Primal

There really does seem to be no difference between subjective idealism and solipsism, as both claim that reality is ultimately in one's own mind.

BTW, Plato's theory translates basically to dualism, which was already covered.

So-called "objective idealism" posits brute facts along with many unecessary entities and thus becomes too superfluous to be acceptable.

Yes but then what are the perceptions made of? How do they behave? What are their limitations? Perception must be made of "something" less it be nothing. I'm not saying there is any distinction merely asking what the underlying substance is like. If it is radically different with each new perception then the idealism is a form of pluralism not monism.


That question is irrelevant as it supposes I make a distinction between matter and substance, I do not.

I however realize a description of matter is in order to promote a fuller picture, in which case I can point you towards atomic theory.

Liebniz tried to do the same for idealism by proposing monads, however this was never confirmed. Idealists may try to hijack atomic theory but this fails as the atoms themselves are never fully percieved(in a matter that would make them distinct/noticeable), and thus the attempt fails or creates a paradox.

Who says it is unknown? Substance can simply be matter.




However we cannot really "see" atoms, only entities composed of something.


Well then your viewpoint is at odds with science.


Where else can they come from? If you propose the existence of something non-mental then you are venturing away from idealism.


Ah yes but to claim this they must show the alternatives to be more superfluous, positing other "minds" and forces does not, in fact it makes the position one with more unecessary assumptions then materialism. (Matter composing things(supposing substance) vs things being the creations of parts of multiple(oft unseen) minds(supposing substance,others minds and capabilities of mind.)


This assumes matter is unknowable see a bit above for my answer to that. God would be superfluous in that He would make the idealist viewpoint posit a position in regards to substance, along with an extra, unknown entity(God). As well as God's mechanism of somehow interacting with your mind and maintaning what you see/all of existence without Himself being seen. Materialism need only posit a substance.

Primal

Spoken like a true relativist.

Keith Russell

Dominus and Primal:

Isn't it part of the law of identity (the law of non-contradiction, 'A is A') that things can change only in accordance with their nature?

Doesn't the law of identity thus allow us to induce (if not deduce) cause and effect?

Keith.

Hugo Holbling

:notworthy

Primal

No, because that would presuppose that things in fact change. You cannot derive this purely from the law of noncontradiction but must also assume it from the onset.

As for Hugo: Nah you're right, we should let people who have absolutely no respect for logic and evidence enter into rational discussions. Hooray for Hugo! :notworthy s down to Hugo.

Keith Russell

Primal:

That things change is hardly an assumption.

It can be observed.

Do you not think that the law of identity ('A is A', things change only in accordance with their natures, etc.) is simply a priori--that there is no observation which supports it?

Really?

Keith.

crocodile deathroll

It is not just matter that make us human but also energy, your brain has to be a certain temperature and function. blood has to flow through it so is can process information.

I guess I call myself a functionalist

AnthonyAdams45

Do bare particulars exist? That is, do quality-less instances of matter exist? If not, then are the qualities identical to the matter or a secondary layer to the matter? If identical to the matter, then how is that some properties are apparently mental, such as size and location? If a secondary layer, then how not a dualism?

Idealism rejects the idea that qualities are somehow supervenient on an object, but rather are the object. Since all qualities are reducible to mind-dependent components, the mental is real, the material is not.

What idealism is not about is some one mind creating the universe as it goes along. Nor is it about some parallel reality that requires another set of rules and principles to guide the mind. The world as experienced is acollection of qualities. Every quality is mind dependent, thus science studies qualities, such as mass, volume, etc, and in so doing is purely mental activity. To ask how idealism explains matter misses the point; for the idealist, there is no matter to explain. All that needs explaining are properties and those properties are mental.

Hugo Holbling

Okay, Primal: since you're not following, i'll slow down.

Please explain what you mean by a relativist and how it comes about that relativism implies rejecting logic and evidence. Take note that i'm being civil here - i really want you to tell me. Laying my cards on the table from the outset, i suspect you are mischaracterizing relativism; it may be that my understanding is poor, so i am interested to learn how. For the purposes of this discussion, should it continue, i shall of course play the dutiful part of the relativist.

For the interested reader, here is a link to a basic explanation of relativism. Perhaps you can begin by saying what is wrong with it, if anything, and how it leads to your contention.

I promise my subsequent posts will have more rhetoric and attempted-humour in them...

Clutch

Keith, just to pick a nit here. The law of identity (P <--> P) is not the law of non-contradiction (~(P &~P)). You can have the former and not the latter in a logic; eg, paraconsistent or dialethic logic.