rainbow walking

Thomas: You mean your objection fails to militate against the argument from evil?

rw: No, I mean CP fails to militate against my rebuttal.

Thomas: Your position seems to require that all humans must be satisfied for God to have fulfilled his obligation. I have questioned that requirement.

rw: This entire line of questioning arose over your claim that partial intervention would not hinder man’s acquisition of his own GG. This “satisfaction” defense is based on the probability that no matter what a god did men would always be expecting more.

You admit as much when you say this: Thomas: Maybe I wouldn't be satisfied if God didn't intervene more, but that's just a fact about my psychology, not a fact about whether God has met his obligation.

Is there any reason to think your psychology is that much different from anyone elses?





Thomas: I don't think you understood the question. I say God can intervene, and that can be good, whether or not we realize he has intervened.

rw: Sure he can, and in ways that man wouldn’t be able to directly anticipate….but the claim that it would be a good thing hasn’t been established. We’ve been through 8 pages of all the possible negative consequences that could arise, so I really don’t know what else to say except we are not likely to agree on this.



Thomas: Well, given our epistemic situation, we just have to weight everything equally. If there are 10,000 possible levels, then the chance of any particular level being the correct level, all else equal, is one in 10,000.

rw: Okay, then proceed to identify this possible level that satisfies all the requirements of both man’s self acquisition of GG and God’s moral stature.



Thomas: Everyone to whom I put this question will agree that humans are in a position to decide, sometimes, when there are too many starving children in America. My point is that we seem to believe we're often in a good position to estimate these sorts of things. If my opponent merely claims we can't tell there's too much suffering, then chances are, she's being inconsistent.

rw: She? Setting aside the gender confusion, I don’t care if you poll everyone in America and they all give the identical answer. If we all think there’s too many starving children anywhere…then why are there still starving children at all? Certainly enough food exists to feed every single one. So either everyone is lying or waiting on someone else to get the job done or waiting on God to do it. Which is it?



Thomas: Because it's not happening. Because sometimes it's morally obligatory to intervene.

rw: And why is it morally obligatory for a God to intervene but not man?



Thomas: Because. I'm. Not. Trying. To. Explain. Anything. With. The. Elves.

rw: You certainly were headed in that direction. Perhaps a memory refresher:

rw: Is this your new position? A world of invisible, undetectable elves…?



thomas: Sure. Undetectable elves who prevent more scalding than gets prevented now. When are you going to offer a criticism?

Now when I offer my criticism, which is nothing more than a reminder of the Razor, we get into this non sequitur discussion. What’s up wit dat?

You can’t say you weren’t trying to explain anything because you suggested this elves bit to explain how a god could bring about a state of affairs where fewer children get scalded.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by rainbow walking :

But it doesn't follow that God would never be justified in intervening. You have to provide some reasons to think dissatisfied humans could not exist in a maximally good world.

If you agree that it's a good thing for humans to intervene, and you can't think of any reason it would be different for God, then it would be a good thing for God to intervene, too. All your attempted negative consequences have failed to do the work you want them to, because there is no contradiction in saying:

"God intervenes to prevent some suffering, and humans have well developed history and science and understanding of the consequences of their actions."

If you can find a contradiction in there, show it to me. Otherwise, God can make that sentence true.

Why would I ever need to do that? I've already shown that we're probably not at the right level of suffering right now. So if you can't provide reasons to think we are, then God probably doesn't exist.

If you had any familiarity with academic writing, that wouldn't confuse you. If you wrote like an academic at all, you'd be writing like a 1960s academic.

Do you believe there are too many starving children? Yes or no. If you do, then you believe we're in a good position to estimate when there's too many or too much of a bad thing. And then you'd have to show that there's something relevantly different about that than there is about this situation, if you want to block the analogy.

Who ever said it's not morally obligatory for humans not to intervene?

The Razor only applies to already-observed phenomena, not to hypothetical situations. I've already told you this, and apparently, you simply ignored it or forgot.

rainbow walking

Thomas: But it doesn't follow that God would never be justified in intervening.

rw: It does if the justification for his intervention is based on man’s subjective opinion.


Thomas: You have to provide some reasons to think dissatisfied humans could not exist in a maximally good world.

rw: I’ll be glad to as soon as you describe a maximally good world.



Thomas: If you agree that it's a good thing for humans to intervene, and you can't think of any reason it would be different for God, then it would be a good thing for God to intervene, too.

rw: It might be a good thing for a god if he intervened…It’s always a good thing for man to intervene. It would not be a good thing for man, if God intervened, for reasons I’ve already articulated dozens of times now.


Thomas: All your attempted negative consequences have failed to do the work you want them to, because there is no contradiction in saying:

"God intervenes to prevent some suffering, and humans have well developed history and science and understanding of the consequences of their actions."

If you can find a contradiction in there, show it to me. Otherwise, God can make that sentence true.

rw: The contradiction is between God electing to intervene to prevent some suffering and his attribute of moral perfection. Moral perfection, should he elect to intervene, would demand he prevent any further suffering…or play favorites and become a very selective interventionist, and this would negate moral perfection.



Thomas: Why would I ever need to do that? I've already shown that we're probably not at the right level of suffering right now. So if you can't provide reasons to think we are, then God probably doesn't exist.

rw: And both our subjective opinions of too much and not enough fail to satisfy the necessity of finding the right level. Perhaps there is a wide range in this level that has not been abridged either way…? How would we ever know? All we have is our subjective opinions to guide us.



Thomas: If you had any familiarity with academic writing, that wouldn't confuse you. If you wrote like an academic at all, you'd be writing like a 1960s academic.

rw: I don’t understand…



Thomas: Do you believe there are too many starving children? Yes or no. If you do, then you believe we're in a good position to estimate when there's too many or too much of a bad thing. And then you'd have to show that there's something relevantly different about that than there is about this situation, if you want to block the analogy.

rw: I believe that one starving child is too many but I don’t know how to address the problem, do you? Now we can argue that God would easily know, but there might be a reason why we must learn how to resolve this issue ourselves in order to progress towards our greater good.



Thomas: Who ever said it's not morally obligatory for humans not to intervene?

rw: We are if we insist on putting anything off on a God.



Thomas: The Razor only applies to already-observed phenomena, not to hypothetical situations. I've already told you this, and apparently, you simply ignored it or forgot.

rw: That’s why I only hypothetically invoked it…

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by rainbow walking :

How? No justification can exist if it's based on humans' opinions?

The maximally good world is the one that a morally perfect being would want to create. Why couldn't that include dissatisfied humans?

We've been through this what feels like dozens of times. It's not always justified to intervene completely, even if it is sometimes justified to intervene a little bit. This is completely obvious. If I'm a playground supervisor, I'm going to intervene when the kids get into really heated, violent disagreements, but I'm not going to intervene any time there's some tension. If God is morally perfect, he will intervene at the right level, which might not be complete intervention. Or if you think it is, provide some reasons I should think it is.

I see no way to answer my argument: Chances are, we're not at the right level, because most levels aren't the right level. How have you denied that argument?

So you think we can tell when there's too much of something. Why can't we do the same for evil?

Yeah, and there might be a Powerful Deceiver who is making you think your argument works when in fact it's completely impotent. You have to provide reasons to think something is probable, not just point to its possibility.

In fact, chances are, there probably isn't such a reason, because (1) God is omnipotent, so more often than not, he can help us progress without using some instrumental situation, and (2) most possibilities are not actual, so inductively, we know there probably isn't such a reason.

rainbow walking

Thomas: How? No justification can exist if it's based on humans' opinions?

rw: I argue this on the basis of a non-interfering God who’s not motivated by the levels of suffering man currently endures, is not going to be motivated by our cumulative subjective opinions of this non-interference, regardless of how they fall out in relation to the question of his existence. An omniscient God would probably know man’s entire range of reactions to his non-interference and have already anticipated atheism.



Thomas: The maximally good world is the one that a morally perfect being would want to create. Why couldn't that include dissatisfied humans?

rw: Then your description of a maximally good world is a world of dissatisfied humans? And this would be better than our present world…how?




Thomas: We've been through this what feels like dozens of times. It's not always justified to intervene completely, even if it is sometimes justified to intervene a little bit. This is completely obvious. If I'm a playground supervisor, I'm going to intervene when the kids get into really heated, violent disagreements, but I'm not going to intervene any time there's some tension. If God is morally perfect, he will intervene at the right level, which might not be complete intervention. Or if you think it is, provide some reasons I should think it is.

rw: Such intervention as you describe would not be complete intervention. Thus you’re describing partial intervention. Who gets left out of the intervention process and why? Who gets cured of a disease and who doesn’t and why? Aside from making these moral choices how do you intervene in such cases without arising suspicion, creating a gap in natural predictability and explanatory power derived by man in a consistent environment? Partial intervention is rife with difficulties. But I doubt I would ever be able to present a reason sufficient to convince you otherwise.



Thomas:I see no way to answer my argument: Chances are, we're not at the right level, because most levels aren't the right level. How have you denied that argument?

rw: With my argument. No level is justified in the face of man’s self-acquisition of his own GG, our subjective opinions to the contrary notwithstanding.



Thomas: So you think we can tell when there's too much of something. Why can't we do the same for evil?

rw: It’s just as subjective. All you accomplish is justifying a reason to reject the existence of an omni-max God…but say nothing towards the existence of a non-interfering omni-max God. And it still falls out to being nothing more or less than your opinion. Since you entered this discussion with that opinion, you’ll leave this discussion with that opinion…and nothing more.



Thomas: Yeah, and there might be a Powerful Deceiver who is making you think your argument works when in fact it's completely impotent. You have to provide reasons to think something is probable, not just point to its possibility.

rw: A non-interfering God cannot deceive since that would be a form of intervention.

Thomas: In fact, chances are, there probably isn't such a reason, because (1) God is omnipotent, so more often than not, he can help us progress without using some instrumental situation, and (2) most possibilities are not actual, so inductively, we know there probably isn't such a reason.

rw: Chances are, we believe what we want to believe about this level of insulation between our mortality and our existence. It isn’t a necessary layer and we can live without it. Once we figure this out we generally jettison all ties to a theistic explanation for anything. There are ample layers left to choose from.

Chances are, even if such a God exists, he would be too insulated from us to ever be motivated by anything we said or thought about his non-intervention anyway. Our opinions, whether probably justified or not, would have no power to motivate his intervention. I would say that remaining non-interventionist, to the point where the entire world eventually takes off this extra garment of insulation between us and our mortality and stops looking for some miraculous cure to our mortality, will be one of the best and most moral behaviors such a God could incorporate. Then we might grow up enough to seek our own resolution to the problem without all these distractions created by religious confusion.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by rainbow walking :

Right, but I've never said he would be. He'd be motivated by his moral perfection, not by humans' satisfaction or dissatisfaction alone.

It might be, because it might be that some amount of intervention is too much intervention. We've been through this time and time again.

Whatever maximizes goodness.

Look, you gave me a "might," that there might be a reason we don't know about. And I'm giving you a "might" right back, to show you that we can't accept "maybes" alone; we have to have some reason to think they're probable before we take them seriously. You still haven't shown the contradiction in saying "God intervenes once and humans have a sufficiently useful history, culture, and knowledge."

rainbow walking

Thomas: Right, but I've never said he would be. He'd be motivated by his moral perfection, not by humans' satisfaction or dissatisfaction alone.

rw: If he’s motivated by moral perfection it’s got to be all or nothing, else perfection is diminished. And we’ve covered this ground as well.



Thomas: It might be, because it might be that some amount of intervention is too much intervention. We've been through this time and time again.

rw: In just a few replies below you’re going to call a foul because I used a “might”. I guess you’re trying to get ahead here because you use two mights…:^D Describe a world better than this one brought about by DF.



Thomas: Whatever maximizes goodness.

rw: I’ve argued that maximal goodness for man is derivable by man else it loses maximal effect. You’ve got to show how God can intervene to bring about maximal goodness equivalent to man’s bring-about-ableness. Partial intervention runs afoul of moral perfection as it leaves God choosing to benefit some to the exclusion of others. Full intervention runs afoul of man’s GG acquired by man and has its own unique problems. I listed several a few pages back.



Thomas: Look, you gave me a "might," that there might be a reason we don't know about. And I'm giving you a "might" right back, to show you that we can't accept "maybes" alone; we have to have some reason to think they're probable before we take them seriously. You still haven't shown the contradiction in saying "God intervenes once and humans have a sufficiently useful history, culture, and knowledge."

rw: And you called my bet and raised me one might above. However, I can easily reword the argument to eliminate the might. Especially in the case of hungry children, there are many good reasons why we aught to learn how and be motivated to take care of our children…a God isn’t needed for this. If He intervenes to feed the hungry children in one country he should probably intervene to feed all hungry children and then we don’t have to worry about it. But, once he starts intervening there goes the neighborhood.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by rainbow walking :

Sometimes some intervention is good when all intervention is bad, remember?

One in which terminal cancer is 10% less painful. Give me a reason to think that world would necessarily be worse than this one. When you do, remember that God can bring about any logically possible state of affairs.

If there are several people, all of whom equally deserve to be benefited, God can randomly select the ones that receive the benefit. If it's morally perfect to intervene for some of them and not for all, God can choose which ones (if they all deserve it equally) however he wants.

rainbow walking

Thomas: Sometimes some intervention is good when all intervention is bad, remember?

A. Some intervention =good for some men

B. Full intervention= bad for all men

C. Some intervention=bad for moral perfection (where God is capable of full intervention)

A doesn’t outweigh B and C



Thomas: One in which terminal cancer is 10% less painful. Give me a reason to think that world would necessarily be worse than this one. When you do, remember that God can bring about any logically possible state of affairs.

rw: 10% better for cancer patients. Man can duplicate this process already. Same as above.



Thomas: If there are several people, all of whom equally deserve to be benefited, God can randomly select the ones that receive the benefit. If it's morally perfect to intervene for some of them and not for all, God can choose which ones (if they all deserve it equally) however he wants.

rw: This still militates against moral perfection since God could totally eliminate the need. But then you end up right back at bad for man…which also militates against both God’s moral perfection and man’s self acquisition of his GG. So it’s three to one on this front…

You can’t “if” a moral perfection into play with partial benefit when full benefit is available also. It’s a lose/lose situation for God and a partial benefit/lose situation for man.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by rainbow walking :

All you're doing is asserting that I'm wrong without providing any support. Look at what you just did. I said sometimes some intervention is good when all intervention is bad. You just flat-out denied that with no support at all. And it's obviously true! I've proven that already by pointing out that intervening on a playground sometimes can be good when full intervention is bad. Just saying something doesn't make it true.

Huh? Why is the fact that humans could do that enough to show God shouldn't? The playground kids could learn to get along with themselves, but it's still good to intervene sometimes.

Again, you're just saying over and over again that full intervention is required by moral perfection. Just saying it over and over again doesn't make it true. Find a way to answer my "playground" example.