owleye

I think there is at least one sense that Chomsky is correct. Evolution by descent in accordance with changes in DNA is a discrete process, not a continuous one. Moreover, if it aims at anything, it aims to be in a stable relationship both within itself and with its environment. Since the future genetic code depends on the present genetic code, such that the future can be achieved only by modifications of the present, and that such modifications can only involve discrete changes, it is not surprising that when its environment changes (or when a species finds itself in a different environment) it will undergo signficant changes.

In its simplest form, we can see how discrete changes can effect the constitution of atomic nuclei. By the addition (fusion) of the basic units of the nuclei of Helium and Hydrogen, other atoms can be constituted in accordance with the requirements of stability within the nucleus and the environment it finds itself in. Only a relatively few number of "designs" are stable. As we move beyond the nucleus of atoms, to molecules, however, the number of variations in stable designs grow enormously, but as well there remain equally significant "gaps" among relatively stable variations.

owleye

Gurdur

This is quite contradictory; to which case(s) are you referring ?

Several natural evolutionarily-based tendencies require at least minimal socialisation for development.

I'm somewhat surprised at this question; after all, it isn't as if we haven't been over this ground before, DRF7.

Again I put a question to you which I've put before (if somewhat implicitly), and never gotten an answer;

If you believe language not to be innate and evolutionarily-derived, where the hell did it come from then ?

How else do you account for the obvious dedicated specialization of (in the main) the left-side Broca's and Wernicke's area (and the connecting pathways) for language production and comprehension respectively, and ditto with the homologous right-side areas for music production and comprehension respectively ?

Language is an inherent tendency that seems to have a cut-off period somewhere around puberty; in one of the most famous and well-documented cases of a terribly socially-deprived child (as far as I knowe, there are no really well-documented cases of feral children), she never really developed significant language capability despite intensive training (after, of course, she had been taken into care).

And display it usually in bizarre ways; even well-socialized adults can display fetishism, the pathophilias and the like.

I don't see any difference; exactly the same can be said about learning to walk.

[ May 21, 2002: Message edited by: Gurdur ]</p>

Ierrellus

phaedrus,

Mea culpa! It was I who did the shift to animal awareness in the hope that if SOD is a linguistic necessity, is an innate precursor of language possibility, it must have some evolutionary heritage, hence could be found in animal (other than us) consciousness.

DRFseven,

Infant sexuality exists!


Owleye,

You make my brain sweat! Do you think the major evolutionary developments might have been caused by sudden environmental catastrophies? The sun does fusion, even as we speak. Does language, from what we know of it,fit the discrete morphological definition?

Ierrellus

Gurdur

I'm none too sure that I see your point here; in what way would that make Chomsky's theories on the emergence of language more correct than say Pinker's representations of the evolutionary view ?

Moreover, while I regard the entire punctuated equilibria as being very much overstated, it is a matter of fact that in the evolution of systems you get effects of complexity, which appear to us like sudden, discrete jumps.

Teleological phrasing, and incorrect thereby.

Perhaps it would be better to say,
What works, works
which includes evolutionarily stable strategies.

Ierrellus

IMO, when it comes to evolutionary changes among the species, Chomsky is out to lunch! He cannot explain "innate" without explaining evolutionary changes whether these are step-by step alterations or large, cataclysmic revisions of organism/environment interface. If SOD is a linquistic necessity as well as an evolutionary possibility, its innate qualities must have predecessors.

Ierrellus

Gurdur

That is indeed the conundrum.

BTW:
it has been shown that chimpanzees have actually all the physical machinery necessary for a wide range of produced phonemes, i.e. for phonologically complex spoken speech ---
however they lack the necessary neural bandwidth in fine-motor control from the cerebellum.

and somewhat embarrassingly, the most complex communicational system (apart from humans) that just might possess some form of grammar,
belongs to the Carribean Reef Squid.

Such are the torments of a linguist's days.

Gurdur

Since I'm somewhat more interested in your definition(s), especially since I'm getting at a psychological tendency behing the perceptions.

I would really like to see definitions from others first; I've touched upon SOD in human language (self-explanatory a definition, I believe) and in basic cognition (ditto, and I've also added a mote of explanation).

I wonder why you haven't gotten into details as yet.

I don't see the value in having to re-type something already stated in a thread.
Why aren't children able to run immediately after birth ?
After all, a zebra foal can manage it in 12 minutes, IIRC, after birth.
Nope, not just among humans.
Take a look, for example, how dogs or chimpanzees sort out disagreements in the sharing of food, or the integration of a newcomer.
Because humans are animals, and it only makes sense to look at any available evolutionary history.

I would have thought that was obvious.
You have dogs, unable to differentiate; you have chimps, our very next cousins, able to do so; rhesus monkeys apparently have problems with it.

see above.

This is a very odd question; what do you mean by "groundings" here ?

I'm suggesting a theory of what our groundings are; you seem to think I want to overrule some groundings with my own "cherished notion".

I also fail to see what evidence you have that I cherish this notion of mine.

Or do you mean this notion is in contradiction to your own accepted philosophical definition ?
In which case I remind you that philosophical definitions and schools of thought on SOD are hardly unanimous[/i], and possibly you should entrust us with your own POV ?
BTW, Nietzsche is long-dead, and van Quine and Putnam have put some work into this too, IIRC.

Unfortunately not.

"At the end" refers to the end of my explanation, not of the process being described.
I believe I am clear in stating that the same cognitive biases of evolutionary descent underly grammar and "higher" cognition.

I fail to see what is unclear about that.
I also refer you to the OP of this thread, to which my comments were initially directed.

Coherent, complex speech requires grammar.

I'm speculationg that, more or less.

Better said, given evolutionary cost-benefit strictures, I believe that grammar will not evolve unless self-consciousness does.
I'm wary of teleogy and value judgments on "levels".

Complex tasks.

Training, experience, and predispositions of individual subjects.
You ignore my very next point there.
I could; It will take me a wee bit of time to dig out the studies.
In essence, various psycholinguistic studies seem to show that very young infants display an ability to be able to picture abstract objects, and also seem to have the grammatical categories of subject and object present.

Perhaps in more detail ?

An idle metaphor, nothing more.

phaedrus

Gurdur

Regarding all your statements like ....

Since I'm somewhat more interested in your definition(s), especially since I'm getting at a psychological tendency behing the perceptions.

I would really like to see definitions from others first; I've touched upon SOD in human language (self-explanatory a definition, I believe) and in basic cognition (ditto, and I've also added a mote of explanation).

I wonder why you haven't gotten into details as yet.

....

In which case I remind you that philosophical definitions and schools of thought on SOD are hardly unanimous[/i], and possibly you should entrust us with your own POV ?

....

Perhaps in more detail ?

Havent you noticed or comprehended what i offered earlier...for your benefit...here it is We understand real objects in their own terms as independent and separable substances; yet real objects are also the phenomenal objects that are present in perception, and these have an essential epistemological dependence on the subject. We are free to ask whether this is a peculiarity of our knowledge, that we can't help but conceive of objects except as objects-for-a-subject, since it is impossible for us to have knowledge outside of our subjective viewpoint, or whether it reflects something essential about reality, that consciousness and subjectivity are things that are just as fundamental ontologically as is the external, physical, and objective. Is undecidability merely a limitation on our knowledge? Or does it reflect, as it is reasonable to ask about quantum uncertainty, some basic truth in which there is no indecision and no uncertainty? So could you just state what SOD is in human beings according to you? Asking this coz i am getting this feeling that this discussion seems to be only meandering around the fringes of the main topic, if i can have clear cut phrasing of your position, either the discussion can be furthered in a constructive way or whatever. Evolution, language, cognitive causes are all fine, but the crux of the issue is whether a subject-object split/metaphysics in the cartesian sense is the right way to look at ourselves and the world we live in. So while we have been meandering around in verbal/non-verbal, humans/animals..etc, would rather look at the main issue...the one which was discussed at certain length in this old thread...<a href="http://iidb.org/cgi-bin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=21&t=000215&p=" target="_blank">Poll on Ontology </a>. One can always get into - Ockham's mental language, cases of Aphasias, and nagel's bat...etc, but let me first understand where you stand on the SOD.

Anyhows just that i am not told that i havent responded to the remainder of your post...here goes...

I don't see the value in having to re-type something already stated in a thread.



Why aren't children able to run immediately after birth ?
After all, a zebra foal can manage it in 12 minutes, IIRC, after birth.

Ahh, so just like there are certain explanations for why children are not able to run immediately after birth, i presume you know of some explanations for why it takes time for SOD to appear in children? If you have, care to share?

[b]Nope, not just among humans.
Take a look, for example, how dogs or chimpanzees sort out disagreements in the sharing of food, or the integration of a newcomer.[b]

Sigh, now explain as to how non-verbal communication helps in disputing and agreement among human beings? And again i point out to the words in my post - "it talks about share, discuss and agree in addition to "communication"

Because humans are animals, and it only makes sense to look at any available evolutionary history.

He he, so now please link up any evidence found among animals to SOD in human beings

I would have thought that was obvious.
You have dogs, unable to differentiate; you have chimps, our very next cousins, able to do so; rhesus monkeys apparently have problems with it.

So is it SOD or just self-concept?

see above.

see above

This is a very odd question; what do you mean by "groundings" here ?

Umm, you want me to explain what cultural/historical/linguistic groundings are?

I'm suggesting a theory of what our groundings are; you seem to think I want to overrule some groundings with my own "cherished notion".

I also fail to see what evidence you have that I cherish this notion of mine.

Ahh, maybe its not your cherised notion and i just assumed Now,what is this theory you are suggesting?

Or do you mean this notion is in contradiction to your own accepted philosophical definition ?
In which case I remind you that philosophical definitions and schools of thought on SOD are hardly unanimous[/i], and possibly you should entrust us with your own POV ?
BTW, Nietzsche is long-dead, and van Quine and Putnam have put some work into this too, IIRC.

No for all and thanks for pointing out the obvious. Oh shit, the fritz is dead, i didnt know . Van Quine and putnam well well well...no one else ?

I believe I am clear in stating that the same cognitive biases of evolutionary descent underly grammar and "higher" cognition.

Umm..err...everything can be rooted in evolution and everything on this planet could be said to have a common cause in the big bang or whatever, thats easy.

I fail to see what is unclear about that.
I also refer you to the OP of this thread, to which my comments were initially directed.

Yup fail to see is right How can an individual separated from his/her environment?

I'm speculationg that, more or less.

Better said, given evolutionary cost-benefit strictures, I believe that grammar will not evolve unless self-consciousness does.

Are you speculating or stating your belief or paraphrasing a scientific explanation?

I'm wary of teleogy and value judgments on "levels".

Good, what if i say the human level?

Training, experience, and predispositions of individual subjects.

Ahh the subject, would you say it all depends on the subject?

You ignore my very next point there
I could; It will take me a wee bit of time to dig out the studies.
In essence, various psycholinguistic studies seem to show that very young infants display an ability to be able to picture abstract objects, and also seem to have the grammatical categories of subject and object present.

Mate, you stated as a general rule infants dont exhibit SOD and then gave exceptions, so how can it be the main point??? Will wait for the studies, would particularly like to see the sample size

JP

Ierrellus

Carruthers, in an article (1998) posted on Online Papers on Consciousness, claims that an animal must have a "theory of mind" , i.e. a thought of thought, before it is capable of communication with humans. He goes back to Nagel on what it is like to be a bat. IMO, such a distinction can best be described in an Art Buchwald phrase--"the manure of a large domesticated animal!"

To expect a human definition of perceptional consciousness from what might be a creature expressing prerequisites of such a definition is absurd.

Does Jane Goodall know to some extent what it is like to be a chimpanzee? Does Irene Pepperberg know to some extent what it islike to be a grey parrot? This science has only just begun.

Ierrellus

DRFseven

I'm referring to cases where multiple children are kept locked away or institutionalized under extremely deprived circumstances together or where there are two feral children living together. It would seem that if language is innate, they would develop some sort of unique language among themselves, but they don't. And later, they can't be trained to normal speech. Admittedly, cases of feral children are extremely rare and much of the documentation has been sensationalized, but still, of about 43 cases, none have developed language.

And have we answered the question, Gurdur? If we have, and we haven't informed the rest of the world, then, we are remiss!

Come on, Gurdur; I don't know, I'm only guessing, offering opinions, stating what seems logical to me in the hopes of furthering my understanding and by participating in a discussion, perhaps stimulating some insight.

But I think it IS evolutionarily derived through a process of semantical layering that serendipitously begat language. That's just my guess, of course; hell, maybe there ARE little "grammer nodules" in there that I'm too dense to fathom.

My point is that people display sexual behaviors whether reared in isolation or not; whereas, as you point out, they must be exposed to language during a certain time period or they will never use it.


Yes, and walking is another of those innate potentials; apparently bipedalism must also be modeled.

I see a difference between an innate potential and an innate behavior; a big difference. Innate capacities afford a much greater flexibility in behaviors because we are much less hard-wired.