Primal

boneyard bill wrote:

I define on the basis of meaning, and that is infered merely from phenomenon: my own raw experience.

Surely our definitions cannot differ radically, as they refer to the same object.

Though I wonder what then is your definition of consciousness?

Obviously it cannot be something defined as immaterial from the onset.



Here I believe you are wrong. No theory explains ALL the data. Thus your dillemma is a false dillema. A better standard is whether a theory is parsimonious with the data.

Yes but if its not material it must be made of something, less it be literally nothing. And if that something is not-material it is a radically new substance, something different from the physical substance of every day experience. Something that divides the universe into at least two fundamental categories.

Adrian Selby

Yes, sentient experience has been accounted for in materialistic terms, as I've been saying and you've been disputing. Your response to my posts as I see it is that you demand that materialism must be adjusted, fine, I told you repeatedly that we work with different conceptions of what is material and I've stressed the relational aspect of aggregates of components as responsible fully for what we take to be sentience.

I've conceded that a scientist can prod about with things and record from the subsequent first person report the undergoing of changes in their sentient state. This can never conclude or dispute that something immaterial may have happened, by definition. It can provide support for the identity model, of which I support a particular flavour that may or may not have the support of modern materialist philosophers, the point of which comment I'm trying to fathom the use of.

You asked how we could know whether or not the sun had sentient experience. I think this illustrates your misunderstanding of the nature of the systems and our understanding of these where we find evidence of sentience. Much research has been done too that shows that an increase in the complexity of organisation of on off switches with structured input results in a greater refinement of response on behalf of the system. If we want to call simple systems, of which the sun is one, sentient, then fine, we can call thermostats and rocks sentient, along with viruses. I don't see that the concept of sentience is usefully applied to these things unless we radically revisit the concept of sentience and what it can entail.

I've asked you to outline a model of the relationship between mind and brain as it is clear that your criticisms can be met by other more flawed systems such as Cartesian dualism.

If we can understand where our conceptions of matter differ we might get to the bottom of whether or not the reductionist enterprise is indeed flawed as you say, or whether it is rather supported by enhancements to our understanding of physical systems (in the neurological sphere particularly) such that reduction becomes less absurd, because the reduction of talk of boobs to c-firings becomes a blend of one set of concepts and way of talking to another set of concepts and way of talking.

sodium

You suggested vision as an example of something that might be immaterial. Then you admitted that our concept of vision could refer to brain states. So I don't see what remains unexplained. Of course, this isn't a proof that materialism is true, but as far as I can see, you persist in denying that materialism could explain all the facts, and yet there is no example of something that remains unexplainable.

boneyard bill

Primal writes:

and

Why not?

BB writes:
It doesn't matter what scientists know. As I have already pointed out scientists research the data. Materialism is an interpretation of the data. The question is what is the most reasonable interpretation of the data: one that explains all the data or one that doesn't.

Primal responds:
Here I believe you are wrong. No theory explains ALL the data. Thus your dillemma is a false dillema. A better standard is whether a theory is parsimonious with the data




Of course, no theory can give a detailed explanation of all the data, but a theory can take all of the data into account.

Matrialism is unable to account for sentient experience. Therefore, the theory is incomplete. Another theory that accounts for sentient experience is therefore to be preferred. The parsimoniousness of the theory can only be considered in the context of its explanatory power. A theory that explained nothing could be extremely parsimonious but who cares.

boneyard bill

Primal writes:

Please study a little history of philosophy. The concept of mind is hardly a new idea, much less a radical one.

boneyard bill

Adrian Selby writes:

The whole point of this thread is whether or not materialism is true. The identity argument is an attempt to defend materialism against the charge that it cannot explain sentience. There is no argument with the point that science might make advances by operating with an "as if" assumption that materialism is true without asserting that with any confidence.

The problem for many of us isn't that science sometimes assumes materialism. The problem is that science, and particularly science education, usually assumes materialism to be true and often prohibits (just as you propose to do) any non-material language to describe the results.

This is not advantageous to science or to a search for truth.

boneyard bill

Adrian Selby writes:

What is so terribly flawed about Cartesian dualism?

boneyard bill

Adrian Selby writes:

I don't think our conceptions of matter differ very much from what you have described. The difference is what can logically be concluded from such a conception. I contend that the logical conclusion is that materialism fails. And if materialism fails, a lot of materialistic science fails. I don't see, for example, where the neo-Darwinian theory of evolution could survive given this conception of matter.

boneyard bill

Sodium writes:

Yes, but I also said that if it refers to brain states then matter isn't what we thought it was. It necessarily has a different character. It is mind/matter.

Adrian Selby

Strawson, Ryle and Ayer will do a better job than I could.

The key problem is the explanation for the mechanism by which the disembodied mind (non spatial) is attached to the particular brain.

No, its matter better understood. What I think matter is (who is this 'we') is something that can support an explanation of sentience in scientific terms, where these terms are those created and defined for the purpose of differentiating aspects of matter in our environment (both near and distant).

This depends on whether you do or don't think conceptions of materialism can change, but the ontological status of materialism doesn't. I argue that it can change without invoking anything more existent than the mere physical. What cause could science have for assuming something other than materialism, and how could it begin to investigate, with its methodology and verificational procedures anything more than the material?

I don't see how materialist models of the mind are stepping beyond the material when explaining sentience in terms of particular sorts of organisation of materials functioning in particular sorts of ways.