Gunnaheave

Sorry, I didn't have time to catch up on the whole thread, but I'd like to toss my 2 cents in for what it's worth. I think it is a mistake to approach the issue in terms of 'isms', a framework which already biases the whole discussion towards absolutes. When one asserts that a proposition is true whether that be a descriptive propisition or a moral stance, the meaning of the affirmation need not normally address the scope of universality/relativism in doing so. Questions about relatvism/absolutism come about as a kind of secondary rationization, but why pretend this is an abstract problem (unless you are committed to a universal position via the deus ex machina)? The question isn;'t whether or not truth or morality in general are absolute; the question is whether or not one's commitment to any given proposition needs to be qualified by recognition of any given contingencies (cultural, linguistic, etc.). In the end, one doesn't have to decide once and for all whether all propositions are universally valid or relative, one may get a cline of different degrees of truth, ranging from the clearly relative to those propositions tending towards universality.

Thus, if I assert that one shouldn't wear a pink hat with a blue dress and yellow shoes, the assertion is relative to fashion standards, which most would easily grant to be relative. I have yet to encounter a fashion fundamentalist ("NO, it's wrong in all times and all places!") If I assert that it is morally unacceptable to marry one's Mother's Mother's Mother's Mother's Mother's Sister's Daughter's, daughter's daughter's, daughter's daughter, I get a proposition which some will affirm without hesitation (Navajos - because that would be someone of the same clan, and hence a violation of incest taboos), and others would deny (E.g. most Anglo-Americans, a causin far-removed - who cares). Although the implications are far more removed, this generally falls in the range of acceptable relativisms to a number of people. Most of the Navajos I know acept that non-Navajos can marry such individuals, but remain adamant that no Navajo should do it. Propositions about kinship norms are thus relative to the kinship systems in which the speaker operates, or at least to which the proposition is intended to apply. If I assert that it is wrong to kill or torture small children, I get an assertion which most will be reluctant to qualify in terms of relativity. But of course it's a rather theoretical question. I can think of no society in which it is generally acceptable to do such a thing (though I can point to ways in which just about every society qualifies this under some conditions of non-membership - before you think of cannibalism just look at U.S. foreign policy). In any event, lacking a practical framework in which the assertion would require modification for a given cultural background, the assertion stands as a tentative absolute. It carries the force of an absolute until there are concrete grounds for reconsidering the matter.

What I am talking about is replacing abstract debates between relatvism and absolutism with a more grounded discussion of the contingencies behind validation of different assertions. What many a relativist actually advances isn't some ironicaly universal cognitive theory, so much as a concrete concern to see that affirmations are not uncritically carried beyond the context in which they were generated. If it is absurd to assert that Everything is relative, it is equally absurd to add words like absolute to propositions you have already affirmed. If the 'absolute' part merely means the propoisition is truthful, then it's a redundancy. If it goes beyond that towards a suggestion that no contingenies could countermand the trut or the proposition, then such claims eclipse by definition the very grounds of the original affirmation. Where could such a blank check come from other than a God (on a machine)?

mhc

But "absolute" isn't a synonym for "truth". So the "absolute" part wouldn't *merely* mean that the proposition is truthful. "Absolute" would be a description of the kind of truth the proposition exemplifies.

Please facillitate my understanding by telling me what the ground of the original affirmation is. No particular affirmation appears to be under discussion, so the ground you refer to must be something universal, applicable to all affirmations?

Gunnaheave

mhc:

Point 1)

"But "absolute" isn't a synonym for "truth". So the "absolute" part wouldn't *merely* mean that the proposition is truthful. "Absolute" would be a description of the kind of truth the proposition exemplifies."

Three points:

a) Please note the "If" that is included in the portion of my argument that you quote here. It's not a synonym, you're right, but the meaning of a sentence isn't just a function of its component words. This is a plausible construction of absolutism as SOME peope advance it.

b) Note then that the second hpythetcal in my own post is intended to suggest something similar to your own position in the last line above.

c) I was trying to address a range of poential uses of the term, from those who add 'absolute' as a kind of intensifier, (as if to say "it REALLY REALLY is true, no REALLY!") to those trying to qualify an assertion as being necessarily immune to qualification by relative contingencies. If the former possibility doesn't strike you as a plausible interpretation, then so be it. I suspect that some do use the term in such a manner (perhaps disengenuously so), but if none do, then the matter goes to the second interpretation. My overall point does not rest on the alternative you have singled out here.

Point 2)

"Please facillitate my understanding by telling me what the ground of the original affirmation is. No particular affirmation appears to be under discussion, so the ground you refer to must be something universal, applicable to all affirmations?"


No particular proposition is under discussion, which is part of the problem, as I see it. In any event, my test doesn't presuppose a particular universal ground for all assertions. My point is that such grounds vary with the circumstances of the discussion, but that attempting to assert that a proposition is 'absolute' is (if it is taken to mean 'immune to possible contingencies') by definition going beyond the grounds of any reasonable affirmation. Such things are furthermore unnecessary. the affirmation itself is sufficient to vouch for the truth of a given proposition, and merely adding 'absolute' to the matter serves to do little other than beg the question.

On the other hand, (and forgive me if I'm being paranoid here), I suspect that you are trying to catch me in a self-referential paradox. I am asserting that one should approach these matters on a case-by-case basis, but I am asserting the matter generally. Fair enough. Though I deny asserting a universal ground for all propositions, I must admit that I have made universal assertions. is this self-referentially inccoherent? I don't think so. For one thing, I haven't denied the possibility of absolutes; I have suggested that the relativity/absolutness of a value is itself should be approached as an empirical matter applying to particular propositions rather than dealt with in one sweeping judgement. For another, the universal scope of a categorical proposition is a function of the meaning of the proposition itself, whereas the universality of truth or morality would be a function of the universality of a metastatement about the first. A relativist need not assert for example that when people assert universal propositions that they really mean them to be particular propositions; rather the question is whether or not the grounds for affirming those propositions are themselves universal. I maintain a proposition with universal implications, but i do not maintain pre-emptively that that assertion is itself immune to contingencies, or that it is not potentially subject to relative value systems, etc. Thus, the truth that I assert is a relative truth, though the scope of its relative application seems to me rather broad.

By way of example, consider the three propositions I already listed. Each has it's own grounds for affirmation (norms of fashion, norms of kinship systems, and norms of ?) Insofar as the grounds of the first two can be shown with reasonable accuracy to be based on values limited in scope to particular social systems, the truth (or, alternatively, the moral weight) of the propisitions becomes relative to those particular systems, and they become meaningless outside of those systems. The third example, I offer as a possible candidate for a practical universal. Barring an adequate revalation of cultural contigencies making it relative, one need not regard the matter as relative (though a pre-emptive absolutism would be unhelpful here). Thus, I am suggesting that one speak of norms as relative to the extent that they can be demonstrated to be meaningfully predicated on contingent epistemological or ethical systems. One shouldn't speak of values as relative in an absolute epistemological sense, and absolutism simply adds nothing to this framework. A theoretical assertion that a value is absolute /immune to possible contngencies strikes me as metaphysical gamesmanship (and these always fail as far as I can tell), but a practical/default assumption that the evaluations apply universally stands until the a demonstrable link to contingencies with practical implications can be shown.

long winded fool

How about proper application of logic will lead to truth. All times that logic does not lead to truth it is because it is being improperly applied at some level. (see below)

...perhaps you mean "an illogical conclusion is cannot be logical"

This is obviously true, (and redundant,) but what I mean is that a false conclusion cannot be logical and therefore must be illogical.

All cats are canines.
I have a pet cat.
Therefore my cat is a canine.

While this is a logically valid argument, it proceeds from a false assumption and reaches a false conclusion and is therefore unsound. The argument has a valid syllogism but a false conclusion, and is therefore illogical. A false conclusion derived from true premises must necessarily be illogical as well.

All cats are felines.
I have a pet cat.
Therefore, my cat is a canine.

Invalid. So therefore, all false conclusions are illogical. Perhaps "absolute falsity" would be a more relativist-friendly term than absolute truth, though absolute falsity implies the existence of absolute truth. By determining what's false, we systematically eliminate all absolutely untrue things, and could one day theoretically be left with absolute truth.

Wrong. Logic is a product of the human mind. There are many forms of logic with differing conventions, paradoxes etc.

Forgive a long-winded fool for a moment, but I'm only aware of one kind of logic and a huge number of examples of misuse of that logic. Like the various conflicting theories on the origin of life, there is only one actual origin and there is only one actual form of logic.

Reality is enormously variable.

Can you give an example of material reality, apart from strictly mental perception, being variable from one individual to the next? I mean, maybe Jesus would qualify, but I doubt he'd be admitted as an example here.

Wrong. Logic is not a god susbstitute.

Don't you mean "God is not a logic substitute?" Doesn't this imply an assumption that, on some level at least, logic is absolute?

Truth for humans does not exist outside of human perception. Whatever it is that's out there doesn't have little labels proclaiming "True" and "False" - the mind infers truth and falsity by comparing our perceptions of whats out there.

The laws of physics do not have little labels either, yet most would agree that they exist independently of human perception, (though this is unprovable.) The mind infers the understanding of the laws, but the laws exist regardless of the mind. The laws of logic and cause and effect exist in the same way as the laws of physics do as the way the space-time continuum executes itself. The laws of logic are even more fundamental since they are prerequisite to the laws of physics. We may be in error about specifics (in fact we must certainly be in many cases) but the absolute laws of logic, whatever they might be, (identity, non contradiction, excluded middle?) are still in effect and always have been.

Yes, but what is truth and how do you tell?

Doesn't matter. Must every single physical law be proven absolute in order to assume that all physical laws are absolute? But as I stated earlier, eliminating absolute falsity is a good (and perhaps the only?) way to uncover absolute truth.

..but such belief in the existence of absolute truth is without foundation!

Nonsense. If truth is not absolute, it must be relative, and as such learning from the past would become a meaningless notion. To assume we can learn to a certain degree because, though truth is completely relative in certain cases, it tends to be reliable most of the time is not logical. This is nothing more than assuming an entirely arbitrary system of applying truth whenever it works and retreating from it when it doesn't solely because it supports the relativist's illogical conclusion that truth is necessarily unequal, yet also relative.

False. Relativism does not state that all views are equal - indeed this would be an absolute truth claim! How would you propose we measure our closeness to absolute understanding?

Without an absolute claim, relativism must state that all views are equal in value or lack thereof. Any inequality places unbalanced value on something, which begs the question, "By what authority does this thing have more value than the next?"

We do not need to measure our closeness to absolute truth. We only need measure whether or not we are moving in the right direction to discover it, and the only thing needed for this is critical thinking.

Their madness being relative to how hard you poke them in the eye?

Absolutely!

Gunnaheave

Long Winded Guy:

"Any false conclusion is always the result of an improper application of logic. "

It seems to me that at least this proposition collapses the process of evaluating premises with that of assessing the validity/cogency of an inference. As a practical matter, which I'm sure you understand, correct logical form can produce a false conclusion from false premises. One can always use logic to bring existing premises under scrutiny, but outside of 0-premise proofs such as a redctio one cannot eliminate the element of judgment that goes with evluating the particular premises of any given argument. So, no, I don't think it is fair to say that logic garuntees (sp?) a true conclusion. The best one could say that is that proper application of deductive logic garuntees that one cannot derive a flase conclusion from tryue premises. but not that this makes the truth of the conclusion RELATIVE to the truth of the premises. Logis is thus a tool that one may use in combination with a number of evaluative strategies (which will be made in terms of the cultural/linguistic norms of the person doing the analysis) to help determine the truth of a proposition. Logic itself might even be deemed universal to the extent that every known language has negation and either conjunction or dysjunction, these being the linguistic features necessary to construct all the relations of formal logic. But, two qualifiers:

1) The universal features of logic work in conjunction with variable grammatical systems to foreground vastly different themes, thus generating radicaly different conceptual fields. If logic is universal, it is in this sense but a component of any cognitive system, and those total systems can normally be shown to have relative features other than logic.

2) The significance of logical features in a system for evaluating language (e.g. an applied logic) is itself relative to the interests of a given ideology. The universal applicability of logic does not amount to a universal significance, because not everyone gives a shit, and none of us do at all times and all places (we don't shout 'ad hominem' at a stand-up comic, at least I don't). Whether or not logical values are the most salient feature of a stretch of discourse is relative to the cultural norms applicable to the particular social context (including established genres, or fashion of speaking) in which the utterance was made.

Thus, logic, as a system is a viable case for a universal, but it does not undermine the case for either cultral or linguistic relativity.

…yes, I CAN have my cake and eat it too!

mhc

hmmmm. I think that the universal applicability of logic remains unaffected by what people know or say. Just as it isn't necessary for anyone to have knowledge of arithmetic for 2+2=4 to remain true.

John Page

Hi Longwind:

How would you tell that its being improperly applied, as opposed to man's system of logic being flawed?
Right, so the truthfulness of a conclusion is relative to: a) the accuracy of the premise(s) and b) the efficacy of the truth-telling process - such as logic - in determining what the accuracy of the conclusion will be when compared to reality.
Again, this is a definitional statement, but how do you tell what is false? How about "All false conclusions are contrary to god's nature" and other attempts to claim "I know the real truth"?
Predicate Logic, two-valued logic, three valued logic, propositional logic, dialetheism, paraconsistent logics, boolean logic.... which is the one "true" kind of logic?
No, I am bound by my mental perceptions. Material reality seems to be all a change, the syaing "nothing lasts forever" comes to mind.
I'll stick with my original - I believe the concept of god preceeded that of logic. How do you think this implies logic is absolute?
The laws of physics were invented by humans to rationalize to themselves the behaviour of reality - i.e. the laws describe the behaviour, they do not determine the behavior.
ROFLMAO!
Yea! Logical proof of relativism!
Arbitrary? Truth is a relation and can vary by degrees.
Authority? It does not appear to me that things need any authority to have the values that we perceive in them. Why do you have a problem with relativism admitting inequality - we can sense the difference between things and those differences can be detected as different from the differences between other things - this is reality, all is relative.
...and how do you know you are moving in the "right" direction?

Cheers, John

John Page

2+2=4 is only true when performed (according to the applicable rules of arithmetic).

Mind experiment: There is a point in time when no living being knows of arithmetic as formal method of counting and deriving the sum of quantities. Can any of those living beings show you that 2+2=4? No, of course not.

The concepts arithmentic are contained in people's minds, it is you and I who use our brains to determine that the quantity two and another quantity two produce the quantity four. You can write the symbols on the blackboard all you want but for anyone that hasn't learned artihmetic they're meaningless.

Furthermore, that you have learned and can apply artihmetic's rules consistently to produce the same quantity from the same math question means that you have a repeatable, reliable, process in your mind.

Have I convinced you?

Cheers, John

mhc

Your single typo "arithmentic" surely could stand for the whole post

Have you convinced me?
Not quite, but I do see your point.
I am trying to put together a picture of your position.
I believe you would say (have said) that to be is to be conscious. In other words, being is predicated on knowledge of being.
Is that a fair assessment?

John Page

Damn. There goes another entire universe of thought.
Hmmm. My bad example. Perhaps I should have "information processing thingy" rather than "living being". In any event, the result would have to be meaningful and not just happenstance.

I haven't fully thought through the example of a computing machine that takes 2 and 2 and produces 4 - the answer is only meaningful to an entity that understands arithmetic. However, that does not mean that an arithmetic operation cannot have utility and function without understanding. Do we really understand why and how two plus two equals four? I think Russell came up with something.... but we are not all Russell.... curioser and curioser....

Cheers, John