sodium

I would agree that it would be possible in principle to emulate a conscious mind without creating a conscious mind. For example, a giant stack of cards with questions and responses might somewhat emulate a conscious mind, but would have no internal processes. However, an emulation that copied both internal and external processes would be conscious. So I deny premise 1.

Premise 1 appears to assume that consciousness cannot be reduced to the physical. So, I'm trying to figure out why you would come to the conclusion expressed by premise 1.

As for interactionism, I would like to have this view specified with a bit more precision.

1) What information is input to the mind from the brain?
2) What information is output by the mind to the brain?
3) How does the input and ouput occur?
4) What tasks (if any) does the mind perform?
5) How did this state of affairs come about?

I'm not really looking for the right answer here, just a plausible answer that fits with what we know about the brain, and avoids some of the philosophical problems of epiphenomenalism.

Metaxy

I said it was an existent and distinct phenomenon. Many materialists acknowledge that, and merely assert that it has a physical basis. The first premise (though somewhat limiting of the cases where my argument applies) doesn't automatically restrict it to non-physical cases.

Metaxy

OK, OK, I get it.

If interaction doesn't hold, consciousness wouldn't be able to influence the physical universe to make us able to acknowledge we are conscious. And if it does hold, you would be able to see the point where it interacted with the physical world by observation and also disprove my argument.

I hereby declare that line of reasoning dead until further revision

boneyard bill

Sodium writes:

And consciousness can't be reduced to they physical, ergo: materialism is false.

Materialists usually counter this in one of two ways. The neophyte answer is: We just haven't had enough time. Science is still working on this problem. This is an argument from faith. I agree that science is still working on the problem. I also conclude on the basis of statistical analysis that there's a 50% chance that scientific discoveries will lead us closer to a solution and 50% chance that they will us further away.

The more sophisticated answer is that we have reduced consciousness to matter and physical law. All of human behavior can be explained with reference to it. It is only this little problem of qualia that the non-materialists keeping bringing up that creates difficulites. But since qualia doesn't help solve any significant scienticfic problem it must not exist in spite of our strange intuition that it does.

This answer presupposes materialism. But just because materialism can theoretically explain all observable phenomena doesn't mean it has done so correctly. The Ptolemaic theory also explained all observable phenomena. If a new problem arose you just add another epicycle. Likewise, materialism can add automatisms to its explanations indefinitely. Can't explain this behavior? Make it an instinct or drive.

I don't believe this is quite correct. If there is what you might call an epiphenomenalist school, I believe it is a materialist view. The popular anti-materialist view of the moment, advocated by David Chalmers, is called Naturalistic Panpsychism. This view accepts epiphenomenalism as a logical outcome of its view. But the position itself is not labelled as epiphenomenalism.

This position, which as noted I don't believe is properly called epiphenomenalism is even less justifiable than the materialist position. The problem with Chalmers and his school is that the accept that materialism has explained behavior correctly

I would argue just the opposite. The existence of qualia (which, after all, should hardly be subject to debate) proves that the materialists have not sufficiently accounted for behavior. If they have accurately accounted for behavior it should include a role for qualia and then it should be their responsibility to find a reductive explanation for qualia to justify their position.

The problem with Chalmers' approach is that he separates qualia from information. He then concedes that materialism can explain behavior solely with reference to information. But qualia is information. So the real question is why we get our information in the form of qualia. The information we receive, after all, is digital: photons, nerve impulses, etc. But the information we experience is analogical. Why is that? I don't believe the answer can be given in materialist terms.

This aptly illustrates Chalmers' problem. He accepts entirely too much materialism to make his project viable. Who says belief is called by a physical state? Where is the proof for this? Chalmers said his proposal was a crazy idea. On the contrary, it isn't nearly crazy enough. It's just materialism-lite.

I don't quite get this point. What is the difference between qualia and experience. The "biological experience" in question is pain. The qualia in question is pain. How does the materialist explain the pain? It is quite unnecessary from a materialist point of view. I don't see how this creates a greater problem for Chalmers than for the materialist. In fact, I don't see how the materialist can even talk about these questions without reference to qualia. They just substitute more concrete terms like "pain" or circumlocutions like "biological experiences."

You are full because of the qualia of being full. How does your substituting the phrase "biological experiences" for qualia explain anything? We have an experience of the world and that experience is information about the world (and, of course, about ourselves). That information that we have is qualitatively different from the information we received. Hence it is qualia. But it is not not information. That is the problem with Chalmers' approach. He separates information from qualia and therefore becomes incoherent. But I don't see where the materialist becomes any more coherent by substituting "experience" for qualia and then declaring the problem solved.

boneyard bill

markfiend writes:

How did you arrive at that conclusion? Are you making that claim by presupposing that materialism is true? If so, the claim can hardly be used to prove materialism. But the truth of materialism is the issue this thread is all about.

boneyard bill

Contracycle writes:

Please, tell us what those reasons are. Or are the reasons merely that you presuppose materialism to be true in the first place?

Wyrdsmyth

Don't equivocate abstraction with a necessity for the supernatural.

What is the implication? That computer software must also work "by magic," since the software deals with many abstractions, even though it is rooted in hardware? Calculators deal with abstractions and higher forms of math -- are they tapping into the supernatural realm?

There is nothing inherently supernatural or 'divine' about thought, morality, math, logic, or any other abstractions in life. And there definitely does seem to be an analog between your consciousness and your blood-filled brain. A DIRECT analog. A head injury can radically affect your 'abstract mind.'

If only it were true that our 'abstract minds' were disembodied, immortal, indestructible, etc. Sigh...

sodium

I've presented arguments for why the alternatives to materialism do not make sense. Maybe I'm being irrational, but let's not throw the f-word around

Define qualia.

The point is that adding epicycles made the Ptolimaic theory appear more arbitrary, more kludged to fit the facts. I think that's quite different than the case with materialism, where various events are simply interpreted according to the theory.

So, are you an interactionist then? If so, what is your response to the questions I posed for interactionism?

When your brain goes through the proper procedure, this is pain. This procedure is responsible for, among other things, proper avoidance behaviour. So, the brain goes through a procedure that is desirable for our survival, and we refer to this as pain. That's quite different than claiming that our brain goes through a procedure, and we have an experience that somehow corresponds, but it isn't clear why this correspondence exists.

So, are you arguing that the "qualia" theory is to be preferred because it is a shorter phrase than "biological experiences"? In fact, I was only using the phrase to contrast with the hypothetical non-biological experiences. Biological experiences are really just experiences.

Don't you mean that the sensation of being full is a qualia? I don't think anyone contends that the fullness itself is a qualia. It's just something that happens to your stomach.

If "qualia" are just a way of describing first-person biological events, then all these philosophical problems disappear.

Dominus Paradoxum

A ha. So what we have here is a Searlian physicalism. That is, if we call our experiences physical that will make them so. The problem, of course, is that there can be no such thing as to 'first-person' biological event. If an event is first-person, then it is subjective, whereas biological events are objective, i.e., accessible from the third-person perspective. The qualia are not. Ergo qualia cannot be identical to third -person biological states. Q.E.D.

boneyard bill

Sodium writes:

If you claim that science will solve a problem someday and therefore you will believe it today, that is faith. It also happens to be the argument I hear most often from materialists when it is pointed out that we do not have a reductive explanation of consciousness.

Qualia are sensations. The five senses. Sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell. Is this question controversial?


BB:
Sodium replies:



What is an instinct? What is a drive? These are labels that apply to observed behaviors. But they explain nothing at all. If qualia play no role in our behavioral patterns or if qualia do not exist, then our behaviors must be explained in terms of automatisms, such as an instinct. But, as noted, these labels really explain nothing at all. So materialism sacrifices a possibly meaningful explanation for behavior in favor of a faux explanation. The point isn't to explain behavior. The point is to preserve materialism at all costs.

I'm not familiar with the interactionist position so I can't say that I am or am not. As for the questions you posed, I haven't read them. If they are on this thread I will reply when I get to them if they do not assume so much knowledge of the interactionist position that I am unable to understand them.

I haven't any idea whether my brain is going through proper or improper procedures when I feel pain. Pain is when it hurts regardless of what the brain is doing.

Pain has nothing to do with the brain. Pain is when I hurt. It may be that there are muscles pinching a nerve or there may be lots of signals going around that cause me to feel pain. But they are not the pain. They are biological processes but they are not biological experiences. Experiences are not biological. Experiences are psychological. Qualia are not identical to processes of any sort. They may be caused by them, but they are not identical to them.

Since experience is one thing and a process or procedure is something else, I don't see what the mystery is. Of course it isn't entirely clear why many things that science studies correspond. That's why we call them "laws" of science. The correspondences are always there and we can't reduce them to any more primary causes so we accept them as fundamental relationships and use the laws to explain instead of trying to explain the laws.

I'm not using any theory. I'm claiming that qualia exist as a fact. Unless you are blind, deaf, olfactorily impaired, out of touch, and tasteless; you have to admit that qualia exist. The term qualia is vastly preferable to the term "biological experiences" not because it is shorter but because there are no such things as a "biological" experiences. As I noted earlier, experiences are psychological, not biological.

Yes. At least we agree on something.


BB asks:
Sodium replies:
Perhaps. But then we're left to ponder the great incomprehensible question of just what is a "first-person biological event."