stretch

So, basically you're saying that in order to be a viable concept, such a concept must be imaginable (including mathematical representations), and since the abilitly to imagine (or do math) differs across individuals, there are just certain concepts that are never going to be unversially acceptable and/or understandable?

If so, that makes sense to me. If not, if you don't find this topic too, too boring, maybe you could explain.

exnihilo

1. hate
2.ignorance
3. guilt

that, my friend is god in a nutshell.
--exnihilo

Philosoft

Well, I haven't actually said anything about what a concept must have; I've only tried to explain why I think certain things are not concepts.
Actually, as I consider myself a rather philosophically ignorant noncognitivist, I'm always willing to expound on this topic, in hope of learning something. I think we can consider "things" as materially existing or potentially existing. I call these concrete things and abstract things, respectively. There are many differences, but both types share the attribute of logical possibility. So, while a winged pig might not be a concrete thing, it does not present a logical contradiction and is, therefore, a thinkable concept.

An important distinction between the two types of things is that physical (concrete) things can directly affect other physical things whereas abstract things cannot directly affect physical things; this is definitively true about both types. It becomes problematic when we try to mix attributes - non-physicality with the ability to affect physical things, for example. These other types of things, which I'll call D-things, are usually postulated by merely mixing existing attributes, without regard to thinkability. I can't even ask for a thinkable example of a D-thing because we can't think about them in the first place. At this point, they're just haphazard collections of attributes with arbitrary names.

stretch

Which I interpret as meaning you are trying to explain why certain groupings of words, as in the proposed definition, do not constitute a meaningful concept of any sort. (Just checking to see that we're on the same page.)

Your definition of 'thing' then, excludes anything that is not potentially material. Which means it would exclude concepts such as justice? Is 'justice' thinkable?



But you can define D-things, right? So the general class of 'unthinkable things' can be coherently defined?

Philosoft

Close enough.

Yes, but it isn't a thing.
From my perspective, D-things usually contain definitive contradictions. I once believed they also describe logical contradictions, but I'm not sure I can show that.

stretch

Would I be correct in assuming that you consider god to automatically belong to the class of D-things? Or just the proposed definition above? Or neither?

Given that most definitions of god claim that god is not material, maybe it doesn't fit the D-thing category at all (?)

Philosoft

I don't know about god(s), but I would definitely call God a D-thing.
But they also claim God can affect physical things, and that fulfills my requirement for mixing attributes.

stretch

But it doesn't seem to meet your earlier definition of 'thing' as being either material or potentially existing .... where I assume you were talking about being potentially materially existing ....

but maybe you meant something else ....

Philosoft

That's part of the point - God is not a thing according to the categories of things of which I am aware.

stretch

Of course not ... if you say that things must be material, and God isn't material, God can't be a thing.