Amen-Moses

So Bonobo's are only social animals because of their human natures?

Are you still taking the pills or what?

Amen-Moses

Amos

Well they have their own Bonobo nature wherein they are distinct from other animals who may have a lesser degree of socialization.

Go pull your wire.

Kantian

Oops! I apologize for not responding earlier, Longbow. I had overlooked your post in search of 99percent's potential response.

That was Hume's analysis of morality as a cache of rationalizations of one's sentiments. Kant classified all those "rationalizations" as hypothetical imperatives and sought a universal rational principle. Despite his discovery or formulation of the categorical imperative, Kant never really demonstrated how such a rule supply its own motivation for the rational, autonomous human being. Rather, he makes an illegitimate derivation of the categorical imperative from the noumena. He is correct that moral oughts do not originate in nature, that there is no empirical basis, but incorrect in his "transcendental derivation." This leads into Kant's argument of the freedom of the will, which is a whole 'nother can of worms.
Could you elaborate? Perhaps with an example or an instance that demonstrates how one could remain rational and act immorally.
That's incorrect. He only establishes certain features of experience as "synthetic a priori judgments" not that all of philosophy are a priori. After all, Kant could be seen as an empiricist in the Humean tradition, since he does accept several of Hume's premises or criticisms as legit. In the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant attacks several a priori concepts of metaphysics.
I am aware of the origin of the notion of the noumena in the CPR, but his attempts of deducing a grounding principle of morality from a transcendental will cannot be truly defended.
~Radical subjectivity~

[ September 28, 2002: Message edited by: Immanuel Kant ]</p>

Longbow

You seem to be taking Hume's analysis for granted. My response is why should morality be its own motivation. This is not something we must show or show is irrelevant. It is something that you must show is essential to morality.

As for his derivation being illegitimate, I think you are going to have to show that.

You're missing the point. Kant actually agrees with the idea that morality should be its own motivation. It is based on such a proposition (one that he also takes for granted) that he argues for the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. (He does, I think, take it for granted, ultimately, that people would choose to be moral.)

But, what I am saying is why does this even matter? Sure it matters as a practical concern, but how is this essential to morality being what it is? In other words, it is not necessary that everyone value morality or even tend to value morality. In fact, it is mistaken to try to build something like that into morality, itself. If anything you must account for people's interest in morality independently of what morality is.

Kant is certainly not an empiricist. And, his works are more of a response to Hume rather than standing in the tradition of Hume. Philosophy as we commonly understand it (metaphysics, epistemology, morality, etc.) is what Kant called "pure philosophy" which he said was a priori. His attacks on certain of these concepts are not attacks on a priori knowledge in general. The very aim of the Critique of Pure Reason is to establish what can be known through a priori reason.

It certainly can. Kant is just a compatibilist like probably most philosophers. If you really want to know what his arguments for morality are, you should go to the Critique of Practical Reason, the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, and the Metaphysics of Morals. As for his discussion of free will, don't confuse his building it into the rest of his world view as the argument for it.

All terminology aside, what Kant is saying is that our wills are completely determined, indeed predestined, but that does not diminish the fact that they still exist.

"One can therefore grant that if it were possible for us to have such deep insight into a human beings cast of mind, as shown by inner as well as outer actions, that we would know every incentive to to action, even the smallest, as well as all the external occasions affecting them, we could calculate a human being's conduct for the future with as much certainty as a lunar or solar eclipse and could nevertheless maintain a human being's conduct is free."

-- Critique of Practical Reason

This is really no different than what plenty of philosophers (not Hume) before him have said standing ina tradition that goes back to Boethius of reconcling the phenomenon (not a reference to phenomenology) of our wills with metaphysical determinism.

[ September 29, 2002: Message edited by: Longbow ]</p>