CRDbulldog

I want to thank echidna, LaDorissima and Marz Blak for their responses. I have printed them off and will take them to work with me tomorrow where I hope to have some time to read them and compose a reasoned response.

My son starts back to school tomorrow and we have been busy getting him ready to go.

Thanks again,

CRDbulldog

JerryM

I think it's interesting to explore the theist's position that morality comes from God (or some supernatural deity). There are some logical problems with this argument. What is it that actually makes something "good?" The theist will say that something is good and moral because it is commanded by God; or, it is in accord with God's will. But then we can ask (as did Socrates) does God command it because it is good, or is it good simply because He commands it? I hope everyone can see the subtle but definite difference here. If He commands it because it is good, then in a logical sense, "goodness" must already exist independently of God, or the quality of "good" is logically anterior to God. If something is good precisely because He commands it, then it doesn't quite make sense to say that God is good (unless we say that God commanded himself to be good--not very logical.) The theist can argue that "good" derives from God's nature--it is simply God's nature to be righteous--but then we can ask how did God get to be good. Was there a greater God who made Him good or commanded Him to be good? And this still implies that goodness existed even before God did. These are some subtle philosophic points, but I hope this is understandable. I think it shows that there are some logical difficulties with the claim of a theological basis for morality.

Marz Blak

Indeed; I would agree with your position, that logical problems and question-begging abound in the positing of an omnipotent, perfectly benevolent god (from which third-party subjective moral laws are derived).

What do you think about arguments for the existence of an objective morality apart from positing a god as its source/author?

[ August 15, 2002: Message edited by: Marz Blak ]</p>

JerryM

I think there certainly can be an objective morality, the term "objective" meaning something which is readily apparent to most people and upon which most people will agree. And this morality can be determined by the study of history, science, and human behavior. True, ethics does not have the same degree of objectivity as physics or mathematics--it's more akin to biology, or maybe psychology. But I think an excellent ethical system can be based on a rational and compassionate understanding of human beings' motivations and desires and how we live in society. Isn't that really why we study history? To learn what the consequences of people's choices and actions have been?

bd-from-kg

CRDbulldog :

I have to agree with pug846 and Marz Blak that you have not only failed to establish a “natural basis for morality”, but that nothing remotely along these lines can possibly do so. Some of my comments will inevitably echo theirs, but hopefull they will contribute something since they are coming at the queistion from a somewhat different direction.

Now already this raises a serious question. Are you talking about (1) objective reasons why I choose to “live by” certain principles and you choose to live by (possibly different) principles, or (2) an objective criterion by which, when our principles conflict, it is possible to determine which is “correct”? Unfortunately the bulk of your post seems to be devoted to a discussion of (1). This is a waste of time. We all agree that there are objective reasons why I do the things I do, and you do the things you do. But this sort of thing is a part of the science of psychology, not moral philosophy.

No problem. To avoid misunderstanding, let’s put these words in the mouth of an imaginary Smith. Now Smith says: “Integrity is all very well most of the time. But occasionally situations arise where it is clearly not in my interest (even my enlightened, long-term interest) to be truthful, to return things to their rightful owners, etc. Similarly with “fair play”, etc. It’s true that violating these so-called “principles” is often (though not always) not in the interests of “society”, but what’s that to me? For example, if I cheat on my wife (and get away with it) I can have a lot of fun. True, I’m undermining the institution of marriage very slightly, but this affects me very little. Similarly, if I keep a wallet containing several thousand dollars that I find lying on the ground, I may undermine very slightly people’s trust that everyone will always act honorably, but what’s that to me compared to gaining several thousand dollars?” These are pretty good arguments. Your answer seems to be that Smith is mistaken; that it is never the case that his self-interest conflicts with the principles of integrity, fair play, etc. This is just wishful thinking. You can’t deal seriously with moral questions until you admit what everyone knows: that it is sometimes in one’s self-interest to violate moral principles.

You say yourself that it’s hard to live by [moral] principles. Why do you suppose that is? Isn’t it because occasions arise where it is clearly not in one’s self-interest to do so?

So let’s try this one again: in what sense is it “self-evidently good” to adhere to these principles when it is not in one’s self-interest? (Remember: since you are claiming to locate a “natural” basis for morality, you may not appeal to some mysterious “innate moral sense” that you can’t account for naturalistically.)

Much of the rest of your post is devoted to pointing out that natural selection will favor those who act in certain ways. From this you conclude that evolution provides a “natural basis for morality”. But this argument fails both logically and practically.

First, from a logical standpoint, the conclusion simply does not follow from the premises. Your reasoning is basically of this form:

(1) A disposition to act in certain ways tends to result in differential success in reproducing the genes of those who have it, and thus will be favored by natural selection.
(2) Therefore the kinds of acts in question are morally right.

It need hardly be pointed out that (2) does not follow from (1).

The argument fails practically in that it proves far more than that you want it to. For example:

(A) A disposition to impregnate as many women as possible will (under some conditions, at any rate) certainly tend to result in differential success in reproducing one’s genes, and thus will be favored by natural selection. Does it therefore follow that it is morally right to try to impregnate as many women as possible?
(B) A disposition to kill all the men and rape all the women in a population that has been defeated in war will tend to produce differential success, etc. Is this policy therefore morally right?
(C) A disposition to enslave members of societies other than one’s own when the opportunity arises will tend (under the right conditions at least) to produce differential success, etc. Is this policy therefore morally right?

Innumerable examples of this kind could be given. In reality natural selection favors a great many kinds of behavior, some of which we would be inclined to call “moral”, but many of which we would not. Thus, not only does (2) not follow logically from (1), but it is not even the case that as a matter of fact (2) is true whenever (1) is. There isn’t even much of a correlation between kinds of behavior for which (1) is true and those for which (2) is. The apparent plausibility of your argument derives entirely from focusing exclusively on cases where both (1) and (2) happen to be true.

Interestingly, in a later post you discuss a southerner in the ante-bellum South who opposes slavery and suffers for it:

This won’t do. For it to make sense, you would have to appeal to some “higher-level” principle than “whatever behavior is favored by natural selection is right”. But you never explain what this principle is. And it’s hard to see how you could come up with any such principle that could plausibly be called “natural”. If it is opposed to the behavior that would be favored by natural selection, in what sense is it “natural”?

Let’s put this another way. You say that you think we all have an “innate moral sense”. But you now admit that this innate moral sense sometimes tells us to do things that are clearly against our own self-interest and will not lead to differential success in reproducing our own genes. If so, this innate moral sense cannot have been produced by natural selection; indeed, it would have been selected against. So how do you account for its existence?

In any case, you’ve been taking it for granted that statements of the form “Acting in accordance with principle X is morally right” actually express propositions, and thus can be meaningfully said to be true or false, and further, that we all have pretty much the same understanding of what propositions they express. The first part is not self-evident, to put it mildly; a great many moral philosophers deny that such statements express propositions at all. And the second part is flat-out false; there is not any general agreement about what propositions (if any) they express. Thus you have been putting the cart before the horse from the start. The first question that you need to grapple with is whether such statements (or moral statements in general) really express propositions, and if so, what propositions they express. Until you get reasonably clear on these points your entire presentation here is basically meaningless.

dk

Oops, wrong thread

[ August 19, 2002: Message edited by: dk ]</p>

K

bd-from-kg:

While I feel that morality is not objective, I do think that CRDbulldog is correct in postulating a morality based on survival of the fittest.

There are a couple of ways at looking at survival of the fittest. The one I use is that a successful organism will live long enough to reproduce AND ensure that at least one of its offspring lives long enough to reproduce (and from there the cycle continues). Our species has very few inborn natural defenses against predators. A human being is hopelessly outmatched when pitted (physically) against many of the other members of the animal kingdom. How is it then that we made it indisputably to the top of the food chain - especially considering how long it takes for our offspring to become self-reliant? Our brains and the language and social groups they allow. These aid us not only in protection but also in providing food and other necessities.

Groups composed of individuals with traits that would tend to keep them together would thrive, while those that didn't would dissolve and expose their members to the dangers of non-united life. If an individual knows that he/she can trust the other members of the group, different members will be free to specialize in areas of survival knowing full well that the remaining needs will be met by other members.

With this in mind, I would contend that the integrity (or morality if you like) is just a name for the traits that help build a strong group. Our morals are then passed on to us through our DNA. Therefore, while an individual may be helped by not acting in a moral way, there is an inborn desire to act morally. The reasons for this desire are not readily apparent to the individual and would be called "integrity for integrity's sake". However, it is really just a drive to create a strong group that will allow us to raise our offspring to be successful (in a Darwinian sense).

Why would we ever act in an immoral way? While it is important to remain in a group, there is also a strong sense of self-preservation and a drive to reproduce. This is due to the fact that our genetic information is carried by individuals instead of a queen as with ants or bees. There are situations when these selfish drives are at odds with the morals defined above. Different individuals will be genetically predisposed to choices that tend to be closer to moral or immoral behavior. This range of morality is accepatble for what are generally considered gray area. For individuals displaying extremely immoral behavior, there is a natural tendency for other members of the society to try to remove them from the offenders gene pool (prison, death penalty).

What does the future hold? This is a tough one. Since we are now undoubtably at the top of the food chain and we have huge societies that are capable of providing our basic needs plus, is it safe to assume that the qualities that allowed us to form tight knit groups will still remain important for survival? Some obviously will, but I would guess that others will lose importance only to be replaced by others.

The main point is that while I believe that morals do have a perfectly natural basis, I also believe that that same nature has and will continue to cause an evolution of those morals.

bd-from-kg

K:

You say:

But if you believe that morality is not objective it would appear that there is really very little that you think CRDbulldog is correct about, especially regarding his views on morality.

[Note: Obviously the statements below about what you and CRDbulldog believe are “as I understand you”.]

CRDbulldog is claiming that there is an objective basis for morality, and that this objective basis can be located in the evolutionary process. Now when someone claims that there is an objective basis for morality he means that there is an objective basis for determining whether specific moral statements (such as “It was wrong for John to keep the wallet he found on the street instead of returning it to its rightful owner”) are true or false. And this, of course, implies that such statements are objectively true or false, which in turn implies that morality is objective.

You, on the other hand, do not believe that morality is objective. That is, you believe that statements like “It was wrong for John to keep the wallet” are not objectively true or false, or in other words that they do not express propositions.

Now the vast majority of people believe that moral statements like “It was wrong for John to keep the wallet” do express propositions – that they are true or false in themselves, regardless of anyone’s opinion or attitude. Your position entails that this belief is mistaken. Thus if Smith says that it was wrong for John to keep the wallet but Jones says that it was right, your position is that they are equally correct – that there is no objective basis for saying that Smith’s opinion is true and Jones’ opinion is false. In particular, one cannot decide between them by referring to the evolutionary process – by determining, for example, whether natural selection is more likely to favor a disposition to have Smith’s opinion or Jones’s.

Thus, when you speak of “a morality based on survival of the fittest” all that you can mean is that a disposition toward behavior, attitudes, and perhaps beliefs, of the sort that are generally regarded as “moral,” can be explained in terms of natural selection. You cannot mean that such beliefs are more “objectively valid” than beliefs about what’s “right” and “wrong” that natural selection would select against. On the contrary, you hold that the term “objectively valid” is meaningless in this context.

Thus your position is essentially that natural selection can explain why it is that most people mistakenly believe that some moral statements are objectively true and others objectively false. CRDbulldog’s position, by contrast, is that natural selection provides an objective basis for distinguishing between moral statements that are objectively true and those that are objectively false. Obviously these positions have little in common.

K

bd_from_kg:

You are absolutely correct. I think I linked the common origin of morality in the views of CRDbulldog and myself. However, as you summed up exactly, I believe it's nonsensical to say those morals have any objective truth value.

Marz Blak

I've only just popped back in and had a brief look at this, but at first glance I would say that this evolutionary argument makes sense to me, mainly because it explains the tensions we all seem to experience between altruism and self-interested behavior, between the interest of the individual and the interest of the group, between the interests of the smaller group and those of the greater group, etc. It is an interesting formulation. I may have more to add (assuming I am adding anything ) once I've had a bit of time to digest it, as it were.

That said, I should also add that bd-from-kg's explanation of the fundamental differences between the positions of K and CRDBulldog is a very clear and cogent one, in which I see no fault. It is also a very helpful bit of reasoning for me personally.

I have long felt that morality and ethics were inherently subjective fields of philosophy, in the sense that I have failed to see how any so-called 'objective' approach failed to be free of some presuppositions that I did not feel to be at least arguable. At the same time, it is also apparent that to many (maybe even most) people, the idea that all morality and ethics are ultimately subjective is, well, a morally difficult position to hold (indeed, to many people, calling someone a 'moral relativist' is intended as a profound slur against his or her character, as I am sure those who read this will agree), to the extent that, to my reading, much of what passes for the postulation of objective moral theories is oddly similar in its structure and underlying approach to theology.

Perhaps not so oddly, at that, when one considers all the parallels....

In any event, it has occurred to me that this discomfort with the idea of morality being subjective is so apparently widespread among people that it would seem reasonable to theorize that it might have some evolutionary basis. The posts I've read here have given me a good deal to think about and work with in this regard.

My thanks to you all for the posts.

[ August 21, 2002: Message edited by: Marz Blak ]</p>