Adrian Selby

In my view it can be a physical process 'undergone'. To undergo a physical process is to have, in the case of brains, an experience.

The only reason that there seems to be a difference is because the object is sufficiently complex a system to support a detailed (incredibly detailed and sophisticated) interaction with an environment.

It is in a crude sense no different to the phenomenal aspects of animals, its just more complex.

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the incorrigible analytics' club

Mexicola

The Rorty thing is just the idea that the incorrigibility of the mental is not a fundamental metaphysical fact but rather 'just' a human practice. The rest of the paragraph isn't from Rorty. I should have made that clearer.
But anyway. The point I was making was questioning the claim that 'no one other than me can know what it is like when I see a red apple'. Why do you claim this as though it were self-evident? How do you know, a priori, that scientific investigation could not discover this? Assuming this at the start seems to beg the question a bit...
The role of judgment in all this is to get away from the idea of qualia. Qualia are postulated as a 'what it is like' which is completely private and unknowable by anyone else. I (along with many other people, eg Dennett) think that assuming such qualia as a starting point leads us into error, as I said above. On the qualia view, when we see something red we are presented with an internal qualia which we subsequently identify as 'redness' (ie the 'Given' is then 'taken'; given a name) The problem here is the status of the qualia, which seems to evade characterisation as physical (mental images in the brain being...problematic) On the judgment view then, when we see something red we just... see something red. The judgment is not a subsequent process but is bound up with the recognition of the object as 'red'. The judgment happens, if you like, prior to consciousness, as opposed to on the basis of it.
This facilitates the avoidance of problems with consciousness because consciousness is, on the judgment model, formed from meaningful judgments, not primitive 'given' qualia. These are much easier to understand as results of the activities of the brain than mysterious 'given' qualia of 'what it is like'.
The 'what it is like' on the judgment model can be communicated to others precisely because it is meaningful, unlike qualia. So if we want to tell someone what our experience of an apple is like, we can describe it. The point about judgments is that experience itself is a sort of 'description', not a given which we subsequently describe. Similarly, this idea of 'what it is like' also has advantages for science. Given that judgments are always, by definition, 'present' in consciousness (as they form what is 'in' it), they always have some behavioural/physical effects. This means we don't need to account for qualia which are 'there' in consciousness but have no effects in the world; judgments by definition do have these effects.
I'm sure there's plenty more you could ask about this but, to save me time and effort, I strongly recommend you read Daniel Dennett's Consciousness Explained. Most of the above is a simplified version of his ideas in that book. His main thesis is that consciousness, rather than being formed by a 'Cartesian Theatre' in which we are given experience, is actually more like a book being edited, revised and cut as it is formed. This means that only things which have an effect in the world (by thought, speech, etc) can possibly be conscious, indeed they are by definition. Think about consciousness of an object. Anything you can possibly say or think about it is, obviously, conscious (by virtue of you noticing that you've said/thought it) Consciousness for Dennett is then a sort of 'cognitive celebrity', in which only the 'famous' thoughts/judgments (those which 'catch on' enough to have effects of some sort) are conscious.
A lot of people however don't like this idea. I can see why it's counter-intuitive. We intuitively suppose that when we pick out and notice something, like a clock ticking, it must have already been 'there' in consciousness before we 'noticed' it. Dennett's move is simply to question how we are entitled to this claim, given that until we 'noticed' it we weren't, by definition, aware of it! For Dennett, being 'noticed' (in a very general sense) is being conscious.
Incidentally, this fits in well with the claim that experience is conceptual, not pre-conceptual, as it avoids the picture of experience as 'Given' prior to judgments.

VivaHedone

Take the lion example. What I'm saying is that it is not the experience of seeing the lion which causes you to run away, but the neurons that cause you to see the lion. I explained my justification for this in the original post. To run away, you need certain electrons to flow down certain nerves. Now, as the actual sight of the lion is not a material thing, it surely has no physical power to cause these electrical signals. Therefore it must instead be the material cause of your sight of the lion, rather than the subjective experience of seeing the lion, that causes you to run away. This begs the question, why the sight? Why not just the electrons? (See 'Purpose of Subjectivity'.)

Of course this argument depends on the distinction between the electrons/chemicals that cause sensation and the actual sensation itself, and it is this distinction which is coming under attack.

But there is a distinction between the river flowing and the smooth rocks, yes? The smooth rocks arise from the process of the river flowing, but this does not mean that the flowing river and smooth rocks are one and the same thing.

All electrical flows are objective. An electrical flow is not an 'experience', but a material occurence. The sight or feeling of an electrical flow is an experience, but not the flow itself.

To use your example, a smooth rock is a material thing.The sight and feel of the rock are subjective experiences.

There is no such thing as an 'objective experience'. Experience is by definition subjective.

One is material, the other immaterial. You cannot pick up a sensation; you cannot experience an electron. I have a feeling I may be missing the point here, but keep trying to drum it in!

N.B. I have got a bit confused when describing mental processes, so to save time from now on 'electrons' shall be used to describe all electrical flows and chemical reactions and neurons etc. that cause subjective experience.

John Page

A subjective experience results from an arrangement of physical matter. The sensation is different than that what causes it. A thought is a type of sensation.

When you see a lion this is a material experience, your mind/brain compares the incoming sense data with its archetypal concept for lion (size, color, locations, #legs etc.)

My analogy for what your theory is saying is as follows. There is a piece of paper with the numeral 1 written on it. The numeral 1 is not a material entity in the sense of carbon atoms on cellulose - it is the form of those atoms that denote the quantity "one". However, I can pick up a material pencil and proclaim "There is one pencil".

While your subjective experience of life is your own, we can nevertheless communicate these experiences to discover our minds/brains give rise to these experiences in the first place.

Cheers, John

Cheers, John

Mexicola

VivaHedone:

I think the source of your problems is the assumption that now that science has discovered 'electrons' they are 'all that really exists', the 'building blocks', as it were, of everything else. This seems a fairly silly assumption which comes from the view of the world as like a Lego object. Modern science is a bit more complex than that.
The crucial point about this is that your question 'which electrons are the experience?' is like someone asking 'which electrons are the cat?' Sounds like an okay question? Well what if we chop the cat in half? Which group of electrons are now the cat? Both? But then surely the cat is in two places at once! Silly! So, neither? But then all we've done is separate two groups of electrons! How can this have 'destroyed' the cat? Surely then the cat didn't exist at all! If it did then it was the group of electrons, but we've just shown that the group of electrons can still exist (in two places) but the cat not! Therefore they're not the Same Thing!(Note: Not Serious Argument, Just Example)
This is the sort of argument which Greek philosophers were fond of, and its the same sort of one anayltic philosophers have often got their logical knickers in a twist over. They assume a certain 'ultimate structure/unit' of reality, and then argue from there that nothing else can exist in that way (physically, usually), so whatever it is we're talking about must be MetaPhysical!
Of course we want to say the cat existed the whole time. So then the cat isn't just a particular group of electrons, it's something like a functional property of them. Move them around in the wrong way, and it'll stop existing.
Now, arguably, the same applies for sensations. Sensations are a functional property of certain other groups of electrons. They don't 'physically' exist ('physically' meaning 'just electrons') but then neither did the cat as we saw above. They're something that certain groups of electrons do when put together in the right way. What these electrons do is think about 'themselves' (as humans), and 'their' environment. You'll want to ask: 'Well, in that case, where do these things happen? Are they physical events?', but this just brings us back to the 'cat/electron' argument. You want to be able to pick out certain electrons and say 'These are the sensation' and for this to somehow explain consciousness. It isn't like that. You need (to explain consciousness) to explain functionally what the electrons do. Or rather, what the atoms and molecules which the electrons make up do. Or rather, what the cells which the atoms and molecules make up do. Or rather, what the areas of the brain which the cells make up do. Or rather, what the organisms of which the areas of the brain are a part do. You need all these levels of explanation (and more, eg what language in which the organism speaks/thinks, etc) to give a satisfactory explanation of consciousness. You're not going to get it with simple 'but which of these electrons is the sensation?' questions. The question makes something similar to a 'category mistake'. Sensations aren't things like electrons. This doesn't however mean they're 'non-physical entities' which inhabit a 'non-physical world' of consciousness (except just as a figure of speech) any more than cats are 'reflections of the Platonic form'. It just means they're more complex properties of electrons, like other living things are. You're not going to get a definition of any of these (or any other things, arguably) in simple 'x is made up of group of electrons y, or else it does not exist' form. Try giving one of these definitions for movement, or gravity, or energy, or... This doesn't mean they don't 'exist'. Just that you're looking in the wrong 'place'; at the wrong level of description.

Nowhere357

Exactly so. That our mental experiences influence the brain must be the default position.

It seems the primary objection is the mystery of how a non-physical mind can influence the physical brain. But it's accepted that the mental experience is caused by the brain - thus showing that influence can cross the 'gap' in at least one direction. Why should the thought that influence can cross in the other direction cause conceptual difficulty?

But judgement involves thoughts and memories as well as the direct experience of awareness.
Qualia refers to the quality of the direct experience. I don't see where they are in contradiction. The definition of qualia seems self-evident and useful to me.

Merriam-Webster
Main Entry: qua�le
Function: noun
Inflected Form(s): plural qua�lia /'kw�-lE-&/
Etymology: Latin, neuter of qualis of what kind
Date: 1675
1 : a property (as redness) considered apart from things having the property : UNIVERSAL
2 : a property as it is experienced as distinct from any source it might have in a physical object

VivaHedone

I have never to my recollection asked that question. My point is that electrons are not the experience, but the cause of it.

I have never claimed that cats consist of electrons, merely that material mental processes do. But still, the answer is neither, since a cat is a complex arrangement of matter. To alter the arrangement of matter in a way which means that the cat cannot function is to destroy the cat.

Thankyou.

You cannot do a sensation. Sensation is not a verb. Electrons create a sensation.

No I don't. This is a quite remarkable statement, as I am arguing that electrons (or rather, electro-chemical mental processes) are not in fact sensations but the cause of them.

I know that the workings of the brain are hugely complex, and you need this sort of wide understanding to try and explain it. However, that is not what I am trying to do. I am trying to distinguish between the mental processes that are the direct physical cause of sensation, and the sensation themselves. This is to support my argument that it is not sensations but the material cause of sensations that has any physical effect.

I don't think there is any satisfactory explanation of consciousness, anyway (see Purpose of Subjectivity).

There is a big difference. I am mystified as to how the brain causes sensations (again see Purpose of Subjectivity), but the physical brain is clearly able to cause effect. Subjective experience, however, is immaterial, and therefore cannot cause effect. You have declined to address any of my opening arguments, and I invite you to do so.

Nowhere357

Why do you accept that the physical affects the immaterial (the brain causes sensations), but claim it to be impossible that the immaterial can affect the physical (the immaterial cannot cause effect)?

Your op included this statement:
Your claim that subjective experience can have no effect is what I am addressing. It looks to me like your only support is the assertion that all effects must have physical causes (thereby begging the question of whether the mind affects the body), but maybe I'm missing something. Hence my question.

boneyard bill

Vivahedone writes:

You are assuming that event must have one and only one cause, but is that reasonable? Aristotle identified four causes. (Sorry, I can't remember them off the top of my head).

It is certainly true that a physical event must have a physical cause but that doesn't necessarily complete the story. The thermostat on my furnace causes the fire to come on but there isn't enough energy in a temperature change to light the fire. The change in temperature provides the information that is necessary to send a signal that releases enough physical energy to light the fire.

Of course, our computer technology provides information that causes all kinds of things to happen that are much more sophisticated than a thermostat.

Likewise, sentient experience provides the information that is necessary to tell the organism to run from the lion. The physical cause of the running are the leg muscles. But the lion is also a cause of the running and the sensation of the lion is also a cause of the running. So this one act has three causes.

Let's carry the point one step further. You are in the jungle and someone tells you there is a lion coming, and you run away. You have no sensation of a lion, and you still run away. What causes you to run away from a lion when you have no sensation of it? According to your theory, the cause of the running and the cause of the sensation are the same, but the sensation itself plays no causal role. But if you have no sensation of a lion then the action of running should not follow. And yet you do run anyway. Why is that? Your theory cannot explain it.

But, of course, you run because you have information that the lion is coming toward you even though you have not experienced that fact directly. It is the information regarding the location of the lion that causes you to run. Information has causal power. Sentient experience is information. Therefore, sentient experience can play a causal role by interacting with the physical even though a physical act also needs a physical cause.

Adrian Selby

VivaHedone,

The being mystified is a consequence of your dualistic position. It's no wonder when you have that model of the subject matter that you have these intractable problems of immaterial and material cause effect relations. Perhaps a new model is in order?

After all, you maintain the sensation is different to the undergoing of brain processes, you just haven't actually supported it. You have reiterated this view that I've in turn interpreted as being based on two different perspectives on the same states. You call different a 'sensation' and 'electron' while ignoring the fact that one is subjective and the other is objective. This does not mean they are different. It can mean they are different senses by which we refer to that which can be considered their common, possibly identical referent.

Again, the processes by which cruder central nervous systems interact with the environment to me are different in terms of complexity only. You can either deny this, and posit that homo sapiens uniquely have immaterial natures, or you can posit anything from the identity theory I espouse to some panpsychic view of everything being capable of consciousness. Either way, if you're positing that the sensation is immaterial, for example, the sensation induced by a tiger that triggers 'run away' behaviour, then what is it that other animals lack in virtue of behaving this way?

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