Koyaanisqatsi

Yes, I know, which is why I clarified my argument so that you could actually address it instead of avoiding it with this rhetoric.

So you're agreeing with my initial assessment of theistic "reasoning."

Thanks for taking the long way around back to my initial observation.

Except that it would not be possible for you to "verify" that there are only two apples, if there are actually five apples. That's what the word "verify" means. Thus, you would be demonstrated incorrect and I would be demonstrated correct according to the evidence at hand.

You can deny that you have been demonstrated incorrect, but that won't change the facts of the matter.

See how simple it is?

And just exactly what are these presuppositions you keep asserting I have? Since you seem to be intent on making this "dueling presuppositions" and all, I thought it would be nice if you would detail what mine are (pre)supposed to be.

Yes, they are. One conclusion is unsound (aka, unsupportable), since it does not follow or correspond to the facts.

I think what you're trying to argue is that one conclusion is believed to be sound in spite of the evidence which demonstrates it to be unsound.

This is, again, called "denial."

And the difference is what? Considerable?

A "solipsist presupposition argument" is a not only internally redundant, it's an absurdity. To whom would a solipsist make such an argument? No one but the solipsist exists.

No, special pleading only applies when something is equivalent in form and function.

I would want my presuppositions (whatever those may be; I'll wait) to be analyzed in the same manner one would analyze any other presuppositions. If one's presuppositions are based on illogical constructs, then they can be demonstrated to be unsound.

Whether the one presupposing either acknowledges or accepts their presuppositions to be unsound or not is irrelevant to whether or not they are unsound, yes? That is, after all, the point of a debate.

Unless, again, you're going to argue solipsism, in which case, again, there is no point in you debating or even responding to any of us figments of your imagination.

How so? If you are the solipsist, then nothing exists outside of your own mind, including a god. If you claim that a god exists independently of your own mind, then solipsism is void and objectivity obtains.

I hold no beliefs. Atheism; without belief in a god or gods.

When have I "condemned" others for simply having presuppositions? I was "condemning" (your word, not mine) theists for having irrational presuppositions; a presupposition that the bible is true simply because the bible says it is true (or, to be more specific, that the claims made by the authors in the bible are true because the authors say they are true) and little to nothing else. It is to the irrational nature of such a presupposition that I made my initial observations; observations that you have affirmed in spades.

If you and I were to engage in a debate and you could demonstrate that my "presuppositions" are just as irrational as your own and in the same manner that yours are irrational, then perhaps my observation that yours are irrational would be "special pleading," but until you could do that, it would not be special pleading for me to argue the irrational nature of your presuppositions, yes?

Take your "solipsist presupposition argument," for example. If you had argued it in a debate, all I would have had to do is concede it as proof of its invalidity.

In other words, "denial."

If it can be demonstrated that one's system of verifiable evidence is fatally flawed (or, in the case of theists, non-existent as a necessary condition), then the beholder must relinquish said system or else simply deny that such a demonstration has been conclusive, yes?

And yes, that would mean conclusive to the individual as well as to those engaged in or following the debate.

In case you're going to trott out solipsism again, it takes at least two to debate, so either you grant objectivity or maintain solipsism, in which case, the debate is pointless and therefore ended.

Considering our own interchanges, however, the evidence for my existence outside of your own mind is more than compelling to disprove any claims that you are the solipsist to anybody but yourself, apparently, which, either way would mark the end of the debate, yes? If you claim that you are the solipsist, then you've negated all purpose for debate.



It does if you're going to continue to argue a "solipsist presuppositional argument" from absurdity.

Does this mean you are granting my objective existence and therefore discarding any kind of "solipsist presuppositional argument" from absurdity?

No, that is your issue, not mine and you haven't demonstrated how my "belief systems" are circular in the same manner that the theists of my observation are, let alone that they are circular or even "beliefs." For it to be special pleading, they would have to be equal in form and function.

Kindly recall that it was the irrational quality of the theist presuppositions that I based my observation upon, so if you can demonstrate that I have like irrational presuppositions, then and only then might an argument for special pleading be valid.

You have failed to provide an example of what my "circular reasoning" is supposed to entail or that such alleged circular reasoning is equivalent in form and function to the circular reasoning I pointed out in my initial observation (thus rendering your "special pleading" argument moot for the time being), so while yet another cute rhetorical statement, it remains little more.

But, thanks for demonstrating objective reality by replying to my post and not just awakening to your solispsism and making us all disappear. I've got a date tonight, so that will come as a relief to both myself and my girlfriend.

theghostinthemachine

---------------------------------

Oh, I forgot. God died and made you the judge of rational arguments and it just so happens that you - as judge - find none of the arguments convincing. Thanks.


I am glad that you can admit that you have no respect for "the intellectual merit of the personal god concept that rules theism." Whatever that means...? However, your scathing rebuttal of the ontological argument impressed me.

<snip>

Again, we get a "I don't care" from you. I think you are a coward.

mosaic

What basic beliefs? You're not going get out of this by being vague. And the point with the questions was that the debate if pointless if you hold to your position. There is no point in responding to him. Your argument cannot be better according to its own conclusions, therefore what is its purpose?

And where did you imply belief is all that matters? Explain away what exaclt you meant by scientific methods. You imply they are somehow different, not merely erroneous. This applies to the bullet wound example. If you dont recognize a qualitative difference exists between " believe based on evidenc" and "I belive based on my personal inclinations," then this is the consequence. You're claiming boith are personal inclinations which reads to me as a ridiculous equivocation.

And no I dont get it because I dont see why I should have to presuppose I have the authority. How are you not presupposing by implying that we might not? . Did I decide that I have the authroity to think? To reason? I automatically do both so its a presupposition on your part to suggest that I might not have this authority. This sounds like the transcendental argument.

Normal

Wow, so are atheistic believes! Special pleading

Whoa, easy there champ, I can easily verify there are only two apples, who is stopping me? You're the one that's wrong here.

You can deny I have demonstrated only 2 apples as well, but that won't change the facts of the matter.

See how easy that is?

Read: What I [you] believe is true.

You are concluding one thing based on evidence, I'm concluding one thing based on evidence. We can claim the other is in denial all we want, but that's not much of an argument, now is it?

Sigh. I mean the presupposition is solipsist, meaning it's all that's needed to be authoritative about the beliefs of an individual. It was a bit of a play on words on my part, if you don't get it, don't bother.

What you believe is illogical? There, that was easy.

Of course, but the fact that everyone has presuppositions kind of puts a big question mark on why you were previously condemning only theists to this practice.

It's a non sequitir because I never claimed it was a solipsist argument, you did (oh wait, does that mean it's a strawman?). My previous play on words (solipsist presuppositional) did not cognitize with you, so consider it irrelevent to the conversation.

Internal belief you arn't stating: I believe there is not sufficient evidence to warrent a belief in god.

The thing is: all presuppositions are based on value judgements. You cannot argue that circles are better then squares to someone who likes blocky things over round things.

See above.

Sure, never needed that argument in the first place.

Here's your irrational presupposition: "I believe that what I believe has an authority on truth"

I've demonstrated it repeatedly, here are a few highlights

"I believe that what I believe has an authority on truth"
What I [you] believe is true.

theghostinthemachine

I simply pointed out your insulting attitudes towards theists (because you are cowards) and now you say I am bitching? It seems none of you have anything at all positive to contribute, and are just content to stick with the insults. And when theists leave the forums, it turns into a mighty "we refuted their arguments and sent them running." Grow up.


No, it is because I presented an argument using modalities, and not one person refuted the actual argument, and instead claimed that I simply switched the words "will" and "must" I have been through that debate too many times to waste time on it any longer with untrained atheists. In modalities, and possible worlds, necessity, possiblility, and actuality, there is a big difference between 'will' and 'must'. But leave to the resident atheists to claim a philosophical victory when they get the last word. So be it, but do attempt to refute the actual argument, and show the theorem that proves that the premise in question is a necessary truth - not one person did that, and yet they all claimed a victory. It reminded me of a young earth creationist debating Kennith Miller on evolution. The atheist in this case would be represented by the YE, the por fellow thinks he is right, but....he just does not understand the premises and arguments being presented. Take it for what it worth, but do some online research and be honest about it.




That would interesting to see.

Argumentum ad Absurdum - look it up. Atheism is not a default position - why not pantheism, or agnosticism, or any other positions. The burden of proof is on the one making the claim, be that claim "God exists" or "God does not exist"

"God does not exist" is a positive claim so far as logic is concerned. This what written by an atheist who is getting his Ph.D in philosophy:

"1. what is 'the burden of proof'?

in informal reasoning, 'the burden of proof' refers to a generic
discursive obligation, incurred by anyone who asserts a positive claim,
to demonstrate that his or her claim is true.

the fallacy of 'shifting the burden of proof' occurs when someone who
makes a positive claim places the burden of proof on an interlocutor who
denies or questions the truth of this claim. this is a special instance
of the fallacy known as argumentum ad ignorantiam, in which lack of
falsification is taken to imply verification, or, equivalently, when
lack of verification is taken to imply falsification.

2. what is a positive claim?

in general, a positive claim refers to any claim which predicates
something of x or of all members belonging to the set of x - in other
words, any claims of the form 'x is y' or 'all x is y.' notice, however,
that for all claims P, where P = 'x is y' or 'all x is y,' P inherits a
burden of proof just in case P is not analytically true - that is, just
in case y is not predicated of a particular x or of all x's by
definition. for example, the statement "a bachelor is unmarried" does
not incur a burden of proof, since "unmarried" is predicated of
"bachelors" by definition.

3. is 'the burden of proof' governed by formal logical laws or
principles? does it constitute a 'profound principle of logic'?

strictly speaking, no. rules governing the 'burden of proof' are
procedural and need not apply in all possible modes of discourse.
in formal logic, for example, propositions are neither presumed true nor
presumed false. a proposition can be regarded as true or false WITHOUT
any kind of supporting evidence, merely for the purposes of analyzing a
piece of reasoning which contains the proposition in question as a
premise. also, in exclusive disjunctive dilemmas of the form p V q, one
can show that p is true merely by showing that q is false. once one has
shown that q is false, no further evidence is required to show that p is
true.

4. how does 'the burden of proof' function in debates about the
existence of god?

as kant has shown, existence is not a real predicate. therefore, any
statement of the form 'x exists' is necessarily synthetic, since the
predicate 'exists' does not belong to the definition of any possible
subject x. therefore, it follows that a statement p, where p = "god
exists," is synthetic, irrespective of how "god" is defined.

but if p is synthetic, then anyone who asserts that p incurs a strong
burden of proof with respect to the truth of p. moreover, since p is a
positive claim, it is improper for anyone who asserts that p to shift
the burden of proof to those who deny that p.

notice that a statement q, where q = "god does not exist," is also a
synthetic positive claim and therefore inherits the burden of proof as
well.

5. does this mean that all propositions carry a default presumption of
"false"?

no. from a logical standpoint, propositions qua propositions are simply
sentences which are either true or false, but are neither presumed true
nor presumed false.

procedural rules governing the burden of proof do not apply to
propositions qua propositions. rather, they apply to *beliefs* about the
truth or falsity of propositions, since any informal assertion of a
proposition entails a concomitant statement of belief regarding the
truth or falsity of that proposition.

example: x asserts that "p is q" = x believes that "p is q" is true.

as we have already established, if x asserts that B, where B is a
synthetic statement of the form "p is q," then x inherits the burden of
proof with respect to the truth of B. but "x asserts B" is equivalent to
"x believes that B is true." thus, to say that x inherits the burden of
proof with respect to the truth of B is simply to say that x inherits
the burden of providing justification for his belief that B is true; it
is not to say that x inherits the burden of proof with respect to the
truth of the statement "x believes that B is true," which is necessarily
true just in case x asserts that B.

we might say, then, that all beliefs that B is true, where B is any
synthetic proposition, carry a default presumption of unjustified unless
and until they are justified. this does NOT mean that all synthetic
*propositions* B are presumed false unless and until justification is
provided for the *belief* that B.

<proof>

1. suppose x asserts that B, where B is any synthetic proposition of the
form "p is q"
2. as we have already established, x's assertion of B is equivalent to
an expression of x's belief that B is true.
3. let C = "belief that B is true"
4. C is either justified or unjustified.
5. since C involves a positive claim, C inherits a strong burden of
justification with respect to the truth of B.
6. since C inherits a strong burden of justification with respect to the
truth of B, it follows that C is prima facie unjustified (that is, C
carries a default presumption of unjustified unless and until
justification is provided for C)
7. suppose that there is no extant justification for C.
8. suppose y claims that the fact that there is no extant justification
for C entails D, where D = "B is prima facie false."
9. "B is prima facie false" is equivalent "it is prima facie not the
case that B is true," which is equivalent to ~B
10. as we have already established, y's assertion of D is equivalent to
an expression of y's belief that D is true.
11. let E = "belief that D is true"
12. E is either justified or unjustified.
13. since E involves a positive claim, E inherits a strong burden of
justification with respect to the truth of D.
14. but the only forthcoming justification for the truth of D is the
fact that C is unjustified.
15. but lack of justification of C does not entail justification of E.
16. therefore, unjustified beliefs that p do not carry a default
presumption that p is false.

this proof shows, among other things, that those (e.g., skeptic) who
maintain that "all propositions are prima facie false unless proven
true" are guilty of committing a special epistemic form of argumentum ad
ignorantiam.

- njj"

Like the modal refutation of the omniscience/freewill contradiction, this will likely go right over your head as well. Such is the trouble one runs into when the atheist will go to any length to defend thier faith in atheism.

B. H. Manners

Let's keep things nice and not fall into the insult trap.

Steven Carr

You wrote there :- 'There is no free will/omniscient contradiction. The only conclusion that can be drawn from the claimed contradiction is that God knows that X will do A at T1. Not that X must do A at T1. If God knows infallibly that I will do X at T1, this only states that I will do X at T1, not that I must do X at T1. There are propositions in the argument that would have to be necessary truths, which they are not.'

Well, let me present Plantinga's argument, according to independent sources (not untrained atheists)

http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_w...roblem_of_evil

''On Plantinga's example, where S is a situation in which Curley is free to take or refuse a bribe, it is either true that "If Curley were to be free in S, he would take the bribe" or "If Curley were to be free in S, he would refuse the bribe" (note that only one can be true). These truths about what we would freely do in possible situations help make us what we are, and are timelessly and necessarily true -- and so, crucially, out of God's hands.'

So it appears , that when you claim that that these propositions would have to be necessary truths, you overlook that Plantinga himself considers them to be necessary truths.

If it is a necessary truth that Curley would accept the bribe, then clearly Curley both will and must accept the bribe.

The proposition is true, and true propositions cannot be rendered false by Curley or by anybody else.

If Curley cannot render false the proposition 'In Situation S, he will accept the bribe', then clearly he must accept the bribe.


http://www.philosophos.com/knowledge...ions_1030.html explains it in terms that even I, an untrained atheist, can understand.

'The standard answer to the question, what is natural necessity? is that propositions that express natural necessities are general propositions that support counterfactuals,or 'contrary to fact'
conditional statements. (This is the answer given by the American philosopher, Nelson Goodman)'

So Plantinga's true counterfactuals are necessary truths, contrary to your claim that they are not.

(Of course, Curley will still FREELY accept the bribe, but he will not be able to render a true proposition false, obly Christian apologists can do that)

theghostinthemachine

First, the thread in question is not debating free will and the problem of evil. Secondly, the below argument, which was formalized by an atheist named Ed Stoebenau, makes the disticntions clear.


"1) God's knowledge cannot be wrong.
~<>(B & ~A) & ~<>(~B & A)
2) God knows that I will do A.
B
3) If I have free will, then (I can do A) and (I can do ~A).
F --> [ <>A & <>~A)
4) If I can do ~A, then it is possibly true that I will do ~A.
<>~A --> <>~A
5) If it is possibly true that I will do ~A, then God's knowledge that I
will do A is possibly false.
<>~A --> <>(B & ~A)
6) If God's knowledge that I will do A is possibly false, then God's
knowledge can be wrong.
<>(B & ~A) --> ~[~<>(B & ~A) & ~<>(~B & A)]
7) Therefore, God's 'knowledge' that I will do A is not possibly false.
~<>(B & ~A) from 1, simplification
8) Therefore, it is not possibly true that I will do ~A.
~<>~A from 5 and 7, modus tollens
9) Therefore, I cannot do ~A.
~<>~A from 8, restatement
10) Therefore, it is false that (I can do A) and (I can do ~A).
~(<>A & <>~A) from 9, but I cannot recall the name for this argument.It is valid.
11) Therefore, I don't have free will.
~F from 10 and 3, modus tollens

The way I see it, only premises 1, 3, and 5 are needed for the argument.The argument isvalid (sic), and I view (1) and (3) as both being true. Premise (5):

5) If it is possibly true that I will do ~A, then God's knowledge that I
will do A is possibly false.
<>~A --> <>(B & ~A)

I do not see as obviously true. It is not of a form which is necessarily valid in modallogic. It would be if B were necessarily true, for in that case anypossible world in which~A was the case would also be a possible world in which B was the case.But B was notconsidered necessary in this argument, nor do I view B as necessarily true:it would seemthat B, for an infallible agent, would be true only in those possibleworlds in which Awere true, and false in any possible worlds in which A was false. Thus, Ido not considerthis argument sound. That does not mean I consider that there is not a problem between free will and omniscience which includes complete prescience, see usenetarticle<35e03eaf.4295574@news.vt.edu> by me.)

In addition, I should mention that there seems to be a theorem in S5 modallogic whichcould be used in the above argument to make it a sound one. But thetheorem is not oneI've seen proved, and is highly counter-intuitive to me, that I won't useit in this post. Nonetheless, if someone could off the list prove the following I could useit in anomniscience/free will argument:[](a v b) --> []a v []b"


I am afraid you have seriously misunderstood the argument. Plantinga was very careful to note this distinction. Here it is:

(with regards to free will and omnisceince)

"(49a) Necessarily, if God knows in advance that X will do A, then indeed X will do A.

(49b) If God knows in advance that X will do A, then it necessarily follows that X will do A."

(49a) only states that X will do A, (49b) states that X must do A. The atheological argument needs (49b) to elicit a contradiction. The only thing (49a) states is what you have unwittenly agreed with above (and which I never denied) - "It is necessarily true that God knows that proposition P is true, then P is true. But it does not follow that if God knows that proposition P is true, that proposition P is necvessarily true."

God, Freedom, and Evil p.67

And in the example given by you and the infidels at Wikipedia, Plantinga is speaking about transworld deprevity and Plantinga is careful to note the above distinction that I gave.

Here is another example:

Suppose Maurice has the choice to eat oatmeal or not at some time t. Let the state of affairs S' include Maurice's being free to take the oatmeal and free to reject it; let S' also include all factors relevant to Maurice's decision (though they do not determine his decision without his input, since we are assuming his decision is freely made). Now one of the following conditionals must be true:

"(28) If S' were to obtain, Maurice will freely take the oatmeal at time t.

(29) If S' were to obtain, Maurice will freely reject the oatmeal at time t.

We can assume God knows which of these two conditionals is true. Suppose it's (28). Then there is a possible world W' God cannot create---a world in which S' is true yet Maurice does not take oatmeal. To actualize W', God must actualize S'; but then, since (28) is true, God will have actualized a world in which Maurice will take oatmeal! Note that God cannot make Maurice refrain from taking the oatmeal, once He actualizes S', because that would violate Maurice's freedom---put another way, God cannot choose which of (28) or (29) is going to be true, only Maurice can. (The same argument applies if we suppose (29) is true. In that case, God cannot actualize a world in which Maurice freely takes the oatmeal.)

All Plantinga needs to claim, now, is that, once God endows his creatures with free will (to make their lives and actions morally significant), he is not free to instantiate Mackie's world. It is up to US to choose the truth values of conditionals of the sort given in (28) and (29) --- and once that is settled, God is bound by our choices in such a way that he can no longer create certain possible worlds. It might have been the case that we ended up with Mackie's world, but God does not have the power to guarantee it, which is why we did not, in fact, end up in Mackie's world."

http://www.pitt.edu/~rclifton/Plantinga.html

(bold mine)

It is clear that you have missed this important distinction, and have come to false conclusions concerning evil, free will, and omniscience

Wanna bet? That is not what Plantinga argues at all:


"(49a) Necessarily, if God knows in advance that X will do A, then indeed X will do A.

(49b) If God knows in advance that X will do A, then it necessarily follows that X will do A."

That God knows that Curley will accept the bribe is necessarily true, that Curely will accept the bribe is not necessarily true.


See above. You are the 'obly' one trying to get away with something here.

Steven Carr

Once again, Ghost gets straight to the heart of the matter.

If it is true that in situation S , Maurice does not take oatmeal, then in no possible world (with S) will Maurice not take oatmeal.

Therefore if counterfactuals are true, they are necessarily true.

If the counterfactual is true (and Plantinga insists there are true counterfactuals), then Maurice cannot falsify it. A truth which cannot be falsified is a necessary truth.

Ghost wrote 'If God knows in advance that X will do A, then it necessarily follows that X will do A."'

This, of course, is not what I, or Plantinga, is arguing.

Plantinga is talking about the truth of counterfactuals.

Plantinga says that it is a true statement that X will do A in situation S. It therefore follows necessarily, that X will do A in situation S.

If C, then C, is a tautology. All tautologies are necessary truths.

If it really is true that in situation X , A will do B (as Plantinga claims), then it is a necessary truth that in situation X, A will do B.

He MUST do B in situation S, that is what Plantinga means when he claims that it really is TRUE that he will do B in situation S.

The fact that he is choosing freely has nothng to do with it.

If it is true that he will choose one particular way, then it is true that he will choose one particular way.

He cannot choose anything else (or else Plantinga would be wrong to say that it is true that in situation S, he will choose one particular way).


What part of 'true' is Ghost having problems with?

Perhaps Ghost can tell us how, if it really is true that in situation S, Maurice takes oatmeal (as Plantinga claims), how Maurice can not take oatmeal in situation S?

Steven Carr

Is it just me , or has Ghost just claimed that God knows things which aren't necessarily true?

Strange sort of knowledge???.

In much the same way, God knows that Sacremento is the capital of Texas, but it is not necessarily true that Sacremento is the capital of Texas.