Ernest Sparks

So, Albert, may we have your permission to append appropriate mental notes to your mere assertions?

For example:

We’ve been living in a post-Christian era for half a century now. {just a comment; no argument here}

Europe has been post-Christian for a full century. {that's just another assertion; pay no attention}

But more importantly, Europe has been post-Catholic since the French Revolution. {just some historical color here}

And that’s the source of its and our moral decline. {none of this has been an argument, so this is not supposed to be a conclusion}

Thanks,
Ernie

Albert Cipriani

Dear Ernest,
Your post made me laugh out loud. That's kinda rare. Thanks, I think I needed that.

Kyser_soze,
I'm glad you're not sore, Kyser.

Neither am I. All's forgiven even tho you didn't ask for it to be. -- Albert

Ernest Sparks

Albert,

Please tell user theIPU that all's well.

And please have a blessed Holy Week and celebration of the Resurrection.

Regards,
Ernie

keyser_soze

And vice a versa...

Bill Snedden

As you explain it, the comparison is somewhat apropos. I have always believed, "if you cannot say what you mean, how can you mean what you say?" and strive to choose just the right word or phrase to articulate my meaning. It's one reason why, after almost three years of posting in these fora, I've accumulated only a mere 2100 or so posts.

Another reason is because, as we shall see, when I'm not so careful I almost invariably fail to convey exactly what I mean...

If you'll note, I said "changing mores," not morals. "Mores" are social norms and reflect cultural values. They do not necessarily equate to morals.

You can see the reality of this demonstrated by the charming scatological reference you made. If you examine the whole of human history, you will find that there are cultures, both in the past and present, that didn't and don't have the same attitude toward faeces as we do in the West. That our attitudes are different reflects differing cultural values. That many cultures change attitudes over time reflects changes in cultural values. These changes are reflected in praxis, hence changing mores or norms.

More importantly, however, is that I was obviously so unclear in my writing as to lead you to believe that I hold that moral values are infinitely mutable. I do not.

What I was trying to say by my reference to "changing mores", is that I see a shift in cultural values over time. Some people, namely more conservative folk (most likely you would be in this number ), tend to equate these values with morals, but it just isn't so.

They point to things like increased drug use, tattoos, body piercing, single parenting, or any one of a number of other behaviors and decry the immorality of modern society. I disagree that these things represent changes in moral values, but feel that they represent changing cultural values instead (I would also put homosexuality in this category, but I'm sure that you would disagree. No matter; it's arguable at worst and I can defend it on other grounds.).

I could go on about what I do consider the relationship of values to morality, but all I wanted to do here was correct my earlier miscommunication.

Yes, you're quite right. Again, I hit that "submit reply" button too soon.

What I meant was that on my viewpoint, morality requires freedom of conscience and choice, not that one equals the other. In other words, "freedom" does not equal "license". I'm sure you would agree with that.

On my view, an increase of freedom does not represent an increase in morality, but rather an increase in personal freedoms is a necessary requirement for an increase in morality. Slaves are not moral agents.

Well, of course all choices depend upon values. But are all values moral values? I don't think so. I value chocolate, but I don't think people who prefer vanilla are evil.

Addiction is certainly "no choice at all", but neither do people necessarily choose to become addicted. Current medical and psychological research points to both neurological and biological preconditions for addictive behaviors (which are not necessarily limited to so-called "sinful" behaviors. I would say that the Rev. Fred Phelps is addicted to religion.)

As to the rest of the above, I would say that choices, or more specifically, the ability to choose, is a moral value in and of itself. That does not mean that all choices are on equal moral footing nor does it mean that any choice is moral regardless of what it is or what it's consequences may be. I hope I've made myself clearer here.

This is largely irrelevant to the theory Maslow developed. It doesn't matter what the content of these needs are; if they exist, they can be classified into the categories Maslow described and thus "fit" into the hierarchy. All that he's saying is that some types of needs are more basic.

In your example of the feral child (I assume that was Victor?), the reality is that he is not as susceptible to heat or cold as other individuals, therefore he does not have the same level of need in this category as another. It doesn't mean that the category is invalid.

I agree that there is a give and take, but I disagree that the gains aren't worth the cost. Spencer Tracy makes a nice speech with a reference to this very issue towards the end of Inherit the Wind, but I can't remember it. Anyway, I would argue that technological gains over the past century have vastly outweighed the cost.

And again, I disagree. In fact, I think technology has an as yet untapped potential to facilitate the creation of this "world community" you see as fictional. After all, our similarities far outweigh our differences. If we could only learn enough about each other to see through the veil of differences that separate us, I'm convinced it would bring us closer together. How amazing is it that right now there could be individuals all around the world reading this very message? Such a community would have been impossible only 10 years ago. At the current rate of growth, the entire world will be "connected" in some form or another within relatively short order. The exchange of information will increase exponentially. Bad ideas shot down more quickly, good ideas promoted faster.

Less you mistake me, I'm not an "everything is rosy!" kind of guy. I realize that there is great potential for destruction, but I feel it is outweighed by the even greater potential for tremendous good. It seems to me that you, to paraphrase John Kennedy, look at what is and cry "WHY?" I, on the other hand, look at what could be and cry, "WHY NOT!"

Regards,

Bill Snedden

Albert Cipriani

Dear Bill,
That’s dirty pool, you shooting down my assertion that the global community is a fiction with your appeal to the internet we’re using to argue this very point. And ironic! How dare I disagree with you when the very fact of doing so would belie my Luddite proclivities. Let’s pass over in silence this notable exception to technology’s tyrannical rule.

The verdict is still out whether or not the Internet remains an exceptional technology. It hinges upon the difference between what’s real and what’s virtual. Tho my belief in and support of the internet has cost me dearly financially, and I still believe it’s the single best invention of the 20th century, I am suspicious of the ends it will ultimately lead to. My problem with all technologies is that they make it easier for us to be less real, and by that I mean, less able to fulfill our nature. Most people no longer even believe we have a nature. So my complaint on this count is a hard sell, and I’d rather pass.

Onto the crux of our difference. You wrote: Thus, you are morally obliged to rank freedom higher than I do. Since you see freedom as a prerequisite to morality, since you rightly assert that we cannot be moral without it, you might say that freedom should be valued more than moral values in that freedom is the mother of all moral values.

I don’t mean to put words in your mouth, but to extrapolate a bit on what I believe you must mean. Especially considering this: If you allow me to put the word “freedom” in your mouth by way of extracting your phrase “ability to choose,” then you have reiterated my original complaint: “This is a blatant equivocation of freedom and morality.”

On the one hand you’ve agreed with me that you don’t mean to equivocate freedom with morality: But on the other hand you seem to be sliding right back into that position with I cannot conceive of any meaning other than “freedom” for your phrase “ability to choose.” But perhaps you mean something else by it and that’s what’s causing my misunderstanding.

But the more interesting issue to me, the real crux of our differences as I said above, is not that you may be equivocating freedom with morality, but that you believe freedom is a prerequisite of morality.

On the surface, your assertion seems self-evident, like you said, “Slaves are not moral agents.” Catholic morality says as much: no sin is a sin unless the sin is freely willed, that is, we are culpable for what we do only if we were also able not to.

But there’s a hidden mechanistic deterministic assumption in the proposition that morality requires freedom. It’s hidden by the analogous (i.e. non-univocal) term “freedom” which has the following two meanings:
1) freedom of motion and
2) freedom of intent.

Ergo, physical freedom is a prerequisite for moral acts, but not a prerequisite for morality itself.

Thus, Maryl Streep in “Sophie’s Choice,” in the face of the barking Nazi pig, ACTUALLY chose the death of her innocent child. But she did not INTEND the death of her innocent child. Thus, a slave who ACTUALLY makes no choices his entire life long is still a moral agent internally, in terms of his freely chosen intentions he is not free to act upon.

Thanks for the mental stimulation. That sounds kinda perverse, but thanks just the same. I hope it was as good for you as it was for me. Albert the Traditional Catholic Lighting a Cigarette

theIPU

mere assertion :boohoo:

Boro Nut

It's true Albert. I've gobshited my way to 1500 posts in a fraction of the time.

Bill Snedden

You're not completely alone. Like I said, I believe that the benefits will outweigh the costs (and I acknowledge that there are costs), but I could be wrong and freely admit that.

Doesn't sound particularly unreasonable, especially when you consider that God apparently ranks freedom the highest value of all (excepting himself, of course). After all, "Free Will!" seems to be the armchair apologist's answer to just about every problem the non-theist raises.

As to most of the rest of your post, I think I can clear up my meaning further by responding to these:

Hmmm..."freedom of intent"? I would say that your assumption about my assumption contains a hidden "Catholic" interpretation of "morality"...

AFAIC, "intent" only has moral bearing upon actions. Intent without actions is valueless (in the moral sense).

In other words, if I form in my mind the intent (momentary, shall we say ), to shoot the idiot driver who cuts me off, no moral status obtains if I fail to act on that intent.

I understand that Catholic thinking on this is different (intent is seen as an act of the will, or can be the moral equivalent of an act), but we'll have to agree to disagree on that.

So you see why I would not necessarily agree with this. However, I can certainly concede that one can live a moral life merely by avoiding negative moral situations. Thus, a person who took no actions whatsoever could still live a moral life, as long as she was never in a situation where refraining from action could be considered morally deficient. I can't imagine that such a life would be very interesting, however....

I'm not sure what you mean in the case of the slave, but I would agree with you that it's possible to be a slave and live a moral life (as I noted, above). What I meant by my remark about slavery was really more directed toward society rather than the individual: a society that practices slavery, either institutionally or in praxis, cannot be a moral one.

As far as Sophie is concerned, she had no choice. There can be no moral status discerned where choice is restricted in that manner. A choice made with a gun to your head is no choice at all...



Regards,

Bill Snedden

Albert Cipriani

Dear Bill,
You wrote:
But my favorite line of Emmanuel Kant is: “Thought is insipient action.”

To insist that morality requires thought's actualization is to make morality subject to the vagaries of time and space and undercut its claim to absolute truth. If you’re a relativist, as I suspect you are, that should suit you just fine.

Just the same, even if you don’t mind undermining absolutism with your claim that morality requires action, you should mind undermining our freedom. And that your claim does. Your view renders the paraplegic a virtual moral midget, a slave to amorality. Whereas, if morality does not require action, every conscious second of a paraplegic’s life is as potentially moral or immoral as mine.

Accepting my pain, wishing good for others, feeling others’ pain, these are all morally good “actions” that I or a paraplegic are capable of every conscious second of our lives. To deny the moral worth of these morally good intentions is to deprive us of most of what passes as our moral life. I dare say that when the final chapter is written, the book of our life will turn out to consist far more of good and bad intentions than good and bad actions.

Tho we agree that only free acts are moral acts, we disagree on the reciprocal proposition, that moral acts require free acts.

Extrapolating your view leads me to a disturbing place neither of us wish to go. That is, to the degree we value morality, we must value moral beings. Conversely, we likewise must devalue beings with a dimminished capacity for morality, such as the paraplegic or retarded.

I’ve enjoyed our dialogue. But something tells me it doesn’t belong in this forum. I doubt others here care much about such niceties as we are wont to get into. So, to paraphrase Mae West, “I may come up and see ya sometime…” you know, in your philosophical forum above.” – Cheers, Albert the Traditional Catholic