Wiploc

The way I read it, their point was that you haven't taken a position you are willing to stick with. Which is it, does constraint make us robots or not? If it hasn't made us robots to have our wills constrained as much as they are, then there is no reason to believe we would become robots by having our wills constrained a little more.

If constraint makes us robots, then we are already robots. If contraint doesn't make us robots, then we would still have free will if, say, god made guns misfire when they were aimed at people.
crc

GunnerJ

Bullshit! Please settle one issue for me, I have a bet running: are you purposefully ignoring my posts or just unobservant?

Allow me to repost yet again my full argument, and hope that this time SOMMS finds it in his heart of hearts to consider the whole thing:

Emphasis added for what should be obvious reasons.

...but just in case, I'll spell it out again. Your defense that god allows us to be able to chose evil because he wants us to freely chose to follow him implies that god is selfish: he institutes a policy for his own benefit and disregards the negative effects it has on those who must live by it. That someone is able to chose to shoot me to death so that the possibility of freely chosing not to exists does not benefit me. It only satisies your god's bizzare fetish.

Like this one?

Or this?

Or here?

And what to make of this?

I think that's enough. It is contradictory to claim that without the capacity to make evil choices, we would be robots, and then to claim that we currently lack the ability to make some evil choices, without claiming that we are robots. You have contradicted yourself. Pointing out a contradiction in your claims is not tantamount to assuming your claims.

Once again, "I" hamper nothing. In such a Universe, our freedom would be limited to a further extent than it is now: included in the set of things we cannot do would be evil acts, right next to traveling faster than lightspeed or skinny dipping in lava without burning up.

Now you've lost me. What the hell are you blabbering about? And when did I make such a claim? My only claim is that god could have made the capacity to do evil impossible without rendering us "robots" just as he created a universe without the ability to break physical law without rendering us robotic. Your hand-waving and strawmen have dont nothing to defeat this logic.

I'm tempted to ask you to demonstrate that I ever made the second claim, but then, I can't even decipher the garbled English you put your dispute with it in. Suffice to say, differentiating between an appeal to a "no evil possible" situation and a "less evil possible" situation is pointless when I have only argued for a "no evil possible" situation. I defy you to demonstrate that I have ever argued that it was merely possible for god to disallow less evil without violating free will. I am, and always was, arguing for a total removal of the ability to do evil.

Oh, come off it! No one is "whining!" Stop equivocating the word "should," no one is arguing a moral obligation, only a logical expectation deduced from the definitions of "omnipotent" and "omnibenevolent." Secondly, and hopefully for the last time, I was not arguing for god's ability to preserve "free will" and make evil to be merely "difficult," I was arguing for god's ability to preserve "free will" and make evil impossible.



(Long and totally worthwhile diatribe about SOMMS's integrity [or lack thereof], ommited by author.)

Allow me to hold your hand through my actual argument, and although I'm taking baby steps for a "special" case like you, alert me if I go to fast!

1) If an omnipotent, omnibenevolent being exists, he can easily revome evil, and he would want to.

2) Evil exists.

3) Therefore, an omnipotent, omnibenevolent being likely does not, as he would remove evil.

[The free will defense (FWD), that an omnipotent, omnibenevolent being doesn't remove evil is because he wants to preserve our free will, may be offered at this point.]

4) Our freedom to act is already limited by physical law. We cannot travel faster than light speed or become invisible even though we may will to do.

5) However, the proponent of the FWD argues that we still have free will.

6) Therefore, imposing another set of limitations, such as making evil impossible, would not destory our free will.

7) Therefore, (3) is true regaurdless of the FWD.

Lose you anywhere?

It's hard to see someone sticking to a position when you're busy building a straw man. BTW, what the hell is this "[me] and Thomas" crap? If you can't differentiate between two differnet arguments offered by two different commentators, all hope is lost.

(Several deep breaths) What the bloody, bloody, bloody hell are you talking about? I won't even bother pointing out the false dichotomy or the numerous beggings of the question you commit... where the hell are you pulling these two "options" from? Are you reading a different thread than me?

You are the only one arguing that removing the ability to do evil renders us robotic. Every time I used your terms, it was an argumentative assumption to set up a disproof by contradiction.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by luvluv :

They'll all have to "not apply" for FWD to be at all useful.

In my view this is completely intuitively baseless. It makes no sense that God would have this arbitrary desire about the causal history of the souls rather than the current characteristics of the soul such as its degree of sympathy. If soul-making is to be a plausible story about why humans experience suffering, the theist must explain what, specifically, about a soul is good and requires suffering. Simply to have been produced as a result of suffering isn't obviously good.

The entire FWD is a freedom of action defense! Or at least it must be for it even to begin to succeed. Otherwise, God could let us have all the freedom of will we wanted and just stopped every evil action that grew out of that ill will. The theist must argue that freedom of action is important

Sure, maybe they could. If the theist is in the business of presenting an intuitively plausible explanation, however, she'll have to do better than "maybes" and "possiblies." There's no good reason to think more prohibitions on freedom of action would produce such a danger, especially because some of the prohibitions that exist now are so very minor.

There is good antecedent reason to think such: God is omnipotent. The burden of proof is therefore on the theist to provide a plausible story in which God requires character development that results from suffering instead of character development that results from God's actions.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by 7thangel :

I don't see those consequences; please explain how they follow.

Thanks for your input. I'm glad to have a theist conceding that FWD fails.

rainbow walking

Z: Eh, first of all, Rainbow, please format your posts consistantly. It's rather difficult to respond if I can't really figure out what statements are newly added, and which ones are earlier quotations.

rw: I always run into this problem with these discussions. Sorry, I’ll try harder. In this response I’ll put our previous comments in quotes, your most recent replies in bold and my responses will follow in normal font with my initials at the front to mark them as my replies.


Z: OM. NI. PO. TE. NT. Don't tell me "It would breed horrible, horrible things! That's simply not possible if we have an omnipotent being at the helm. It won't breed ANYTHING if God doesn't want it to.


rw: Then you’ve just eliminated freewill. Freewill necessitates man have choices. That can’t obtain in a world where god does what he wants, just because he can, without regard to man. Our present universe allows man choices. Any alteration made to our present universe cannot force man out of the realm of choices or PoE fails. I think you are confusing what god can do with what man’s freewill can endure. I’m not challenging your claims of what god COULD do. Certainly, if he’s omnipotent he can do what he wants without any adverse effects to himself…but that totally ignores the effects to man, and specifically man’s freedom of choice. God can’t do anything he wants to and it not have an effect on man, if what he does is for the benefit of man. And that is PoE’s basis of reason, that god SHOULD have done something different on man’s behalf to eliminate evil and suffering. It isn’t enough for PoE to just invoke omnipotence and say, “see, god COULD do this.” You must show how such invocation applies to man without cancellation of man’s freedom of choice. In this respect, freedom of choice will act as a restraining order on just how far you can go with gods attributes. If you make a claim as to what god COULD do, it is only logical that I insist you demonstrate how such doing affects man’s freedom of will. Even, and especially if you create new universes out of whole cloth. I want details. I won’t allow your claim any weight without substantiation when you invoke god’s powers to make changes to man’s present environment.

Z:That basically sums up the VAST majority of the arguments you presented this time around. 'But if God did X, Y would result' is erroneous and illogical. Such rules can't BIND an omnipotent deity. And as soon as you make the claim such rules DO bind an omnipotent deity, he ain't omnipotent, and the PoE ends up winning.


rw: My challenge of these changes, you allege an omnipotent being can make, are not designed to demonstrate any binding of god, but of man. I’m not arguing that god can’t do that. I’m arguing for some justification, based on what I can easily see resulting if god did that, consequentially for man and his autonomy of will. PoE fails, if it destroys man’s autonomy of will to achieve its goal. So any changes you make must not lead us to the conclusion or inference that man’s will is harmed. If it does then you’re not arguing against a FWD. If you make a change in a natural law, or in man, in order to eliminate evil, I’m well within the constraints of this argument to show adverse consequences resulting from that change. It goes towards showing that god can’t do that, not because his attributes prevent it, but because of the residual effect on man’s autonomy of will. Remember PoE is designed to eviscerate the FREEWILL defense. If it destroys freewill in the process it’s failed to obtain.


Z: And under the right conditions, gravity would have to go. You're (AGAIN) applying universality to the changes that would need to be made by an omnimax deity. Gravity as a whole doesn't have to go.


rw: O’kay, then demonstrate how you can remove its potential for bringing human suffering into existence or its aiding and abiding evil acts. For instance, pushing someone over a cliff to murder them.


Z:Substaniate? As I said, I usually consider it a part of the PoE. Otherwise, wierd little loopholes arise like "God has since imagined himself out of existance." If you don't like that addendum, that's fine: Treat it as a whole new argument. As I said, the RPoE. So consider this my initiation: I'm now arguing from the RPoE, rather than the initial (unspecified) PoE.


rw: Well, in a much as you’ve already conceded that PoE, in its original form, fails to obtain, I have no problem with you modifying your argument to continue the debate. However, I must insist you justify this new proposition at the outset. To my knowledge, (which is very limited in scope), the FWD doesn’t specify that “governance”, so you must substantiate your modification.


Z: First things first: Omniscience cannot guide. Omniscience is knowledge. Knowledge does not guide our actions. If we allow it to, we commit a naturalistic fallacy ("should" from "does").


rw: Then your position is that action is initiated without forethought? So, should you decide to drive your car to the store, you don’t bother to look for your car keys because, even though you know they are required, the only thing guiding your actions is your decision? I see no fallacy here nor does your explanation suffice to demonstrate one.

Z: Next up: It appears I've screwed up, but not in the way you think. Once again, we're defining terms differently. This time, it's entirely my fault. I didn't complete the definition of omnipotence, as I assumed you were aware of it. Omnipotence isn't, technically speaking, the ability to do anything.


rw: Say what!?! Chuckle…so now we’re back to square one? Sorry Zadok but you and I both know that YOU have not been arguing from this technicality to this point. Shall I copy and paste some of the claims you’ve made that omnipotence would allow this god to accomplish?


Z: It's the ability to do anything that doesn't entail a contradiction. God can't drop a square circle onto the floor next to me, nor a triangular elipse. He can't make two sets of two items be fifteen items, while remaining two sets of two.

rw: Uh..no…that’s not a technicality that restricts omnipotence. I disallow it. God can alter logic to make this possible. But that’s god’s problem and not ours, until he does it such that WE can drop a square circle onto the floor. Then it becomes a matter of cause and effect…specifically in relation to our freewill. For the purposes of PoE, freewill is the only collar that will fit around god’s neck. You can have god do anything but negate man’s freewill.

Z: Likewise, an omnibenevolent being, a being who BY DEFINITION commits all acts out of love, cannot commit an act not out of love.


rw: Then you hold the position that god’s actions are guided by omni-benevolence, but not by omni-science? How do you support this claim? You are, in affect, saying this god doesn’t know what he’s doing, he’s just…or SHOULD, or REQUIRED to follow his heart.

Z: It's a direct contradiction in terms, knowledge a priori, if you will. Have you read Hume's "Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding?" There are two types of knowledge, a posteriori, and a priori.



rw: I fail to see the significance of “experience” as a propositional composite of PoE, especially in relation to omni-benevolence.

Z: (There may be other types, but only those two matter.) The first type entails statements like "The world is round." By negating the statement, I end up with "The world is not round." That does not entail a contradiction. The statement is FALSE, but it's not inherently contradictory. A priori knowledge, however, includes statements such as "All single men who are not widowers are bachelors." If I negate the statement "All single men who are not widowers are not bachelors," I've created a contradiction in terms, an impossibility.


Rw: Are you saying god’s omnibenevolence exists independent of experience, a priori, or is derived from experience, a posteriori? Is this in relation to man or in relation to god? Or am I misunderstanding you here? Clarification is requested.

Z: My apologies for not clarifying this, I thought it was generally understood and committed a fallacy in that regard.



Rw: Well, I’m not sure anything’s been clarified here. ( scratching head in bewilderment)

Z: My argument stands. There is no contradiction inherent in the concept of a world in which no evil exists.

Rw: But you haven’t explained how such a world works so your argument stands only as an assertion unsupported.

Z: (We can prove this by showing that it is possible to create a space in which no evil exists. That space can be expanded. Hence, it is possible.)

rw: But it isn’t analogous to either this world or any other you’ve yet to explain.



Z: Therefore, such a world would have been created by any omnimax deity. Such a world does not exist. (Does anyone else feel like they need a smilie for three dots arranged in a triangle?) Therefore, an omnimax deity does not exist.

rw: And this is one of the major problems with PoE, regardless of how well it’s argued. It’s big on the “COULDS” (what this god COULD do) but it invariably fails to address the “SHOULD” or, as you’ve been using it “WOULD” do. Your presentation of PoE thusfar has just assumed that the presence of evil and suffering is all that’s needed to justify the “SHOULD/WOULD” motivation for an omni-max deity. The assumption stands out like a pimple on a mules ass.

Again, I apologize for my lack of clarity on both this matter and the matter of the governance clause. This is the first time I've seriously participated in a debate of this sort, and I figure I'm allowed one or two mistakes.

rw: Hey, come on man, that isn’t necessary. It’s appreciated and accepted, but, let’s face it, none of us are capable of arguing our positions from an omni-science position. I appreciate your honesty in admitting when you think you’ve goofed. That speaks highly of you. I only hope I can demonstrate the same virtue.

edited twice to fix my ignorance.

Dr. Retard

SOMMS wrote:
I suspect it's:

C-they think we aren't robots, but that God should have restricted our freedom in such a way that would not turn us into robots so there would be less evil.

After all, the dispute is over whether restricting someone's freedom need turn that someone into a robot. I say No. Restricting someone's freedom need not turn that someone into a robot. Proof: Prisons restrict criminals' freedom; they do not turn criminals to robots. Paralysis restricts paralytics' freedom; it doesn't turn paralytics into robots.

tw1tch

Dr. Retard,

I think semantics is getting in the way here.

Yes...this is what some atheists hold. But it is really only putting pretty words on a logical absurdity. My remarks about 'robots' equate 'robots' to 'lack of freedom'. I equate 'lack of freedom' to 'any hinderance of what we can now do'.

To say we could have 'some hinderance of what we can do now' and not suffer 'lack of freedom' (robots) IS a logical absurdity.


What's kind of funny is that I used this exact analogy a few posts back to prove a point.

We put people in jail...
...they can do jumping jacks
...watch TV
...eat carrots.

They have some freedom. However, are they free?


Of course not.



Yet this is the exact situation the Rimstalker and Thomas claim to want.




Satan Oscillate My Metallic Sonatas

tw1tch

Rimstalker,
Crap...this is worse then I expected. It's obvious I have given your posts far too much credit. I won't make this mistake again.

Your ENTIRE argument boils down to...I feel God is selfish for giving me freedom.

If this is your position...don't try to cover it up and make it seem like a valid logical argument. It's not. It's your opinion.



If you feel this way...fine. Thus you(not me) see a problem with evil. However, don't delude yourself into thinking this is some sort of rational argument. This is merely your opinion...you shouldn't be suprised when others aren't persuaded by this 'argument'.

I personally don't think it was selfish for God to give me freedom. Therefore I don't see a problem with evil.



Satan Oscillate My Metallic Sonatas

Dr. Retard

SOMMS:

I don't think anyone equates 'being a robot' with 'having any limitations on freedom'. Quite the contrary. I think we all agree: you can have limitations on your freedom without being a robot.

So the question is: Why didn't (and doesn't) God limit our freedom in these non-robotifying ways? It looks like a good thing to do; we pay people to do it for us; we do it ourselves when we have the chance; why doesn't God do it?

Jobar

[aside]
By the by, SOMMS, have you acheived a positive mental attitude about the existence of the Invisible Pink Unicorn yet?

For those of you who wish to see our esteemed tw1tch here win the 2002 world title for eel wrestling in jello and vaseline, try that link. Thirteen mortal pages- then he vanishes...[/aside]