Agnos1

Keith Russell said:

Question for Mr. Russel:

Why do you think the mind is not part of reality?

Keith Russell

Agnos I asked:

Keith Russell said:

quote:
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Objective moral principles are not 'intrinsic' to reality or nature. They are instead
derived by the mind, from principles observed in reality, which the mind then evaluates using a process of reason.
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Question for Mr. Russel:

Why do you think the mind is not part of reality?

The mind is most certainly part of reality, but objectivity is not intrinsic to the mind. Objectivity is the result of the mind's observation of (and this is what I should have said) reality external to the mind, which is then evaluated by the mind using a process of reason.

Thank you for catching that, and giving me the opportunity to clarify.

Keith.

[ September 09, 2002: Message edited by: Keith Russell ]</p>

bd-from-kg

Keith Russell:
From the Internet Encycopedia of Philosophy entry for "objectivity":

It appears that you're following Rorty's terminology. Everyone has the right to use whatever terminology they like, of course, but that doesn't justify saying that the more standard usage is wrong, or contradicting those who follow it. It would be appropriate to say something like "Rorty [and I] prefer to use the term "objective" to mean ... and "intrinsic" to mean ... This has the following advantages in facilitating the communication of certain ideas that we find important or interesting ..."

But I find it interesting that Rorty's second "notion" of objectivity seems to be pretty close to what I have in mind when I talk about "objective" morality (which I discussed at length earlier on this thread).

Principles of any kind cannot be "observed" in reality. Nor can moral principles be "derived" in any reasonable sense from observations of any kind.

bd-from-kg

Agnos1:

A somewhat belated reply.

What sort of “evidence” might you find “compelling”? I can’t see how there could be any evidence that could have any bearing on such questions.

Whether things like physical laws “exist” in an objective sense is one of the great issues dividing idealists and realists. I tend to say “yes”, in the sense that the world must have an underlying structure that is responsible for the patterns and regularities that we observe and formulate into “laws”, but “no” in the sense that the descriptions of this underlying structure embodied in “physical laws” are not the underlying structure itself; they are how we conceptualize or understand this structure. In that sense they do not “exist independently of the human mind”.

But in any case, physical laws are nothing like moral “laws”. Physical laws describe the world. What do moral “laws” describe? Nothing. Moral laws are prescriptive, not descriptive.

Moral principles aren’t a bit like mathematical truths, starting with the fact that they aren’t truths. And mathematical truths are tautologies, which is a very special kind of truth. Tautologies are true by virtue of the meaning of the words; they have nothing to do with reality. If moral principles had nothing to do with reality, they wouldn’t be of much interest.

I don’t think so. It has experimentally been shown that many species act in ways that promote the interest of related individuals (who share many of their genes) rather than their own, and some biologists have misleadingly referred to such behavior as “altruistic”. But even ants and bees behave in this way, apparently from pure instinct. Are they “displaying morality” ?

In fact, I’m not at all sure what it would mean to “display morality”. Does it mean feeling guilt because one did something that violated a moral principle that one subscribed to? Or that one changed one’s mind about what to do after being presented with a moral argument? I’m baffled. And I’m even more baffled as to how an animal might do anything that could conceivably be described as “displaying morality”.

This doesn’t look like an argument at all. After all, what would constitute a valid reason for an emotion? It’s true that I feel unhappy when I’ve lost something I value, but in what sense is this a logical reason to be unhappy? What’s happened has happened; what good does it do to feel unhappy about it? All that can be said, it seems to me, is that certain emotions typically accompany or follow certain kinds of events; logic doesn’t enter into it. But if it doesn’t make sense to speak of rational reasons for any emotion, how can the fact that there are no rational reasons for a particular emotion have any bearing on anything?

Non sequitur. The fact that moral principles only exist in the mind doesn’t make them subjective. Here are some other principles that exist only in the mind:

(1) Act in ways that correspond to one’s beliefs.

For example, it is irrational to rush to catch the three o’clock train to Boston on Sunday if you know that it doesn’t run on Sunday.

(2) Act in ways that correspond to one’s desires.

For example, it is irrational to rush to catch the three o’clock train to Boston if you have no desire to go to Boston.

(3) Believe only things for which you have some evidence.

For example, it is irrational to believe that you neighbors are about to leave for a vacation in Spain if you have absolutely no evidence to suggest that they are.

(4) Expect regularities that have held consistently in the past to hold in the future.

For example, if the sun has risen in the east every day of your life and you have good evidence that it has done so since time immemorial, it is rational to expect it to rise in the east tomorrow.

There are a number of other such principles, but these are enough to illustrate the idea.

The fact that all of these principles exist only in the mind doesn’t make them “subjective”. Of course, that it doesn’t make them “true” either. They aren’t propositions, so the question of “truth” doesn’t even arise. They are valid principles of rational action.) Moral principles are much more like these principles than they are like “laws of nature” or mathematical truths.

Well, if it is subjective, this would have the benefit that your beliefs would correspond more closely with reality. For a rational person this is an absolute, bedrock value. Deciding what to believe on the basis of what belief would be most “beneficial” is both irrational and immoral.

It depends on what you mean by “objectively sound”. But if you mean that there are moral principles that would commend themselves irresistibly to any sufficiently rational person with enough knowledge and understanding (like the principles I listed above), I would say “yes”. And yes indeed, “Act and think rationally” is another such principle. Again, note that none of these principles can be proved or demonstrated to be true; in fact, they aren’t true, since they aren’t propositions. Rather, they are principles of action that reasonable people follow.

This is a highly controversial claim; it is known as materialism, or more precisely physicalism. It would be more prudent to say only that consciousness objectively exists. Thus, if I have a headache, it’s true that I have a headache regardless of what anyone thinks. Similarly, if I believe that Nome is the capital of Alaska, it is objectively true that I believe it, even though it’s objectively false that Nome is the capital of Alaska. Facts about what’s in my mind are just as real and true as facts about what’s in my suitcase.

If that were true, morality would just be a subdiscipline of sociobiology. The problem here is what G. E. Moore called the “open question”. In this case it goes like this. Suppose that it were demonstrated that people are “hardwired” to react to a certain type of action by admiring, praising, and otherwise rewarding it. One could still meaningfully ask “Yes, but is it right to act in this way?” The fact that we can recognize this as a meaningful question rather than a nonsensical one like “Yes, I understand that this object is square, but is it round?” shows that saying that an action is right cannot mean that we are “hardwired” to react to it in a certain way.

In fact, we have pretty much collectively decided that certain kinds of behavior that seem to be pretty darn hardwired, such as keeping women in an inferior status and giving preference to members of our own race, are morally unacceptable. It seems that, for humans at least, our “software” can override our “hard wiring”. So the question becomes, in what respects should we override our ”hardwiring” with appropriate software? And no appeal to how we are hardwired can help us answer this question.

It depends on what you mean by “intrinsic”. You were getting closer before. I think that there are “value judgments” that everyone would agree on if they were sufficiently rational and had enough knowledge and understanding. This is quite a different thing from “hardwired” – i.e., instinctive or “programmed” – reactions, but it is also quite a different thing from “intrinsic values” or “objectively correct” moral principles in the sense of principles that would be correct no matter what anyone thought or would think regardless of how rational or knowledgeable or understanding they were.

I think you mean that nothing would matter. But that isn’t true either. Of course some things would matter to me, and others would matter to you. But there would be nothing that mattered to everyone (or even that would matter if everyone were perfectly rational and had enough knowledge and understanding). I could function perfectly well in such a world, but I don’t think it’s the world we actually live in.

A happy life is by definition desirable to the person living it. But it is not self-evident that it is rational or reasonable for other people to value it, especially strangers.

Sure, they can be called good. But the mere fact that you call a something that I might do “good” because it makes some stranger happy is not self-evidently a reason for me to do it. Why should it matter to me that you define a word in a certain way? Morality cannot be established by linguistic fiat.

It’s appropriate to question everything. The burden is on those who claim that there are objective (or for that matter, universal) moral principles to make the case. You can’t just declare yourself the winner by default.

If it is a rational belief.

Look. I agree with you in that I believe that there are moral principles that will commend themselves irresistibly to any sufficiently rational person with enough understanding. (Which is only to say that there are moral principles that everyone is already committed to at a deep level, just as anyone who accepts Euclid’s postulates is committed to accepting the Pythagorean Theorem whether he realizes it or not.) But this isn’t so merely because I say it’s so, or because everyone (more or less) has an innate feeling (hunch? intuition? instinct?) that there are objective moral principles. Such hunches or intuitions have proved to be wrong too often in the past to be considered reliable. (Look at Euclid’s postulates!) It is necessary to produce a convincing argument, or to show people by some means that they do indeed accept these principles at a deep level, just as Socrates showed the slave boy that he “really” believed the Pythagorean theorem, even though he had no idea (initially) that he did.

Agnos1

bd:Thanks for your very insightful and thorough reply. I hadn't given up on you.

I'd like to know the extent of your expertise besides mathematics which leads you to some of your conclusions. Not that I trust authority entirely, but I might be more inclined to question such statements as "dominating women and being racist is hardwired" (vs. learned behavior) if I was talking to Joe Schmoe who simply had an opinion. I'm not being flippant. Much of what you say makes sense and I want to be able to take it to the bank.

Regarding compelling evidence, it would be persuasive perspective that would make me change my beliefs/views. Referring to your own words, explanatory "principles" that work better than others are more compelling to believe in.

I understand and concur with your definition of physical laws vs. the "conceptualization" of those laws. The strange barrier between the "mind" which conceptualizes and that which is "outside" the mind is something I'd like to pursue later.

Now, descriptive vs. prescriptive, since presciptive principles are based on and reflect descriptive realities, how is this different from the mind conceptualizing reality? If we find irresistable principles deriving from reality, then I see little distinction between these principles (i.e. morality) and 1+1=2 which is also prescriptive in the sense that I say the orderliness that I observe "should" be construed as certain mathematical theorems and because of the persuasiveness of these theorems they are deemed "true." Please tell me where my thinking doesn't "add up."

If mathematical truths are tautologies, and tautologies have nothing to do with reality, then bringing moral truths up to the level of tautology would make them at least as irrelevant as math, which I think we agree interests us very much and is not irrelevant.

I had said: "Comparisons in the animal world, for instance, show that morals and ethics are even more universal than previously considered, since many species have been experimentally shown to display morality."

I want you to pursue this link and tell me what you think. I've read the book by this researcher, Frans De Waal who is the leading behavioral anthropologist working today and seems his evidence for animal morality is compelling evidence to me.

<a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0674356616/ref=pd_sim_books/002-8826662-0980815?v=glance&s=books" target="_blank">http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0674356616/ref=pd_sim_books/002-882666 2-0980815?v=glance&s=books</a>

If this link didn't set up properly simply go to amazon.com and look up "good natured."

Now this is very interesting and helpful. By separating emotion from learned notions of morality and saying that they are part of our built in equipment (like it or not) I can now say, "Jonny (the amoralist), don't blame morality for people's feelings of emotion; they're going to have emotional reactions whether they subscribe to your perspective or not." Am I reading you right here?


If this is true then you may be of immense help to me.

I had querried: "Can we therefore not come up with some basic and objectively sound moral principles, such as rational behavior as well as thinking is "better" than irrational?"


Why can't a principle of such an irresistable nature not be considered "true?" Wouldn't it constitute proof if it is detrimental not to behave or act in accordance with a principle which conforms to studied rational thought? Especially if natural selection has guided these principles through time and across species.

I had said: "... consciousness exists within the physical world, not apart from it."

Why is it so controversial? This harks back to the seemingly arbitrary "barrier" between mind and matter which I mentioned earlier, and that I feel is almost mystical in nature, this notion that the mind and thought are separate from concrete reality, much like the supernatural world would be. Wouldn't this "non-controversial" type of thinking let the proverbial religionist's foot-in-the-door? If such a mystical "mind" exits, why not "God?" How can you fault the religionist who believes in the supernatural when you believe the "mind" exists in some sort of altered state, transcending the physical world? Not to fret--if the mind can be shown to be the synergistic sum of all brain parts and functions, the paranormal is kept safely within the realm of irrationality and wishful thinking.

The mind can make up all sorts of things which aren't objectively true, as you say, but those things which conform to reality, and I allege that fundamental principles of morality can be part of this, are said to be objectively true.

Me: "we are hardwired for certain emotions and reactions to environment which then extends later on to the level of morality."

You: "saying that an action is right cannot mean that we are “hardwired” to react to it in a certain way."

De Waal does a pretty good job of explaining how emotions are part of a building-block-like structure that does result in morality/ethics. It's not that emotions = morality, but they are PART of it. Imagine having no emotions involved when witnessing a crime. Could we attribute or even want to claim that the act was moral or immoral? Can it not be that morality is both biological as well as cultural?

If we could collectively decide that killing was right, that one's personal property was up for grabs, then I would think morality was truly subjective. But since certain fundamental moral principles remain "one-way," I'm drawn toward the objectivist approach. I can't say I'm not torn though.

I would only disagree with this statement insofar as humans have a high degree of empathy, and empathy is exactly the trait needed to achieve the "self"-evidence needed to say that other people basically feel as I do about many basic things, including the desire for a happy life.

Me: "Actions that promote the most good or do not hamper good can themselves be called good."

You: "Sure, they can be called good. But the mere fact that you call a something that I might do “good” because it makes some stranger happy is not self-evidently a reason for me to do it. Why should it matter to me that you define a word in a
certain way? Morality cannot be established by linguistic fiat."

I should have been more assertive. Actions that promote the most good or do not hamper good are good.

Me: "It is through reductionism that these fundamentals are questioned and I say it's not appropriate to do so."

You: "It’s appropriate to question everything. The burden is on those who claim that there are objective (or for that matter, universal) moral principles to make the case. You can’t just declare yourself the winner by default.

What I meant was that by breaking down behavior looking for that physical and non-existent quanta of morality is like trying to dissect the brain looking for the mind..it can't be done. You've hear the adage "the whole is greater than the sum of its parts." There are numerous examples in nature of this fact and through parsing we can easily end up missing the forest for the trees. I'll stop with the cliches now.

Me: "The rational belief in objective moral principles is NOT the same as the irrational belief in the supernatural." This in fact is what the amoralist is saying.

You: "If it is a rational belief."

Why are you unwilling to commit to its rationality, given everything you have said about it? "there are moral principles that will commend themselves irresistibly to any sufficiently rational person with enough understanding...

I agree. I think it will be shown that although ethics are arrived at using the power of reason, and rational people will see their merit and embody moral principles. It won't just be I like green and they like red--which one of us is right?? Morality itself will be seen, and it has been shown to be driven by NECESSITY and by evolutionary imperatives, to include humans but not to exclude other animals. Like 1+1=2, Consciousness + Self-awareness + Empathy = Morality every time.

[ September 15, 2002: Message edited by: Agnos1 ]

[ September 15, 2002: Message edited by: Agnos1 ]

[ September 16, 2002: Message edited by: Agnos1 ]

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[ September 16, 2002: Message edited by: Agnos1 ]</p>

dk

dk: In an objective sense? Are you saying what is known theoretically about reality is objective, but practically subjective?

Keith Russell

Greetings:

(From the 'I've said this a few times before, but you may not have read it yet Dept.' ...)

'Objective' does not mean independent of the mind, though that is often how the term is used.

The term for the idea that knowledge or concepts exist independently of the mind is 'Intrinsic'.

And, the term for things which have no existence independent of the mind is 'subjective'.

So, when one's concepts correctly model (correspond to) reality, one's concepts are 'objective'.

Concepts don't exist independently of the mind, but objective concepts were not developed entirely from mental input, nor do they exist solely in 'reality' itself.

Keith.

Keith Russell

bd-from-kg said:
"Principles of any kind cannot be "observed" in reality. Nor can moral principles be "derived" in any reasonable sense from observations of any kind."

bd, the above is a claim; it is not an argument.

And I disagree.

Keith.

The AntiChris

I have to admit I was a little puzzled by by the second part of bd's statement.

Chris

Ted Hoffman

I apologise to everyone in case I raise issues that have already been settled. Please refer me to the right page in case you would like me to read some article. I have only read the first two pages.

The AntiChris asked: So can anyone, preferably someone who subscribes to the existence of objective moral principles, explain what qualities/characteristics a moral principle would need for it to be considered objective?

I do not subscribe to the existence of objective moral principles.

Why?

First, its because I beleive that morality is dynamic and is an artifact of civilization (just like human rights - but that is a topic for another thread). Evolutionary ethics (as cooperative ethics) also indicates that morality can help us as a species to survive and live together in harmony as a society.

Going by that, if eating pizza happens to endanger the lives of people or makes life uncomfortable, it will be declared unlawful and later immoral (not necessarily in the same order).

(I understand objective morality as one which states whatever it states as right or wrong irrespective of viewpoint of interpretation. Not a universal one - because universal beliefs and values are intrinsically subjective. Unless AntiChris can tell us the working definition that is applicable here since I understand [from Darwinian ethics] that objective morality can also naturalistically be one that is rooted in human nature - our genes)

Secondly, objective morality (which I beleive is an agent of moral realism) assumes that ethics and/or morality will remain fixed, non-contigent, necessary and eternal.

Being eternal, cosmically fixed and non-contigent are the very antithesis of human beliefs and morals (which are temporal, dynamic and based on purpose and need) would make objective morality be non-natural and extra-human.

This implies existence of a supernatural being who set out these objective moral values. The problem with this is that the argument is self-subverting since it:
(1) assumes the inability of humans capability to use their intelligence to come up with moral values
(2) it assumes existence of an unexplained being (it must be a being since morality can only come from sentient beings)
(3) It makes morality arbitrary since if such a being decides to change the moral rules, humanity will have to adjust accordingly (the euthyphro dilemma).

Helen's argument that God does not change is false because in the bible God changes his mind, regrets, loses his temper etc. And a God that does not change is incapable of action.

In summary, even if an objective morality in the first sense existed, the term objective (in the sense of impartiality, and non-subjectivity) would be misleading because extra-human does mean objective. It would be subjective to that being.

If by objective morality, you mean the morality rooted in human nature, then still the word objective loses meaning because if we had evolved differently, then it would also be a different set of morality. So that would make this so-called "objective morality" a result of (ie subjective to) a chaotic and unpredictable process and thus the term "objective" (in the sense of something that already exists) would lose meaning because its nature would be based on the results of a process (evolution).

In any case natural selection does not necessarily eliminate members with bad moral values.

The AntiChris wrote : However, many atheists do indeed subscribe to a theory of objective moraliity and this is what I'm interested in.

Objective morality is prescriptive as opposed to subjective morality which is descriptive. I would like to know which atheists subscribe to the theory of objective morality and how they explain the fallacies and inconsistencies inherent in such a concept.

Do you have any names? Links?

My morality is based on Kants universalism test. If the application of an act on a universal scale results in more harm than good, then the act is immoral. More importantly, is the case of logical contradictory test: is the results of an act thwarts its own purpose, then the act is wrong.

dk said: I submit that objective morality exists, and that the proof is independent. What proof? I submit Children that haven’t reached the “age of reason” benefit from morality irrespective of their religion, civilization, nationality, race, etc… In this light I don’t see how anyone can reasonable reject the objective nature of morality.

As was observed before, this was not sufficiently coherent to have any meaning. If you later explained it, I would appreciate it if you told me which page has your explanation.