Lobstrosity

This is the exact problem with Tercel's idealist position. He without justification mandates that if consciousness is material, then it must be able to break down into little pieces of consciousness...that it has to be some fundamental quantity like mass, charge, or spin. But where does it end? Do we also get to define life as a fundamental quantity? What about vision? Can I argue that since the basic components of the eye don't have visionness (or perhaps visionosity) that the eye cannot be responsible for vision? Ear components don't have hearingness so clearly they can't produce what we call hearing. Transistors by themselves have nothing to do with logic, so clearly computers built from these transistors can't be responsible for the calculations they perform. So in this same vein, since neurons aren't conscious by themselves, they clearly can't produce consciousness in the brain. All of these sound like great arguments, don't they?