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03-29-2002, 10:18 PM | #101 | |||
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bd from kg,
Notice the author/article also presents your views: Quote:
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Even so, it is not relevant since children are already protected by the law and recognized as people. I have conceded the fact that they are persons and so has everyone who has participated so far in this thread. This book is hardly a call for society to start killing little babies whenever they want to. And if this is the best argument you have to show the dreaded effects of abortion on society in all these years it doesn't say much. People would be discussing such things even if abortion were never legalized. Quote:
The context was not to give a complete definition of a person. As you know, I was saying that the woman is obviously an established person and is already considered such in the eyes of the law. Her life should be the primary concern. |
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03-31-2002, 04:13 PM | #102 | |
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If you think I have, please point it out. One of us needs correcting. |
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03-31-2002, 04:40 PM | #103 | |
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BD: Sorry that I have been away.
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In this post, I will focus on personhood. My definition of personhood is based on physiological structures, namely those necessary for cognition to take place. You argue that mental events are the only morally relevant issues in defining personhood, and that physiological considerations are morally irrelevant. If this is the case, we can only take one position that I am aware of: a person sleeping or in a coma (who cannot have cognition in their current state) must non-persons. You have objected before that the values we use to determine personhood are forward looking, and that they must consider future potential for cognitive mental states. But, how does this square with the idea that physiological structures are irrelevant? How could we possibly determine whether an individual (animal or thing) had potential for cognitive mental states (or that it did not) without examining physiological structures? What does a doctor look at when a woman goes to get checked in order to determine whether she is pregnant or has a tumor? My position is that the physiological structures are morally relevant, because by employing them we can encapsulate the concept of personhood in a simple statement that always agrees with our moral values about what a person is. I also feel it is wrong to limit moral discussions as forward looking. Personally, what I value looks to the past, and to the present. In most cases moral decisions take into account consequences (in the immediate or in the distant future). In most cases moral definitions have to do with what a thing is, in the present, which is usually determined by what it has been and has done in the past. I will give you a chance to reply before going any further with the person-hood angle. Editing to add this: If we found something capable of cognition, but with the body of an orangatan, we would still find that the structures it uses for cognition would be, well, of a kind to make cognition possible. [ March 31, 2002: Message edited by: Jerry Smith ]</p> |
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03-31-2002, 06:07 PM | #104 | ||
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The point is to discuss how much(if any)law would have to be re-written if we did consider an embryo or fetus a person. I have suggested that there might be little or no need for a change in laws concerning abortion if the definition of "Person" included an embryo or a fetus. You replied: Quote:
Your formulation has it that anyone who does something with knowledge of its posential results becomes responsible for those results. Neglecting the possibility of rape for the moment, we still must ask how far the responsibility (for the results of consensual sex) carries. Now, I have just found a long post you wrote to me on page 3 of this thread that I had not seen before, and maybe I should go back and make a full reply to it before carrying this any further. I do have some things to say now, though. You still have shown absolutely no good reason that a person's responsibility for the unintended results of an act can carry to the point where they are obligated to allow their body to be used as a life-support-system for another person. You did remark that pregnancy was a unique situation, and asserted that it is reasonable that it is the only case where responsibility carries this far. You stated the obvious, that with pregancy, the person for whom one must provide one's own body as life-support-system is a person of whom one was involved in the creation. Apart from this obvious fact, you did not explain why the responsibility to this newly created person carries so far. I provided another example where one person is directly responsible for making another person dependent on themselves as a life-support-system in part and pointed out that under the law, the responsibility created by this does not carry so far as a requirement to provide themselves as a life-support-system. You only countered that a woman's body is a life-support-system that is automatically engaged. You did not offer a rationalization for the conclusion that she must therefore let it continue to operate as such. (Side note: I hope that someone with medical knowledge will post on this thread about the question of whether a woman's body goes out of its way to become a life support system or whether an embryo secretes chemicals that suppress the woman's immunological reaction to a foreign body inside of her, and proceeds to attach itself to her placenta and draw blood and nutrients out of her body by connecting its own circulatory system to hers.) Another side note: I do not have time to post a new thread on "partial birth abortion." I will just say a couple of things about the procedure: 1) it is sometimes a medical necessity. In severe cases of hydroencephalitis, a "partial birth abortion" is by far the best means of protecting a woman from death or long-term disability resulting from the attempt to deliver a live baby with a skull 4 times or more the normal size. 2) if Congress had included a clause in their last attempt to ban the procedure that provided for the protection of the woman from death or long-term disability, by allowing the procedure in only those cases, Bill Clinton would have signed it. I guess you notice that no one is trying to push that bill through for GW to sign. Look for a full reply to your page 3 post as time allows. |
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03-31-2002, 08:50 PM | #105 | ||
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Jerry Smith:
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[ March 31, 2002: Message edited by: bd-from-kg ]</p> |
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03-31-2002, 11:14 PM | #106 | |
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bd from kg,
I really didn't want to have to read all of your extremely long posts again to have to find an example of where you will often interchange the word 'baby' when discussing abortion. Here is one example and if I have the time or inclination I will find more... Quote:
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04-01-2002, 03:25 AM | #107 | |
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[ April 01, 2002: Message edited by: Jerry Smith ]</p> |
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04-01-2002, 08:39 AM | #108 | |
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An embryo with no central nervous system has no physical structures that can produce mental events. Period. New structures must be produced for mental events to be generated. That, I believe, is a significant difference between an embryo and a comatose person. Both may have no mental events. However, only the comatose person has the actual structures capable of producing mental events in the future. The embryo does not. Jamie |
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04-01-2002, 02:11 PM | #109 | |
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Danya:
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Unfortunately the English language has no word that can be used for both the fetus and the baby that it will become if carried to term. This can create an awkward situation in some contexts. The sentence you quoted is a good example. Replacing “baby” with “fetus” in this sentence would hardly do; it’s even more inappropriate to speak of “giving the fetus ... a ‘low-quality’ life” (that is, as you put it, one in which it would “go hungry, be abused, or otherwise ... grow up unwanted or unloved”) than it is to speak of “giving the baby death” when referring to an abortion. In fact, the grammatical difficulties here tripped you up. The complete sentence referred to above was: “But, in some cases, it has to do with why a woman chooses to get an abortion rather than raise a child that she knows will go hungry, be abused, or otherwise be born and grow up unwanted or unloved.” It doesn’t make sense to say that a woman knows that a child will be born. |
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04-01-2002, 02:16 PM | #110 | ||||||
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Danya:
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Actually the passage you cite supports my position (which you seem to have found almost incomprehensible) that there is no significant moral difference between fetuses and babies. What Singer and I agree on is that fetuses are persons if and only if babies are persons. But he concludes from this that, since fetuses aren’t persons, babies must also not be persons, whereas I argue that, since babies are persons, fetuses must also be persons. Since you apparently agree with me (and disagree with Dr. Singer) on the question of whether babies are persons, if you accept the logic of the passage you quoted you are logically compelled to conclude (as I did) that fetuses are persons. If you don’t accept this logic, why did you bother to bring it up? Quote:
If the previous excerpt from Singer’s magnum opus were not clear enough on this point, here’s some more: Quote:
As Peter Berkowitz pointed out in <a href="http://www.thenewrepublic.com/011000/coverstory011000.html" target="_blank">The Utilitarian Horrors of Peter Singer</a>: Quote:
Absent such rights, there is no way to justify coercive intervention on the baby’s behalf. That’s what the whole concept of “rights” is all about. If an individual has rights, the state is entitled to intervene to prevent those rights from being violated; otherwise it has no basis for such intervention. Thus, for example, if you kill your neighbor’s cat, you can be punished, but not very severely, because all you’ve done is to destroy your neighbor’s (not very valuable) property. If you kill a stray cat there is no penalty whatsoever because you haven’t infringed on anyone’s rights. Now we are finally in a position to comment on what Dr Singer has to say about adoption. Quote:
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