Freethought & Rationalism Archive

picklepuss · 11-16-2002, 07:40 AM

Quote:

Originally posted by Clutch:
[QB]Reference is just how language picks things out. Eg, the words 'horse' and 'cheval' refer to the same thing; presumably there is some story to tell about how this reference is determined within the respective languages to which they belong. Presumably there is also some story to tell about what, psychologically speaking, is involved in understanding the words. The received view, before Putnam, was that it's the same story in both cases. He's arguing that it can't be.

Suppose that you see something out of the corner of your eye -- a moving shadow, but it's gone when you turn to get a better look. You conjecture that you saw a rat who ran round the corner. You take to calling the rat 'Ted', and you say things like, "I wonder where Ted sleeps at night?", and "I hope Ted doesn't have nasty diseases".

Consider two situations consistent with all of this. In the first one, you really did see the moving shadow of a running rat. In the second, the moving shadow was cast through the window onto your wall, and was just an accident of some moving branches in the moonlight. The point is that both situations are consistent with the same visual experience and psychological states on your part. The only difference is whether there actually is a rat. In the first situation, what does your use of the term 'Ted' refer to? Obviously, the rat. In the second, what does it refer to? Obviously, nothing. So your psychological state cannot determine reference; at most it co-determines reference, along with a collection of brute facts that typically go far beyond anything you know.

OK, finally the light dawns!! I can't thank you enough for all your trouble.

--pickle

Clutch · 11-16-2002, 08:28 AM

No trouble! Always pleased to meet someone with a genuine interest in philosophy.

(As opposed to: "Hey, I think truth is just facts plus reality plus the objectiveness of what's factually and really true." Which this board sees a lot of. Truly.)

Mr. Sammi · 11-19-2002, 06:42 AM

I think meaning is an emergent property of a set of relations.

This example consists of 3 relations such that : aRb, cRd and eRf. The relations are relative constructs. A relation in itz most absolute form would be a direct correspondece between representation sensory data. An example of a direct relation would be what gives meaning to daylight OR what gives meaning to hunger. When the 3 relations are set inclusive what emerges is the meaning of the 3 relations in relation to each other, IN OTHER WORDS the meaning of the 3 relations itself whether the emergent property is absurd or not. We can influence meaning by corrupting a set of selations by the inclusion of another relation which will definitively bias the original set of relations.

Hope this helps...

Sammi Na Boodie ()

Thomas Metcalf · 11-22-2002, 02:26 PM

Originally posted by Clutch:

"I disagree with Putnam, fwiw. But by contemporary standards, that leaves me swimming upstream."

I'd be interested to see how you'd disagree with him. Do you mean that meaning maybe just is in the head, after all? Or that a coherence or biosemantic theory of intentionality is more appealing than a causal theory? What do you think of the problems of disjunction and error?

Clutch · 11-22-2002, 06:30 PM

TM,

Well, I disagree in some respects, and I agree in others. I agree there is a social element to reference, but I think this is implicit in the psychology of a competent language user. (Ie, such a user intends (at some level) that her use of a name conform to that in general use around her, and to the history of use in whose causal chain her acquisition of the term is a link).

I disagree that it's a necessary truth that water = H2O, because I think it's not even an actual truth; 'water', in its normal usage, picks out a wide and probably vague range of referents, depending on context. And hence I disagree that the meaning of 'water' in 1750 was H2O.

Among other things.

As for the disjunction problem, well, it's not entirely relevant here. But I think it's a very serious challenge to any sort of physical reductionism towards intentional concepts -- no big surprise there, I guess.

Thread Tools	Search this Thread
Show Printable Version	Search this Thread: Advanced Search

11-16-2002, 08:28 AM	#12
Clutch Veteran Member Join Date: Oct 2001 Location: Canada Posts: 3,751	No trouble! Always pleased to meet someone with a genuine interest in philosophy. (As opposed to: "Hey, I think truth is just facts plus reality plus the objectiveness of what's factually and really true." Which this board sees a lot of. Truly.)

11-19-2002, 06:42 AM	#13
Mr. Sammi Banned Join Date: Jun 2002 Location: Montr�al Posts: 367	I think meaning is an emergent property of a set of relations. This example consists of 3 relations such that : aRb, cRd and eRf. The relations are relative constructs. A relation in itz most absolute form would be a direct correspondece between representation sensory data. An example of a direct relation would be what gives meaning to daylight OR what gives meaning to hunger. When the 3 relations are set inclusive what emerges is the meaning of the 3 relations in relation to each other, IN OTHER WORDS the meaning of the 3 relations itself whether the emergent property is absurd or not. We can influence meaning by corrupting a set of selations by the inclusion of another relation which will definitively bias the original set of relations. Hope this helps... Sammi Na Boodie ()

11-22-2002, 02:26 PM	#14
Thomas Metcalf Veteran Member Join Date: Jul 2002 Location: Boulder, CO Posts: 1,009	Originally posted by Clutch: "I disagree with Putnam, fwiw. But by contemporary standards, that leaves me swimming upstream." I'd be interested to see how you'd disagree with him. Do you mean that meaning maybe just is in the head, after all? Or that a coherence or biosemantic theory of intentionality is more appealing than a causal theory? What do you think of the problems of disjunction and error?

11-22-2002, 06:30 PM	#15
Clutch Veteran Member Join Date: Oct 2001 Location: Canada Posts: 3,751	TM, Well, I disagree in some respects, and I agree in others. I agree there is a social element to reference, but I think this is implicit in the psychology of a competent language user. (Ie, such a user intends (at some level) that her use of a name conform to that in general use around her, and to the history of use in whose causal chain her acquisition of the term is a link). I disagree that it's a necessary truth that water = H2O, because I think it's not even an actual truth; 'water', in its normal usage, picks out a wide and probably vague range of referents, depending on context. And hence I disagree that the meaning of 'water' in 1750 was H2O. Among other things. As for the disjunction problem, well, it's not entirely relevant here. But I think it's a very serious challenge to any sort of physical reductionism towards intentional concepts -- no big surprise there, I guess.

Freethought & Rationalism Archive

The archives are read only.