Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by NonContradiction :

That's the question. Does God have a good reason for not preventing evil? I can't think of one that would justify all evil. I can't imagine any plausible one. And I can't think of any reason it's better that God not tell us of one, if it exists. So I conclude that such a reason probably doesn't actually exist.

Philosoft

I think it's a fallacy to start with the a priori notion of a benevolent God and to judge God's actions with that bias. How do we know things about individuals other than what they tell us and what we observe? What you're telling us is that, not only do our behavior judgements apply haphazardly to God, but we already know enough about God's nature that we can interpret his behavior in terms of his nature, contrary to the way we normally judge individuals.

NonContradiction

Therefore, your whole argument against God being benevolent is riding upon you thinking that He doesn't have a good reason for not preventing evil. I don't think that is a very strong argument.

It sounds to me like the argument from ignorance. Simply because you don't know of any reason doesn't mean that one doesn't exist.

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by NonContradiction :

Well, it's not just that. I don't know of any good reason. I can't think of any plausible good reason. And there's no evidence that if I knew the good reason, humanity would somehow be worse off. It is on these bases that I conclude that probably, some of the suffering is indeed gratuitous. Just like you conclude there's no elephant in the room because you see no elephant, you can't think of any way an elephant could be there without you knowing about it, and there's no reason to think that if you knew about it, you would be worse off for knowing about it -- that is, it's to your benefit to know the elephant is there.

If you think "maybe it's not gratuitous" is a defeater for the inference from "apparently gratuitous" to "probably gratuitous", it's not clear why a similar "maybe" proposition wouldn't function as a defeater for any empirical inference. Maybe the elephant is being hidden from you by magical elves that bend the light in the room, so you can't conclude there's no elephant in the room.

NonContradiction

Well, the AfE makes the a priori assumption about God being benevolent, but how am I judging God by that bias?

How am I applying haphazard behavior judgements? I don't think that God's behavior, if He has a good reason for not preventing evil, negates Him having a benevolent nature.

NonContradiction

I want a point of clarification from everyone: If a benevolent God doesn't prevent malevolence in the minds of men, does that conflict with His benevolence?

Philosoft

The traditional AfE merely starts with the common conception of the Judeo-Christian God.
If I imagine an all-powerful being, who is not omnibenevolent, torturing Job, I would be justified in condeming said being's behavior as morally wrong. But in order to exempt God from this judgement, God is defined a priori as omnibenevolent, even though his behavior speaks otherwise. Put another way, if omnibenevolence wasn't part of the 'powerful being' concept to begin with, we would likely not infer omnibenevolence from the accounts of the being's behavior.

Wiploc

I'll play it either way. That is:

1. I do think a perfect god would do that (along with killing any mosquito that came within six inches of me), but

2. but even if it weren't true that a perfect god would do that, (for instance, if the free will defence worked) there would still be plenty of natural evil around to disprove the existence of a perfect god.
crc

Thomas Metcalf

Originally posted by NonContradiction :

I don't think it has to. But God must prevent the expression of some of that malevolence. We can think nasty thoughts all we want, but God should step in to prevent more rape, murder, torture, and genocide, than get prevented now.

NonContradiction

Yes, I know. I might also add that God, according to the Judeo-Christian concept, is more than simply Tri-Omni.

Why would you be justified? Let's say that you have some evidence that God may not be benevolent. It does not logically follow, simply because you may have some evidence to the contrary of God's benevolence, that God is guilty as charged. This is why we don't convict people simply because there is evidence against them.

The AfE, as you know, makes the assumption that God is omnibenevolent. Again, simply because there may be evidence to the contrary of God's benevolence doesn't mean that God isn't benevolent.