Skepticos

Keith Russell states:

"Ayn Rand said that sensations (percepts) tell us that something is, but they don't tell us what something is. For that, we must use reason."

I am not sure how this statement supports perceptual realism - a position, which I believe, is defended by Objectivism.

For, we perceive objects, and these objects may simply be products of the mind and not representative of anything external. Or, on the other hand, they may very well be representative of something external. So, it is true that the senses do tell us *that* something exists, but they, in no way, can assist us in determining whether or not such existences are external to the mind.
We can use the faculty of reason to identify various objects of perception, such as a computer monitor or a tree. But how does this process help us determine if these identified objects are external to the mind? What role is accorded to reason in this context? How can reason tell us that our perceptions are representative of something external? In my judgment, it cannot.

Does this mean that there is no escape from the egocentric predicament? I think that's a very good question.

- Skepticos

Keith Russell

Skepticos:

You're right, reason doesn't tell us whether or not something is external to the mind. Reason is the process of validating, proving.

Existence cannot be proven; existence is the basis of proof.

Objectivism accepts 'existence exists' as an axiom.

Keith.

Skepticos

Keith Russell states:

"You're right, reason doesn't tell us whether or not something is external to the mind. Reason is the process of validating, proving.

Existence cannot be proven; existence is the basis of proof. Objectivism accepts 'existence exists' as an axiom."

Concerning the first paragraph:

If neither the senses nor reason tell us that what is perceived is external to the mind, then how does Objectivism defend perceptual realism?

Concerning the second paragraph:

Understood. But my point is not to ask for a proof for the fact that something exists. That's a given, and obvious to the child and the mentally challenged. I am inquiring into how Objectivism defends perceptual realism. Objectivism (as I undertand it) states that what is perceived corresponds directly to an external world. I want to know if this belief is simply a presupposition, or is founded on some sort of argumentation. I recognize that an Objectivist argument for perceptual realism has been provided in this thread (see my posts above), but I don't see how the second paragraph is germane to the topic.

- Skepticos

[ October 15, 2002: Message edited by: Skepticos ]</p>

Keith Russell

Skepticos:

Objectivism accepts the validity of the senses to provide accurate data about an external world, because there is no evidence to support any other conclusion. Reality cannot be 'proven', but it is self-validating. Thus, I accept it (as does Objectivism) as axiomatic.

We can imagine other scenarios (the 'evil magician', or 'brains in jars', but they aren't backed by evidence. They are [i]arbitrary[i/] in that they cannot be disproved, but they cannot be proved, either.

(For me, personally, there have been numerous times when I was sure of something, and yet I was wrong.

If I was imagining all this, that couldn't/wouldn't happen.)

But if you're want me to offer some kind of 'proof' of existence, I cannot help you.

Keith.

[ October 15, 2002: Message edited by: Keith Russell ]</p>

Skepticos

Keith Russell writes:

"Objectivism accepts the validity of the senses to provide accurate data about an external world, because there is no evidence to support any other conclusion."

This sounds like the default position. X is accepted because there is no (and there can be no) evidence for non-X.

"Reality cannot be 'proven', but it is self-validating."

Again, I am not looking for a validation of "reality" per se, but for the manner in which Objectivism defends the view that the senses are valid.

As I understand it so far, Objectivism states that the senses are valid because any argument used against its validity assumes its validity, due to the fact that all conceptual knowledge is founded in the senses. So, if we take our argument against the senses to be sound, then we undercut the very foundation which imparts validity to the argument: the senses.

In my opinion, I understand the foundational nature of Objectivist epistemology. There is an axiomatic foundation to the hierarchical structure of knowledge, and this foundation lies outside the province of proof because "proof" consists in the reduction of all knowledge back to this foundation.

- Skepticos

Keith Russell

Skepticos:

I think you've answered your own question.

Objectivism accepts the validity of the senese, because there is (and cannot be) any evidence that the senses are not valid.

Such 'evidence' would have to come from the senses--and if they weren't valid, the evidence which they provide [that they aren't valid] couldn't be trusted.

Keith.

Skepticos

Keith:

Actually, *you* answered my question in earlier posts. I just constructed my own wording of your earlier replies.

I thank you for taking the time to respond to my posts. Cheers!

- Skepticos

Keith Russell

Skepticos:

You're more than welcome. Glad to be of help...

Keith.