Kantian

There are no naive questions in philosophy, only bad ones loaded with unexamined presuppositions.

I would presume that that would depend upon the definitions of the constituents in your statements, and the consistency in equating two terms.

Not at all. You would then have to completely pre-empt the consensus definition of the term cucumber and replace it with something totally foreign to the intersubjective agreement of the community of that word. Not so with the word "God."

Yes you could. But this simple exercise in ostentative demonstration fails on all accounts- i could as well call the cosmos Johnny, but that would require a very rigorous argument why the intrinstic (bear with me) meaning of "Johnny" has anything to do with the cosmos. And you know that you have to defend why the word "cucumber" counts.

Perhaps you are not trying hard enough with this superficial polemic.

Of course you could. Nobody is denying that you could call a box a hammer. Look! (points at a box) Hammer! This wittgensteinian exercise is fun in exploring the limits of our intersubjective activity, but falls short of the reasoning outlined by Spinoza.

Since that isn't analogous to the reasoning proffed by one Spinoza in the slightest, i must ask you to read his Ethics, since it is a masterpiece of philosophy that will do nothing but enrich your understanding of rationalism.

I must stress that i am no pantheist, but a fan of Spinoza.

~Solipsist~

Jayhawker Soule

Be it "emotionally satisfying" or not, what is its value added? What is "pantheism" other than "metaphysical naturalism" that feels good?

My concern is that there is, indeed, some additional layer, that its essence is teleological, and that it manages to stay in the naturalist camp by 'extending' the definition of "natural".

Keith Russell

Greetings:

Immanuel Kant, the 'our' referred to your and my disagreement--and now I think our disagreement has devolved to the level of semantics.

We could call anything that exists, 'God', and then we could say "see, 'God' exists!"

Yes, the universe exists, and if (remember the 'if') the universe is 'God', then yes, 'God' exists.

But, you are ascribing characteristics to the universe, by calling it 'God', that it doesn't have when I call it 'the universe'.

It isn't the existence of the universe that you and I are arguing, but what--exactly--are the special characteristics you see in the universe that lead you to conclude that it isn't just 'the universe', but is also 'God'.

I think you and I observe exactly the same universe. But, I think you wish to romanticize things a bit, by claiming that you see the universe also as a mystical or spiritual entity, in addition to its actual identity.

What is it that you think I am failing to understand about 'the universe', when I say that 'the universe is not 'God''?

Keith.

Kantian

Actually that is the crux of your counterargument, and the inevitable consequence of such a volley.

The fulcrum of this discussion weighs upon what the universe consists in, and from my understanding of Spinoza, it is a single "substance."

Characteristics? Such as?

Re-read my first post in this thread slowly and address the salient points I quoted of Spinoza. I could elaborate but i am between classes

If you think i am arguing a mystical or spiritual entity, you have completely misunderstood Spinoza's pantheism. I can only refer you to the sources of his philosophy for a healthier grasp of pantheism.

Simple- theistic presuppositions curse even the most militant of atheists today. Do a google search and look up Spinoza, come back with specific questions that are relevant to this sort of geometric pantheism, but please do not presume i am a Spinozist.

~Subjectivist~

[ September 10, 2002: Message edited by: Immanuel Kant ]</p>