Albert Cipriani

Dear John,
You say what I said you say. This time your exact words are: It is not. By your definition, a concept is an abstraction. That is a tautology, using two words for the same idea. According to your species of non-reasoning, there is no difference between a concept and an abstraction. According to me, there is.

If you are right, and the concept of a dog is an abstraction, then so too are all our memories. The concept of pain and pleasure is, too. Indeed, pray tell, what are we capable of thinking of (since all our conscience thoughts are concepts) that isn’t an abstraction?

You fail to distinguish between concepts that derive from empirical reality and concepts that derive from subjective reality. The former are merely symbolic manifestations of objective natural reality. The latter are pure abstractions (not symbolic manifestations) of subjective supernatural reality.

You ask: I prefer to simply call concepts concepts, symbols, symbols, and abstractions, abstractions; and leave off all weak adjectives like “pure.” Isn’t it clear enough that whatever we are conscious of experiencing between our ears are concepts, whether it’s the experience of pain or pleasure or a memory or our pet dog or the word “dog”?

Concepts come from two sources, objective or subjective, that is, from a natural or supernatural source, that is, from outside or inside us. (By “objective, natural, and outside” sources, I mean, of course, from our five senses AND/OR from chemical imbalances within our brains.) Whatever the source of our concepts, those concepts are real, even if others judge them to be unreal.

But only concepts whose source is not outside of us, that is, concepts that derive from subjective, supernatural, or internal processes are abstractions… or if you prefer, are true or pure abstractions. These, too, by definition are real even if others judge them to be unreal.

For example, numbers, even imaginary numbers, are objective concepts. They are symbolic representations of objective, natural, external things. But love is not. Love is a bonafide abstraction in that it is not a symbolic representation of anything objective, natural, or external to us. Love is a concept that springs from within us fully formed like Athena from the head of Zeus. So are love’s handmaidens – justice and empathy.

Numbers are real enough to the mathematician who devotes his life to them. Likewise love of God is real enough to the saint who devotes his life to Him. Both mathematician and saint may believe the other is squandering their life on a fiction, but neither is. Both are being real. The only question is who is being more real. The saint who is juggling his abstractions with his symbols or the mathematician who is only bouncing his single symbolic ball of numbers? – Sincerely, Albert the Traditional Catholic

John Page

Albert:

1. All concepts are asbtracts, not all abstracts are concepts. A thought is abstract. The idea/concept of a dog is abstract. Some paintings are called abstract, a precis of a book is an abstract.

Thus "A concept is an abstract thing" is not a tautology.

Subjective reality can be explained empirically. There is no evidence that "pure concepts" exist external to the mind/brain and there is evidence that concepts reside in the mind/brain.

Cheers, John

John Page

Please confirm I have this right - you're saying a subjective concept is supernatural in origin? So, if I could convince you that subjective concepts are not supernatural would your need to believe in a supernatural disappear?
We agree both love and numbers are concepts. I agree numbers are easier to discuss objectively. Love is a word used to describe a state of mind/body that we are capable of recognzing (even to the point that there are different kinds of love) etc.

Do you have difficulty with the idea that we can have a concept that is related to an internal (mind/body) state? Would you say that constipation is a "pure" abstraction? Would you say that consternation is a "pure" abstraction? Surprise?

Cheers, John

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Conchobar :

I don't think so. It just means not fully definable in natural terms. Ghosts are supernatural but no one thinks that if they existed, they wouldn't leave something empirical behind.

Who's using natural laws? God is somewhat definable in our terms -- at least, the god that most Christians and other monotheists talk about is -- so if those limited definitions give us anything useful to work with, we may be able to use it to argue against God's existence.

Suppose I told you of the being X. Being X is supernatural. Being X, if it exists, necessarily causes the sky to be green instead of blue. If you accept that definition, you must accept that Being X does not exist. Otherwise, you're just not accepting the definition, or you think the sky is green, which is obviously false. And I'd wager that 99% of all theists think we can accurately apply predicates to God, even if he's partly supernatural.

Suppose I tell you of Being Y. Being Y is completely undetectable by empirical means. Being Y, however, is a married bachelor. We know that Being Y doesn't exist because self-contradictory beings do not exist. Similarly, self-contradictory versions of God do not exist.

To deny that we can come to these conclusions means to deny that we can correctly apply predicates to God. Such a position is self-defeating and almost universally unpopular. But if you're talking about the God about who we can't correctly apply predicates, you're not talking about the god about whom philosophers of religion talk, and you've just stepped outside of the debate entirely.

Albert Cipriani

Dear John,
Yes.

No.

No, for it does not arise from an internal, subjective, non-natural source.

Yes, for it may arise from an internal, subjective, non-natural source. We can know this because the same external, objective, natural thing that “causes” a subject’s consternation one day may not cause it another day. Ergo, whether or not consternation arises in a subject is contingent upon that subject as opposed to the external, objective, natural things that supposedly “caused” the subject’s consternation.

No, for it is beyond our conscious control. Like a reflex, it simply happens to us. Ergo, the cause of surprise must be external, objective, natural. – Sincerely, Albert the Traditional Catholic

John Page

Albert:

Thanks for answering the questions, its certainly made it easier for me to understand your position.

I was surprised by your response and was interested that you rate consternation and surprise differently. I suggest that they are similar except that surprise is something you observe more than feel, and consternation is something you feel more than observe. However, they are both internal states.

Taking the previous notes, am I correct in observing that you think surprise is more supernatural than consternation (because you describe it as a pure abstraction to which, in turn, you attributed supernatural cause)?

Cheers, John

Albert Cipriani

Dear John,
Both emotions are internal states only if you define internal in a spatial, mechanistic, psychologically-retarded way, as something to the defect of: “that which happens INSIDE one’s head.”

Furthermore, you are attempting to make a distinction where there is no difference. Your “something you observe more than feel” is impossibly incoherent. Even if by it you are attempting to distinguish between thought and feeling, I would reject that also as a distinction without a difference.

No. It’s just the opposite. What we have here is a failure to communicate metaphysically. You’re the one who is trying to tag my “abstraction” as a “pure abstraction.” If you must call supernatural acts “pure abstractions” go ahead, but I prefer to call them simply “abstractions.”

Once again, abstractions are distinguishable from all other pretenders to that supernatural throne (such as concepts or symbols) in that abstractions do not derive from objective, natural, or external sources. They spring from us fully formed. What I’m calling abstractions may be likened to what Emmanuel Kant called “a priori synthetic knowledge.” – Sincerely, Albert the Traditional Catholic

John Page

Where is the evidence that surprise etc. occurs outside the head? Why is it retarded to suppose they are inside the head?
Let me explain, then. I see Albert is surprised. Albert is surprised but is consciously unaware of his reaction and display of surprise. In this case we can say surprise is more observed than felt. I think the reverse is true with consternation, in that it is felt by the subject in advance of it becoming apparent to an observer.
You're shifting feet here. You started using the term "pure abstraction" and I asked you what you meant. Also, you were the one who related abstractions to supernaturality, not me. I'm just trying to understand what you mean. Now you're telling me all abstractions are supernatural - is this correct?
No they don't. Mathematics (dealing with abstract numerical concepts) was developed by man over many centuries, for example.
So the abstractions are supernatural like synthetic (i.e. made up by man) knowledge? Is this what you're saying?

Cheers, john

Albert Cipriani

Sorry John,
This is your Dear John letter.

I’m going to have to give up with you. I’m here for dialogue and to be challenged intellectually. A series of questions can satisfy the latter for a time. But two days of it, exclusively, exceeds my patience.

No hard feelings. Look at this as a failure to get the girl’s number. Your pick-up lines were fine: questioning this and that, showing me that you seemed genuinely interested in my religious charms and metaphysical glands.

But questions gets a man just so far, I says. After a while, why they just become inquisitional. I have me pride you know, and me good name to think of. A respectable girl expects more from a gentleman than just more questions. So I says g’day to you, sir. Respect my maiden virtue and step aside, now. I’m leaving this pub. – Albert’s 19th Century Traditional Catholic Alter Ego, Alice (Before the Sex-Change Operation)

Conchobar

Originally posted by Conchobar :

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God is defined as being supernatural. That means undetectable by empirical measures (i.e. application of natural laws).
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TM: I don't think so. It just means not fully definable in natural terms. Ghosts are supernatural but no one thinks that if they existed, they wouldn't leave something empirical behind.

Conchobar: You are mixing apples and quartz geodes. God is defined as supernatural which means outside of nature. God is not natural and therefore natural empirical methods cannot define him. Ghosts are hypothetical entities that have the potential for being measured. As defined they can be seen or heard. Who ever heard of an invisible, inaudible ghost? So the ghost has something natural, it either gives of light/photons, or electromagnetic waves picked up by a living brain, if such is possible. Or if the ghost talks it must do likewise, make soundwaves which are natural or by telepathy stimulate the brain, in both cases something interacts with nature and must be natural.


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God is not definable by nature therefore natural laws cannot be used as a proof nor disproof.
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TM:Who's using natural laws? God is somewhat definable in our terms -- at least, the god that most Christians and other monotheists talk about is -- so if those limited definitions give us anything useful to work with, we may be able to use it to argue against God's existence.

Conchobar: Crikey, you lost me there. I hypothesise that we cannot argue against God's existence because we can only use natural empirical methods and they are by definition invalid. Likewise we cannot prove god by empirical methods or natural laws. I use the flatland analogy. Beings in a two dimensional universe like a flat page of paper can see only length and width but have no concept of depth. The flatlanders can see each other as lines but they can't see us looking at them from above. In the universe of two dimensional beings, we three dimensional beings are supernatural. If God exists in a 7th dimension he can see creatures in the 6th and third dimensions (us) but we can't see him.

TM: Suppose I told you of the being X. Being X is supernatural. Being X, if it exists, necessarily causes the sky to be green instead of blue. If you accept that definition, you must accept that Being X does not exist.

Conchobar: Agree so far.

TM: Otherwise, you're just not accepting the definition, or you think the sky is green, which is obviously false. And I'd wager that 99% of all theists think we can accurately apply predicates to God, even if he's partly supernatural.

Conchobar: This is where Theists err most grievously. They define God and violate the definition. God is either supernatural or he is not. If he is partially matter-energy he is not God. If he acts on the universe at all, (wild speculation) it is at the Big Bang where he is prehaps operating from a higher dimension, like you drawing lines on the flat worlder's page. But we are still unable to see, hear, or communicate with him because he is not natural in a three dimensional system, only in his 7th, 8th, or 9th dimensions.


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The most honest position is to admit that we can't know if there is a god or not. We can't disprove or prove what we can't experience or measure.
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TM: Suppose I tell you of Being Y. Being Y is completely undetectable by empirical means. Being Y, however, is a married bachelor. We know that Being Y doesn't exist because self-contradictory beings do not exist. Similarly, self-contradictory versions of God do not exist.

Conchobar: Agreed. But there is more to your analogy, eh?

TM: To deny that we can come to these conclusions means to deny that we can correctly apply predicates to God. Such a position is self-defeating and almost universally unpopular.

Conchobar: But not necessarily wrong.

TM:But if you're talking about the God about who we can't correctly apply predicates, you're not talking about the god about whom philosophers of religion talk, and you've just stepped outside of the debate entirely.

Conchobar: You have stepped out of the scientific debate as well you should. God does not belong in the Science classroom nor should he be evaluated by a biochemical, biophysical science protocol. As a researcher myself, I feel that God is not an appropriate subject for a science seminar or a journal artical (exception being recent articles dealing with brain circuits that conceptualise god and mediate mystical experiences.) Those only show what parts and circuits of the brain that code the god concept, not that it is true or false.

I am an agnostic because I admit that there is no evidence that my brain can analyse for any realistic critical analysis of god(s). It is so insufficient that I can't affirm or deny God.

Conchobar