rainbow walking

rw: Two things: It's not clear to me why you assume God can't freely walk?

And it's not clear to me why God, having created a state of affairs where John freely walks, hasn't created a causal chain where John freely walks. I think you're going to have to add a conditional here, something like "John freely walks in direction X" to get around the causal chain. (Where X is only one of a multitude of directions John could concievably choose to walk in.)

Wouldn't this conditional be required to lessen the grip of CFW? Otherwise Bd's criticism obtains.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by rainbow walking :

To show that if he couldn't, there would be something he can't do and he wouldn't be omnipotent.

There's only some ways he could do that, Free Weak Actualization and Unfree Weak Actualization -- God can only bring about L by those two ways, whereas John has a third way: Strong Actualization.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by bd-from-kg :

Wait a minute. If I want to annoy my coworker maximally, I'm going to figure out exactly what bothers her most and do it. That would be rational, and I would be taking some of her interests into account. I'd just be acting wrongly based on those. And if I weren't able to do that, I'd be less powerful.

Compatibilist Freedom

I really think this is just delaying the inevitable. God can only bring about "some person freely learns" by causing someone other than himself to learn. I can bring it about either by relying on someone else, or not. Jane, the non-omniscient version of God, can do everything God can do, plus bring about L without causing someone other than herself to learn.

It seems more direct if God isn't relying on any other agent, or using any other agent. If there were no one other than God in the universe, God couldn't bring about L. If I were alone in the universe, I could bring about L.

Omnipotence and Maximal Perfection

This is a good way to get at the issue, but I don't think it helps you very much. I think it makes genuine sense to say that one has lost the ability to perform to visit Paris for the first time as soon as one has visited it. You may not agree with that yet, but here's a way to understand actual abilities that makes me think to visit Paris for the first time helps decide power: There are reasons to think someone might want to visit Paris for
the first time again rather than just to visit Paris. It's something someone conceivably might want to do, the way someone might conceivably want to learn. So that's why I think it can be sufficient to measure power.

Here's how I understand it. Metaphysically possibility is the "bottom" possibility, and logical possibility is our best way to get at it. Really, logical possibility is just a function of whether we can derive a contradiction. It's like conceptual possibility in that it's epistemically available to us. It might be the case that some logically possible things are not metaphysically possible, but we have no way to decide what's metaphysically possible except that we think it roughly mirrors logical possibility. I think.

It's wildly implausible to me to say that I need an argument for me to realize what's conceptually possible or impossible. Conceptual possibility must be directly epistemically available to us via introspection, or it's not conceptual. Maybe logical possibility requires an argument, but surely I know what I can conceive of and what I can't.

Even if it were accepted that God is conceptually impossible if the ontological argument were sound, you'd have to actually give some reasons to believe the antecedent. Almost no one propounds any version of the ontolgoical anymore, and with good reason -- it seems to fail more spectacularly and decisively than either of the Big Two a posteriori arguments for theism.

The Power to Choose

But remember, we're not measuring God's power by how many perfections he has -- that would be measuring God's greatness instead. We're measuring God's power by the variety of stuff he can do. Sure, being able to choose something you don't normally want or shouldn't want doesn't seem to be something that would grant a person more greatness, but that's totally different. Whether anyone would want an ability seems to me to be unnecessary for whether it is an ability. Omnipotence is about bringing about states of affairs, not about being the sort of person who doesn't bring about states of affairs she wouldn't normally want. I don't think there's anything strongly counter-intuitive in imagining a rather limited and dangerous being who happens to be omnipotent.

Nic Hautamaki

quick thought: The definition I have always used for omnipotence would be "an unlimited ability to make reality conform to one's desires"

suppose you use that definition instead... would it answer some of your objections?

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by Nic Hautamaki :

Okay, let's call that definition N. Where s ranges over states of affairs:

(N) X is omnipotent iff for all s, if X desires that s obtain, then s obtains.

I can think of a couple of problems.

The first is that if I never desired anything, I would have an unlimited ability to make reality conform to my desires. So I think we have to change it a little bit:

(N*) X is omnipotent iff for all s, if X desired that s would obtain, then s would obtain.

And it's possible that X would desire something logically impossible, so we'd run into problems unless we restricted s:

(N**) X is omnipotent iff for all s, if s is logically possible, then if X desired that s would obtain, then s would obtain.

So let's see what happens if we accept (N**). Here's a logically possible state of affairs:

(s1) Someone or other strongly actualizes "someone or other learns."

I don't think God can bring about (s1), and I don't think (s1) would necessarily happen, even if God desired it. God would have to cause someone else to learn, and it wouldn't be strong actualization anymore.

bd-from-kg

Thomas Metcalf:

Rationality

Would it? That’s the crux of the matter. Does rationality relate solely to determining how to fulfill whatever ends one happens to have? Or does it also include having rational ends?

I know that the prevailing view nowadays is that it doesn’t make sense to talk about whether an ultimate end is rational. And certainly if by “rational” one means nothing more than “in accordance with logic” this must be true; there’s no way to derive “you ought to have such-and-such ends” from any factual premises. But that isn’t the whole of what I mean by “rational”, and it isn’t what the classical philosophers (such as Aristotle, or for that matter Aquinas) meant by it either.

Without trying to explain just what I mean by “rational” in general, let’s just look at a specific and highly relevant example. Suppose that I have developed an empathetic understanding of Betty so complete that when I imagine doing something that would cause her pain, I literally feel that pain, just as clearly as if I were actually experiencing it directly – as in a particularly vivid dream or “flashback” to an experience of my own. I would contend that in that situation it would be irrational for me to cause her that pain gratuitously. (Moreover, I think that almost all of us are at least rational enough that we would not cause her this pain gratuitously under these conditions; refraining from pointlessly causing pain of which we are acutely, immediately aware requires only a very minimal degree of rationality.)

Moreover, I think that it’s a self-evident principle of rationality that if we know that we would approve of our doing X rather than Y if we had sufficient knowledge and understanding, it would be irrational to do Y anyway. Thus if I know that I wouldn’t cause Betty gratuitous pain if I had the kind of deep empathetic understanding I talked about above, it would be irrational for me to do so even though I don’t have this kind of understanding.

Of course, God does have this kind of understanding, so the second part of the argument is unnecessary in His case.

I think Aquinas’s point was that the “ability” to act irrationally is not properly considered a “power”. More on this below.

Compatibilist Freedom

But this is ignoring the point of “S-omnipotence”. The idea is precisely that, although there are certain things that God cannot do, he can cause them to be done. Now you’re saying that causing something to be done isn’t “good enough”; God has to do it Himself. This amounts to saying that S-omnipotence isn’t omnipotence. That may be a tenable position, but you needn’t have resorted to all those mental gymnastics to reach it.

Not so. God could simply create a space-time continuum that includes creatures who learn.

Omnipotence and Maximal Perfection

I don’t really understand what you’re getting at. Surely “bringing a creature into existence ex nihilo for the first time” is exactly the sort of thing that we do not require a being to be able to do in order to qualify as omnipotent, for the obvious reason that it might have already done this. Or does the very first act of creation strip an omnipotent being of its omnipotence? I doubt that anyone in the history of the world has understood omnipotence in this way. This is so far from our pretheoretic notion of omnipotence as to be grotesque.

This is just as opaque as all of the other descriptions and definitions I’ve read.

Well, in that case any argument that such-and-such, while logically possible, might not be “metaphysically” possible, is just a cop-out. “Metaphysical possibility” appears to be nothing more than a name for we-know-not-what. which is to say that it’s meaningless.

If anyone wants to argue that something is logically possible but metaphysically impossible, I would challenge them to show that there is a coherent concept, “metaphysical possibility”, that can be clearly distinguished from logical possibility. If they can’t, I’ll have to conclude that they’re speaking gibberish.

Well, it seems wildly implausible to me that you never need such an argument. The reason for this is that to “conceive” of something is ordinarily taken to mean conceiving of it without self-contradiction. thus you can’t really conceive of a square circle even if your geometric intuition is so poor that you believe that you can. Thus something is “conceptually possible” if you can conceive of it without self-contradiction. But it often requires an argument to show that something can’t be conceived of without self-contradiction. For example, a person might well believe that a right triangle such the square on the hypotenuse is larger than the sum of the squares on the other two sides is conceptually possible, but he’d be wrong.

It’s even possible to be wrong the other way around: you might believe that you can’t conceive of something, but be wrong.

Well, as I said, I certainly don’t buy the Ontological Argument; I just said that this was the reply that a Christian theologian would probably give. I was going by Morriston’s comment in Omnipotence and Necessary Moral Perfection: Are they Compatible?:

It seems to me that the only reason for believing that the conception of God as the “greatest of all possible beings” commits one to the view that God exists necessarily would be that one accepts some version of the Ontological Argument. And Morriston refers repeatedly to “Anselmians” as the main target of his arguments throughout the article. St. Anselm, of course, is known for little else today but the Ontological Argument. Have I gone wrong somewhere?

The Power to Choose


But being “able” to do what one does not prefer is not a “power” or “capability”, but an impediment to real power. For example, I try strawberry and chocolate ice cream and decide that I greatly prefer the strawberry. So naturally I want to choose strawberry any time I'm presented with this option. But if I might end up choosing the ice cream that I do not prefer, I don’t have the power to choose strawberry; I just have the power to decide which one I prefer. Without the assurance that I’ll act on my preference this is a rather paltry kind of power.

But I’m not talking about what I would normally want or prefer, but what I do prefer at the moment of making the choice. Besides, in God’s case this distinction doesn’t exist. He doesn’t prefer A to B at one moment and B to A at another.

But suppose we imagine a being who has definite preferences but whose actual choices are random, completely unrelated to those preferences. He may have the power to do anything, but he doesn’t have the power to pursue goals, to achieve ends, to fulfill purposes. What kind of omnipotence is that? A being whose actions are not based on his purposes and ends cannot act effectively; it cannot accomplish what it desires. A being that cannot get what it wants cannot reasonably be called omnipotent.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by bd-from-kg :

Rationality

It seems like a more powerful being would be one who could avoid experiencing Betty's pain, or who could make himself enjoy it so much that it would outweigh the pain of the shared experience.

Freedom

We just have to talk about second-order soas. God has to use other people if he wants to bring about L. So he can't bring about L' where L' is "some person brings about L without using someone else."

Omnipotence and Maximal Perfection

Yes, simply to create something shouldn't diminish a person's power. God can only bring about "X is created ex nihilo for the first time" once, but he can't bring about "X is created ex nihilo for the second time" until he brings about the first. He's always got this one state of affairs that he can do, that depends upon his having brought about another one. It just makes sense to me that learning is something someone might conceivably want to do, so not being able to do it would mean a lack of power.

Metaphysical possibility seems to me to go along with what we mean when we're talking possible simpliciter. Just think of your most basic idea of possibility. Alethic possibility, maybe.

The most prominent example would be if God is metaphysically necessary but not logically necessary, when we understand logical necessity to be a function of, well, logic. God is not logically necessary because the denial of "God exists" does not express a contradiction in any acceptable language of logic. But Anselmians will want to say that he exists in every possible world.

Does anyone really believe she can conceive of a square circle? I might be willing to grant that occasionally, people have false beliefs about what they can conceive of, but it's surely the exception.

The Power to Choose

At the very least, I think you can agree that F & F's definition of omnipotence, and H & R's definition, must fail. There are logically possible bring-about-able states of affairs that are beyond God's power. From this point, I'm undecided about whether it will be possible to formulate a better definition that doesn't fall prey to the necessary severe indecision kinds of problems. I think your attempts were in the right direction; do you have an updated finalized version?

7thangel

Hi Tom,

I guess your argument can simply be won by taking this stance:

If man has a free will, then whatever man wills is outside God's power and thinking, thus God is not omnipotent and omniscient.

That is one reason why I do not believe man has free will. What I believe though is that all power and thinking comes from God. And that man is nothing more than a superb robot.

Your argument is also defective in terms of analysis, in terms of speaking about "my God," not someone else's God's though. For you are comparing apples and oranges, and thus conclude that the oranges are defective because it does not have the quality of the apples.

You said:
In simplicity, your demand is that God cannot be everything! In your line of reasoning, the next possible argument you would come up is that God cannot have sex. (Well, I think he can do phone sex though, he...he..he..) And so, the ramification of your demand for the existence of God is to lose meaning of all things. So then where will we draw, or concieve, what is evidence?

Nice to be alive and posting again!!!! Amen.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by 7thangel :

How is that anything like my argument? My argument is that there are things God can't do, so God isn't omnipotent.

I still don't see how this has anything at all to do with my argument.

My observation is that there are things God can't do that other beings could do. I'm not asking God to be or not be anything in particular.

7thangel

I hope this may clarify the very essence of your argument:

"In a world where exists two entities, one cannot be the other."

If God is distinct or separate being to human beings. Then, whatever the other human beings does is not, or can never be at the same time, be done of God. In this argument, you can clearly see the impossibility of omnipotence and omniscience. This is what is actually you are trying to prove in comparing humans to God. And apparently, the qualities of man's potence and knowledge is different to God's.

You said that humans can learn, while God cannot. I do agree without any further thought. And any apologist who would not deny the free will in man will surely fall short to your argument, because they will posit the existence of two powers. Thus, the existence of two powers negate either of the powers to be omnipotent.

It just came to mind that I argued to you that God cannot make another perfect being. It will turn out that anything created is always a subset of the creator. In this case, any created cannot be free from the creator." So is the will and power created of God in men. But in any case, I think I failed to make a clear literal defense of my excellent argument.

Let me clarify your stance again in another words: You are arguing the non-existence of omnipotence in the existence of two or more distinct potences.

I will tell you that you are right. (I remember though, that you argued against me that God can create another omnipotent being. Just in case you did not, I beg your pardon.)

[Added at edition] Sorry for being slow to answer. As usual, I appreciate your patience on me. Thankz.