Kharakov

Theophage,

I understand what you are saying, but disagree with it.

Here is my statement:

In no way whatsoever does (empirical) evidence indicate whether or not something (besides the observer) possesses consciousness.

Evidence does not indicate whether or not something is thinking or observing its surroundings. Evidence can indicate that something is interacting with and changing its environment- but this does not indicate whether something is conscious or not.

</strong>

I agree that observation of behavior provides empirical evidence.

I disagree that the behavior of an object (empirical evidence) indicates whether or not the object is conscious.

Consciousness is "the state of being characterized by sensation, emotion, volition, and thought " (www.m-w.com merriam webster online collegiate dictionary). We can also include the other definition from the same site "a : the quality or state of being aware especially of something within oneself b : the state or fact of being conscious of an external object, state, or fact". It does not matter what definition we use.

In no way does the behavior of an object and/or any empirical evidence indicate whether or not that object is experiencing sensations, emotions, whether or not the object is doing what it is doing by its own choice, and/or whether or not the object is thinking.


Can anybody else put this in clearer terms?

excreationist

I think the term "consciousness" is very confusing though. People often use it to refer to the kind of sensation that most adult humans have - of having experiences and being able to describe them to themselves in words.
A more foundational thing is "awareness" - e.g. like a cat or a dog would have. Most people would agree that those animals have experiences including that of genuine pain. Now vets normally use anaesthetics on pets during operations and this implies that the pets could otherwise "feel" the pain.

So anyway, I think consciousness usually refers to second-order awareness. It is easier just discussing plain awareness first.

Filip Sandor

Originally posted by Theophage:

So it seems everyone here agrees that information or knowledge, etc. are nothing more than: an arrangement or pattern of physical things.. yes??

Would anyone like to add or take away anything from that statement, before I expose the logical fallacies that it contains?

P.S. BBL

Theophage

Actually, in order to have information you need not only the code itself (the physical arrangment of something) but you need a code reader. As an example, in the case of DNA, the code is the arrangement of nucleotides, the code reader is the protein made therefrom.

I am hoping that you aren't going to come back with some explanation about how information is only information when interpreted by a conscious reader, because you will simply be begging the question about the non-materialistic natuer of consciousness.

Speaking of which, what are those qualities of thought that brain electrochemical patterns doesn't share again? You never did clue me in as to what they were, yet you asserted more than once that they were different.

Daniel "Theophage" Clark

[ January 29, 2002: Message edited by: Theophage ]</p>

Theophage

Kharakov,

We seem to be using certain words in differnt ways here, and I think that is what is causing our disagreement. Perhaps not, but I'll try to explain and see if that doesn't solve it.

You wrote:

In no way whatsoever does (empirical) evidence indicate whether or not something (besides the observer) possesses consciousness.

and again,

I disagree that the behavior of an object (empirical evidence) indicates whether or not the object is conscious.

But we both agree on what consciousness is, and that behavoral observation is indeed empirical evidence. So what part of the above causes us to disagree? I think the secret is in the word "indicates".

To me, evidence indicates a particular conclusion. I use the word "indicate" as in "leading to a conclusion". You seem to be using that word as in "gives proof of". I think my usage is more correct.

We both agree that we cannot have absolute proof of anything. I assume we also agree that in spite of this limitation, we can come to reasonable conclusions given evidence, even though those conclusions may turn out to be wrong. Thus my use of the word "indicate".

If an object behaves as if it is conscious, the correct conclusion due to reason (given no evidence to the contrary) is that the object is conscious. This is how we determine that other humans are conscious. As you'd brought up earlier, the other humans may be philosophical zombies, and only give the appearance on consciusness. Thus, even though the behavior indicates or leads to the conclusion of consciuosness, the evidence is not so overwhelming that it cannot be wrong.

Similarily, if an object does not behave as if it is conscious (or behaves like it is not conscious), the correct conclusion due to reason (given no evidence to the contrary) is that the object is not conscious. We may be incorrect in this conclusion, it may actually be conscious and simply give no outward signs of it, but that is simply the price we pay when dealing with evidence and not proof.

Are we on the same sheet of music now? Evidence is simply something that leads to a reasonable conclusion, it is not proof. Observation of conscious behavior is evidence of consciousness, but not proof of it. similarily, Observation of non-conscious (or non observation of conscious) behavior is evidence of non-consciousness, not proof of it.

Why would you use "indicates" to equal "proves" when we agreed at the beginning that you cannot prove anything? Clearly, my use is more correct.

I hope this has put this matter to rest.]

Daniel "Theophage" Clark

crocodile deathroll

I can use an analogy for this "pattern" You could Imagine a Eskimo building a traditional igloo in the Sahara desert (homesick of course) and after as his lays his last ice block, he notices the first one is starting to melt in the extreme desert heat. So he just replaces it with new one taken out of the freezer, then he replaces the second one laid and so on. After a full summer his very out of place igloo still appears to be very much in tact and he too swears blind it is still the same igloo as he maintained it t by replacing the blocks that were out in the sun the longest simple .
The only thing that has really survived after all that time is the pattern. Same as the the pattern of synapses, dendrites and axons in our brains that gives us our sense of self.

Filip Sandor

Theophage, your argument for the physicallity of 'information' is the most logically incoherent one I have seen yet; it makes absolutely no sense at all.

In all, I have seen materialists call the mind: a notion, information, a physical pattern, a physical arrangement, a code, a symbolic representation, and who knows what else.. but basically, it seems like no materialist actually knows what they are talking about.

For example, Synaesthesia has resorted to calling the mind a 'notion'.

Ok... now what the hell is a 'notion' and how on do you define it in physical terms? Is such a feat even possible.. or is it just another materialistic claim??

You on the other hand, represent another group of materailists who calls the mind a physical 'arrangment' or 'pattern'. You claim that as long as there is a 'reader' to read something else called a 'code' which apparently 'holds' information 'inside' a physical arrangement, then the physical arrangement is information.

What is the arrangement of matter if it is not the matter itself?? Is the 'arrangement' of matter another entity that forms apart from the matter itself, when a 'reader' is incorporated?

What the hell is a reader?? How do you define a reader, in physical terms?

Does an encyclopedia contain information as long as someone is around who can read the language it's written in??

What about a music CD... what if I break all the CD players and computers that can 'read' the information that a materialist claims is contained 'inside' the CD... does the arrangement of the matter that makes up the CD physically alter itself when I break the last 'reader' to get rid of the 'information' contained 'inside' it??

Does any materialist here REALLY have a CLUE about anything they say..?? Do materialists just blindly make comparisons between things computers and humans and consiousness because they seem somewhat similar and appear to bear some of the same qualities and look like they might make 'decent' analogies?

Do materialists (at least the ones here) make any true effort to investigate their own claims or do they just ride on ignorance.. pretending they know things??

I think its time for you and the rest of the materialists to crack open some books on philosohy and logic... and start 'reading'!

[ January 29, 2002: Message edited by: Filip Sandor ]</p>

Francois Tremblay

So... where is the evidence for a non-material substrate again ? Or is it as elusive as the evidence for the existence of God ?

[ January 29, 2002: Message edited by: Franc28 ]</p>

Farren

This is a wild aside from a lurker:

hi all hope I don't offend anyone by not addressing them directly.

There are an infinite number of blind men somewhere groping an elephant and all coming up with plausible scenarios not involving an elephant.

Reading through this debate (it feels making you way to the front of a long cue when you come in late), it strikes me that there is a level at which language makes more conflict apparent than there is.

Extending the kind of reasoning of Russel (how 2 can equal 1 by applying the same transformation universally - early post) loosely:

1. The claim that there exists a logical layer ("awareness", "consciousness") and a material layer is true for the sake of argument.

2. For the logical layer to be "aware" of, "conscious" of, "thinking" about (a lot of that here) the material layer, it must interact with the material layer.

2. For the logical layer to say anything that follows from anything else (i.e. be consistent, have a "logical" argument) about the material layer, it must either:

3. Choosing to ignore the possibility that any logical entity here is using method 2.3. to further their wicked aims, we must assume that logical layer and the material layer exactly (2.1.), or closely (2.2), correlate, all of the time - or at least for the span of the history enfolded in the present (memory).

4. If (2.2) is true then there are properties of the logical which do not correlate to properties of the material (albiet a smal ratio), in which case the two can be regarded as independent, mutually partially affecting entities. This also implies that the logical entity is in fact, a seperate "material", in the sense widely proclaimed by people of the cloth (ouch). Because of the demands of close correlation, the "fuzz" of non-correlated behaviour would continuously be very close to the mean. Creating an extensive seperate discourse about both layers is therefore like having seperate vocabularies for either side of a mohair scarf.

5. If (2.1) is true then there is a continuous one-to-one correlation between the logical and the material. In this case one cannot apply a label to an property of the logical without implying an equivalent label for an equivalent property of the material. To demonstrate the point:

is a property of the logical
is the equivalent property of the material
+ is a property of the logical
& is the equivalent property of the material
f( ) = +
f( ) = &
if f'( + ) =
... guess what f'( & ) is? (I know there's a lot of smart ppl here)

I think its obvious that in a scenario like this (multiplied by a thousand and one transforms) only one set of symbols is required.

I don't disagree with collective phenomenalogical vocabulary ("personality", "behaviour" or even "feeling"),but whichever way I poke it
"consciousness" seems to map out to "the experience of experiencing", i.e. something we share with rocks, air and the space time continuum in general.

More often the emotional overtones and implied objective significance when non-materialists discuss it makes it look like some kind of super reality additive, like the wet slice of pudding with cherry on it when there's not enough sauce for the whole thing.

I feel the mentalist position is conditioned by centuries of "spiritual" discourse, like a toddler who has recognized that two sides of a coin are closely related, but is still trying to keep each side in a different pocket, and because, over time, they are able to achieve each part of the desired configuration, believes that the theory as a whole hangs together. No insult to mentalists here. The comment is about this particular line of reasoning, not the whole individual <img src="graemlins/notworthy.gif" border="0" alt="[Not Worthy]" />

Personally I feel that any "spiritual" yearnings can be satisfied by considerating the infinite (but non-recursively ennumerable) complexity of matter and the solace that this makes everything unique.

&lt;edited to correct sentences saying the opposite of what I wanted to&gt;

- Farren

[ January 29, 2002: Message edited by: Farren ]</p>

Filip Sandor

Dear Farren,

You sure know how to stick it together... but sheesh, you didn't have to use so much glue!!