world.

P2: The world contains totally unecessary suffering.

P3: God's nature would not allow Him to create totally unecessary suffering.

C1: P1, P2, and P3 cannot all be true.

Now, which premise do you wish to change?

You have already admitted P2 and P3, and you appear to admit P1.

Do you see now why people have trouble with your arguments?

Alix Nenuphar · 05-29-2003, 10:43 AM

rw:

To continue my analysis....

Keep in mind that there are two separate formulations of the problem; one of which has a better theological answer than the other: the Problem of Evil (usually defended by the necessity of free will) and the Problem of Pain (currently undefendable).

I give a logical summary which shows the form of the argument (which is identical).

----- The Essential Problem of Evil (or Pain) --------

P1: God created the world.

P2: The world contains totally unecessary evil (or suffering.)

P3: God's nature would not allow Him to create totally unecessary evil (or suffering.)

C1: P1, P2, and P3 cannot all be true.

---------------------------------------------------------------

During the course of your argument, you apparently shifted from discussing evil to discussing pain (or suffering). I will, therefore, address the Problem of Pain.

Despite some of your statements above about the existence of totally unecessary suffering, I suspect that your argument really revolves around a contention that P2 is false; that there is no unecessary suffering, and that all apparently unecessary suffering has some higher purpose.

For that higher purpose, you appear to suggest two possibilities:

1) that suffering serves to 'define' some higher good.

2) that suffering is a necessary part of the development process of man whereby God 'achieves' some higher good.

In case (1) you would need to demonstrate that, in fact, such good outweighs the suffering.

In case (2) you would need to explain why an omnipotent being could not create the higher good without such a development process.

Koyaanisqatsi · 05-29-2003, 11:08 AM

I think another problem is (and we've talked about this before) that you're looking at human history and then trying to justify it through "god" eyes, instead of looking at human history (and its "progress") as necessarily independent of any god.

If you start with the premise, "Gods don't exist," then the status quo of humanity is entirely obtained due to the resilience of mankind; due to mankind having no choice in the matter. We have progressed in spite of not having a god to help us progress.

See what I mean? You're looking at our status quo and then factoring backwards to arrive at a god, when our status quo is the result of no god.

If there were a god with the omnimax qualities you state, then our status quo should be radically different and that, of course, is the crux of the PoE.

You are attempting to contradict this through a post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy, by stating that because we have the status quo we have, this is the only possible status quo and an omnimax god would know this, thus the omnimax being created it in precisely this manner.

All this does is equate a god with a no god scenario; since with or without a god, we still arrive at our status quo.

As others have pointed out, you need to explain why a god can't create us perfect and why such perfection won't retain its status quo over time.

In other words, you're not remaining logically consistent to the givens; you're instead interchanging a god scenario with a no god status quo.

For example, a world in which all humans are created perfectly would result in a world always populated by perfect individuals. There would be no "entropy of perfection," since a god exists to insure (a) we are created without such entropy and/or (b) god would account for any possible entropy and correct for it.

Postulating a perfect world (i.e., morally perfect humans inhabiting this world) ipso facto means that there would never obtain a scenario in which we acted immorally and would therefore mean that the status quo is incapable of changing to a less than morally perfect status quo.

Arguing that we didn't earn this perfection is therefore irrelevant, since we would have no need to earn it; it would be instantiated just as all other aspects of this god's creation would be instantiated and we would know nothing different.

This is, of course, why the free will fallacy was created, but, again, to remain logically consistent, if we do indeed have free will, then a god scenario is equivallent to a no god scenario. The god of the free will scenario would simply be equivalent to the big bang, for example, where existence is set in motion and god self-annihilates for all intents and purposes.

If a god is not there to effect change (in keeping with free will), merely instigate evolution, then such a being is entirely irrelevant to our existence and effectively non-existant to us. It would never be able to let its identity or purpose be known, either directly or through inferrence, thus it would also have to program into us these parameters, so that at no point do we ever contemplate its existence.

Thus, by contemplating a god's existence, we ipso facto negate the free will god and we're once again back at a god who effects change.

If we posit a god who effects change, then there is no reason this god can't intervene more directly and make any changes it wants to, such as we see in the bible.

So, to remain logically consistent, one must either argue for a free will god (which equates to no god at all, effectively) or a god that does and will effect change directly in mankind's evolution.

If the latter, then we have PoE.

rainbow walking · 05-29-2003, 11:42 AM

Hi Thomas,
I�m glad you�ve moved the discussion here as it saves us both from covering a lot of needless ground. Now�

Thomas: I think there are two strands of theodicy working here, the (1) "God will do it eventually" theodicy and the (2) "humanity has to develop a principle for rightness" theodicy. I'll consider them in turn.

1. A couple of posts ago in "PoE", you claimed that humanity's spirit, science, politics, and progress were something we required suffering to achieve. I said:

Thomas: God can give us spirit, science, politics, and progression.

And you said:

Rw: He has and will...in his own way.

But that's obviously not good enough. It's not morally perfect. Because some of that suffering is unnecessary, because God could give us more of those goods immediately.

Rw: Yes, yes he could. If he couldn�t, then he wouldn�t be omnipotent. So if he hasn�t, there must either be a good reason or he doesn�t exist. Now�

Thomas: It's as if I observe a swarm of bees attacking a child and I say "Well, I could get rid of all those bees and then the child would cease to be in so much pain. Maybe I'll do that in ten minutes." It would have been morally better to do it immediately, even though the child wouldn't have had as much of an opportunity to develop a "preference for rightness."

I don't think you're going to be able to defend the ethical principle "You shouldn't intervene to help someone if it's physically possible for them to help themselves, if they would just choose to do so."

Rw: You are absolutely right Thomas, in this case the question of choice can�t be conferred upon the little girl. Obviously she didn�t choose to be stung so painfully and, just as obviously, not long after the pain began she would do her best to escape it. So the question isn�t a matter of reducing the pain as this might jeopardize her life by not triggering her escape mechanisms.
I agree that she�s suffering unnecessary pain and I would certainly do my level best to rescue her in this situation. So why would an omni-benevolent god not do so? What purpose does it serve for this child to suffer like this?

Most children have parents. Where are her parents? How did she manage to get into this situation if she has responsible adults over-seeing her activities? Protecting children is a necessity if man is to preserve his future. To preserve his future brings him closer to the realization of his greater good. Being neglectful of his children could incur the loss of their lives, or worse.
The moral burden here rests upon her parents. God is not morally obligated to baby sit for neglectful parents. The message here is that parents are responsible for the safety of their children, which is only right. To do so promotes man�s greater good. How many children have to suffer and die before adults get this into their thick skulls?

Thomas: 2. In "My final reflections on PoE", you claim that it is the development of this "preference for rightness" that justifies all this suffering. But it is hard to see why God wouldn't just give us a greater capacity to develop it in the first place, and reduce suffering correspondingly. You seem to address this worry here:

rw: For such a being to address man�s suffering directly he would have to address the way man experiences physical and emotional pain and this would affect man�s perceptual capacities. For such a being to address man�s suffering indirectly he would have to address the way nature affects man�s perceptual capacities and thus create an entirely different set of physical attributes directing the inter-action of the materials that comprise man�s nature. Neither of these interventions would be �right� for man if man has any moral obligation to pursue his own greater good.

Thomas: I don't understand why humanity would cease to be able to pursue its own greater good if it were better at such a pursuit in the first place! I'm saying God could have created, instead of humans, humans*, where humans* are just like us except they're a little better at identifying and pursuing the sorts of goods you try to identify in "final reflections". Humans* wouldn't have to suffer quite as much as humans. So how would this undermine the humans*' obligation to pursue their greater good?

Rw: Self-improvement is an integral aspect of man�s greater good and built into the meta-path. For God to have by-passed this process would not be to man�s benefit for the same reason I outlined for Alix. An earned good is better than an un-earned good. An omniscient being would know this and want the best for man if such a being is omni-benevolent.

Thomas: Of course, God could also have instantiated the possible world that contains humans**, who are all born with a perfectly functioning "principle for rightness." What would be so wrong with that world, such that a world full of rape, murder, torture, genocide, famine, natural disasters that kill a much larger proportion of poor people than rich people, painful terminal illnesses, and the like, is good by comparison?

Rw: Most humans are born with a perfectly functioning PFR (Preference For Rightness), but it can�t function until put to the test and that requires a world where both good and evil are possible choices. The PFR is a function of the will. Such a preference must be developed into the realization of man�s greater good, otherwise man becomes a robot operating from a program or an animal operating from instinct. I don�t think an omniscient God would see any relevant value in this.

Marz Blak · 05-29-2003, 12:19 PM

Hi, hope you don't mind my jumping in here. I've been following this and related threads for some time, and not having read every pertinent post I am uncertain, but it seems to me that rw's position may have changed.

Whereas what I now am seeing from him would appear to be an affirmative theodicy on his part, where I became aware of the argument he was making it was not an affirmative theodicy per se, but rather a more abstract argument that the PoE cannot pertain against an internally consistent epistemology refuting it:

(From http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.p...hreadid=53798:)

Quote:

Originally posted by rainbow walking
...What I shall do is... demonstrate the utter futility of PoE against an internally consistent epistemology....

Obviously, it is one thing to argue that the PoE can be defeated by an appropriately formulated epistemology, and quite another to argue that such an epistemology must pertain and that the PoE is therefore entirely indefensible. The first case is obviously much easier, as it sets aside the larger question of whether accepting the validity of the epistemology 'defeating' the PoE is warranted.

So what is the argument, then?

If it is the former--that it is possible to formulate an internally consistent epistemology which opposes the validity of the PoE--then I for one would certainly agree (while seeing it overall as little more than an exercise in question-begging).

If, on the other hand, it is the larger argument as to whether there is warrant to hold as valid such an epistemology--in this case, the 'Best Possible Path' approach put forward by rw--then it still seems to me that the objections to such an approach put forward by his opponents here are not satisfactorily addressed by his counter-arguments. It seems to me that rw's response to the 'unnecessary suffering' objections opposing him do indeed amount to little more than a post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy, combined with more than a smattering of Unknown Purpose.

In other words, to my thinking, while rw's approach is self-consistent, it seems to me that in order to accept it as valid, one must accept certain presuppositions about the existence and nature of god on, well, on faith. So to my thinking, it is good apologetics, but like all apologetics with which I am familiar, it is persuasive only to those already predisposed to believe it.

One final word: as a relatively new visitor to these boards and a complete dilettante in matters philosophical, I must thank you all for giving me the opportunity to read and learn.

rainbow walking · 05-29-2003, 12:58 PM

Hello Alix,
I appreciate all the constructive criticism you�ve offered. It�s been helpful and I especially appreciate the tone in which it�s offered. By way of explanation, (not as an excuse), I have no formal education beyond the 10th grade of high school so the ability to formulate my arguments in a more coherent manner just isn�t there. I depend on the assistance I get from people like you to clarify them and, if need be, abandon them as bad arguments. I apologize for any confusion this may engender but it�s unavoidable in my case. The statement I made previously about having to explain my position so often wasn�t made to reflect boredom but frustration at myself. It is through such discussions as these, and the criticisms that follow, that I am able to improve my abilities in these areas, so, I appreciate your patience in this matter. I am learning.

Alix: If I may suggest, there are three characteristics of your explanations which might cause misunderstandings (and a consequent need for clarification):

1) You often make assertions without support, assertions that are by no means obvious truisms. I suspect that you do view them as truisms.

2) Unusual terminology. I addressed this to some extent in my response to your 'Day Four' thread.

3) Failure to explain the process of deduction. You frequently conclusions, without showing how those conclusions were arrived at.

Rw: I will keep this in mind and work towards a resolution.

Alix: Now, as for the current post....

You said,

Thus a man with a history who has earned his position is better than a man without a history in the same position who has no history upon which to draw.

Alix: Here is an example of point one. Why is such a man 'better' who has a history? If your contention is that both the end-result and the process are valuable, you should say that. As you phrase it, it appears that you are merely asserting that the end-result can be qualitatively different, depending on the process used to achieve it.

Rw: Point taken. Let me see if this works�the process makes the end result more valuable and thus, makes the process both valuable and necessary.

An omniscient God would know this and prefer the best for man.

Alix: Using the standard definition of omnibenevolent, yes, God prefers what is best.

Certainly it is achievable by man, but not logically conferrable by God.

Alix: Unsupported assertion. An omnipotent God could confer anything not logically impossible, yes?

Rw: My mistake. What I meant is that it wouldn�t be logical for God to by-pass the meta-path if a man with a history is better than a man without.

To be a matter of conference would contradict God�s omnibenevolence as his omnibenevolence would want the best for man and nothing less.

An omniscient God would know the distinction. An omnipotent God could see to the conference anyway but would end up creating a logical contradiction to his other attributes in the process and an aberration in man.

Alix: An excellent combination of points one and three: what other attributes? What aberration? Why does it cause this aberration?

Why does God confering this on man create a logical contradiction?

Rw: I thought I explained this already using the �earned/un-earned analogy? A created man that bypasses the meta-path has no history and, as a result, no way to appreciate his position. It�s like being given a million dollars without a frame of reference to evaluate the value of money. You may as well have just given him a dollar, or like giving a million dollars to a toddler. How do you give someone a history who�s never had one?

In the case of man living in pure anarchy, earned respect would be an absolute necessity. Unearned respect is a fickle friend. Here today and gone tomorrow.

Alix: You continual refer to problems related to the fact that men are not God; that men must achieve things through learning and earning because there is no other way for them to be achieved. Your omnimax God does not have this limitation, and can create men who exhibit and are entitled to respect, admiration, and love, without the learning process.

Rw: Can he? These are all normative values that require an act of the will to choose. He could implant the knowledge but not the experience. I can tell you about tornados and warn you to stay out of their path and you would have knowledge of tornados that would essentially be useless until you actually encountered and experienced the full force of a tornado. Then the knowledge would become meaningful to you. He could create a matrix style pseudo-world to augment your knowledge but it would have to have the same force as the real world to convey the experience. I would be interested in hearing how God could do this. Simply asserting �omni-max� doesn�t support the assertion.

Alix: It would appear that a great deal of your logic in this thread is based on some unusual ideas about what 'omnipotence' enables God to do. Surely an omnipotent God does not require a development process to achieve an end; to do indicates that He is NOT omnipotent. Again, this may be a case of point one - you are using the term in a highly idiosyncratic fashion.

Rw: I don�t recall challenging his omnipotence anywhere. I�ve already conceded that he can do anything he wants to do, even defy logic, in relation to man. My argument revolves around his will, what his omniscience and omni-benevolence has determined to be the best course. Unless you are going to argue that his omnipotence can also over-ride his other attributes and force upon him a course of action against his will. If you do you�ve incurred a contradiction in the use of his attributes to force PoE and it fails to obtain. There can be no contradiction in the inter-action between his attributes so we have one logical restraint on omnipotence. It must act in concert with his other attributes. Additionally, I�m not arguing that God needs a developmental process I�m arguing that man does and God knows this.

Alix: So you admit the existence of unecessary and regrettable suffering.

Rw: Oh yes, absolutely.

Alix: If your omnimax being is omnibenevolent, then it would wish to eliminate such suffering. Such suffering exists, therefore the omnimax being doesn't - which is the essence of the Problem of Evil.

Rw: Not if his omniscience already knows that to succumb to his heart at any point prior to man�s acquisition of his greatest good would not facilitate the expression of his omni-benevolence to its fullest capacity. If his interference prevented man from achieving full potential, God would not allow himself to be ruled by his heart but his head in such a matter.

Alix: Again, a problem of terminology. God can create men who have achieved their full potential and greatest good.

Rw: I must insist you support this assertion. How can God create men who�ve achieved something who�ve never achieved anything? Achievement requires a test or process or challenge.

Alix: In addition, you seem to be envisioning the progress of the world as a given, rather than allowing God to create the greatest good in the beginning.

Rw: My position is based on reality. I�ve offered enough argumentation to support my claim of progress. My argument also allows man a role in the creation of his own greater good. Your solution negates man�s will.

Alix: If this premise: that the world as it is now must be a given, and you are arguing against the PoE on grounds that require God's intereference, then you should make this clear.

Rw: I�m not arguing for God�s interference, you are.

Alix: And again, you are making assertions, not logic chains.

Rw: Perhaps, but I�ve seen no logic chains from my opponents either.

Alix: And using such terms as 'heart' and 'head' with regard to an omnimax being is to commit semantic mayhem: these are worlds used metaphorically in relation to men - you have not demonstrated that they can be used in a similar fashion with God.

Rw: Aren�t we being a bit pedantic? They convey the same meaning and obviously you haven�t misunderstood their usage and context. (And a hell-of-a-lot easier to type)

Alix: The only argument you provide to accompany this is that God (shorthand for omnimax being) is not responsible. Unfortunately, you do not support this assertion.

Rw: This was in reference to suffering incurred by premeditated acts committed by man and suffering that man either has the ability to alleviate himself now, or at some future point�which covers pretty much all bases. In most cases of premeditated action that incurs suffering it is regrettable and unnecessary. Any individual instance cannot be said to contribute to man�s greater good�only such suffering incurred in the aggregate as it pushes man to the realization of his responsibilities towards being �right� as opposed to wrong can be seen to result in man�s acquisition of his greatest good. No specific act is necessary but suffering incurred in this fashion is unavoidable until man nears his greatest good. The degree of suffering incurred is contingent on man�not God.

Alix: And God could have created men who were already 'right' - to use your words. A solution that would have eliminated the suffering that you have admitted is necessary only for that purpose.

Rw: That�s a nice sounding assertion Alix but it doesn�t get you around my argument. I�ve postulated very good reasons why he won�t. If your criticisms don�t address my argument directly, but just continue to assert God could have done X, what have you gained?

Alix: Consider: if God is omniscient, omnibenevolent, and omnipotent, then God was perfectly aware of what 'totally unecessary and regrettable' suffering was going to occur as a result of God creating the universe. But God went ahead and created it anyway - despite being capable of creating the world without that 'totally unecessary and regrettable' suffering. Hence, the Problem of Evil.

Rw: Yes God would know in advance of all such instances and the suffering incurred. He would also know the final outcome and the responses from him that would best facilitate that outcome. He could have created a species by-passing the meta-path but would have incurred a logical contradiction in the process.

Alix: Sigh. Again and again you assert this. But you do not demonstrate it. What is the logical contradiction in by-passing the 'meta-path'?

Rw: I hope my explanation above was enough to get us steered in the right direction for future discussion of this matter that appears to be frustrating you.

rw: Knowing this he preferred to create a creature fit enough to travel the meta- path and realize God�s greatest good as expressed in his omni-benevolence.

Alix: It does not appear to me that you have actually addressed the essence of the PoE.

Perhaps I missed something. Could you clarify?

Rw: I hope this helps, (though it has been my experience that it rarely does. I generally end up explaining these things several times in different ways), maybe you�ll be the exception.

Have a nice day

Alix: Thanks. You too. If you wish to clarify (I can see that clarification appears to bore you), you might consider the points I noted above.

------------------------------------------------------------

Try it in simplified logical form.

P1: God created the world.

P2: The world contains totally unecessary suffering.

P3: God's nature would not allow Him to create totally unecessary suffering.

C1: P1, P2, and P3 cannot all be true.

Now, which premise do you wish to change?

You have already admitted P2 and P3, and you appear to admit P1.

Do you see now why people have trouble with your arguments?

Rw: I hope we can work around those troubles Alix. My argument entails too many postulates to set out in this form. I shall have to be content to clarify those points that need clarifying and defending the argument on its merits such as they are. Sorry.

rainbow walking · 05-29-2003, 01:39 PM

Alix: To continue my analysis....

Keep in mind that there are two separate formulations of the problem; one of which has a better theological answer than the other: the Problem of Evil (usually defended by the necessity of free will) and the Problem of Pain (currently undefendable).

I give a logical summary which shows the form of the argument (which is identical).

----- The Essential Problem of Evil (or Pain) --------

P1: God created the world.

P2: The world contains totally unecessary evil (or suffering.)

P3: God's nature would not allow Him to create totally unecessary evil (or suffering.)

C1: P1, P2, and P3 cannot all be true.

---------------------------------------------------------------

During the course of your argument, you apparently shifted from discussing evil to discussing pain (or suffering). I will, therefore, address the Problem of Pain.

Rw: I only shift focus when I perceive my opponent to be shifting focus, but this is essentially irrelevant because my position covers the modified version of PoE regardless of how it�s focused, (incidentally, if PoE is such a good argument , why the modification?), because it addresses pain and suffering incurred by both premeditated acts of evil as well as gratuitous instances of pain and suffering such as natural catastrophes. As you can see, my plate is full so if I appear to be shifting from evil to pain or suffering I hope I do so only as a following of my opponents lead. If my opponent suggests an example of premeditated evil, I argue my position in relation to his example. If he suggests an example of unnecessary pain or suffering then I follow his lead but my argument only changes in relation to the details needed to negate his example. It�s still the same argument just applied in different ways to the many examples it occasions. That is one of its strong suites. As we shall see�.

Alix: Despite some of your statements above about the existence of totally unecessary suffering, I suspect that your argument really revolves around a contention that P2 is false; that there is no unecessary suffering, and that all apparently unecessary suffering has some higher purpose.

For that higher purpose, you appear to suggest two possibilities:

1) that suffering serves to 'define' some higher good.

2) that suffering is a necessary part of the development process of man whereby God 'achieves' some higher good.

In case (1) you would need to demonstrate that, in fact, such good outweighs the suffering.

In case (2) you would need to explain why an omnipotent being could not create the higher good without such a development process.

Rw: No, I can agree with P2 and still retain the argument because of the meta-path inserted between man and God. I can allege that all suffering and evil is unnecessary with the exception of that required to teach man the lack of the necessity for it. Naturally this incurs some degree of evil and suffering but nowhere near the amount we have encountered down through history. But the blame lies with man, not God. The meta-path affords man the opportunity to learn his lessons but cannot dictate how much evil and suffering will occur before man makes the proper connections and gets the message. Additionally, man has the capacity to contain as much of the evil and suffering as possible if he so chooses. In my argument I detail man�s progressive history that extends into the future, (somewhat optimistically), where he has made the connections, but I have to concede that man�s science has far outdistanced his moral progression, to date. This weakens my position somewhat, but not to the point of it being indefensible. God does not incur any moral turpitude in the degree of suffering that obtains along the journey, iff man successfully completes it. So any claim that God does not exist because he does not intervene or has created a bad path, is basically premature. The argument is internally consistent.

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05-29-2003, 10:43 AM	#15
Alix Nenuphar Regular Member Join Date: Mar 2003 Location: Maryland Posts: 113	rw: To continue my analysis.... Keep in mind that there are two separate formulations of the problem; one of which has a better theological answer than the other: the Problem of Evil (usually defended by the necessity of free will) and the Problem of Pain (currently undefendable). I give a logical summary which shows the form of the argument (which is identical). ----- The Essential Problem of Evil (or Pain) -------- P1: God created the world. P2: The world contains totally unecessary evil (or suffering.) P3: God's nature would not allow Him to create totally unecessary evil (or suffering.) C1: P1, P2, and P3 cannot all be true. --------------------------------------------------------------- During the course of your argument, you apparently shifted from discussing evil to discussing pain (or suffering). I will, therefore, address the Problem of Pain. Despite some of your statements above about the existence of totally unecessary suffering, I suspect that your argument really revolves around a contention that P2 is false; that there is no unecessary suffering, and that all apparently unecessary suffering has some higher purpose. For that higher purpose, you appear to suggest two possibilities: 1) that suffering serves to 'define' some higher good. 2) that suffering is a necessary part of the development process of man whereby God 'achieves' some higher good. In case (1) you would need to demonstrate that, in fact, such good outweighs the suffering. In case (2) you would need to explain why an omnipotent being could not create the higher good without such a development process.

05-29-2003, 11:08 AM	#16
Koyaanisqatsi Veteran Member Join Date: Sep 2000 Location: Yes, I have dyslexia. Sue me. Posts: 6,508	I think another problem is (and we've talked about this before) that you're looking at human history and then trying to justify it through "god" eyes, instead of looking at human history (and its "progress") as necessarily independent of any god. If you start with the premise, "Gods don't exist," then the status quo of humanity is entirely obtained due to the resilience of mankind; due to mankind having no choice in the matter. We have progressed in spite of not having a god to help us progress. See what I mean? You're looking at our status quo and then factoring backwards to arrive at a god, when our status quo is the result of no god. If there were a god with the omnimax qualities you state, then our status quo should be radically different and that, of course, is the crux of the PoE. You are attempting to contradict this through a post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy, by stating that because we have the status quo we have, this is the only possible status quo and an omnimax god would know this, thus the omnimax being created it in precisely this manner. All this does is equate a god with a no god scenario; since with or without a god, we still arrive at our status quo. As others have pointed out, you need to explain why a god can't create us perfect and why such perfection won't retain its status quo over time. In other words, you're not remaining logically consistent to the givens; you're instead interchanging a god scenario with a no god status quo. For example, a world in which all humans are created perfectly would result in a world always populated by perfect individuals. There would be no "entropy of perfection," since a god exists to insure (a) we are created without such entropy and/or (b) god would account for any possible entropy and correct for it. Postulating a perfect world (i.e., morally perfect humans inhabiting this world) ipso facto means that there would never obtain a scenario in which we acted immorally and would therefore mean that the status quo is incapable of changing to a less than morally perfect status quo. Arguing that we didn't earn this perfection is therefore irrelevant, since we would have no need to earn it; it would be instantiated just as all other aspects of this god's creation would be instantiated and we would know nothing different. This is, of course, why the free will fallacy was created, but, again, to remain logically consistent, if we do indeed have free will, then a god scenario is equivallent to a no god scenario. The god of the free will scenario would simply be equivalent to the big bang, for example, where existence is set in motion and god self-annihilates for all intents and purposes. If a god is not there to effect change (in keeping with free will), merely instigate evolution, then such a being is entirely irrelevant to our existence and effectively non-existant to us. It would never be able to let its identity or purpose be known, either directly or through inferrence, thus it would also have to program into us these parameters, so that at no point do we ever contemplate its existence. Thus, by contemplating a god's existence, we ipso facto negate the free will god and we're once again back at a god who effects change. If we posit a god who effects change, then there is no reason this god can't intervene more directly and make any changes it wants to, such as we see in the bible. So, to remain logically consistent, one must either argue for a free will god (which equates to no god at all, effectively) or a god that does and will effect change directly in mankind's evolution. If the latter, then we have PoE.

05-29-2003, 11:42 AM	#17
rainbow walking Veteran Member Join Date: Aug 2000 Location: Erewhon Posts: 2,608	Hi Thomas, I�m glad you�ve moved the discussion here as it saves us both from covering a lot of needless ground. Now� Thomas: I think there are two strands of theodicy working here, the (1) "God will do it eventually" theodicy and the (2) "humanity has to develop a principle for rightness" theodicy. I'll consider them in turn. 1. A couple of posts ago in "PoE", you claimed that humanity's spirit, science, politics, and progress were something we required suffering to achieve. I said: Thomas: God can give us spirit, science, politics, and progression. And you said: Rw: He has and will...in his own way. But that's obviously not good enough. It's not morally perfect. Because some of that suffering is unnecessary, because God could give us more of those goods immediately. Rw: Yes, yes he could. If he couldn�t, then he wouldn�t be omnipotent. So if he hasn�t, there must either be a good reason or he doesn�t exist. Now� Thomas: It's as if I observe a swarm of bees attacking a child and I say "Well, I could get rid of all those bees and then the child would cease to be in so much pain. Maybe I'll do that in ten minutes." It would have been morally better to do it immediately, even though the child wouldn't have had as much of an opportunity to develop a "preference for rightness." I don't think you're going to be able to defend the ethical principle "You shouldn't intervene to help someone if it's physically possible for them to help themselves, if they would just choose to do so." Rw: You are absolutely right Thomas, in this case the question of choice can�t be conferred upon the little girl. Obviously she didn�t choose to be stung so painfully and, just as obviously, not long after the pain began she would do her best to escape it. So the question isn�t a matter of reducing the pain as this might jeopardize her life by not triggering her escape mechanisms. I agree that she�s suffering unnecessary pain and I would certainly do my level best to rescue her in this situation. So why would an omni-benevolent god not do so? What purpose does it serve for this child to suffer like this? Most children have parents. Where are her parents? How did she manage to get into this situation if she has responsible adults over-seeing her activities? Protecting children is a necessity if man is to preserve his future. To preserve his future brings him closer to the realization of his greater good. Being neglectful of his children could incur the loss of their lives, or worse. The moral burden here rests upon her parents. God is not morally obligated to baby sit for neglectful parents. The message here is that parents are responsible for the safety of their children, which is only right. To do so promotes man�s greater good. How many children have to suffer and die before adults get this into their thick skulls? Thomas: 2. In "My final reflections on PoE", you claim that it is the development of this "preference for rightness" that justifies all this suffering. But it is hard to see why God wouldn't just give us a greater capacity to develop it in the first place, and reduce suffering correspondingly. You seem to address this worry here: rw: For such a being to address man�s suffering directly he would have to address the way man experiences physical and emotional pain and this would affect man�s perceptual capacities. For such a being to address man�s suffering indirectly he would have to address the way nature affects man�s perceptual capacities and thus create an entirely different set of physical attributes directing the inter-action of the materials that comprise man�s nature. Neither of these interventions would be �right� for man if man has any moral obligation to pursue his own greater good. Thomas: I don't understand why humanity would cease to be able to pursue its own greater good if it were better at such a pursuit in the first place! I'm saying God could have created, instead of humans, humans, where humans are just like us except they're a little better at identifying and pursuing the sorts of goods you try to identify in "final reflections". Humans* wouldn't have to suffer quite as much as humans. So how would this undermine the humans' obligation to pursue their greater good? Rw: Self-improvement is an integral aspect of man�s greater good and built into the meta-path. For God to have by-passed this process would not be to man�s benefit for the same reason I outlined for Alix. An earned good is better than an un-earned good. An omniscient being would know this and want the best for man if such a being is omni-benevolent. Thomas: Of course, God could also have instantiated the possible world that contains humans, who are all born with a perfectly functioning "principle for rightness." What would be so wrong with that world, such that a world full of rape, murder, torture, genocide, famine, natural disasters that kill a much larger proportion of poor people than rich people, painful terminal illnesses, and the like, is good by comparison? Rw: Most humans are born with a perfectly functioning PFR (Preference* For Rightness), but it can�t function until put to the test and that requires a world where both good and evil are possible choices. The PFR is a function of the will. Such a preference must be developed into the realization of man�s greater good, otherwise man becomes a robot operating from a program or an animal operating from instinct. I don�t think an omniscient God would see any relevant value in this.

05-29-2003, 12:58 PM	#19
rainbow walking Veteran Member Join Date: Aug 2000 Location: Erewhon Posts: 2,608	Hello Alix, I appreciate all the constructive criticism you�ve offered. It�s been helpful and I especially appreciate the tone in which it�s offered. By way of explanation, (not as an excuse), I have no formal education beyond the 10th grade of high school so the ability to formulate my arguments in a more coherent manner just isn�t there. I depend on the assistance I get from people like you to clarify them and, if need be, abandon them as bad arguments. I apologize for any confusion this may engender but it�s unavoidable in my case. The statement I made previously about having to explain my position so often wasn�t made to reflect boredom but frustration at myself. It is through such discussions as these, and the criticisms that follow, that I am able to improve my abilities in these areas, so, I appreciate your patience in this matter. I am learning. Alix: If I may suggest, there are three characteristics of your explanations which might cause misunderstandings (and a consequent need for clarification): 1) You often make assertions without support, assertions that are by no means obvious truisms. I suspect that you do view them as truisms. 2) Unusual terminology. I addressed this to some extent in my response to your 'Day Four' thread. 3) Failure to explain the process of deduction. You frequently conclusions, without showing how those conclusions were arrived at. Rw: I will keep this in mind and work towards a resolution. Alix: Now, as for the current post.... You said, Thus a man with a history who has earned his position is better than a man without a history in the same position who has no history upon which to draw. Alix: Here is an example of point one. Why is such a man 'better' who has a history? If your contention is that both the end-result and the process are valuable, you should say that. As you phrase it, it appears that you are merely asserting that the end-result can be qualitatively different, depending on the process used to achieve it. Rw: Point taken. Let me see if this works�the process makes the end result more valuable and thus, makes the process both valuable and necessary. An omniscient God would know this and prefer the best for man. Alix: Using the standard definition of omnibenevolent, yes, God prefers what is best. Certainly it is achievable by man, but not logically conferrable by God. Alix: Unsupported assertion. An omnipotent God could confer anything not logically impossible, yes? Rw: My mistake. What I meant is that it wouldn�t be logical for God to by-pass the meta-path if a man with a history is better than a man without. To be a matter of conference would contradict God�s omnibenevolence as his omnibenevolence would want the best for man and nothing less. An omniscient God would know the distinction. An omnipotent God could see to the conference anyway but would end up creating a logical contradiction to his other attributes in the process and an aberration in man. Alix: An excellent combination of points one and three: what other attributes? What aberration? Why does it cause this aberration? Why does God confering this on man create a logical contradiction? Rw: I thought I explained this already using the �earned/un-earned analogy? A created man that bypasses the meta-path has no history and, as a result, no way to appreciate his position. It�s like being given a million dollars without a frame of reference to evaluate the value of money. You may as well have just given him a dollar, or like giving a million dollars to a toddler. How do you give someone a history who�s never had one? In the case of man living in pure anarchy, earned respect would be an absolute necessity. Unearned respect is a fickle friend. Here today and gone tomorrow. Alix: You continual refer to problems related to the fact that men are not God; that men must achieve things through learning and earning because there is no other way for them to be achieved. Your omnimax God does not have this limitation, and can create men who exhibit and are entitled to respect, admiration, and love, without the learning process. Rw: Can he? These are all normative values that require an act of the will to choose. He could implant the knowledge but not the experience. I can tell you about tornados and warn you to stay out of their path and you would have knowledge of tornados that would essentially be useless until you actually encountered and experienced the full force of a tornado. Then the knowledge would become meaningful to you. He could create a matrix style pseudo-world to augment your knowledge but it would have to have the same force as the real world to convey the experience. I would be interested in hearing how God could do this. Simply asserting �omni-max� doesn�t support the assertion. Alix: It would appear that a great deal of your logic in this thread is based on some unusual ideas about what 'omnipotence' enables God to do. Surely an omnipotent God does not require a development process to achieve an end; to do indicates that He is NOT omnipotent. Again, this may be a case of point one - you are using the term in a highly idiosyncratic fashion. Rw: I don�t recall challenging his omnipotence anywhere. I�ve already conceded that he can do anything he wants to do, even defy logic, in relation to man. My argument revolves around his will, what his omniscience and omni-benevolence has determined to be the best course. Unless you are going to argue that his omnipotence can also over-ride his other attributes and force upon him a course of action against his will. If you do you�ve incurred a contradiction in the use of his attributes to force PoE and it fails to obtain. There can be no contradiction in the inter-action between his attributes so we have one logical restraint on omnipotence. It must act in concert with his other attributes. Additionally, I�m not arguing that God needs a developmental process I�m arguing that man does and God knows this. Alix: So you admit the existence of unecessary and regrettable suffering. Rw: Oh yes, absolutely. Alix: If your omnimax being is omnibenevolent, then it would wish to eliminate such suffering. Such suffering exists, therefore the omnimax being doesn't - which is the essence of the Problem of Evil. Rw: Not if his omniscience already knows that to succumb to his heart at any point prior to man�s acquisition of his greatest good would not facilitate the expression of his omni-benevolence to its fullest capacity. If his interference prevented man from achieving full potential, God would not allow himself to be ruled by his heart but his head in such a matter. Alix: Again, a problem of terminology. God can create men who have achieved their full potential and greatest good. Rw: I must insist you support this assertion. How can God create men who�ve achieved something who�ve never achieved anything? Achievement requires a test or process or challenge. Alix: In addition, you seem to be envisioning the progress of the world as a given, rather than allowing God to create the greatest good in the beginning. Rw: My position is based on reality. I�ve offered enough argumentation to support my claim of progress. My argument also allows man a role in the creation of his own greater good. Your solution negates man�s will. Alix: If this premise: that the world as it is now must be a given, and you are arguing against the PoE on grounds that require God's intereference, then you should make this clear. Rw: I�m not arguing for God�s interference, you are. Alix: And again, you are making assertions, not logic chains. Rw: Perhaps, but I�ve seen no logic chains from my opponents either. Alix: And using such terms as 'heart' and 'head' with regard to an omnimax being is to commit semantic mayhem: these are worlds used metaphorically in relation to men - you have not demonstrated that they can be used in a similar fashion with God. Rw: Aren�t we being a bit pedantic? They convey the same meaning and obviously you haven�t misunderstood their usage and context. (And a hell-of-a-lot easier to type) Alix: The only argument you provide to accompany this is that God (shorthand for omnimax being) is not responsible. Unfortunately, you do not support this assertion. Rw: This was in reference to suffering incurred by premeditated acts committed by man and suffering that man either has the ability to alleviate himself now, or at some future point�which covers pretty much all bases. In most cases of premeditated action that incurs suffering it is regrettable and unnecessary. Any individual instance cannot be said to contribute to man�s greater good�only such suffering incurred in the aggregate as it pushes man to the realization of his responsibilities towards being �right� as opposed to wrong can be seen to result in man�s acquisition of his greatest good. No specific act is necessary but suffering incurred in this fashion is unavoidable until man nears his greatest good. The degree of suffering incurred is contingent on man�not God. Alix: And God could have created men who were already 'right' - to use your words. A solution that would have eliminated the suffering that you have admitted is necessary only for that purpose. Rw: That�s a nice sounding assertion Alix but it doesn�t get you around my argument. I�ve postulated very good reasons why he won�t. If your criticisms don�t address my argument directly, but just continue to assert God could have done X, what have you gained? Alix: Consider: if God is omniscient, omnibenevolent, and omnipotent, then God was perfectly aware of what 'totally unecessary and regrettable' suffering was going to occur as a result of God creating the universe. But God went ahead and created it anyway - despite being capable of creating the world without that 'totally unecessary and regrettable' suffering. Hence, the Problem of Evil. Rw: Yes God would know in advance of all such instances and the suffering incurred. He would also know the final outcome and the responses from him that would best facilitate that outcome. He could have created a species by-passing the meta-path but would have incurred a logical contradiction in the process. Alix: Sigh. Again and again you assert this. But you do not demonstrate it. What is the logical contradiction in by-passing the 'meta-path'? Rw: I hope my explanation above was enough to get us steered in the right direction for future discussion of this matter that appears to be frustrating you. rw: Knowing this he preferred to create a creature fit enough to travel the meta- path and realize God�s greatest good as expressed in his omni-benevolence. Alix: It does not appear to me that you have actually addressed the essence of the PoE. Perhaps I missed something. Could you clarify? Rw: I hope this helps, (though it has been my experience that it rarely does. I generally end up explaining these things several times in different ways), maybe you�ll be the exception. Have a nice day Alix: Thanks. You too. If you wish to clarify (I can see that clarification appears to bore you), you might consider the points I noted above. ------------------------------------------------------------ Try it in simplified logical form. P1: God created the world. P2: The world contains totally unecessary suffering. P3: God's nature would not allow Him to create totally unecessary suffering. C1: P1, P2, and P3 cannot all be true. Now, which premise do you wish to change? You have already admitted P2 and P3, and you appear to admit P1. Do you see now why people have trouble with your arguments? Rw: I hope we can work around those troubles Alix. My argument entails too many postulates to set out in this form. I shall have to be content to clarify those points that need clarifying and defending the argument on its merits such as they are. Sorry.

05-29-2003, 01:39 PM	#20
rainbow walking Veteran Member Join Date: Aug 2000 Location: Erewhon Posts: 2,608	Alix: To continue my analysis.... Keep in mind that there are two separate formulations of the problem; one of which has a better theological answer than the other: the Problem of Evil (usually defended by the necessity of free will) and the Problem of Pain (currently undefendable). I give a logical summary which shows the form of the argument (which is identical). ----- The Essential Problem of Evil (or Pain) -------- P1: God created the world. P2: The world contains totally unecessary evil (or suffering.) P3: God's nature would not allow Him to create totally unecessary evil (or suffering.) C1: P1, P2, and P3 cannot all be true. --------------------------------------------------------------- During the course of your argument, you apparently shifted from discussing evil to discussing pain (or suffering). I will, therefore, address the Problem of Pain. Rw: I only shift focus when I perceive my opponent to be shifting focus, but this is essentially irrelevant because my position covers the modified version of PoE regardless of how it�s focused, (incidentally, if PoE is such a good argument , why the modification?), because it addresses pain and suffering incurred by both premeditated acts of evil as well as gratuitous instances of pain and suffering such as natural catastrophes. As you can see, my plate is full so if I appear to be shifting from evil to pain or suffering I hope I do so only as a following of my opponents lead. If my opponent suggests an example of premeditated evil, I argue my position in relation to his example. If he suggests an example of unnecessary pain or suffering then I follow his lead but my argument only changes in relation to the details needed to negate his example. It�s still the same argument just applied in different ways to the many examples it occasions. That is one of its strong suites. As we shall see�. Alix: Despite some of your statements above about the existence of totally unecessary suffering, I suspect that your argument really revolves around a contention that P2 is false; that there is no unecessary suffering, and that all apparently unecessary suffering has some higher purpose. For that higher purpose, you appear to suggest two possibilities: 1) that suffering serves to 'define' some higher good. 2) that suffering is a necessary part of the development process of man whereby God 'achieves' some higher good. In case (1) you would need to demonstrate that, in fact, such good outweighs the suffering. In case (2) you would need to explain why an omnipotent being could not create the higher good without such a development process. Rw: No, I can agree with P2 and still retain the argument because of the meta-path inserted between man and God. I can allege that all suffering and evil is unnecessary with the exception of that required to teach man the lack of the necessity for it. Naturally this incurs some degree of evil and suffering but nowhere near the amount we have encountered down through history. But the blame lies with man, not God. The meta-path affords man the opportunity to learn his lessons but cannot dictate how much evil and suffering will occur before man makes the proper connections and gets the message. Additionally, man has the capacity to contain as much of the evil and suffering as possible if he so chooses. In my argument I detail man�s progressive history that extends into the future, (somewhat optimistically), where he has made the connections, but I have to concede that man�s science has far outdistanced his moral progression, to date. This weakens my position somewhat, but not to the point of it being indefensible. God does not incur any moral turpitude in the degree of suffering that obtains along the journey, iff man successfully completes it. So any claim that God does not exist because he does not intervene or has created a bad path, is basically premature. The argument is internally consistent.

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