BadBadBad

I've been hit by christians with this Free Will concept and it has always struck me as a very foolish concept on a number of different levels. I hadn't thought about the free will to commit evil angle. Very interesting though. The discussion about God choosing a particular world based upon a finite number of people with a finite number of decisions makes it very difficult to accept that Free Will exists at all in the context of God.

Romans 9 illustrates this pretty clearly. It says God creates us like a potter creating a pot. Some are blessed, shown mercy, honoured, shown the riches of his glory, and are given his salvation. Others are shown his wrath, dishonored, hardened, and damned. There's no Free Will here. God decides.

If God is the standard for defining good and evil, isn't being hardened against God the biggest sin, the biggest evil? If my heart is hardened against God by God , is that evil? If my heart is hardened against God, by God, do I have Free Will to go against that and believe in God? Romans 9 says no.

9:20
Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus?

The_Ist

I have been doing some more thinking on this subject as well, so my responses here do not coincide with some of the things I previously said. My apologies.

Angrillori, I’m assuming that I need not respond to your first post, because what you have outlined in the latter post is presumably a better reflection of your viewpoint. Am I right?

Philosoft, I don’t feel as though it would make sense for me to respond to your last post on this thread, because my view on the issue is now quite different. But if you want to comment on anything I say here, feel free. The same goes for anyone else, of course.

The Christian view of foreknowledge is not uniform. What you describe here is Exhaustive Divine Foreknowledge (EDF): God knows every single event that has happened and will happen. However, another emerging view is Open Theism (OT), which, if I am correct in my understanding, holds that God cannot know everything about the future, because such is irreconcilable with Libertarian Free Will (LFW). OT does not say that God is not omniscient; omniscience implies knowing everything that is possible to know, and according to the OT view to know the future in its entirety is logically impossible. But this fact does not limit God’s power to control/predict/ordain future events – even if God does not know what our free will choices will be, he still can know all possible outcomes based on our free will choices, and thus “block” the “paths” that lead to an outcome that he does not foreordain, if he so chooses.

Another idea is Molinism, but I don’t know enough about it to discuss it. I’ve pretty much adhered to the EDF position throughout my life, so that is the position I will be primarily assuming here. However, I may propose responses from both the EDF and OT point of view, based on whether or not it seems relevant.

But a key point here is that you are assuming EDF. So a proponent of OT would probably object right off the bat, and say that God cannot know the outcome of all human decisions in the future without negating LFW.

I understand what you’re saying.

First of all, I agree that the number of choices will always remain finite.

I also concede that by instantiating any C(x), God does not seem to negate our free will, because EDF in and of itself is not causative. This position differs from what I’ve said in other posts.

However, though there are an infinite number of possibilities for C(x), there is only a finite number from which God had to choose, based on the fact that he was trying to accomplish something by creating the universe. IOW, for the sake of the argument at hand, assume that God had good reasons for creating the universe. He had certain goals and purposes in mind. But here’s the key point. Since God is supposedly flawless, possessing EDF, omnipotence, etc., he would have the knowledge and ability to know and instantiate precisely which C(x) would fulfill these goals/purposes to the max. And if he didn’t act on this knowledge, and instead chose some other C(x), his act of creation would have been imperfect. So, it seems to me that God actually only had ONE C(x) he, as a being that lacks nothing, could pick: the one that fulfilled his goals and purposes for creating the universe to the max. Therefore, if God exists, this is the only universe he could have created, while acting in accord with his flawless nature.

Now, of course, the major objection to this is that if such a God exists, he would have been able to fulfill his purposes and goals to the max while avoiding much, if not all, of the evil and suffering that exists in the universe. The basic argument goes like this:

A1. If an OmniGod exists, he would remove/disallow the existence of all unnecessary evil/suffering.

A2. There exists unnecessary evil/suffering in the universe.

A3. Therefore, an OmniGod does not exist.

But a sufficient counterargument to this, I think, is as follows:

B1. If A1 is true, then if the OmniGod of the Bible exists, he would remove/disallow the existence of all unnecessary evil/suffering.

B2. By considering what the Bible says, if the OmniGod of the Bible exists, he would not remove/disallow the existence of all unnecessary evil/suffering. (You, as an atheist, would probably be quick to point out that the Bible seems to portray the existence of unnecessary evil and suffering.)

B3. Therefore, A1 is false.

B4. Therefore, argument A is unsound.

(If you’ve read McHugh’s response in the formal debate area, this argument is similar to his, though he explains it better.)

Now, allow me to assume the OT position quickly. “When” (admittedly a misnomer) God had not created the universe yet, time did not exist. Time came into existence when the universe was created. Accordingly, in these circumstances “when” the universe did not yet exist, God could not possibly know the outcome of his creation, because there was not yet a “future” to know about. It is logically impossible to know of that which doesn’t yet exist. (I, myself, am wary to agree with this conclusion, because I do not see anything logically impossible about knowing the future even if it doesn't yet exist. Perhaps the OT would say that if the non-existent future was absolutely knowable, LFW would be negated. I am not as well-versed in OT, so I'm representing that position based on limited understanding.)

I concede that LFW does not seem to be negated. I withdraw my traveler example. However, the proponent of OT would probably argue that if the future choice can be determined simply by factoring in every circumstance surrounding that choice, then it really isn’t a “choice” at all, but just a result of pure circumstance. Frankly, I don’t know if this objection is sound. Furthermore, the OT proponent might argue that since the future doesn’t exist (an idea that is arguable in and of itself), it is logically impossible to know.

I think this objection would fall under the one regarding unnecessary suffering described above, so I feel no need to repeat myself.

Jabu Khan

This is a hard one to debate using the bible because free will had no place in christianity until long after the bible was written. it was a concept imported from celtic beliefs by druids who werec onverted to christianity. At first they were persecuted for suggesting free will. Patrick and Augustine wrote many arguments against the notion of free will. It wasn't accepted until much later when high ranking members of the church read the works of the dissenters and decided to run with it.

Jamie_L

I think there's a flaw here. Your arguement assumes that the God of the Bible qualifies as an "OmniGOd". However, the fact that he does not remove/disallow evil renders him non-Omnimax, or at least calls it into question. So, this B1 is unsound.

Jamie

The_Ist

So what you're basically saying is that a being that does not remove/disallow evil is not an OmniGod. Or, in more logical terms:

If [being X does not remove/disallow evil], then [being X is not an OmniGod].

Now, here's the converse:

If [being X is an OmniGod], then [being X does remove disallow/remove evil].

If you're stating the former, you're also stating the latter.

But this statement assumes the validity of A1. IOW, you are assuming that my conclusion is false (which is that A1 is false) in an attempt to invalidate one of my premises. But the conclusion itself follows from the premises. So it looks like you're arguing in a circle: the premise is false because the conclusion is false; but the only way you can say the conclusion to be false is if you assume one of the premises to be false in the first place. So I don't think your objection invalidates argument B.

Hopefully that explanation makes sense.

Angrillori

(I would like to extend an invitation for all those who say dialogue never causes anyone to change anything they think to note their disproof.)

Well, it's a clarification. I was saying the same thing, but I think the second post is easier to understand, isn't it?
Well, when I say foreknowledge I just mean to know what will happen, but that's just me being picky.
I'll just take a second and point out a couple of the glaring flaws in this OT idea.

First, to know the future, is just that, to know the future. OT is just a clever way of denying God this ability. You say OT prevents God from knowing everything about the future, I would point out it prevents God from knowing ANYthing about the fututre. Any knowledge of the future after humanity hit the scene neccessarily entails knowing the results of mankind's freewill decisions. In fact, tell me one thing God could know about the fututre that couldn't be invalidated by some action and choice of mankind. Can God know my house will be here tomorrow? What if a suicide bomber levels it? In fact, isn't even the weather contingent on man's freewill decisions--think dustbowls and global warming! God can't even know the weather tomorrow any better than I can since mankind's freewill decisions led to global warming which must therefore have not been foreknown by the big guy.

Second, even if we use this OT, and entirely strip God of his ability to see the future, (which would mean an abrupt end to this discussion since we postulated a God like that in the bible that could know the future (Salvation status according to the New Testament and even David pointed out that God knew David's words before David spoke them in the Old Testament--both of which are remarkably dependent on our decisions.)) then this leaves a God wholly indifferent to our free will anyways. You even pointed out that OT would necessitate God actively stripping our free will in any instance where he did need to know the future--for an OT God, in order to know the future, he had to make the future.

For both these reasons, OT is both worthless as a theory, and, completely irrelevant to this discussion.

Don't you see how this doesn't help your case? To know the future, God either has to A) know the results of our decisions ahead of time, or B)actively strip us of free will to force his knowledge to come true. Which is more harmful to this precious 'free-will?'
(Especially since, if you believe in Xian God, he clearly knows whether you're going to hell or not!)

No, in fact it seems even worse that God would actively send people to hell just to fill his prediction versus passively sending people to hell by arbitrarily choosing to create a universe in which he knows people will send themselves to hell rather than choosing a universe where no one sent themselves to hell.

(As an aside: for all those that want us to believe God prizes free will over everything, he certainly chooses to halt it when it suits him, eh Pharoah + King Saul! The moral is, when you want a chance to show off your powers, free will is meaningless, but when it comes time to defend the right of some dude to rape and murder a 5 year old, free will is sacrosanct. Where's a spirit from the Lord when a bleeding baby needs it eh? But back to the point

Actually, since these two theories mutually exclude each other, (OT/EDF) you weaken your point considerably by attempting to use both as justification. If only one can be true, you cannot use the strengths of one to overcome the flaws in another.

I think that's the point. The only way we can possibly stomach a God sending people to hell is if he didn't know the future. If he does know the future, then sheesh, as you've seen, he's got some 'splainig to do!

OT just takes away one of the fundamental assumptions we made: that God can see the future. OT strips him of this entirely, and as such is wholly irrelevant to this argument.

Before you go into your argument, I would like to just point out that what you said is that:

Given possible C's where there was no suffering and no one went to hell, God ACTIVELY AND SPECIFICALLY chose a C such that his C had suffering and people going to hell. You're right, he must have chosen the C that fit his goal, and that means his exact and precise goal was what we have, which is suffering and people going to hell.

Neat huh? With infinite tries, and finite possibilities, it is neccessary that God got exactly what his goal was.

I think you're missing the point. My question was never to disprove omnigod, but to point out that with infinite attempts and finite possibilities, then there were possibilities that God was aware of in which no one suffered or made a choice that led to hell. This means that God prefers a reality WITH FREE WILL where people suffer and go to hell over a reality WITH FREE WILL in which people don't suffer and go to hell.

First: Nope. Don't take the OT route. It ill becomes you.

Second, if God couldn't know the future when there was no future, was he just taking a random shot in the dark with this universe he made? Just hoping that if he did just THAT then a universe would come to be with time and people and everything? Clearly there was some concept of A follows B, even outside time.

Third, it still doesn't get God off the hook, since at each moment T=0, he would know the whole future of that C, and for an eternal being outside of time, he could cycle through an infinite series of C's in no time at all (pun intendended and not intended simultaneously.)

It's not. Can you imagine a circumstance in which you'd make a different decision than you did in any single case? Then in fact circumstance does effect your decision making, which is all the "infinite tries, finite possibilities" idea requires.
Again, I raise my objection to OT since once more it sems to just be a creative way of saying "God can't see the future."

Jamie_L

For the purposes of that post, I was assuming A1 was true, but in general I agree that this is not a premise, but a conclusion of a different arguement. Because it is arguable, your B1 is called into question. Perhaps it was too strong a statement to say it was "unsound". Perhaps better to say, like A1, B1 cannot merely be assumed.

However, I think your implicit assumption that the God of the Bible is an Omnigod is still not something that can be assumed. It seems there are many traits contained in the general, philosophical definition of an omni-max God that conflict with the descriptions of the God in the Bible. In other words, though the Bible may say it's God is an Omni-god, that doesn't necessarily mean the descriptions of that God fit the definition of an Omnigod.

Which seems to be getting way off topic. Perhaps material for another thread?

Jamie

The_Ist

Sorry for the delay, I've been pretty busy lately.

Angrillori, I am going to heed your suggestion and drop the discussion of the OT view. It's not the viewpoint I accept, and, quite frankly, I don't know enough about it to defend it. This is not me saying it is or is not defensible, but just that I do not see the point in arguing in favor of something with which I don't agree.

Agreed.

I agree with this assessment.

I don't think this topic should be considered on this thread, since it is corollary to the discussion at hand.

No, I disagree. I can stomach God sending people to hell, even if he knows the future. Supposing God had good reason for creating us with the ability to reject him, the fact that he knew certain people would do so does not negate the fact that the ultimate responsibility for such rejection lies with he who rejects, since he freely chose to do so. Foreknowledge is not causative.

As I explained, it was his only possible choice, in accordance with his ability to fulfill his goals and purposes to the max.

No, this is a non sequitur. Just because the C that fit his goals and purposes to the max includes suffering and hell, it does not follow that his goals and purposes themselves include suffering and people going to hell. Suffering and hell would, hypothetically, be the necessary by-products of the world C that best fulfills his goals and purposes, not that which actually fulfills them.

I have no problem with what you say here. It is counterintuitive, but that doesn't make it wrong or illogical. But note that this doesn't mean that God likes or prefers suffering and hell over non-suffering and not going to hell, but just that, as I previously stated, hell and suffering are necessary by-products of the world C in which his goals and purposes are fulfilled to the max.

I agree that this would be a topic for another thread. However, let me outline my main points:

1) If the God of the Bible is not an OmniGod (hypothetically speaking), then argument A does not apply to him.

2) If the God of the Bible is an OmniGod, then B1 is a valid premise. This fact seems obvious to me, because B1 is a conditional statement based on the validity of A1. If A1 is invalid, it's not as though B1 becomes invalid, because B1 only makes a claim about the God of the Bible IF A1 is valid.

Biff the unclean

Well that's very interesting. Any source on this? I'd enjoy reading more about it.

Angrillori

Doggone it all. I can see where this is going already. (At the end of the post I'll make my prediction.) Until then, I'll try to isolate where we're missing each other.

On the flip side, given foreknowledge and omnipotence, this god DID in fact put us in a position he knew would lead to our denial of him, even though he knew there was a set of circumstances, some C, in which no one would.

I know the analogy has been made before, but we'll do so again:

If you know, with 100% certainty, that when you put a suicidal man in a room with a gun, that man will kill himself, and at the same time know that if you did not put the gun in the room, he would not kill himself, do you share responsibility, even though the choice to kill himself was his and not yours?

Now go back, and see that god chose a situation where people reject him OVER a situation where people don't.

Given two perfectly viable scenarios, one in which no one chose evil or hell, and another where some did choose evil and hell, a foreknowing omnipotent god chose the latter. Actively chose it.

First, you merely asserted that this was the only possible C to meet his goals. You didn't of course explain what his goals are. To forestall the inevitable: "we cannot know his goals*" defense, I would point out that we can and do know his goals.

Think through the "infinite tries/finite possibilities" concept for a moment. It seemed in the last post (OT/EDF) you were really close to getting it.

If God has infinite tries, and finite possibilities, then, what we see IS his goal, since any other possibility was neccessarily rejected.
Any particular point could have been different. Any particular suffering or evil choice did not have to be so. God chose a C to make it so. If everything is unneccessary, then everything that was chosen to occur stands alone as a distinct and individual goal on its own merits.

You say exactly what I mean. God chose this C to fulfill his goal to the max, perfectly.

I really want you to explain yourself a little better here, because I think there's some point we're missing each other.

I say, god could have anything and chose this. You say god could have anything and chose this. What you're missing is that having infinite triesand finite possibilites means God chose this OVER a corresponding free-will universe WITHOUT hell or evil.

With infinite C's and finite possibilities, it is neccessary that a foreknowing and omnipotent god chose a universe with evil and hell over an equivalent one without either. If the math is right: infinity>any finite number, please show how you disagree.

If this being chose evil and hell where they were unneccessary, then they were in fact his goals and desires.


With infinite tries and finite possibilities then hell and evil are UNneccessary for ANY ends this foreknowing omnipotent being has in mind. Therefore, they were only chosen on their own merits.
But if he is an omnigod, once more we return to his decision to ADD an element (evil/hell) which is unneccessary. It is not a passive: allow evil and not stop it, but an active:choose evil and hell where it is unneccesary. Perhaps an omnibenevolent God wouldn't stop evil/hell, but it certainly wouldn't CHOOSE them when they were unneccessary. (Heck, forget omnibenevolence, even a marginally benevolent foreknowing omnipotent being wouldn't do that!)

*Here's where I figure this thread is going in a couple of posts: we can't know God's plan, and God works in mysterious ways. I had really hoped we could avoid this. But, oh well....