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Luiseach,

Warning: I am not all that familiar with philosophy of mind. The following contains much speculation.
Does this mean that the spotted unicorn I am now picturing in my mind is a physical phenomenon? Or is it more likely that the brain is the physical phenomenon (object) which produces the non-physical mind? By non-physical, I distinguish those objects which can only exist in time. If time were to stop, the physical brain (with all its chemicals) would still exist, but the non-physical "field"(?) that brain produces, which is the mind, would not.
I disagree. I think that "the brain's concept of itself as a unified whole" is self-consciousness (at best), rather than consciousness or "the mind". And self-consciousness is nothing more than the awareness of my thoughts: I am aware that I am aware. I am aware that my body is separate from the rest of reality, in that "I" am encased within its boundaries.

There is more to the mind than merely having a concept of the brain as a unified whole, such as picturing spotted unicorns. Taking my unfounded, much-guessed-at, "field" theory above as true, may clarify the statement of my last post: "Your mind isn't divided. The content of your mind is." The mind itself would be the field created by the brain as it processes chemicals, etc., through time. The content of your mind is your awareness of yourself or your picturing of unicorns, within that field (or via that field).
It seems more reasonable to me that we would have developed the concept of the whole elephant (upon seeing one) before we mentally separated and categorized its component parts.

John Page

Correct, thanks.
Yes, I was refering to the latter. Each of our minds/brains contains concepts, if this were not so the mismatches/misunderstandings wouldn't be possible.

Cheers, john

John Page

1. Think of the split brain examples - these are examples of split minds.
2. Yes, physically altering the elephant doesn't cause the thought to be divided - nevertheless the concept of half an elephant is separate than the concept of a whole elephant and this divisible!!

Cheers, John

John Page

Yes, not an actual physical external unicorn but the concept of a unicorn physically existing in your mind/brain.
Yes.
Why? How can one perceive an elephant if its sub-concepts don't exist in the mind?

Cheers, John

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John,
A concept may be divisible, but the question is whether the mind is divisible.

(Next Post)
A concept has no physical existence, but it may have a physical counterpart in the form of chemicals in the brain, etc.
How do you reconcile this affirmation with your previous statement that the mind is divisible?
By seeing one.

Luiseach

The mind is itself a concept, and therefore, like all concepts, is spatially divisible.

Concepts are products of physical processes; therefore they have physical existence.

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I disagree, in that I see the mind as being the medium in which we deal with all concepts, including the concept of the mind.
I would have agreed if you had said the "mind is a product of physical processes," rather than using the term, "concept". A concept, as I see it, has more of a subjective connotation (and is less-inclusive, as I responded to your last point), in that it is dependent upon understanding and meaning. The word "elephant" brings to mind an image or some understanding of the animal it points to, but I doubt that the chemicals in our brain have any awareness of such an animal. The mind is emergent, which means it requires the whole body working to produce it, as we know it.

John Page

A concept resides in/is a part of the mind, therefore, if a concept is divisible then so is the mind.
An instance of a concept does have a physical "counterpart" and is therefore divisible.

Generally, when we refer to a concept we mean the "same idea" shared intersubjectively by two or more minds. In this case, not only is the concept physically divisible in each thinker's mind but severally so since it is physically divisible in all thinker's minds.
I don't see an issue or contradiction, please explain.
Your response to my question "How can one perceive an elephant if its sub-concepts don't exist in the mind?"

OK so you physically see and receive sense data about what is generally understood to be an elephant. My argument is, however, that one couldn't perceive the thing to be an elephant because you don't understand what an elephant is. Example: You cannot understand or perceive the mathematical process of multiplication before you understand the concept of addition.

Cheers, John

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John,
I think that even split-brain patients work with one mind, even though the physical underpinnings of that mind might be separate (compared to the norm). Perhaps it depends upon whether you view the mind as being subjective or objective. If it is objective, then where does it exist in reality?
A physical counterpart does not mean that a concept and the physical processes that give rise to that concept have the same properties.
I would even say that the physical processes which give rise to certain concepts may be the same within each person's brain, but the mind is the subjective experience of that brain, which must remain whole since it is an emergent property of that brain. As mtdew said previously:
If you agree with the statement that "the physical brain produces the non-physical mind," then you agree the mind is non-physical. If it is non-physical then how can it be spatially divisible in the same way the brain is?
I'm going to have to give this some more thought before responding.

Edited to omit an agreement I didn't mean to make.

John Page

So you are a dualist?
?? But points of view are objective or subjective and the mind is not a point of view.
How not so? The properties that you ascribe are dependent on your point of view - if you're only talking about the physical aspect then this excludes informational properties.
...but is divisible as the brain is divisible, even though the brain may be considered whole.
Just because something is abstract doesn't mean it is completely divorced from physicality.

Cheers, John