Wiploc

Hollar at me if you get going on this. I'm interested.
crc

John Galt, Jr.

Can't wait. But you really should read some of the material that Plantinga has written before you start bashing.

I'll be on the look-out for the site.

John Galt, Jr.

Vorkosigan

That's my hope! To read and reply to as many of his major articles as possible. I won't be able to work on it until May, though. Too many other promises.....

Vorkosigan

luvluv

I've read articles where William Lane Craig refutes this notion, and I'm pretty sure I read about an article in which Plantinga addresses this concern as well (though I didn't read the article itself).

Basically, the point was that heaven is not another possible world, anymore than Cleveland is another possible world. Heaven is a part of this world (if by world you mean total, all-encompasing reality). Thus it is not clear that Heaven is another possible world which could exist with free will and without suffering. There was free will in heaven, and it did cause suffering (the fall of Lucifer and the rebellion of the angels) but the reason there is no suffering in heaven is because the suffering was REMOVED FROM HEAVEN, and displaced to another location. God could (and perhaps will) create a realm in which there is free will and no suffering on earth by eventually removing all those people who will ultimately refuse to use their will for good. But even in that case it will not be true that God made a "possible world" in which there was free will and no suffering. He will have shuffled the suffering to another location (hell, purgatory, whatever).

SRB

I am still unclear about what (2a) is supposed to mean. Does it mean "At least one person has only one leg" (which is the most natural reading)? Or does it mean "all people have only one leg"? I'll assume for a moment that the former interpretation is right If so: good analogy! It is logically possible for it to be the case that both (1a) is true and (2a) is true. Also, it is logically possible for it to be the case that both (1b) is true and (2b) is true. That is Plantinga's claim.

You really need to find out more about what what Plantinga's argument was. He defended the logical consistency of (1b) and (2b). That is, the claim that it is logically possible for there to be genuine suffering in the world, but yet for God to exist. What he said is nothing at all to do with the idea that it is possible for people to be deluded.

Plantinga does not suppose that anyone has transword depravity. As I pointed out last time, his claim is merely that it is epistemically possible (i.e. possible for all we know) that transworld depravity exists in every logically possible world containing significantly free beings.

SRB

SRB

What I wrote is correct, without any restrictions needed. To say that there is a (logically) possible world where X and Y coexist is to say that it is (logically) possible for X and Y to coexist. The addition "only in that logically possible world" is unnecessary. Every logically possibly true proposition is logically possibly true in every logically possible world.

I don't mean any disrespect, but I doubt you are familar with the argument in question. How, then, can you know what it does or does not violate? I wouldn't rely on Carr's paraphrases of anything Plantinga has ever said. I have found that Carr is prone to misrepresenting Plantinga. I don't see how the issue of whether there is any free will in Heaven connects to Plantinga's refutation of the logical argument from evil.

The mere fact that it is logically possible that God needs to permit the suffering we see for some unknown and justifying reason is a straightforward refutation of the logical argument from evil. Evidential arguments are not knocked over so easily, though.

SRB

Wiploc

Is this because
- Heaven isn't a world,
- Heaven may have evil, or
- some third thing I haven't thought of?
crc

Luiseach

I don't see how the fact that it is logically possible that God needs to permit evil refutes the logical argument from evil. I could just as easily say that it is logically possible that God doesn't need to permit evil, but does so anyway.

As far as I am aware, Plantinga doesn't lean towards evidentialism. Am I correct in thinking this?

Vorkosigan

What I wrote is correct, without any restrictions needed. To say that there is a (logically) possible world where X and Y coexist is to say that it is (logically) possible for X and Y to coexist. The addition "only in that logically possible world" is unnecessary. Every logically possibly true proposition is logically possibly true in every logically possible world.

Since when? It is quite easy to imagine logical propositions that are true in some worlds but not in others.

I don't mean any disrespect, but I doubt you are familar with the argument in question. How, then, can you know what it does or does not violate?

Quite true. However, I am familiar with Plantinga generally, and his thinking generally misunderstands or leaves out (I would argue deliberately) important considerations. Thus, I am confident that any the comes from the pen of Plantinga will be shallow, forced, arbitrary, illogical, weak, and ignorant. That has been my experience of Plantinga's work.

I wouldn't rely on Carr's paraphrases of anything Plantinga has ever said. I have found that Carr is prone to misrepresenting Plantinga.

I have never found that of Carr toward anyone. Carr is never one to shie from calling an excavation implement a spade. Some people confuse that with misrepresentation.

I don't see how the issue of whether there is any free will in Heaven connects to Plantinga's refutation of the logical argument from evil.

According to Christian mythology, their god has created two places. One where evil occurs routinely, Earth, and the other a place where evil does not occur and beings such as angels have free will but cannot sin, Heaven.

The mere fact that it is logically possible that God needs to permit the suffering we see for some unknown and justifying reason is a straightforward refutation of the logical argument from evil.

The existence of (1) beings with free will who cannot commit evil and (2) places where free will but not evil exists effectively demolishes the position you outline above. Obviously the Christian god does not "need" to build a place where free will and evil must co-exist, since it did not do so in some cases.

In any case, the Christian god cannot "need" anything -- this implies a constraint of the Euthyphro kind.

Vorkosigan

John Galt, Jr.

SRB,

I am confident you will be able to see the irony in the remark (my emphasis) by a person who in response to your commentsays This, along with Vorkosigan's handling of the modal operators in other passages in his response to you, should provide you with a fairly clear picture of the power of the mind of the individual with whom you are here dealing. I am sure that you, too, look forward to Vorkosigan's 'anti-Plantinga' web site?

I was involved in an exchange with Vorkosigan across an on-line Plantinga paper in a thread in the Evolution/Creation forum (I think). The Plantinga paper is entitled "When Faith and Reason Clash: Evolution and the Bible". I cannot say that the exchange was worthwhile philosophically, but it will give you some insight into Vorkosigan's ability to 'understand' Plantinga.

John Galt, Jr.