The_Ist

That's fine, but just because such a unity isn't valid prima facie, it doesn't follow that it isn't actually valid. And whether this unity is valid is the basic argument we're undertaking.

The fact that human limitations may disallow us from "objectively identifying" a perfect moral nature does not relegate morality to "what God says it is." If morality is rooted in God's perfect moral nature, then something is not "good" simply because God says it is, but because it intrinsically flows from said nature. Though everything God says is good is objectively good, it is not objectively good just because he says it. This is an important distinction that does not disappear just because we can't directly perceive it.

I am simply using "perfect" in accordance with its general definition - without flaw. I'm not trying to say God possesses perfection as an attribute, but am using the term in a descriptive sense - i.e., to say that all of God's attributes are without flaw. To rephrase:

1. God is a being without flaw.
2. God has a moral nature.
3. Therefore, God's moral nature is without flaw.

We may disagree on what constitutes "without flaw," but our perceptions of this moral nature don't make its actuality (assuming it exists, of course) not objective or not flawless.

Two is false. If God possesses a perfect moral nature, he cannot do those moral actions which are imperfect.

Philosoft

But, if I understand correctly, scenario 2 is something you would deny.

I guess I don't understand the distinction between God saying something and something being part of God's nature. For God to communicate anything, he has to "say" it, yes? As far as I know, there is no universal force called "morality" that emanates from God and physically affects things.

So there are independent standards that God adheres to? Are there some things that are objectively good that God doesn't give a flip about? I'm getting confused.

It seems less like a distinction and more like an attempt to have it both ways.

I dont' see how you can describe something about God unless you have a label that means something. As it is, the most you can say about a "perfect attribute" is that it is "what God possesses."

Of course. But our perception is consistent with both moral objectivity (some formulations) and moral non-objectivity. Arguments from ignorance with do neither one of us any good.
I think the syllogism works just as well if limited to only good moral actions.

The_Ist

Sorry for the delay, I've been pretty busy lately.

I would deny that there is some moral standard outside of God to which he adheres, if that is what you mean.

When I say that God has a perfectly moral nature, I guess what I mean is that such a nature is an intrinsic attribute that he possesses. Now, granted, for God to communicate to others this morality, he has to "say" it in some way. But the point I'm getting at is that what makes his actions/commandments necessarily moral is not the fact that morality is defined as "what God says and does," but by the fact that the moral nature from which these actions and commandments originate is perfect.

The answer to both of these questions is no. Hopefully my above explanation makes this quoted statement of mine more understandable.

If by "both ways," you are referring to the two possibilities of the Euthyphro dilemma, then I disagree. I think the Euthyphro dilemma commits the fallacy of bifurcation, and I am proposing another possibility that, IMO, can rationally acount for God being the perfect moral standard.

I would define a "perfect attribute" as one that is superior to all other hypothetical attributes with which it contradicts. For example, I would consider omniscience a perfect attribute, because it is superior to all other hypothetial attributes regarding knowledge with which it contradicts, whether these include possessing some knowledge, or most knowledege, or no knowledge, etc.

Let me repost it accordingly:

1. God is the source of morality.
2. Every good moral action is do-able by God.
3. There is a possible world in which God does every good moral action.
4. Therefore, morality is identical to "what God does."

This just seems like a non sequitur to me. Just because good moral actions become knowable to others by what God does in a possible world, it does not follow, then, that morality is defined as such.