Alonzo Fyfe

I will answer it as soon as I understand what you are asking.

What does "shouldn't" mean?

And I need a useful definition. Don't come back with something that is just as vague and ambiguous as the word you are defining, like "to say that you shouldn't do something means that it would be wrong for you to do it."

Because that's not helpful.

I have a definition of "shouldn't" that I use. It is known as a hypothetical imperative. As in, "If you don't want to have a heart attack then you shouldn't eat as much fat," and "You shouldn't go out driving in that kind of weather, it's dangerous."

"Shouldn't" relates an action to a set of desires.

"Shouldn't" becomes more powerful as you add more and stronger desires. And it is completely arbitrary to limit the relevant desires to one's own. The person who gives the warning about fatty foods or driving in bad weather certainly is not talking about his own desires, but the desires of the person he is giving the warning to.

So, we can use other people's desires in our uses of the word "shouldn't".

The most powerful "shouldn't" ever invented -- the largest and grandest and most weightiest possible -- is the "shouldn't" that talks about everybody's desires. There is no "shouldn't" greater than this.

When I say that you shouldn't torture children, I am bringing the largest, weightiest, most all-encompassing "shouldn't" in existence against any who would torture children. I am saying that torturing children is a violation of this huge greatest-shouldn't-on earth.

But if you have something else in mind, please let me know what it is.

DRFseven

Thank you; likewise. I spent nine hours removing mildew from my mother's deck and driveway with a pressure-washer. How about you?

Quote:

I haven't managed to answer your post yet in detail, in which I believe you spoke about morals being on a par with preferences. You're going to have to make that clearer, I'm afraid. I think what I'm looking for here is how you argue for morality being a preference, so that it doesn't become counterintuitive. Ie. preference for icecream and torture are clearly different intuitively, but your response seemed to indicate that the difference is simply in the response of the person indicating the preference. Ie. it has a different effect in me. That doesn't seem to me to be sufficient to show that they are materially different. They are still, after all, preferences. Surely better to bite the bullet as most determinists do and admit that your theory leads to that conclusion. It's a brutal world for the atheist, but there you go. Then I'll answer that position!

I don't know what you mean by being on a par with preferences. Every decision could be called a preference. If the bridge you were crossing fell in and you had to choose whether to save your child or your dog from drowning in the rapids below, would you call your decision a "mere" preference? It's a preference, but why is it "mere?"

And every preference is made in the mind, driven by emotional connections to memories of that which is preferred.

Quote:

In addition, I can't quite remember, did you say that the "imperatives" in morality are a myth? In other words, there is no "should?" I can't remember.

I said that we can establish objectives within the subjective framework of personal opinion (Ex. "If you value your child's life more than that of your dog, you should save your child first.").

Quote:

In addition, do you argue that there is no such thing as right and wrong? I think you did say that, but in that case, do you argue for objectivity or subjectivity in terms of what you present as moral statements. In other words, "torturing is wrong" is a subjective statement, regardless of the re-interpretation of the word "wrong" to mean "bad for society" or some such meaning that you would substitute for objective wrongness. Or do you agree with Alonzo that moral statements are objective? You don't have to agree with him how that is the case - he argues for some kind of Desires-Theory - but do you agree with the argument for objectivity or not?

I said that rights and wrongs are subject to opinion; subjective. I agree with Alonzo that within that opinion we establish objectives. However, it is the acquisition of moral feelings that drives our opinions. We don't return the extra ten dollars the cashier mistakenly handed back because we are driven by the thought that such an act is necessary for the survival of the species. We do it because we feel it is wrong to keep the money (or else we don't feel it, and do keep the money).

I account for it physiologically. We have evolved a system whereby we "take opinions to heart" before we have even learned to reason. This system of conscience-building requires both biological and social phenomena.

Quote:

I'm going home soon and will check back here on Monday to see if you've had time to answer. Have an enjoyable weekend.

Same to you.

I'm a woman, hear me roar.

Alonzo Fyfe

I agree with the claim that our "moral feelings" influence our opinions. Yet, I hold that there is one more question in need of asking: Are those opinions JUSTIFIED given the types of evidence we use to drive them.

People use star charts to form their opinions as well. They use tea leaves, and they close their eyes and wait for answers to appear mystically in their mind. The fact that people use a particular methodology to inform their opinions hardly implies that no mistakes are being made.

When people use their "moral feelings" to form their opinions, they are making a mistake. They are acting as if we live in a fantasy world in which certain types of actions have"intrinsic value" and we have a mysterious "faculty of perception" whereby if we focus on the idea of the act in the right way knowledge as to its moral worth will simply enter the mind.

This is the only type of story that justifies the types of conclusions that people draw from these types of feelings -- conclusions and implications of the form, 'Others must sense these things as I do. If somebody senses something different, then one of us must be defective in some way. The wrongness of rape is actually independent of the rapist's capacity to sense anything in rape. Even though I sense something as being wrong, I accept that there is a possibility that I am in error, and that I am sensing it incorrectly. In a society where 90% of the people sense slavery as being permissible, and 10% of the people sense it as being wrong, it is still the 10% that is correct, and the 90% that is in error."

These conclusions are not justified from a mere feeling alone. It is only when we take the feeling as evidence of an intrinsic merit or demerit -- perceived through a special faculty of moral perception -- that we can draw these types of conclusions.

So, the main point is, I do not disagree that feelings drive our moral opinions (to some extent). I simply argue that they do so in the same way that, for example, star patters drive the opinions of those who believe in astrology.

Note: I also notice that you digress into the question of explaining an action in your example. I am presently arguing this point with AntiChris. I agree, without the least qualification, that agent-subjectivism is THE BEST THEORY when it comes to explaining human action (including human speach acts such as saying, "that is wrong."). But it is not the correct way to determine the meaning of the proposition spoken. The reason why a person may utter the phrase, "Squares have four sides of equal length" implies nothing about what it means to say "Squares have four sides of equal length."

DRFseven

What does it matter whether an opinion can be justified or not? I mean, certainly it matters as it impacts our day-to-day lives, but people hold moral opinions all the time that some think are "unjustified", yet they still hold those opinions. Rational justification is never necessary for moral opinion.



Whoever implied that "no mistakes" are being made? And who determines the "mistakes?" Even if someone's moral opinion seems a mistake, it's still someone's moral opinion and emotions compel it, the same as if it seems NOT to be a mistake.



I'll be sure to tell Evolution it made a mistake, so expect a call from Evolution, Alonzo, and you can tell it how moral opinions should have evolved. Meanwhile, you might want to check out some of the fMRI/Morality studies that show that emotions form the basis of moral opinons. In fact, when people with lesions severing the limbic system from the frontal area are faced with moral questions, they are able to reason out the dilemmas, but are unable to apply those principles to their own lives. This is because they lack the connections to the emotions to motivate what they know of the facts. Here's one, and
here's another.



But we have to think of it that way, because the feeling comes before the thought. We have no choice. Our brains get the message that something is wrong, and we go, "Ok, something is wrong." Then we think about why and come up with something that seems real from our repertoire. Of course those whose opinions directly contradict ours also come up with why theirs are true, too, but that's beside the point.



But plenty of people justify their opinions by feeling alone. Their perception is that "it just feels right" or "we're just born knowing so-and-so is wrong." Anyway, the result is that the feelings internalized through socialization cannot be denied. And it works really well, because a conscience will do what nothing else can; make us want to behave appropriately on our own.

Well, yes, and in the way that experimenting with different compost mixtures drives the gardener to build certain compost mixes. In other words, every drive is a hit from the limbic system.

Yes, but we know that doesn't matter. Only perception matters in determining what one thinks is right or wrong.

tronvillain

Alonzo Fyfe:
I am not convinced that question is in need of asking - ot seems entirely possible that it is meaningless gibberish.

Ah, but are emotions and star charts and mysticism actually comparable? No. Emotion is the foundation of all value, the basis of making judgements about the world, while star charts and mysticism simply introduce random elements in decision making.

Not only are people not making a mistake when they use their "moral feelings" to form their opinions, they are incapable of doing anything else. Knowledge as to the moral worth of an act does not enter the mind, for no action has "intrinsic value." Instead, knowledge as to the moral worth of an act is created by the mind as a product of the "moral feelings" a given act inspires. When we say "murder is wrong", we are "ultimately saying "murder really bothers me."

Nonsense. All that is required to resolve the existence of conflicting moral opinions is the acknowledgement of differing moral feelings. The opinion that rape is wrong emerges solely from the negative feelings caused by rape, not from any independent "wrongness" of rape. I do not say "Even though I sense something as being wrong, I accept that there is a possibility that I am in error, and that I am sensing it incorrectly" except to the degree that I may not be percieving the situation correctly, for something causing in me negative feelings is the definition of it being wrong. In other words, it may not be wrong, but that is only saying that if I percieved reality more accurately it would not cause negative feelings in me. Your final statement is accurate, but only in the sense that "correct" means "agrees with me" and "in error" eans "disagrees with me."

You are correct: those conclusions are not justified from a mere feelings alone. Since such feelings are poor evidence of an intrinsic merit or demerit, such conclusions should not be drawn at all.

Ah, but that is only the case when such feelings are taken as evidence of intrinsic merit or demerit, and subjective morality does not do so any more than it takes an individual preference for pumpkin pie over apple pie as evidence for the intrinsic merit of pumpkin pie.

tronvillain

Alonzo Fyfe:
A reasonable interpretation of the mother's statement "it is wrong" seems to be "it bothers me", though whether this is "it bothers me to see cats mistreated because I feel empathy for them" or "it bothers me to see you mistreating a cat because its implications about your future behavior bothers me" or "it bothers me to see you mistreating a cat because what other people would think of you they saw you bothers me" or "it bothers me to see you mistreating a cat because of what other people woudl think of me if they saw you bothers me" or some complex mixture of these and other motivations is unknown. If the son were to repeat the statement to a friend, it does not mean that he means exactly what his mother meant, though again a reasonable interpretation seems to be "it bothers me", though whether this is now "it bothers me to see cats mistreated because I feel empathy for them" or "it bother me to see cats mistreated because my mother told me it was wrong and I am punished for doing things she tells me are wrong" or "it bothers me to see cats mistreated because of what my mother would think about you if she saw you" or "it bothers me to see cats mistread because of what my mother would think about me if she saw you" or some complex mixture of these and other motivations is unknown.

In other words, your chain of reasoning about the meaning of such moral statements breaks down rather quickly, and the moral question could easily be "What do I want my son to do?"

Alonzo Fyfe

From DRFSeven: "What does it matter whether an opinion can be justified or not?"

From tronvillain: "I am not convinced that question is in need of asking - ot seems entirely possible that it is meaningless gibberish."

I am wondering if we may be talking about different things.

I am talking about opinions of the form that a person may be fined, imprisoned, or executed. That she may be forced into poverty and hunger, or her children may be taken from her.

What does it matter that these opinions are justified? Demanding that those who seek my death JUSTIFY their opinion is meaningless gibberish?

Like I said, we can't possibly be talking about the same thing. And if we really are debating entirely different things, then this is not a debate.

Alonzo Fyfe

There are two different levels of mistakes.

Assume astrology was, indeed, a science. People would still make mistakes in that, they "read" a particular person and they get the signs wrong.

Another level of mistake is that the astrology as a whole is a mistake. If astrology happens to get something right, it is a mere coincidence.

Intrinsic value theory, which is inherent in a significant portion of our conventional moral practices, is a mistake of the second part. We are deciding who to fine, imprison, and execute in part due to a fiction that we have made up and incorporated into our moral practices called "intrinsic values."


If morality evolved, then somebody needs to explain to me why we have immorality on such a grand scale -- inquisitions, jihads, crusades, slavery, treating women and children as property.

As for linking morality with emotions, I agree that this is done. However, human history, and differences in culture, tell us that these links are not fixed by evolution. We learn to link our emotions to this type of an action or that type. A hundred years ago, whites were taught to link these moral disapproval to the idea of blacks and whites living together. Now, we link it to racism.

As a result, these links are not only a cause of human action, they are a consequence. As a consequence, they are a matter of choice -- as much as anything else is. As a matter of choice, we have a "second order" question to ask -- which type of acts ought to be linked to which types of emotions? What type of moral training ought we to give our children?

The mistake of intrinsic values tells those who make this mistake to treat their moral emotions as picking out items of intrinsic moral worth, and erects a barrier to this question of "what type of moral training ought we to give?" It tells people who have linked their moral emotions to the greatest forms of cruelty to go ahead and be cruel -- to never question what they "feel" is right and wrong.

When, in fact, it is a very legitimate question.


No we don't. As mentioned above, differences among cultures and, in particular, differences within a given population over time, shows that these linkages are not fixed. They are legitimate objects of choice -- as legitimate as anything else.

Also, even in this culture, there are constant signs of people questioning whether the linkage of a particular (moral) emotion to a particular type of act is legitimate. They question, debate, and (sometimes) even change their mind.

We have a choice.



I do not disagree with this as an explanation of human action. I believe that these feelings internalized are very effective at causing action.

But, my problem is, what counts as "behaving appropriately." The method that you are discussing says that "behaving appropriately" is going along with these feelings, no matter what they are.

But they include the "feelings" of those who are sickened by the thought of a black man and a white woman living together -- by the harshest forms of racism. They include "feelings" that homosexuals are to be beaten and tied to fence posts. They include "feelings" that atheists are the personification of evil. These "feelings" are what brought us the inquisitions, jihads, crusades, institutions of savery and the idea of women and children as property and all of the other great moral crimes of our past.

My point is that, while these "feelings" explain our actions, they can never "justify" those actions -- that those feelings need an outside justification. Many people know that, and are constantly subjecting the "linkages" that they feel between certain emotions and certain actions to an external review, and sometimes discovering that the linkages are not justified. They ask, not only, "How do I feel about this?' but "How should I feel about this?" The mistake of intrinsic values, is that it tells us that these are the same question -- when, the truth is, they are not.

The AntiChris

Alonzo Fyfe

I'd like to go back to something you said earlier:
The clear implication here is that "what she is saying" says nothing about the desires and beliefs which caused the mother's speech act. In other words her own personal measure of the "right" or wrong" of an act (her desires and beliefs) is not, at least necessarily, expressed in what she is saying.

However, your theory, which seeks to explain what she really is saying, is expressed in the form of a desire calculation designed as an objective measure of the "right" or "wrong" of an act. This seems distinctly odd.

How do you infer an objective measure of moral "right" or "wrong" from what is said when, by your own admission, the reason for what is said (desires and beliefs which form the moral attitude to an act) implies nothing about the meaning of what is said?

Chris

DRFseven

Alonzo, it seems ironic that you are using an appeal to emotions to argue against the emotional basis of morality. You are asking in effect, if we don't care about human suffering, when I have already stated that the implications of moral decisions are, of course, meaningful in our lives. I am telling you how moral acquisition works, not what kinds of things I think would bring happiness to the world or reduce suffering or blah, blee, blew.

This thread is about subjective morality, right? And during the ensuing discussion, you asserted that certain subjectivists are "mistaken" in the way they talk about their reasons for being moral. But your objection has to do with the fact that while they assert that morality is a subjective matter, they act as if their opinions of right and wrong acts are based on the intrinsic value of the acts, themselves, because emotion drives their opinions. Well, emotionally-driven opinions of right and wrong do not denote "intrinsic value"; they simply reflect learned associations, from which we extrapolate personal moral codes.